

Interview with DR. CLARK KERR, at his residence, 8300 Buckingham Drive, El Cerrito, California, on July 12, 1968.

McCULLOCH: If you'd like to give the overall picture now, then I'll ask questions.

KERR: Irvine began really before I was involved in it. There had been this study, you know, called the additional centers study which recommended for the University three new campuses. If I remember correctly, this was adopted in principle by the Board of Regents in October of 1957 (Sproul was then the president). At that meeting, which was held at Davis, the regents decided to go ahead in principle with one campus in the San Diego area, one in the Los Angeles area, and one in the Bay Area.

McCULLOCH: I remember that meeting because you were elected president.

KERR: That's correct. I remember the date and the location. And, then, also, they said that at some point they wanted to start a campus in the San Joaquin Valley, which has never been done. Nothing was really done about this until I became president. And there had been an earlier debate as to whether or not we needed any new campuses at all. This was when I was chancellor at Berkeley. I developed the first academic plan that any campus ever had. And we came out with the figure which I now regret, because I think it's too high--27,500 at Berkeley. We got that figure taking a look at how big Berkeley had been during the G.I. rush, which was about 23,000. We figured we had to have something more than that. After I consulted--I don't know--over several years endlessly with various faculty groups, we recommended 27,500, and we had quite a battle then. If I remember correctly, this came up particularly in August of 1957.

McCULLOCH: At the Lake Arrowhead conference?

KERR: At the Lake Arrowhead conference center. Yes, that's right. And there were those regents who said that we didn't need any new campuses, that we could expand. Ed Pauley was the leader of this group. We could expand

Berkeley and UCLA--he didn't know why they shouldn't have 50,000, 60,000, 70,000 students. And he said that at Berkeley we had a stadium already, and we had a library, and we could do it cheaper and faster. And I carried the argument to hold Berkeley to 27,500. I might say that the figure 27,500 for Berkeley--UCLA with a different history and a different geographical situation picked up that figure too--became kind of a magic figure for the whole University. And when we developed it, it was intended only for Berkeley.

McCULLOCH: Can I interrupt here? Now, at this Arrowhead conference of 1957 two things happened: you reported the master plan for Berkeley and Allen for UCLA, and then McHenry reported on the new campuses. Did the press cover this? Was this all in the press? This was the first meeting that was ever held where all the regents and the faculty and administration were there together?

KERR: I don't remember that there was much press coverage of it. There might have been, but I don't remember press people really being there or considering it a big story. But, anyway, the battle was that we said we didn't want to go, at Berkeley, above 27,500. Then, of course, if we weren't going to go above 27,500 at Berkeley and UCLA wasn't either (and they got their figures strictly from us, they didn't do any work of their own, I'm sorry to say), then it meant we had to have the new campuses. And it was in October, then, that the regents adopted this report.

McCULLOCH: One question I've got down here. May I interrupt? Why was Sproul not at that Arrowhead conference?

KERR: That I don't know. I don't know.

McCULLOCH: Yet this was a crucial meeting.

KERR: Now, wait a second, there was more than one--there were several meetings

at Arrowhead. There used to be a system of having one Arrowhead meeting a year. And I know he was at some, but he wasn't there in August of 1957.

McCULLOCH: I've already interviewed Dean McHenry and it is his memory that Sproul wasn't there. And this is crucial because you were discussing the master plan for Berkeley; Allen was presenting the master plan for Los Angeles; McHenry was presenting the new campuses report. I wonder why he wasn't there?

KERR: Well, you'd better check the records on that. I don't remember his having been there. If he had taken a position--you know, Sproul had a facility for not taking positions if it was a controversial matter--if he had taken a position I would remember it. I don't remember his taking a position on this question of size. I remember fighting it through myself, but I don't remember whether he was there or not. At least he didn't participate. There was no impact of his views, in any event.

McCULLOCH: Neither on the number of campuses nor the size? The committee on the new campuses made a recommendation for four, and I understand he cut it down to three and made it at the regents' meeting of October 17?

KERR: Yes, and I do not remember his ever having commented on the 27,500. Actually, the 27,500 decision was so basic, you see, to the question of whether there were new campuses. Had we decided to go the direction of the Sorbonne, you know, at Berkeley, then you wouldn't need new campuses. But I do not remember. Sproul was not really much interested in planning at all and he particularly wasn't interested in planning after the end of his regime. I know he once upon a time told me--he said, "My predecessors never paid attention to what I was going to face when I came in. I don't intend to pay any more attention to what my successor faces."

McCULLOCH: Now, may I interrupt then to ask this question, which is a crucial one?

After that meeting where you were named president, the committee was set up under Admiral Charles Wheelock, then of San Diego, chairman of a site selection; and Crouch was on it and Bob Evans was on it, called the Criteria Committee. The question is: did you have any say in this since Sproul was still president and you were president elect?

KERR: No, I had nothing to say about the appointment of that committee. I did follow the work of it as time went on, and the committee had some impact.

McCULLOCH: How do you spell Wheelock?

KERR: Wheelock. Admiral Wheelock.

McCULLOCH: Yes, he's now living near Santa Cruz?

KERR: I though he was in Montereyy some place.

McCULLOCH: Excuse me. Yes, Monterey.

KERR: In working with the committee and its reports, the only part that I remember that we paid any attention to was the minimum size of the campus--this idea of a thousand acres. I think they recommended something like that.

McCULLOCH: I was told that that was the crucial decision--make a minimum of a thousand, then they provided a lot of engineering detail.

KERR: Yes, that's right. And the crucial thing was that we wanted a thousand acres in the future. That's about the only thing that came up out of that committee that was of actual importance. Well, anyway, we then decided to start looking for locations. We had major battles over what came to be the La Jolla campus, and major battles over what came to be Santa Cruz. We did not have any really major battles over the location of Irvine. Now, the battle we had was really whether we would locate in eastern Los Angeles County, there were those who wanted to--Ed Pauley, for example, thought we'd have a lot more political influence if we were

in east Los Angeles County, being such a big county, than if we went to Orange, which was less populated then. There were other people--the governor was reluctant about going into Orange County. Oh, he was really quite decent about it, but this was a very heavily Republican area.

McCULLOCH: Don't I know it!

KERR: As a matter of fact, you know, we ended up putting the three new campuses--which shows that there wasn't any political influence--in three Republican counties because San Diego and Orange, and Santa Cruz are all Republican counties. And there was little comment on the side by the governor and the lieutenant governor and Jesse Unruh and a few others that we weren't paying any attention to the political situation. But they never pressed it. And I always took the position that we were looking for the best location where we could locate the best, and get the best faculty from recruiting points of view. But we did have a certain amount of discussion and almost controversy, but nothing like we had over Santa Cruz and San Diego--only perhaps about going into Los Angeles County. Now, we couldn't find as good a location in eastern Los Angeles County. There wasn't that much land, and it was a pretty heavy smog area too. And, so, when we dropped, then, the Los Angeles County thing, there were only about two sites we really looked at in Orange County. There was one at Yorba Linda. Then, of course, the Irvine. There were others that were considered, but I mean serious consideration. We looked at one near Anaheim. And then we settled down seriously on the Irvine location. I am talking now just about the land, but not the nature of the campus we were going to put up there. On the land side, we had several problems: one, we were much concerned with which particular thousand acres we got, and there were a number of surveys made of that. Second, we were concerned to get

some kind of planning rights and understanding about the surrounding area--what was going to happen. A lot of work went into that. Third, we wanted to get these inclusion areas, and there was some very tough bargaining about what we were going to pay for them. That went on for a long period of time and we really had almost a crisis situation.

