

*Corrected copy.*

The question is whether one can derive an ethic from a psychology and its psychotherapeutic method. Freud himself maintained the physician's and scientist's neutrality on problems of moral conduct, so far as his scientific investigations and his therapy were concerned, and conducted his private life according to his own strict moral code. There is no contradiction here, if we understand that moral neutrality is the necessary condition for scientific investigation and is not the condition for governing behavior or instinctual drives. Freud specifically disclaimed the use of psychoanalysis as a guide to the right conduct of life.

And yet Philip Rieff\* is right when he claims that nonetheless there are intellectual and moral implications in the writings of Freud. Ideas that have played a crucial role in the moral revolution of our time may be neutral in the scientific sense, but they lost moral neutrality in the moment that they challenged established beliefs and altered man's image of himself.

Ironically many of the cultural changes which psychoanalysis produced were not, strictly speaking, derived from psychoanalytic theory or therapy, but were magnificent errors in interpretation, ideas that lost their identities while traveling. Repression, for example, first introduced by Freud in 1895 as a factor in neurosis, emerged later in the popular culture as a psychic evil, the deterrent to health, happiness and successful art. Between 1900 and 1905 Freud began to see that the mechanism that he had isolated in hysteria was a normal and indispensable component of psychic functioning, that repression was not in itself pathological. From approximately 1905 until the present a correct statement of Freud's views on repression would include these two points: (1) Repression is

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\*Freud: *The Mind of the Moralist*, New York: Viking, 1959

not, in itself, pathological (2) It is not repression qua repression that creates neurosis, but the unsuccessful repression. When repression breaks down and an intolerable wish threatens to break through into consciousness a conflict will arise that may initiate a neurosis. There is nothing, then, in this view (which pre-dates the popularization of psychoanalytic ideas) that recommends the theory to those who seek health through the casting off of moral restraints or to those who try to rear healthy children by avoiding "repressions". The error in transmission of the idea in the popular culture certainly influenced conduct in many spheres. Changes in child rearing methods and the sexual morality of adults were attributable, at least in part, to the popular belief that repression was a danger to psychic health. In such instances as these, new standards for conduct claimed the authority of psychoanalysis, but the influential idea was a distortion of the scientific concept.

It is not an easy job to establish the links between Freud's ideas, a scientific idea and their product in social behavior, attitudes and the self-image of modern man. Philip Rieff is a sociologist who brings to this study a considerable erudition and a discerning eye for forms and patterns in behavior. He describes a new moral type that has emerged in the past half century, the product of diverse historical and socio-economic tendencies, one that needed a psychological rationale for its introversion of interest and found it in Freudian psychology. The new moral type Rieff calls "psychological man". As a type he emerges quite convincingly from Mr. Rieff's examination and his handsome prose. But the connections between the modern type, and the influential psychoanalytic ideas that have formed him are not so convincing, and here Mr. Rieff comes into difficulties.

"Psychological man" is described by Rieff as the dominant moral type of Western culture, "specially adapted to endure his own period: the trained egoist,

the private man, who turns away from the arenas of public failure to re-examine himself and his own emotions".. Rieff identifies a new kind of conscience, a reasoned, scrupulous examination of self and motive, one that is guided by the scientific ideal of neutrality and the Freudian "ethic of honesty", a conscience that measures good by personal health values and substitutes reasoned self-judgments for guilt. Because moral aspirations may endanger his health values, psychological man does not aspire. Because social protest is for him only the externalization of an inner struggle with authority, psychological man looks inward for solutions. And <sup>it</sup> since virtue is seen by ~~him~~ as the civilized mask for base longings, <sup>the new morality</sup> psychological man is compelled to question the legitimacy of good.