McCULLOCH: Now, we? You and who? The Irvine Company, I presume?

KERR: With the Irvine Company. Now, originally Bob Underhill carried on the negotiations with the Irvine Company.

McCULLOCH: Bob Underhill--let me make some notes here.

KERR: And my feeling was that Bob was being too soft with Irvine. And the regents came to feel that too. And I took over the negotiations personally and saw them through.

McCULLOCH: Was Bob Underhill on your staff?

KERR: No, Bob Underhill worked for the regents. He was the secretary and treasurer for the regents. And when it came, for example, to getting this inclusion area, it dragged on for some time. At one point there were those who thought that I was bargaining such a tough way that we would lose the whole thing. Dan Aldrich was one of those.

McCULLOCH: Was he already appointed?

KERR: Not by the time we got the land. He came after the land. But the inclusion areas--he was in by that time. And, of course, the land prices had gone up enormously. And I took the position that Irvine wasn't going to, you know, profit from us, too, as well as everybody else who was buying land. We ended up buying this inclusion area for something that was about, like \$6,500 an acre.

McCULLOCH: And you bought 510?

KERR: 510 acres, that's correct. Yes. Then a lot of discussion as to which 510

it was to be. And Pereira was both working for Irvine and for the University.

McCULLOCH: Who was?

KERR: Bill Pereira. There was one occasion when it looked to me as though the thing had been redone in a way, which favored Irvine and not the University. So we had some terrible battles over the price and also which 510 we got. I knew Loyall McLaren, you know, real well. He was a good friend of mine over a long period of time, but I just felt--I've done a lot of bargaining in my life--and I just bargained for the best deal the University could get in terms of the price and of location. And it came out from our point of view very well. There were those who thought I was just ending the whole thing because I was being so tough, but it came out all right. So, we had a big problem, then, over the price and over the inclusion areas. And then also what was going to go up in the surrounding area. We wanted it to be a compatible area. We'd had the experience of, of course, UCLA, and I had seen a good deal of it, with the gold coast coming to surround the campus where the faculty couldn't live and the students couldn't live and there was no place for the students to work either. So we wanted this compatible community. The fact is, I would say, that we were more concerned in all three of the new campuses in getting a compatible situation around in terms of roads and housing arrangements, and so forth, than we were in the specific piece of land. Now, the other

Now, the other thing which we had involved in negotiations on the land had to do with restrictive covenants. Irvine had had a practice of not letting Jewish people come in; and I don't know whether they had faced the Negro problem, but it probably would have been exclusion for Negroes too. They had been exclusionists about Jewish people. And this

was very disturbing to Glenn Anderson and, in particular to Norton Simon. They were almost determined we not go on any Irvine land. One of the things which happened quite behind the scenes--and you'll find no document on this--was that I made it plain to the Irvine Land Company--and this was on their land, not what we bought but the land they still owned--that they would have to do away with any principle or practice of exclusion; that you couldn't have a good campus, you couldn't get a good faculty unless you did. It was absolutely impossible.

McCULLOCH: You couldn't have been more right, Clark, because we had several Jewish, and have a number of Jewish faculty members and they live on those areas right close to the campus. We have some Negroes too.

KERR: There was a time when they couldn't. No, behind the scenes one of the toughest things I had was to tell them that there had to be an absolute understanding--we didn't want it in writing, or anything else--that they would drop their exclusionist principles and drop them just completely, there couldn't be a vestige left.

McCULLOCH: Good for you, Clark.

KERR: So, anyway, we broke through on that, which, I might say, affected not just the campus but affected, you know, the opportunities in that area for a lot of people. Now, this wouldn't seem so unusual now, but in the times when we were undertaking these bargainings, it was a less usual thing to do. Anyway, those were the problems about getting the piece of land.

Then the question came up as to what kind of a campus we would like to have. From the beginning I had taken the position that to make the new campuses the best possible, each one ought to have its own personality and identity to begin with; that if we tried to make them into kind of duplicates of what existed as, I'm sorry to say, the state colleges have done to some extent; that if we tried to make, say a

[duplicate of] one of Berkeley without a library, or [a duplicate of] UCLA without an art collection, they'd be second- or third-rate Berkeleys, or second- or third-rate UCLAs. I wanted them to be first-rate institutions from the very beginning. So, I meant that they should be different from any of our existing campuses and, to some extent, different from anything in the country. And I wasn't concerned as to--among the new plans--which one was the best, because I took the position that just by being different it would be the best for that location. To attract good people you had to have some good and new ideas. And the Irvine plan was really the third one we fixed on, the first one was San Diego. And that grew to some extent out of the existing faculty at San Diego, and Roger Revelle, though I was fairly heavily involved in it. Then we had the collegiate ideas, you know, with the central idea that each of the colleges would have within it at least one department drawn from the social sciences, the humanities, the physical sciences, the biological sciences; that some of the colleges would have attached to them some major professional school. Then the next one we focused on was Santa Cruz which we decided to put on a kind of Claremont College system, or a kind of modernized Oxford or Cambridge system. I say modernized in the sense of having research laboratories at the center of the campus rather than off on side streets some place. And a research library right at the center.

Then the question came up, what for Irvine? So I thought, "Let's go the opposite direction from Santa Cruz and make this a campus..." See, Santa Cruz in a way, you might say, looked back to earlier forms.

McCULLOCH: Oxford and Cambridge?

KERR: Oxford and Cambridge. It looked ahead for the United States, incidentally, but it looked back to Oxford and Cambridge. And so, the question, then, for Irvine was, let's develop a campus. And the theme which I had, and I

later appealed to Dan Aldrich to become Chancellor on, was this: suppose that the land grant institutions, instead of being established in the 1860's were established in the 1960's, how would we do it? How should the campus be tied into the community as the community has changed over a century? And how would it be tied in with a new technology? See, the land grant idea came along with the idea of technology going into industry, schools of engineering, etc. So, there was then this idea of the land grant institution of the 1960's versus the 1860's. The time with the new technology. [The idea was] to make this a highly concentrated campus, using technology to tie it together. Once upon a time there were even some ideas of having a system where books could go from the central library on a conveyor belt all over the campus, which didn't work out. But, anyway, the idea was to concentrate on the campus as a kind of more unified whole than Santa Cruz would be, which was highly decentralized. But also we were trying to say: "Now, what subject matters would you put together in the modern situation?" Now, I came out of the School of Business Administration at Berkeley, and when I was chancellor at Berkeley I had been much interested in putting public administration, business administration, educational administration together. So, wasn't the new theme really administration rather than business administration? So, shouldn't we go, then, for administration?

Now, another field which obviously was developing was the new biology. Shouldn't we make that a theme? In other words, should we be concerned, not with sort of historical disciplines, but how the different streams of thought might be developing? For example, on the languages, what would you really do if you were using the new technology in the language labs? You might have it all tied to linguistics, you know, more than to the individual languages---say, French, or what-not. And then, put literature

together on a comparative basis, rather than having English literature, then some French literature in the French department, and so forth. But instead take a new look at the whole organization of disciplines and organize them in a way which would fit, say, the 21st century, tying into the community in sort of modern types of service and activities. So, this was sort of the idea, that we'd have a campus which would be more centralized by far than--sort of planned as a unit as compared with-- Santa Cruz, and with a fresh approach to the organization of the disciplines.

Now, on all three of the campuses, incidentally, I was much opposed to having a college of letters and sciences because I'd seen Berkeley, you know, with 17,000 students in one college. I always thought it was a monstrosity. I tried to change it when I was chancellor at Berkeley and I couldn't. I tried to persuade my successors as chancellors that they ought to do something about it, and they haven't done anything. I think the problems at Berkeley take a lot of solutions, but one is that someday that monstrosity has to be busted out.

McCULLOCH: Well, Clark, you'd be interested that I've been at Berkeley this morning discussing recruiting problems, and one of the people I was talking to was saying this: "The college of letters and sciences has got to go."

KERR: It's got to go, but when the faculty votes, they vote to keep it.

And, so, in each place the idea was to have the thing in smaller units. For example, the dean of a college of letters and sciences has to cover, you know, at Berkeley seventy budgetary units. He can't know about them. He can't really be helpful in recruiting. He can't really be helpful in developing the whole--no man can know really that much. So, my idea was to get the thing, you know, closer to the humanities or the

social sciences or administration or what-not. So, I did have some ideas about the structure for all three campuses, that one thing was true.

But, anyway, the question came along about the location, although some of the problems, as I say, like the inclusion areas, having a general idea of what we wanted to do with the campus, dragged on for awhile. Then the question was to get leadership. When I first came in as president I was looking for a dean of agriculture, so I had moved Harry Wellman up to vice president of the University. I looked around and I was very much attracted by a young chap in soils and plant nutrition at Davis by the name of Danny Aldrich. And so I had made him the statewide dean of agriculture and I thought he'd done a good job. As I looked around it just seemed to me that Dan would fit Irvine, partly because we had this idea of tying in with the community and modern technology, but also because of the nature of Orange County. There was a person who had a real knowledge of academic life, but who would be able to perhaps work better with the Orange County community, just by his personality--the all-American boy--than almost anybody else I could think of. Then, also, I had in mind that having come out of agriculture, he might have a better rapport with the Irvine Land people--Land Company people--who'd been identified with agriculture, than otherwise would be the case. Though this was not a campus ever designed to have any agriculture in it. And it might seem strange that we would take somebody out of agriculture on a campus that was never intended, and probably never will have a college of agriculture. So, I asked Dan if the regents were to agree with me, would he accept the position: And, Dan said "No!"

McCULLOCH: He did?"

KERR: Yes. He said first of all that he was quite doubtful and that he would

like to think about it, and he came back and said "no." I was sort of surprised, and he said, "I just don't think that I'd fit what a chancellor ought to be and do." He said, "I have some personal characteristics which wouldn't fit."

McCULLOCH: You once told us that he didn't drink, I remember that.

KERR: Yes, that's what I'm going to come to in a minute. But, anyway, so, I said, "Well, Dan, I'm awfully sorry about that, but if that's your decision, I'll accept it." Then I got to thinking about it. And I thought, you know, "Well, by God, what kind of characteristics does Dan think he has that don't fit a chancellor?" You know, he's got a wife, and he's got kids, and so forth. And so I asked, I said, "Dan, I don't want to pry into your personal life. You said there were some personal things which made you impossible as a chancellor. And if you don't want to tell me, you don't have to."--one of those conversations--"But, if you feel like telling me, why, it would help me because I think you'd be an awfully good chancellor there and I just don't want to let it rest on your 'No!'" And he said that he not only didn't drink himself but he didn't allow liquor to be served in his own home. And I said, "Well, Dan, I don't know that the only qualification for being a chancellor is that you drink or that you serve liquor." And I said, "I do not myself think that that makes you incompatible with the position." I said, "Some people will admire you for it, some people will misunderstand you, but there are other characteristics and other talents which far overwhelm that." I said, "Won't you think about it once more?" It was very close that I didn't ask him to come back, because I didn't want to pry into his personal affairs, his personal characteristics. It was just kind of on a hunch, you know, that I'd try it once more. So, anyway, Dan said, well, he would.

In those days I was on a kind of a honeymoon and anything I recommended, the regents did. So, they accepted Dan Aldrich.

McCULLOCH: You'd be interested that he compromised. He serves liquor but doesn't drink himself.

KERR: I know, I understand he did that. He changed.

McCULLOCH: He also drinks wine, and I can never see the difference between wine and liquor.

KERR: Well, I still, to this day, kid Dan when I see him, you know: "Drunk again!"

Then on the physical plan for the campus we had the land, although I'm not sure that when we started working on the physical plan we fully had the inclusion areas. We had the land, we had the general idea of the academic program we wanted, and we also had a chancellor, and we also had an architect--Bill Pereira. The question then was, what kind of a physical plan should we have? At each of the new campuses I insisted that we get the academic idea first and let the plan flow from that. Now, Bill Pereira made some studies which were really quite good of different plans of universities around the world. The question was what to do with this one. And we had a meeting, Dan, and Bill Pereira and myself. I drew in a very rough way my idea of what this kind of campus might be. I guess there must be someplace in the files still--Bill Pereira once told me he had it--something which I drew on. And I thought back as an economist to when I was a graduate student and had read a moderately well-known German economist by the name of Von Thunena. He had written about the ideal city.

McCULLOCH: How do you spell Thunen?

KERR: It's Von, and then, T-H-U-(with an umlaut over it) N-E-N.

Von Thunen. He had a book called, I think, The Isolated State, which would

be the English translation. I think it was Der isolierte Staat.

But anyway, he had a plan where he tried to work out what would be at the center of your city; and then what would come in the suburbs. And then close in you would have truck gardens; and then beyond that you would have dairy farms; and then beyond that you'd have grain fields, in these concentric circles. So, I'd been thinking about a series of concentric circles, and since we wanted an integrated campus, I drew, then, these rings--you know, a ring which would have on it the basic buildings for the humanities and so forth, and then move out to the professional schools. Biological science would have an axis going out to the medical school. And then farther out would be residence halls and playing fields beyond that--that sort of thing. This appealed to Bill.

McCULLOCH: You told me that when we had a dinner at Irvine, and I always remembered, and I'm going to get Bill Pereira to dig that one out.

KERR: Yes, he says he still has it. And I don't know whether maybe my office made an Xerox of it, or anything. He once asked me if he couldn't have that copy. It was probably done in green ink on 8½ x 11 yellow paper--very rough because my handwriting is poor and my draftsmanship is poor. There was this idea of rings with spokes: humanities spokes, you know, the college of fine arts on it, biological sciences, and the medical school. One of the questions came up then, "What do we put in the center of it?" And we talked about things like a Greek theatre.

McCULLOCH: How about the library? Did you have an idea for the library?

KERR: Yes, we had the library. We thought about that. We had one axis going into the town; and as a matter of this original one, there was to be a student union on it, and cultural activities were going to be there--a symphony hall and an art gallery. Then one axis there was to be--I

should say spoke (I remember the original thing to be five spokes)--a student union and the library, and then a place for a concert hall and an art gallery, then leading on into the university village.

Another question we talked about, "What would you put in the center of this thing?" You know, put a lake, or a Greek theatre, a bandstand, or you could have folk dancing at noon.