The caricature obliges us to recognize a number of traits that are identifiable as a modern and a considerable number of beliefs that claim the authority of psychoanalysis. Rieff, himself, by examining the entire body of Freud's works, finds Freud the educator of psychological man. Psychological man <sup>appears</sup> is seen as the personification of the ego, judiciously regulating the demands of the id and the demands of the super-ego. The moral neutrality of psychological man suggests the moral neutrality of the analyst and the analytic method, in which the patient is asked to suspend his critical attitude. The reasoned morality of psychological man may be taken as the triumph of the therapeutic ideal in which the irrational dictates of the super-ego are overcome by rational thought processes. And since Freud himself spoke of the costs of civilized morality, psychological man computes the costs and is a prudent guardian of his mental health. Above all, Freud discovered the tyranny of conscience and, in Rieff's view made guilt a disease. "Freud", says Rieff, "can conceive of a person's feeling guilty not because he has been bad but because, as a result of his repressions, he is too moral. This is one source of his influence: his diagnosis that we are sick from our ideals and that the one practical remedy lies in an infusion from below."

Rieff has described a new morality that claims the authority of Freud and in examining the works of Freud, Rieff finds that the moral implications are there for the reader to see for himself. There is an impressive amount of documentation in Rieff's book, and it might appear that Rieff has made his case.

But a large part of Mr. Rieff's argument rests upon his erroneous conception of the superego, and this needs to be cleared up in discussing his views. Rieff sees the superego as "imposed or superinduced on the real individual (ego)" which he understands to imply as alienation of "the social personality (super-ego)" <sup>from the genuine self (ego)</sup>. Rieff appears to believe that the super-ego is almost entirely unconscious which then leads him to say, "Implicitly Freud presumes that the decisions of conscience are invariably irrational; indeed conscience is defined as being--it is a powerful rhetorical affront--no less irrational than the instinctual id." Rieff speaks of "the ostensibly amoral knowledge of the ego". And later: "Against the rigid moralizing tyranny of conscience, Freud posed a flexible but highly limited administration by the rational ego. Thus narrowly defined, reason makes a weak champion."

Now, of course, if conscience is irrational and the "amoral" ego is weak against its tyranny, the whole question of values, and moral choice, and moral responsibility is thrown into confusion, and this is exactly what Rieff sees as the implications of Freudian psychology. And if guilt is the manifestation only of pathology, the place of guilt as a moral restraint can also be disputed.

In Freud's view the concept super-ego embraces both conscience and ideal self and is conceived as a permanent organization within the personality, an internalized moral system that may exert its influence without coercion from external forces. Part of the super-ego is unconscious. The super-ego is ~~a~~ part of the ego; its values and standards of conduct are an integral part of the ego, and one can speak of the two institutions as merged for all practical purposes. It is only when conflict arises that a division between them can be observed.

We cannot speak of the "amoral" knowledge of the ego, for the ego as properly defined is the possessor of moral knowledge and the executor of moral functions. The super-ego makes no decisions, "rational" or "irrational". Only the ego can make decisions, for it is the ego that judges, reasons and acts.

The sense of guilt, Freud says, is an expression of the tension between the demands of conscience and the actual attainments of the ego. In The Ego and The Id, Civilization and Its Discontents, and in other works he makes it very clear that he regards guilt feelings as normal and indispensable for the functioning of personality. The signal of guilt becomes a warning and usually an effective deterrent to conduct that is incompatible with moral standards. The experience of guilt feelings and self-criticism for failure to measure up to the ego ideal provides the motive for modification of the personality.

Freud differentiates between a "normal, conscious sense of guilt" and the guilt feelings encountered in neuroses. Neurotic guilt feelings arise from unconscious forces and derive their energy and their malignant character from an internal conflict that grows on secrecy and engages the ego's defensive measures to preserve the secret, to keep it from entering consciousness. In this way a neurotic patient may be burdened with intolerable guilt and not know why. The recriminations of conscience may seem to him entirely just but he doesn't know what he has done. The patient may engage in magic acts of appeasement and atonement which he judges absurd and yet must repeat to the point of exhaustion. In these instances we have a disease of conscience, and the sense of guilt which normally serves as a guardian of internal moral laws is now given over to the disease to persecute the personality for unknown crimes.

Psychoanalysis treats the diseases of the super-ego. It does not abolish the super-ego. The super-ego is an indestructible part of the ego. If it were possible to abolish it the entire structure of personality would collapse. A successful psychoanalytic therapy strengthens the super-ego by partially freeing

it from irrational forces. It restores guilt feelings to appropriate moral functions and makes available a store of energy for constructive action that has been bound in disease to magic acts of repentance, self-abasement and avoidance.