McCULLOCH: You'd be interested that we graduate our students in the center now.

KERR: Anyway, that session that Dan, Bill and I had was kind of the crucial one, because out of it the physical plan evolved. Then we had everything in place. The question, of course, was getting the money. In those days we were doing pretty well. As a matter of fact, during the period I was president of the University I don't think that the University on the average had its requests cut by more than one percent, I wouldn't think. We put in really solid budgets and we fought for them. We moved up the percentage of per capita income going into the University of California from something like .22--a little over 1/5 of 1% of per capita income--to about .34 or .36. (Loren Furtado would have the figures.) And that's an enormous increase.

McCULLOCH: Yes, it's a very big increase.

KERR: Of course, the per capita income was going up and there were more people too. But, then, from each person we were getting approximately, by the time I got through, 50% more of that person's income for the University than when I started. And that made possible a lot of things, and it did make possible, if everything went well, nine great campuses in the state of California. Because we had done some projections ahead of what it would cost, we could have nine of the great campuses of the United States for the continuation of what we had underway. So, the money came

along. The Irvine Land Company was generally cooperative.

There was one really big problem around. And that was Joan Irvine versus Loyall McLaren. You probably know something about that battle. We had to be terribly careful because there were all kinds of feuds going on back and forth. To have both Joan Irvine and Loyall McLaren on our side, you know, at the same time...

McCULLOCH: That was quite an achievement!

KERR: So, I had to go see Loyall and persuade him to do something; then see Joan and persuade her to do something with the idea that maybe Loyall wouldn't like it, and vice versa. And we just absolutely had to keep out of that internal battle, and we did.

McCULLOCH: Did you actually go down to visit Joan and talk with her?

KERR: Yes, I did. I visited and talked with her several times. The fact is, I twice went down to her beach cottage.

McCULLOCH: In Laguna Beach?

KERR: In Laguna Beach. She's a very dynamic person, very bright and has a very strong personality. She identifies with her grandfather, not with her father and mother, but her grandfather; and she thinks that she personifies her grandfather. And I gather she's somewhat like her grandfather was, in personality. And so the appeal to Joan was, what more could be done in the memory of her grandfather and the Irvine family than to have a great campus--the University of California, Irvine. And then the appeal to Loyall McLaren was different. The Irvine trust owns--is it 50 or 51%?

McCULLOCH: I think it's 50, I'm not sure. I'm going to talk with Charlie Thomas pretty soon.

KERR: The appeal there was that for them to develop this area most effectively in the modern world they needed a great university campus much more than

a great university campus needed them. There was lots of other land. But there was the chance that the Irvine area could be the great metropolitan center between San Diego and Los Angeles. And being planned from the beginning, it could be really better than either. There were really enormous possibilities there. For the modern world to have a great new city, you need a great new campus. And so that was the appeal to them as compared with the one to Joan Irvine, being a much more personal one in terms of the traditions of a famous family. Anyway, the Irvine group was cooperative, and we got the money; and Dan gave excellent leadership, in my opinion.

McCULLOCH: Did you have anything to do, Clark, with the appointment of Ivan as the vice chancellor of academic affairs?

KERR: Yes, I did have something to do with that in suggesting his name. You see, Dan didn't know Ivan. I had my eye on Ivan anyway. And we later took him to Riverside.

McCULLOCH: He's doing a fine job.

KERR: He's doing a good job at Riverside. I had my eye on Ivan and I wanted to see him tried out. He was then a professor of political science. He wasn't even the department chairman. Was he head of the department at that time?

McCULLOCH: He was chairman of the department at that time.

KERR: Anyhow, he'd not had much administrative experience. I had my eye on Ivan and I wanted to see him tried out, and he did well and was very helpful; and he and Dan got along fine. Then we moved Ivan on up to Riverside.

McCULLOCH: You'd be interested here in one point, Clark, that they started out with an arts and science college, but then it was only a shadow organization because Peltason moved up; and we, the five deans, or four deans, said we should not have an arts and science. And now, of course, we're the schools.

I'm the School of Humanities.

KERR: Well, there was some debate later on [about that].

McCULLOCH: Yes, and you came down and helped us in the academic senate.

KERR: Yes, I was opposed to a college of arts and sciences.

McCULLOCH: You were very explicit. That was a crucial sort of a meeting. There were certain people who felt that general education was a problem and they were arguing. And your appearance at our senate meeting, I know, helped our cause, that is, the deans were all against a college of arts and sciences.

KERR: You can take care of general education without giving yourself an organizational monstrosity to do it.

McCULLOCH: This is what you said, and it was very clear.

KERR: You know, I met behind the scenes with Dan. I was always telling him, I said, "Dan, for God's sake don't get yourself tied up because once you get it, you'll never get rid of it and the campus will regret it all the rest of its life." I hope you got rid of it forever.

McCULLOCH: We did. It's out. The regents have accepted last October each one as a school. We debated college or school. We're the School of Humanities. There is no dean of arts and sciences. It's no longer a college, but we do have in the vice chancellor's office someone we were going to call a director of undergraduate study, but we've changed that title to assistant vice chancellor of academic affairs. And he plans the coordination. And his is a staff position, not a line position.

KERR: Not a line position? But, anyway, the thing went along just very well, until now, of course, with the budgetary difficulties. But that's kind of my overall view of how Irvine went.

Can I say this, that in terms of acceptance of some of these things

the regents, from the very beginning, were sympathetic with the idea of having the new campuses be different. I had somewhat more trouble, although not real trouble, with the various faculty committees I was consulting with about this. They were more doubtful. Of course they knew more about what the existing structures were and so the new ones seemed more different to them. But the regents were quicker to accept it in principle. There was some doubt on the side of the faculty, but not much. The faculty came around pretty quickly to "Let's try some experiments," provided it wasn't on their own campus--[provided] it was a new campus.

There was, in the early times, a sense of jealousy of UCLA about Irvine, which may even continue to this day--also, the same about San Diego. Berkeley really didn't care that much about Santa Cruz because Berkeley was better established. But UCLA was concerned that Irvine and San Diego might take some of the play away from it in southern California. And also there was a sensitivity, politically, particularly on the part of the chancellor. He was very conscious of the political position of UCLA, and sort of doubtful whether he wanted the competition in southern California with what might be greater campuses. He was never really concerned about Riverside or Santa Barbara competing. But he was concerned about Irvine and San Diego competing politically and academically with UCLA. So, there were some problems there behind the scenes.

McCULLOCH: That's interesting and I appreciate the overall picture. You've answered a number of questions and I'd like just to refer to my list.

KERR: You can take your list now.

McCULLOCH: Where did the idea of having those advisory councils for each new campus come from? Was that your idea?

KERR: Well, I know I was in on it. You see, I had made Dean McHenry dean of

academic planning when I became president. And if I remember rightly, it came up in discussions that Dean and I had, but it was never really argued at all, it was just kind of taken for granted. You see, I had come out of the academic senate. I became chancellor at Berkeley not out of administration; but I'd been a member and then chairman of the committee on privilege and tenure during the oath controversy, and I had been head of a little institute. But I was really out of senate work, although I'd never been on the budget committee. But on privilege and tenure I did fight the discharge of the non-signers, so that the Berkeley faculty committee recommended me to be chancellor at Berkeley, the first chancellor at Berkeley. So, I really came out of the senate mechanism. And I was concerned from the very beginning that there be a faculty participation to give advice on the development of the campus, to act as the local budget committee for helping select the original personnel and help [to put across] the idea of faculty government and the idea of the senate participating from the beginning. So, that was something which I don't think I ever discussed with the regents. It was never an item of controversy. It was just sort of taken for granted. If I discussed it with anybody, it would have been with Dean McHenry.

McCULLOCH: Yes. I'm interested to fill you in here. Dean was saying that you and he talked, and in order to avoid the Riverside experience in which UCLA dominated Riverside, it shouldn't be repeated, so, you needed the help of the old faculty, but also to have these separate councils.

KERR: We did draw them from several campuses.

McCULLOCH: You drew them from several campuses, and I understand that you asked for more names than you needed so that you could have a selection.

KERR: That's right.

McCULLOCH: John Galbraith was the chairman of the Irvine Committee?

KERR: Yes, that's correct. I don't know that the regents were ever really fully conscious that there were these committees. I guess they were. It was really done administratively, and between Dean and myself in working it out. And it was just kind of taken for granted that from the very beginning you'd need to have a sense of the presence of the senate and of the faculty.

McCULLOCH: Did you clear this through the committee on committees? Where did the names come from?

KERR: Well, I think what I did was to ask the committee on committees of each of the several campuses to nominate. I think that's how it was done. Because at that time I don't think that the statewide academic senate was quite set up enough to have done it. I think what I did was to go to the academic senate on each campus and ask for a list of names.

McCULLOCH: That's what Dean remembers. You insisted on double the number?

KERR: Yes, we wanted to get people who would really be statesmen and take an interest in the new campus. And we were insistent that they come from more than a single campus.

McCULLOCH: You've answered virtually all my questions. One question, Clark, how much did you work with Dan and Ivan on that long-range plan that was printed with all the maps and things, which I remember I used to help recruit?

KERR: They did the basic work on that themselves.

McCULLOCH: And you worked it over? And then it had to be approved by the regents?

KERR: And it went to the regents. No, they did the basic work on it, although it grew out of ideas which we had put in from the very beginning. There must be some place in the record that I put in some sketches of what these

campuses would be like academically.

McCULLOCH: Yes, I'm going to get that. You told me about that, and I'm really going to find that sketch that you did.

KERR: I don't mean just this one sketch--the 8½ x 11--but at some time earlier I think I put in at least a couple of paragraphs on how each campus should be different from the other one in some mimeograph document--not just this 8½ x 11 freehand drawing.

McCULLOCH: Well, we at UCI certainly appreciate the support you gave us, Clark, and your assistance on decentralization. Would you like to comment a little on the history of, you know, the decentralization?

KERR: Well, when I'd been chancellor at Berkeley the University was really a monolithic place. Sproul had been against having a chancellor, particularly at Berkeley, and to a lesser extent he was against it at UCLA. I just had a fight to get any staff at all. The fact is, I was appointed chancellor by the regents in January of 1952 and I didn't have an office until November of that year (I took office July 1) because Sproul delayed, delayed and delayed in assigning me any place to sit. It took me two years to get a copy of the budget that I was supposed to be administering. This was held as a very tight document. It was just impossible. Anyway, I fought the battles for decentralization. Whatever decentralization took place while I was chancellor were battles I fought and without any support from Ray Allen at all.

One of the battles I fought was over getting department chairmen appointed at the campus level. And Ray Allen had written, you know, in blood that he would stand beside me. Sproul had a meeting in his offices at UCLA. I walked into the room to have this meeting, and I got in there and found three people on one side of the table and I was on the other.

The three people on one side of the table were Sproul, Harry Wellman and Ray Allen. Sproul said he wasn't going to let us appoint department chairmen. Ray Allen, who had sworn that he'd be with me to the death to get department chairmen, you know, said he didn't really need them to run UCLA. Harry Wellman said it would be very bad for agriculture if the chancellor at Berkeley appointed department chairmen in agriculture at Berkeley rather than himself; and Sproul said he wouldn't give it. We had quite a battle over that. And I got up and left the room and said, "Mr. President, that's a decision which I cannot accept." And two weeks later a letter came to both Allen and to me saying we could appoint department chairmen.

Anyway, there were a lot of battles, you know, that were fought like that. But the main problem in the end, after I was chancellor six years, was that the campus personnel all reported statewide. Architects and engineers reported to Roscoe Weaver in the president's office and not to the chancellor. The campus personnel office reported to Boynton Kaiser in the president's office and not to the chancellor; and so on around. So you had nothing really to work with. We had got the business manager nominally assigned to report to the chancellors at UCLA and at Berkeley. As a matter of fact, Jim Corley ran them because he controlled the budget in Sacramento, and so forth. So, really, we had no staff to work with. Of course, I came in when the oath controversy was still on and the non-signers gone and everything else. And so I decided, what could I do without any staff to work with, or any budget to control? And I went off on this planning to find an academic plan and a physical development plan which was a permanent plan of the plan we did. About half the Berkeley campus has been under the plans which I made, which will

be the permanent plan. I could make an impact on the campus by just having good ideas in these plans, I thought, even if I didn't have the staff or control the money, or anything else. And I did have an impact. But having suffered for six years, then, with a tiny little staff and no authority, as soon as I became president I turned over (the statistics on this are all available) all these campus people to the chancellors. Now, we also, at the same time, took the provost at Davis, for example, and gave him the title of chancellor; and what/^{was} the directorship at La Jolla, we made that a chancellorship, too. So that we put the chancellorship on nine campuses, as it turned out, then, rather than on just the two. And we gave them their staffs. And then over a period of time we undertook some other decentralization. My own feeling is that what we finally got worked out by the end of the time of my presidency and is likely to stand with some minor modifications is, you know, the way to organize a big system like this. As a matter of fact, the California system as we finally developed it is the model for the other multi-campus.

McCULLOCH: I think it's a monument to you, Clark, and this decentralization is absolutely fundamental.

KERR: It isn't only decentralization. But when you decentralize it has a lot of impact, so that you have to be concerned not only with what you decentralize but what you keep centralized, too. But, then, with decentralization, you have to be concerned much more with the quality of your local personnel than previously. You can get better people, but you also have to insist on having better people. You have to review every policy in the whole book. And Sproul had a lot of policies which were just written down in some clerk's book; but they would make a decisions for him and

nobody knew what they were. When I was director of this institute of industrial relations at Berkeley, I once had a terrible hassle with one of the assistant or associate deans of the graduate division over some research thing, and he said, "Well, this is the policy." And I said, "Well, there's no such permanent policy. I've looked for it and it doesn't exist." So, he pulls out of his desk just a written set of instructions from President Sproul. He said, "Let me show you this." And it said "In my name you can deny the following..." and "In my name you can approve the following..." and so forth. And so you got these decisions from Sproul which Sproul never saw, but they were done in his name according to these private rules.

Another thing which had to be done was that the rules had to be made available to everybody. And I set up the council of chancellors the first month I was president. The chancellors had never met, and the the chancellors and provost never met under Sproul, not at all. They did on one occasion. I, despite all my troubles over decentralization and some other things with Sproul, was involved in planning his 25th anniversary as president. I called a meeting of the provosts and two chancellors, Allen and myself, to talk about what ought to be done about it to get it underway. George Pettit heard about it and reported it to Sproul and he was furious. He thought somehow ~~wwee~~ were ganging up against him at the chancellors' meeting. And, actually, it had to do with planning something to make this 25th anniversary the best possible for Bob Sproul.