If there are any moral implications that can be derived from psychoanalytic therapy it might be said that a man who has achieved relative freedom from magic and the demands of the drives may have relative freedom to choose. But the question of moral choice cannot be dealt with apart from the question of moral imperatives, and here psychoanalysis has some important things to say, too.

Heinz Hartmann, probably the outstanding psychoanalytic theorist today, takes up the problem of psychoanalysis and moral values in a recent essay\*, written for a psychoanalytic audience.

Psychoanalysis, he says, presents us with a psychology of moral behavior. Through Freud we have come to understand how moral imperatives are derived from the earliest love ties of child to parent and the means by which moral imperatives are internalized in personality. But a psychology of moral behavior cannot be taken as a guide to moral conduct. (In the same way, I would suggest, a psychology of art cannot give us standards by which to judge art. Rieff gets side-tracked here, too.) Moral imperatives, therefore, cannot be derived from psychoanalysis, or from psychoanalytic therapy or from any system of "health values". The "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" can only achieve their imperative quality through the unique conditions provided by the dependency of the child upon his moral teachers and are given permanence in character through the child's identification with them. [ These psychological factors (I suggest) are so potent that in later life no newly acquired values will achieve the quality of an imperative with the rare exceptions of those that are received through a kind of

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\*Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, New York: International University Press, 1960.

conversion experience which, in itself, must be seen in psychological terms as a new edition or a repetition of the earliest love ties of child and parent and identification with the loved object. Needless to say I do not retard psychoanalysis as such a conversion experience.)

The analysis of moral imperatives in psychoanalytic therapy does not deprive them of their power to influence moral judgments. (As examples I would point out that the analysis of incestuous wishes toward the mother will not lead to incest; the analysis of destructive wishes toward the father will not lead to murder. Analysis deprives the unconscious incestuous and murderous wishes of their power to contaminate areas of normal functioning, to inhibit the sexual function or work or to create symptoms.) Psychoanalysis, therefore, can confirm the existence of moral motivations in human character that are permanent and irreversible.

Hartmann demonstrates very clearly that moral imperatives which are, themselves, the most stable class of values and constitute the earliest and most powerful voice of conscience cannot be subjected to objective tests, and their validity as a guide to moral behavior does not need to be proved or disproved; they are beyond proof and beyond rationalization. A man who cannot bring himself to murder does not ask himself like Raskolnikov, "After all, why not?" He cannot. The "thou shalt not" requires no verification.

Hartmann criticizes the tendency today to substitute health values for moral values, sometimes formulated as "there are not moral or immoral people, there are only healthy and sick people." There are many neurotics, he points out, who are "highly moral" and often socially useful, while there are many "healthy" people who are neither. Since health valuations do not have the psychological character of moral imperatives, says Hartmann, there is a psychological error in the implication that they can substitute for "genuine moral valuations" -- and by "genuine", he means integrated into character.

Hartmann notes that people who have undergone an analysis certainly do not have a uniform hierarchy of moral values or similar moral codes. (This is a strong argument against the belief that psychoanalysis indoctrinates or that a system of health values can be derived from the theory or therapy psychoanalysis.) This is not to say that psychoanalysis cannot have an influence on moral life, but that psychoanalysis does not provide standards of conduct based on health ethics. Hartmann quotes Freud: "Why should analyzed people be altogether better than others? Analysis makes for unity but not necessarily for goodness." Hartmann expands these remarks: "If moral inadequacy is due to neurotic causes, successful analysis can remedy it. The more successful integration psychoanalysis promotes may have an effect also on moral conduct . . . The broadening of self-awareness, which is, of course, a regular result of analysis, can influence the degree of consistency of the 'moral system', etc. .

What are the moral implications of self-knowledge? Hartmann says, "Despite what the great Plato thought about it, we do not believe in the simple correlation between the steps toward insight and the steps to moral improvement." But he goes on to point out that awareness of one's own motivations, including those that are commonly unconscious, can broaden the sense of responsibility and reduce the tendency to employ easy rationalizations.