But, anyway, I got the chancellors together and the council of chancellors and we had to go through all the rules of the University to see if they fitted and what could be discarded from all these things and all these books and what new ones should be written. So, there was

really a very major process to work it through. But it is, I think, something of a model for other systems such as North Carolina, Wisconsin and Illinois and New York. Certainly, other people say it is. New York almost exactly followed what we did. Jack Oswald took our system at Kentucky.

McCULLOCH: At Illinois Jack Peltason is chancellor.

KERR: Yes, Illinois.

McCULLOCH: Now, one other question, Clark. Parallel to this decentralization there came the change in the senate organization. First there was a northern and southern section, then separate divisions. How were you involved in that?

KERR: Well, I initiated that. There had been the northern and southern sections and, as part of decentralization, it didn't seem reasonable that you could have, say, a chancellor at Davis but without having a Davis faculty with authority. The Davis faculty could come to Berkeley as part of the northern section, but it could always be voted down. And, so, if you gave the chancellor authority, it seemed that you also had to give authority to the faculty on the campus. And so I asked the senate to be given the exploration of how the senate might be reorganized to be compatible with the reorganization of the University. Out of it then came, of course, the nine divisions. The real trouble on that one was Berkeley. I had some very difficult times with Berkeley.

McCULLOCH: What is the date of this, approximately? When did this take place?

KERR: I did the basic administrative thing first. Before taking on the senate as a whole, I took on the graduate division. You see, there was a graduate dean for the southern campuses. That was Gus Arlt; and a graduate dean for the north who was then Morrie Stewart. And Gus Arlt, who was all

in favor of decentralization at UCLA, was very much opposed to setting up the graduate deans at Santa Barbara and Riverside. Yes, very much opposed. And the dean at Berkeley didn't like this. If you're going to have the chancellorship decentralized, you couldn't any longer have the graduate affairs on this campus being run by somebody. Berkeley reported, presumably, to the president, if to anybody.

So, we'd worked through the graduate division before we worked through the senate thing as a whole. And we had a very bad time with the Berkeley senate. After things had been pretty well agreed to, then they all of a sudden wanted to back up and cancel it. They began to wake up to the fact that Berkeley had been able to control the senate for the whole University because they could control the north, you see, easily, as against the Davis and San Francisco faculty, who didn't come to the meetings very much anyway. And then nothing could happen for the senate as a whole unless the northern and southern sections agreed. And nothing could happen if Berkeley didn't agree to it. They began to wake up all of a sudden to the fact that the Berkeley senate would no longer control the faculty of the whole University. There was a kind of revolt that I got involved in, in much too personal a way in arguing with the people led by Frank Newman of the law school at Berkeley. And eventually they pulled back and went along with the system.

McCULLOCH: What was the date of that again?

KERR: I think the really big battle would have been about either May and June of '63 or May and June of '64. When I stepped in then against Ed Strong at Berkeley in the fall of '64, because I thought he made a terrible mistake in the September 14 order, I tried to get him to take it back. If I had to do it over again, I would order him to take it back rather

than advising him when I got back from Toyko and found out about it. When I intervened at Berkeley the faculty had to be much more for my position, which was against the September 14 order, which was against the use of police. Still, some of them were mad at me because I was interfering with the Berkeley campus autonomy, or Berkeley campus control. And I had just done this to the senate by saying, "You'd better go along with the senate or the whole University, you can't dominate the situation."

McCULLOCH: I see your point there.

KERR: So, the senate thing then did get decentralized as a kind of a repercussion of the overall decentralization of the University.

McCULLOCH: I think that was a very crucial decision and I know that Irvine's having its own senate is just...

KERR: It made a lot of difference. But I might say that I wanted Irvine to have its own senate. I was also anxious for the tradition of a strong senate to be continued. And some of the people who argued against this said, "Well, now, how are you going to have a strong senate--you end up with a new campus where people come from different traditions. Harvard doesn't have a strong senate, you know. Lots of places don't." and "How are you going to have a strong senate" (which I was for) "if you don't let the old senates" (at UCLA and Berkeley) "run it?" And I felt that by being part of an overall University senate, seeing what the older campuses did, these faculty committees had somewhat the same authority and somewhat the same influence as a full-fledged senate even before the first faculty member [and these advisory committees where the first faculty member was appointed]. I was always anxious to have a strong senate on each campus and I was worried, quite frankly, whether or not some of the

new campuses would develop the tradition of a strong senate.

McCULLOCH: Well, it's worked out. I know at Irvine it's worked out; and, as far as I know, at San Diego and Santa Cruz.

KERR: I think it has pretty well. But that was one of the arguments against doing what we did that was persuasive.

McCULLOCH: I heard that Sam Gould felt frustrated because, as a member of the southern section, he just couldn't get what he wanted at Santa Barbara. I just heard this because I was back east at the time.

KERR: Well, Sam didn't like faculty government anyway. As a matter of fact, by and large the chancellors had been against the senate, and at the meetings with the chancellors I would end up as the defender of the senate. There were a number of occasions when the chancellors, particularly led by the chancellor at UCLA, wanted to go on an all-out attack against the senate--all-power-to-the-chancellors type of thing. And I fought some pretty bitter battles, saying that I had seen times in the history of the University when the senate, as in the oath controversy, had been absolutely crucial. I also thought that the quality of our faculty was due to the strength of the senate. And there were occasions when the chancellor at UCLA was really organizing all the chancellors on the grounds of "We've got to make a major drive." Of course, they wanted me to undertake it, which I wouldn't do. They didn't want to get their own necks stuck out. They wanted me to undertake the major drive to reduce the power of the senate. Some of them actually worked for some of the regents. I got it from the regents too: "Why do you let the senate be so strong?" But the fact is, on their own campuses they were not willing to attack the strength of the senate. But they were very happy for me to do so. And particularly the chancellor at UCLA, who talked with a number of regents

many times to try to encourage me to do it, and I always refused to. I believe in a strong senate.

McCULLOCH: I know you do, and we appreciate it. And I'm interested in the San Diego appointment--in John Galbraith's strong academic background.

KERR: He was head of the academic senate. As a matter of fact, several of the chancellors were in the academic senate. John Galbraith came out of the academic senate.

McCULLOCH: Oh yes, he was budget committee.

KERR: He was budget committee and head of the academic council. Vernon Cheadle had been head of the educational policy in the academic senate--he came out of it. And Dean McHenry had been prominent in the senate. Several of our chancellors came out of the senate.

McCULLOCH: San Diego's McGill too. I wonder if the former chancellor of UCLA is going to have an influence in the L.A. Times, and possibly might be a regent sometime.

KERR: He expects to be.

McCULLOCH: That's what I've heard.

KERR: There are three additional things which occur to me. One is that there was an absolutely crucial meeting in Sacramento that Dean McHenry would know about. He was there and actually took rather copious notes on the meeting. It was called by Governor Brown and it was over whether or not we should go ahead with the three new campuses at all. And a guy by the name of Friesen had prepared some statistics (he was then in the department of finance, and a very good man) indicating that these three new campuses weren't necessary. Fortunately, I knew enough about the statistics to see what he had done with them. At one point--one of the few times I was really cruel in my life, and I don't like to be cruel--was with this fellow

Frezan, whom I respected. I said to him as he was presenting these statistics (It was an open, public hearing with Jesse Unruh sitting in on it, and so forth. The governor ran it as though he were a judge hearing the arguments.)--I said, "Mr. Frezan, I would like to ask you as one professional to another, do you really believe the statistics you've been giving us? Will you personally stand behind them?" And he said, "These are the statistics I was ordered to give." And he sat down. And he resigned shortly after from the department of finance, or took a leave, and never returned.

McCULLOCH: Is that right?

KERR: Don McLaughlin went up there and he thought I was losing everything in the world, but I was fighting for these three campuses and the governor was about to cut them out and say there'd be no budgetary support for them. When that day was over we had them.

McCULLOCH: That's a very crucial story and, as a matter of fact, Dean didn't mention that.

KERR: Well, he probably keeps his notes on things like this. He referred to it several times.

McCULLOCH: I'll talk to him about it. What was the date again?

KERR: I remember it was in June, and I remember the room and I can see the faces of the people there. About June of 1960. It was one of those "stop-go" things and if we'd lost it that day, there would have been no new campuses. And we won it, and it was "go."

McCULLOCH: One question, then: the loss of the bond issue that June--did you always think that was just a temporary thing? Because the new campuses rode on that one. That was in '64, June.

KERR: Well, I thought we'd make that one back. I couldn't give you all the

reasons why. I remember that there were several bond issues up at the same time and this one got listed number three or something of the sort.

McCULLOCH: And it didn't bother you, then?

KERR: Well, it bothered me, it bothered me. We went all up to November.

McCULLOCH: In November, and you carried Santa Cruz, San Diego and Orange County?

KERR: We sure did. Yes. But, anyway, about that Sacramento meeting--Dean can give you the details.

McCULLOCH: June of 1960?

KERR: About June of 1960. And it was kind of an unrecorded thing, but it was one of the really crucial events, really, in the history of the University of California that afternoon. From then on we had it won, the whole way through, and we might have had it lost.

Then the second thing would be to say that there were some people in Orange County who were really quite helpful, particularly Brick Power. He organized the Friends of UCI...

McCULLOCH: Yes, I met him.

KERR: He organized the Friends of the University of California, Orange County; and Walter Burroughs who was then publisher of the Daily Pilot. And in terms of community opinion and trying to create an atmosphere of community acceptance, Brick Power and Walter Burroughs were very, very helpful.

McCULLOCH: Who was the one who was regent--McFadden? Was he involved?

KERR: McFadden. No, he was not very much involved. Mac was friendly to the idea but he was not much involved. I think he ceased being a regent, didn't he, in 1958?

McCULLOCH: I think you're right. I'm going to look that up. I've talked with him.

KERR: He was friendly and I went to see him a couple of times, you know, as an ex-regent because he had been involved with the Irvine Land Company for so long. But he was not a major factor in it--friendly and supportive,

but that's about all.

Also, Brick Power and Walter Burroughs were very helpful in giving advice as to how to handle the problems within the Irvine group between Joan and the Loyall McLaren group. I might say that in that connection Loyall McLaren, I think, and Charlie Thomas, both acted in a very decent way because when I was bargaining I bargained with them very, very, very hard. And some things that they said they would never give, why, you know, they ended up giving. Sometimes when you bargain that hard, why, people can end up resenting it. And I didn't feel any sense afterward of personal resentment. I tried very hard not to have personal resentment but, by God, I was working for the University of California. And I had felt that Bob Underhill, who had been bargaining with them, had been giving the place away; and he had a reputation for being a real tough bargainer. But, for some reason, he was a lot tougher bargainer taking a store away from an Armenian rug merchant to build a student union in Berkeley than he was when it was the Irvine Land Company with its power in the state of California. So, I personally took over those negotiations and made a much better deal than Bob Underhill was in the process of making, or perhaps could have made. Anyway, Brick Power and Walter Burroughs were very, very helpful.

McCULLOCH: And you said there were three points?

KERR: Yes. Now, the third thing was that at one point in the border region there was a lot of concern over unjust enrichment, and the governor was concerned about that. Now, this was true for all the new campuses, but particularly for the one ownership at Irvine. Was there any way in which this could be prevented? Of course, Henry George's single tax would have prevented it. But in the absence of that, could the University

buy up even a much larger piece of property than just the thousand acres plus the 510 in the inclusion area, or should we go someplace else where a lot of people would be enriched rather than one very wealthy company? And it was a very major concern--the unjust enrichment. I think it's quite a legitimate one, too, as new campuses are developed, because we put, you know, millions of dollars into the pockets of people who never earned it.

McCULLOCH: Yes, you're probably sensitive because of the Janss problem at UCLA?

KERR: The Janss problem. The Janss problem was, you know, strictly a real estate deal. And they were not careful there, you see, to see what happened around [the campus]. So, they built this gold coast and Westwood, with its very expensive department stores, etc. And I was just absolutely determined that the new campuses would not have to overcome the handicaps that UCLA had with Westwood and Bel Air as high priced real estate developments right around it. That's one answer. You say that you can enrich yourself but not as much as the Janss brothers did. That's about how it turns out. Well, this is the type of thing that would never be on the public record. But certainly a consideration in my mind was that I didn't want to see the Irvine Land Company benefit the way the Janss brothers did. And, by God, if they did, they were going to give something in return. So they gave their thousand acres. They gave us this low price on 510 and, you know, they agreed to get rid of their exclusion of Jewish people and also Negroes. They gave quite a lot for giving us a thousand acres.

McCULLOCH: It's a beautiful campus. Dean McHenry was saying, Clark, that he and Bill Putnam had gone over the sites and they'd hoped to get a view of the ocean.

KERR: That's right. Say, Bill Putnam was quite helpful. His name ought to be in the records.

McCULLOCH: I took a course in geology from him at UCLA.

KERR: I asked him as a kind of personal representative to just take a look at these places and, you know, size them up from the point of view of winds and views. We had been quite concerned to get a view of the ocean. I think there is some rock up high where, you know, if you stand on your tip toes you may be able [to see a long distance]. I don't know whether it's true or not.

McCULLOCH: It wasn't Turtle Rock. Surely not Turtle Rock?

KERR: Way out on the edge of the campus some place. Where, you know, on a clear day you could see the horizon. But we didn't get the view of the ocean.

McCULLOCH: What truth is there to the story that you almost got that area about a mile and a half down MacArthur Boulevard towards the coast, but that they put that cemetery there?

KERR: Yes, we had quite an argument about the cemetery. The cemetery I don't think was in yet, but it had been promised as of that time. I'm not sure that there were any bodies that had been buried there or not.

McCULLOCH: They rushed some bodies in, someone told me. Now, I'm checking with Charlie Thomas. I'm going to have an interview with him.

KERR: I don't know if they rushed any bodies in, but it was a very nice location. I'm not sure about bodies being rushed in, but, anyway, the place had been sanctified, or something of this sort.

McCULLOCH: Concecrated.

KERR: Concecrated, I guess is what you'd say. That was a piece with about two hundred acres in it? I've forgotten. There was quite a bit--two hundred

or four hundred. It was quite a big chunk of land, beautifully located, and we wanted it. And, then, we just decided that we couldn't fight the dead.