And has psychoanalysis contributed to the devaluation of moral values by the unmasking of moral pretense? One must realize, says Hartmann, "that in addition to moral pretenses there are moral motivations which have the full dynamic significance of independent forces in the mental economy. The discovery by psychoanalysis that highly valued moral behavior may have roots in instinctual tendencies or self interest has led to the mistaken view that high valuation is an illusion. Hartmann speaks of this as "the genetic mistake". (To illustrate: (my own example) If moral revulsion against sadism is a reaction fromation against the infantile pleasure in destruction, is moral revulsion devalued by its

origins in an opposite tendency? The psychoanalytic view is that the later moral attitude has achieved independence from its instinctual origins, that it has autonomy in the sphere of mental operations and has validity for what it is, a stable and permanent moral attitude that guarantees against the return of the instinct.]

There is the common belief that psychoanalysis empties the contents of the id and brings the instinctual life and unconscious mental processes under the control of the ego and rationality. (Rieff, too, is inclined to see psychoanalytic therapy in this light.) Hartmann, who has much to say about rationality in the volume under discussion also touched on this problem in an essay published twenty years ago and recently re-issued. Hartmann suggests *(Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation)* that a misconception has arisen out of Freud's statement, "Where id was, there shall ego be." Hartmann says, "It does not mean that there has ever been, or could be, a man who is purely rational; it implies only a cultural historical tendency and a therapeutic goal /expressed in relative terms/. "There is no danger that the id could ever be "dried up" nor that all the ego functions could be reduced to intellectual functions." This "rational" man, if he could be produced, would be a "man without qualities" says Hartmann, borrowing Musil's phrase.

It should be mentioned that Hartmann in his essay on moral values does not alter in any way Freud's own views on the psychology of moral behavior or the position he stated for psychoanalysis in regard to moral values. Rieff is under the impression that there is a "school" of ego psychology that has revised Freudian psychology and has "attacked" (Freud's) "weakling conception of the ego". Hartmann, is in fact, one of the leading scholars in the field of ego psychology but the theorists in this field (Rieff mentions Kris, for example) are not members of a deviant or revisionist wing of psychoanalysis. They are

in the mainstream of Freudian psychoanalysis. It was Freud himself who in the twenties turned the attention of analytic scholars to the study of the ego and who laid the theoretical groundwork for an ego psychology. Between the writing of The Ego and The Id and Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Freud already had abandoned such metaphors as "the rider and the horse" and explicitly stated in the work on Anxiety that he was prepared to give far more to the ego in its executive role than he had previously allowed.

Finally, something must be said about the most unsettling question that arises out of Freud's writings, the question of moral responsibility. If unconscious wishes can motivate behavior is a man fully responsible for his actions? Does he have moral responsibility for ideas of which he has no conscious knowledge? Does he have moral responsibility for his dreams?

Rieff understands Freud to give moral absolution for unconscious thoughts. Rieff says: "We cannot be held responsible, Freud argues, for the thoughts expressed in our dream life." He cites as authority Freud's essay, "Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams" and, unaccountably, Rieff has exactly reversed Freud's statement! This is what Freud said:

"Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one's dreams. In what other way can one deal with them? Unless the content of the dream (rightly understood) is inspired by alien spirits, it is part of my own being. If I seek to classify the impulses that are present in me according to social standards into good and bad, I must assume responsibility for both sorts; and if, in defense, I say that what is unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my 'ego', then I shall not be basing my position upon psychoanalysis . . . .".

Rieff's "psychological man", the man of reasoned morality, prudently steering his course by self-interest and health ethics, is worth the attention bestowed upon him by a social scientist. He remains unclaimed by psychoanalysis, and the authority of psychoanalysis which Rieff claims for him is not supported by the theory or the

therapeutic method of psychoanalysis. Rieff could have made a stronger case for his new moral type if he could have separated the scientific idea from its later forms as it became absorbed into the culture. A scientific idea may retain its integrity as long as it retains its connection with science and the methods of science. When it passes over into popular usage it inevitably acquires new meanings and uses which are no longer subjected to definition or to scientific validation. The term of "repression", for example, as it was absorbed into popular culture and usage has lost nearly all connections with Freud's concept of repression, except through the name itself. If I trace the influence of the concept of repression on contemporary thought and morality the concept itself, (as defined) has probably had little influence outside of psychoanalysis, psychiatry, psychology and related fields. But the popular term "repression" with its uncertain antecedents in the concept has probably been one of the most influential words in the twentieth century. The question of Freud's influence or responsibility for the moral changes brought about by the concept of repression is then thrown into confusion. If the concept of repression goes astray in Greenwich Village shall we hold Freud accountable for the wayward idea in the same way that a father is responsible for his delinquent minor? And whose concept of repression are we talking about? Freud's or Mabel Dodge Luhan's?

The example of "repression" above is my own, but I wish to illustrate in this way the hazards of tracing influential ideas. Mr. Rieff's new moral type reflects with startling accuracy a psychological attitude and system of beliefs that might be called "the popular Freud", Freudian ideas that were made over in popular usage and lost their connections with the original concepts. Strictly speaking these are no longer "Freudian ideas" and Freud's "influence" on contemporary ideas and morality cannot be traced from his writings to the social product without accounting for the reshaping of these ideas as they moved into popular usage and as they

joined forces with other historical and cultural tendencies of the times. In this way it can be argued that the popular Freud has had vastly greater influence upon contemporary ideas and morals than the scientist Freud.

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Moral conduct

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Freud

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Yet, many of the cultural changes which psychoanalysis produced were not, strictly speaking derived from psychoanalytic theory or therapy but were magnificent errors in interpretation, ideas that lost their identities while travelling. Repression, as a factor in neurosis, emerged later in the popular culture as the psychic evil, the deterrent to health, happiness and successful art. In the ~~psychoanalytic view it is not repression qua re repression, but the~~

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~~of-moral-imperatives-in-the-personal-value-system-~~ Moral imperatives,  
therefore, cannot be derived from psychoanalysis, or from ~~any~~ psychoanalytic  
therapy or from any system of "health values". The ~~dynamic-quality-~~  
"thou shalt" and "the thou shalt not" can only achieve their  
~~imperativistic~~ quality through the unique conditions provided by  
the dependency of the child upon his moral teachers and are given  
permanence in character through the child's identification with ~~his~~ <sup>THEM,</sup>  
~~moral teachers.~~ <sup>These</sup> This psychological factors (I suggest) are so potent  
~~in-creating-~~ that in later life no newly acquired values will <sup>achieve</sup> acquire  
the quality of an imperative <sup>with the rare exceptions of those that</sup> unless it they are received through a kind

\* Psychoanalysis and Moral Values N.Y.: International University Press, 1960

of conversion experience ~~as-in-~~ which, in itself, ~~is-a-new-edition-~~  
~~of-the-~~ must be seen as in psychological terms as a new edition  
~~of-a-~~ or a ~~repetition~~ of the earliest love ties of child and  
parent and identification with the loved object. (Needless to say  
I do not regard psychoanalysis as such a conversion experience.)  
~~From-these-psycheological-observations-~~

~~The-psycheology-of-moral-imperatives-explains~~

The analysis of moral imperatives in psychoanalytic therapy does not  
deprive them of their power to influence moral judgments. (As  
examples I would point out that the analysis of incestuous wishes  
toward the mother will not lead to incest; the analysis of  
destructive wishes toward the father will not lead to murder.  
~~Since-the-analyst-himself-maintains-moral-neutrality-in-the-face~~  
of Analysis deprives the unconscious incestuous and murderous wishes  
of their power to contaminate areas of normal functioning, to inhibit  
the sexual function or work or to create symptoms.) Psychoanalysis,  
therefore, can confirm the existence of moral motivations in human  
character that are permanent and irreversible.