I'm pretty certain that at least a number of plots had been sold to people on the grounds that they could have family plots and bury their families there. Anyway, they had gone far enough so that we felt that just from the point of view of public relations and politics, it wasn't worth fighting. You've got to remember something, that at the same time we were working on Irvine, we were working on San Diego; we were working on Santa Cruz; we were redoing Riverside--giving Riverside a new destiny--and Santa Barbara, and Davis; and reorganizing the University; and getting a lot more money, and just plain running the place, because it's an awfully big organization to run. And I'm sure Charlie Hitch [who is] without all of these things to do, since at the present time it's kind of going by itself, would say that's a huge job by itself. And, so, we weren't looking for battles we didn't have to fight and thought we couldn't win. And that's one which I just felt we couldn't win--the cemetery one.

McCULLOCH: Oh, I think it's a beautiful campus, Clark, and the breezes blow. I mean, Bill Putnam (as I said, I had a wonderful course from him in geology at UCLA before the war) was concerned about the Santa Ana winds, but, actually, we get very strong winds from the ocean. And it's a lovely campus. When the Santa Ana winds blow, it isn't too bad, and we have air conditioning.

KERR: Well, doesn't the mountain range to some extent break them--the one across the valley there?

McCULLOCH: Yes, it breaks them because we don't have real heat.

KERR: Yes. I haven't been there for awhile, but as that campus went up on this absolutely vacant land, it was really quite a thrill to see it rise

so fast, particularly at night time to see those lights there. And the last few times I was there and there was enough [built up so that] you could see what was happening, I just got a real thrill looking at [the campus].

McCULLOCH: The most exciting thing that ever happened to me was when I drove by the night that they turned the lights on, and all of a sudden there was the academic community.

KERR: It's really quite marvelous that it could have been thrown up so quickly and so well at the same time.

McCULLOCH: Well, we've just got to get the money because we've got the plan, we've got the faculty, and we've done well in recruiting. We were the most hurt this year. Well,

Well, I don't want to take more of your time, Clark. Let me ask you one more question, Clark, if I may, about the master plan and the concept of the new campuses. Was there any problem? Coons was the chairman of it. I was back east. In fact, I came to San Francisco State because of the master plan. I read it through.

KERR: Well, the development of the master plan is a huge story all by itself. By the time the master plan was really underway and the coordinating council was upon it, which took a little while, the new campuses were accepted. And, so, there never really was any difficulty within the coordinating council about them; and the master plan really put its seal of approval [and] the University was to go ahead with its three. The state colleges, I think, had four at that time to go ahead with. They have some more now.

McCULLOCH: And did you ever know that Sproul cut out the fourth campus which was to be in the Fresno area?

KERR: That's right.

McCULLOCH: And that was left out of the master plan, but listed as a possible later campus?

KERR: That's right. We had plans ahead to the year 2000. The last set of plans went through the regents in January, 1966, just one year before I was dismissed. And, in that, we still had Fresno on the line. But my own first priority was to take the medical center at San Francisco and make it into a general campus at the graduate level, such as, say, a Rockefeller University, only bigger, because I was quite convinced you couldn't have a good medical school. One of the reasons I favored doing what was done with the California College of Medicine was because we had that thing saddled on us and it could never be any good unless it was attached to some campus.

McCULLOCH: Well, it's on its way down. The first buildings are going up right now.

KERR: Yes. Anyway, my top priority was not Fresno, though we had an obligation there. But [my first priority] was the San Francisco campus. And I was hoping we could work out some understanding with USF and San Francisco State as to who did what so there wouldn't be too much duplication and some cooperation. But in order to make that a really great medical school, it had to have more than just a medical and dental and pharmacy [division]. I had a plan which included increasing [subjects] such as sociology and social psychology and anthropology--the total approach to medicine, an ecological approach to it. And I'd even worked out some things privately as to how big a graduate department economics would need to have in order to have sort of general strength but still some concentrated strength on medical economics, and that sort of thing. That was actually my number one priority, and not Fresno.

McCULLOCH: Fresno has a state college there now.

KERR: There is a state college there now.

McCULLOCH: No, Bakersfield. Excuse me, Bakersfield.

KERR: Bakersfield has a new one. Fresno had one.

McCULLOCH: Fresno has had one for a long time.

KERR: I started working on the master plan the first month I was president of the University. I went up to the regents and said, "This thing's a mess." Which it was at the time. And that's how the master plan began. Then it went to Roy Simpson, who agreed with me. And then we got Arthur Coons. And the master plan came along.

McCULLOCH: Excuse me. I shouldn't have said Fresno. I should have said Bakersfield. each time. Kern County, I suppose I should say.

KERR: Kern County's the one that has the new one.

McCULLOCH: Because it's located in Bakersfield.

KERR: But early in the master plan, when I was trying to work out some solution, really before Coons was in on it (the master plan group), I raised the question with San Francisco State, with San Jose State, with Fresno and with San Diego as to how they would feel about becoming a part of the University system. See, by the time I became president our new campuses were on the books--you know, had been adopted. Before going ahead with them and starting the master plan thing, these four which were perhaps the four very best of the state colleges, certainly four of the strongest of them, if they became part of the University system (we could have put San Francisco State and the Medical Center together, and so forth), then we wouldn't have to go ahead with the new campuses. We could serve these areas and then the state colleges could start something else new and in somewhat the same areas if it were necessary; but not necessarily in the same areas. I was turned down.

McCULLOCH: You were turned down by them. Do you feel you were turned down because of the Santa Barbara experience?

KERR: The repercussion at Santa Barbara's having been taken over? It was one of the factors. The other argument given to me was this: that they had been promised by Pat Brown they were going to get University status, and if they got University status on their own, they could do it with their own standards. And they said, "At Berkeley you've still got departments a hundred years old, and we're going to be given the Ph.D. in every department we want to without having to take your standards." And, so, they turned that down. And I regretted the inflexibility of the master plan, quite frankly, because I wanted a more flexible system where you could have campuses shifting from one to another. But I'd offered this, and had been rejected. So that as a consequence, you could have any planning at all. You then had to go to an absolutely inflexible system, which was the master plan. That's a little bit of history.

McCULLOCH: That's a beautiful piece of history.

KERR: The central question in my mind at all times on each of the three new campuses was, how do you make these new campuses absolutely first rate from the day they open their doors? And I wasn't willing to settle for second-, or third-, or fourth-rate institutions coming into the University, hoping that in a century they might be all right. We had a real chance, given the core of the University of California as a whole. [Because of] the good support we were then getting from the people of the state, financially, and having worked out a lot of problems on the open forum and civil liberties on campus, and so forth, I thought they'd have given all those things if we had some inventive ideas and got good leadership; that each of the new campuses could have a position of prestige in the

academic world from the day they opened. I think each of the three did.

McCULLOCH: You succeeded, no question about it, Clark. We just need the money now to keep them going.

KERR: You have to keep the momentum. Now, Berkeley and UCLA could stand the current situation for quite some time--ten years.

McCULLOCH: They have the flexibility, you see, in their budget.

KERR: Well, they've got big, heavy budgets. But the new campuses, if they lose their momentum, it's going to be harder to get that momentum back again, having lost it, than it was to start them. And I would think that if this goes on too long, that the problem of getting back to where the campuses now stand in national prestige would be a good deal harder than all the problems we had in getting them started.

McCULLOCH: Clark, I really want to thank you. This has been a very informative and you have been very gracious to me. Thank you.