Hartmann demonstrates very clearly that ~~the-most-powerful-motivations-~~  
~~in-moral-behavior-~~ moral imperatives ~~in-the-psycheanalytic-view-~~  
~~do-not-constitute-a-class-of-values-~~ which are, themselves, the  
most stable/<sup>class of</sup> values ~~in-character~~ and constitute the ~~essence~~ earliest  
and most powerful voice of conscience cannot be subjected to ~~sei-~~  
objective tests, and their validity ~~does-not-derive-~~ as a guide to  
moral ~~act~~ behavior does not need to be proved or disproved; they  
are ~~beyond~~ beyond proof and beyond rationalization. A man  
who cannot bring himself to ~~imagine~~ murder does not ask himself

like Raskolnikov, "After all, why not?" He cannot. The "theuska" "thou shalt not" requires no verification.

p 71  
Hartmann criticizes the tendency today to substitute health values for moral values, sometimes formulated as "there are not moral or immoral people, there are only healthy and sick people". There are many neurotics, he points out, who are "highly moral" and often socially useful, while there are many "healthy" people who are neither. Since health valuations do not have the psychological character of moral imperatives, says Hartmann, there is a psychological error in the implication that they can substitute for "genuine moral valuations"-- and by "genuine", <sup>he</sup> Hartmann means ~~imperativistic~~ and integrated into character.

p 87  
p 86  
p 86  
Hartmann notes that people who have undergone an analysis certainly do not have a uniform hierarchy of moral values or similar moral codes. (This is a strong argument against the belief that psychoanalysis <sup>a system of</sup> indoctrinates or that health values can be derived from the theory or therapy of psychoanalysis.) But This is not to say that psychoanalysis cannot have an influence on moral life, but that psychoanalysis does not provide standards of conduct based on health ethics. Hartmann quotes Freud: "Why should <sup>analyzed</sup> ~~analyzed~~ people be altogether better than others? Analysis makes for unity but not necessarily for goodness." Hartmann expands these remarks: "If moral inadequacy is due to neurotic causes, successful analysis can remedy it. The more successful integration psychoanalysis promotes may have an effect also on moral conduct. ...The broadening of self-awareness, which is, of course, a regular result of analysis, can influence the degree of consistency of the 'moral system', etc. .

92 ~~What~~ What are the moral implications of self-knowledge? Hartmann says, "Despite what the great Plato thought about it, we do not believe in the simple correlation between the steps toward insight and the steps to moral improvement. ~~Yet, awareness of one's motivations, he says, Yet, says Ha But he goes on to say, "Yet --- One can say, however-~~ he- But he goes on to point out that awareness of one's own motivations, including those that are commonly unconscious, can broaden the ~~tendency to-~~ sense of responsibility and reduce ~~the~~ the tendency to employ easy rationalizations.

chuck  
dkr  
p92 And has psychoanalysis contributed to the devaluation of moral values by the unmasking of moral pretense? One must realize, says Hartmann, "that in addition to moral pretenses there are moral motivations which have the full dynamic significance of independent forces in the mental ~~eeem-~~ economy. The discovery by psychoanalysis that ~~ma~~ highly valued moral behavior may have roots in instinctual tendencies or self interest has led to the mistaken view that high valuation is an illusion. Hartmann speaks of this as "the genetic mistake". [To illustrate: (my own example) "If If moral revulsion against ~~saidm~~ sadism is a reaction formation against the infantile pleasure in destruction, is moral revulsion devalued by its origins in an opposite tendency? The psychoanalytic view is that the later moral attitude has achieved independence from its instinctual origins, that it has autonomy in the sphere of mental operations and has validity for what it is, a stable and permanent moral attitude that guarantees against the return of the instinct.

original  
dkr

There is the common belief that psychoanalysis empties the contents of the id and brings the instinctual life and unconscious mental processes under the control of the ego and rationality. (Rieff, too, ~~appears-to-give-mere-te-~~ is inclined to ~~give-~~ see the psychoanalytic therapy in this light.) Hartmann, who has much to say about rationality in the volume under discussion also touched on this problem in an essay published twenty years ago and recently re-issued, ~~under the title Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation~~. Hartmann suggests that ~~the-fallacy-~~ a misconception has arisen out of Freud's statement, "where id was, there shall ego ~~be~~." Hartmann says, "It does not mean that there has ever been, or could be, a man who is purely rational; it implies only a cultural historical tendency and a therapeutic goal. [expressed in relative terms. ~~etc.~~]." "There is no danger that the id could ever be "dried up" nor that all the ego functions could be reduced to intellectual functions." ~~The-product-of-such-~~ This "rational" man, if he could be produced, would be "a man without qualities" says Hartmann, borrowing Musil's phrase. In his current essay on moral values Hartmann deals with rationality within the framework of psychoanalysis. Rationality should mean "largely correct thinking in consideration of available (outer and inner) data; also the checking on each fact in connection with commonly accepted rules." ~~According-to-this-definition-the-irrational-aspects-of-the-human-mind-~~ Where the objects are the irrational aspects of the human mind, rationality, according to this definition clearly means that we should not avoid them or deny their factual existence as certain forms of rationalism have done, but that we should consider them fully in thinking and action." If I follow this argument correctly,

4 *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, N.Y.: Int. Universities Press 1958

In his current essay on moral values Hartmann deals with rationality within the framework of analysis.

~~Moral Values~~  
*on Moral Values*  
~~on Psychoanalysis and~~

4 It should be mentioned that Hartmann's in his essay/does not alter in any way ~~the position of psychoanalysis on moral values and the its-~~ Freud's own views on the psychology of moral behavior or ~~the position his position with regard-~~ the position he stated for psychoanalysis in regard to moral values. Mr. Rieff is under the impression that there is ~~a school of ego psychology~~ a "school" of ego psychology that has revised Freudian psychology and has "attacked" (Freud's) "weakening conception of the ego". ~~The late~~ Since Hartmann ~~is one of the outstanding-~~ Hartmann, is in fact, one of the leading scholars ~~in research in ego psychology~~ in the field of ego psychology but ~~neither-~~ the theorists in this field ( Rieff mentions Kris, for example) ~~are he~~ are not members of a ~~res~~ deviant or revisionist wing of psychoanalysis. They are ~~classical-~~ in the mainstream of Freudian psychoanalysis. ~~Freud, himself, was the first to put-~~ It was Freud himself ~~who initiated-~~ in the twenties turned the attention of analytic scholars to the study of the ego and who laid the theoretical groundwork for an ego psychology. Between the writing of The Ego and the Id and Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Freud already had abandoned such metaphors as "the rider and the horse" and explicitly stated in the work on Anxiety that he was prepared to give far more to the ~~ge-~~ ego in its executive role than he had previously allowed.

~~In Rieff's work~~ There are a number of errors of fact and interpretation in Rieff's work

4 Finally, something must be said about the most unsettling question that ~~is-implicit-in-psychoanalytic-~~ arises out of Freud's writings, the question of moral responsibility. If unconscious wishes can motivate behavior is a man fully responsible for his actions? Does he have moral responsibility for ideas of which he has no conscious knowledge? ~~Is-a-man-merally-re-~~ Does he have moral responsibility for his dreams?

~~The-various-interpretations-~~ There is no question that the moral implications of "unconscious" has set

~~Rieff finds-the-implications-~~ claims that the implications are clear  
Rieff-claims

~~Part-of-Rieff's-argument-~~ Rieff understands Freud to give moral absolution for unconscious thoughts. <sup>Rieff says:</sup> "We cannot be held responsible, Freud argues, for the thoughts expressed in our dream life."

~~Unaccountably-~~ He cites <sup>as authority</sup> Freud's essay, "Moral responsibility for <sup>the Content</sup> ~~Dreaming~~ Dreams" and, unaccountably, Rieff has exactly reversed Freud's statement! This is what Freud said:

"Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one's dreams. In what other way can one deal with them? Unless the content of the dream (rightly understood) is inspired by alien spirits, it is part of my own being. If I seek to classify the impulses that are present in me according to social standards into good and bad, I must assume responsibility for both ~~part~~ sorts; and if, in defence, I say that what is unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my 'ego', then I shall not be basing my position upon psychoanalysis....".

id was, there shall ego be." Hartmann says, "It does not mean that there has ever been, or could be, a man who is purely rational; it implies only a cultural historical tendency and a therapeutic goal. There is no danger that the id could ever be "dried up" nor that all the ego functions could be reduced to intellectual functions.

Rieff's ~~caricature~~ of "psychological man", the man of reasoned morality, prudently steering his course by self-interest and health ethics, is ~~worth~~ the attention bestowed upon him by a social scientist. He remains unclaimed by psychoanalysis, ~~and his own claims and Mr. Rieff's~~ <sup>and</sup> of the authority of psychoanalysis ~~which Mr. Rieff claims for him is~~ <sup>are</sup> not supported by the theory or the therapeutic method of psychoanalysis. And yet who is to deny ~~that Freudian ideas have prefeundly influenced--the claim of--"influence"--which this new merality has made on Freud. If the scientific idea-~~ morality has been influenced by ~~psyche~~ Freud even when its ideas are shown to be a perversion of the scientific theory. Who owns a scientific idea, ~~after it is absorbed in the culture~~ The author or the consumers? Mr. Rieff could have made a stronger case for his new moral type if he could have separated the scientific idea from its later forms as it became absorbed into the culture. ~~The idea may retain-~~ A scientific idea may retain its integrity as long as it retains its connection with science and the methods of science. When it passes over into popular usage it ~~ac-~~ inevitably acquires new meanings and uses which are no longer subjected to <sup>definition or to</sup> scientific validation. ~~The later transformations of~~ <sup>term</sup> The ~~concept~~ of "repression" for example

for example, as it was absorbed into popular culture and usage has lost nearly all connections with Freud's concept of repression, except through the name itself. If <sup>I</sup>we trace the influence of the concept of repression on contemporary thought and morality the concept itself, (as defined) has probably had little influence outside of psychoanalysis, psychiatry, psychology and related fields. But the <sup>popular</sup> term "repression" with <sup>its</sup> ~~is~~ uncertain antecedents in the concept has probably been one of the most influential words in the twentieth century. The question of Freud's influence or responsibility for the moral changes brought about by the concept of repression is then thrown into confusion. If the concept of repression goes astray in Greenwich Village shall we hold Freud accountable for the wayward idea in the same way that a father is responsible <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ his delinquent minor? And whose concept of repression are we talking about? Freud's or Mabel Dodge Luhan's?

*The entire concept of repression is not taken from Rieff's book*  
Mr. Rieff, himself, attempted at certain points to discriminate <sup>popular</sup> between the ~~idea~~ and the antecedents in Freudian theory, but in making his case for ~~a new moral type~~ the moral influences of Freud a large central part of his argument rests upon ~~an erroneous concept of misunderstanding his misunderstandings~~ of the concepts of mental institutions, particularly the super-ego and its relationships to the ego and the id, ~~the role of guilt~~ and ~~ironically~~ these are presented to us in a form that more closely approximates the popular

In- The example of repression above is my own and is not taken from Mr. Rieff's book

The example of "repression" above is my own, but I wish to illustrate in this way the hazards of tracing influential ideas. Mr. Rieff's new moral type reflects with startling accuracy a psychological attitude and system of beliefs that might be called "the popular Freud", ideas Freudian ideas that were made over in popular usage and lost their ~~ident~~ connections with the original concepts. Strictly speaking these are no longer "Freudian ideas" and ~~the-question-of-influence-must-~~<sup>factor</sup> yet Freud's-relationship-to-the-pe the-relationship-of-the-scientific- Freud's "influence" on contemporary ideas and morality cannot be ~~traced-from-his-writings-to-the-social-product--back-to-~~ derived-from traced from his writings to the social effects- product without accounting for <sup>the</sup> shifts-in-meaning- reshaping of these ideas in-the- as they moved into popular usage and were-caught-up-in-the fluid-exchanges-of-a-culture- as they joined forces with other historical and cultural tendencies of the times. In this way it can be ~~a-arg~~ argued that the Popular Freud has had vastly greater influence upon contemporary ideas and morals than the scientist Freud.

~~At-many-points-in-his-work-Mr.-Rieff-had-to-strain-the-text-  
Above-all--The--In-the-game-of-deriving-ethics-from-  
Freud,-in In-the-current-enthusiasm-for~~

In the game of deriving ethics from Freudian theory it is curious that no one has come up with <sup>one of</sup> the ethical implications of the psychotherapeutic method. ~~that-is-self-evident-~~ In the psychoanalytic therapy a man must hold himself accountable for his unconscious