This chapter examines the rise and fall of ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’, with a view to uncovering the role that this figure played in the transformation of the author of the *Tractatus* into that of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The story of his rise is that of an attempt to make good on commitments inherent to the early Wittgenstein’s conception of language and logic. The story of his fall is that of an abandonment not only of those commitments but also of a conception of ‘the task of philosophy’ (NB, 2). ¹

Wittgenstein’s invocation of the notion of ‘phenomenology’ is striking: a figure from the canonical list of analytic philosophers seemingly aligning his work with that of a main strand in the Continental tradition. Philosophers are now much more open to the idea that figures from these two supposedly distinct traditions might have concerns in common. But the ultimate result of this good ecumenical work should surely be that we see not only the similarities between the thinkers in question but also their differences—the real differences now rather than those gestured at through the simplistic image of two distinct traditions; and my concern in the first half of this chapter is to point to a real difference, in the form of the distinctive motivation of ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’.

If we are to understand the texts in which that figure has been sighted, we need to understand the specificity of that motivation—in particular, a concern to make good on logical commitments of the *Tractatus*. I will make my case by pointing to some connections with the concerns of another mysterious figure rumoured to inhabit the middle writings, ‘Wittgenstein the verificationist’. Here too we find an interest in notions of ‘immediate experience’ and I will argue that the motivation of this figure and that of ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’ is fundamentally alike; but this is first and foremost logical, a concern which a comparison with Husserl, Heidegger, or A. J. Ayer for that matter is unlikely to illuminate. ²

This reading may seem to confirm a particular vision of how the outlooks of figures like Wittgenstein and Heidegger differ and one with some basis in their texts. While the author of the *Tractatus* thought philosophical illumination required clarity about ‘the logic of our language’ (TLP preface), Heidegger declared that it was ‘the destiny of the reign

2 **Phenomenology, Logic, and Liberation From Grammar**

*Denis McManus*
of “logic” in philosophy’, that ‘[t]he idea of “logic” itself . . . disinte-
 integrate[] in the turbulence of a more originary questioning’ (WM, 92), ‘[l]ogic [being] the most imperfect of philosophical disciplines’ (LFW, 343). It is a key thought of the analytic revolution that Wittgenstein inherited and advanced that we need to understand the logic of our language and that this requires that we liberate our thinking from the influence of that language’s grammatical form. But for Heidegger, in contrast, philosophical progress depends on our instead ‘liberating grammar from logic’ (BT, 165). In the second half of the chapter, I will argue—in an ecumenical way—that such apparent differences actually point to parallels, though these include ones upon which I will also draw in articulating a metaphi-
 losophical radicalism in the middle Wittgenstein that the author of Being 
 and Time directly resists. The story of the rise of this radicalism is also 
 that of the fall of ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’ and ‘Wittgenstein 
 the verificationist’, and of two further twists to the notion of a necessary ‘liberation from grammar’.

1. Initial Sightings

Wittgenstein talks extensively and positively of the importance of ‘phenomenology’, ‘phenomenological theory’, and ‘phenomenologi-
 cal language’ in writings such as Philosophical Remarks, Philosophical 
 Grammar, The Big Typescript and elsewhere in his Nachlass, as well as 
 in conversations with members of the Vienna Circle. There we find a 
 concern with the phenomenal and with what we might think of as ‘imme-
 diate experience’. This concern can seem odd not only because of its sub-
 sumption under the supposedly ‘Continental’ label of ‘phenomenology’ 
 but also because it appears very largely absent from the Tractatus.

Some commentators, however, have thought that appearance mislead-
 ing, including the Hintikkas and John Cook;³ and they have done so not 
 without some basis—in, for example, the difficulty of understanding just 
 what the ‘objects’ invoked there are. From such a perspective, Wittgen-
 stein’s interest in phenomenology would indeed seem natural.

Going further—to conclude that this interest is substantively simi-
 lar to that of the likes of Husserl and Heidegger when they talk of 
 ‘phenomenology’—depends, of course, on how we understand that 
 term. There’s little reason, it seems to me, to think that Wittgenstein had 
 much knowledge of either of those authors, his few comments on whom 
 are based—I suspect—on knowledge acquired second-hand through 
 his conversations with members of the Vienna Circle. But one might 
 be struck by, for example, Wittgenstein’s characterisation of a ‘phenom-
 enological language’ as ‘the description of immediate sense-perception 
 without hypothetical addition’;⁴ that might call to mind a Husserlian 
 ‘bracketing’ of the external world beyond such perceptions with a view 
 to getting the structure of that mode of experience in focus.
Another infamous denizen of the middle Wittgenstein’s reflections is ‘Wittgenstein the verificationist’. If one takes the claim that ‘[t]he sense of a proposition is the method of its verification’ (WVC, 79), throws in references to a ‘primary language’, and adds a history of depicting metaphysics as nonsense, one might indeed seem to have the basic components from which one might build a stereotypical verificationist; and on this basis, it has become a standard item in accounts of Wittgenstein’s development from the *Tractatus* to *Investigations* that he had a temporary, verificationist phase.

The piece of work from that period that reads most like a straightforward verificationist tract is Chapter XXII of *Philosophical Remarks*:

> A proposition construed in such a way that it can be uncheckably true or false is completely detached from reality and no longer functions as a proposition. . . . If an hypothesis can’t be definitively verified, it can’t be verified at all, and there’s no truth or falsity for it. (PR, 282, 283)

The epistemological-cum-semantic backdrop necessary for a verificationism with some bite also seems to be in place here. Wittgenstein asserts that ‘two assumptions must be identical in sense if every possible experience that confirms the one confirms the other too’, ‘experience’ here meaning ‘immediate experience’, ‘immediately observable phenomena (such as points of light)’ (PR, 282, 283). ‘All that’s required for our propositions (about reality) to have a sense’ is that our ‘immediate experience’ ‘tends to agree with them or tends not to agree with them’; and ‘[i]n the limit case [where] there’s no longer any connection . . . the proposition (hypothesis) is senseless!’ (PR, 282). I want to argue, however, that—like ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’—‘Wittgenstein the verificationist’ is best understood against the background of the *Tractatus*’ understanding of language and logic, in light of which their concern with ‘immediate experience’, ‘primary language’, and indeed verification takes on quite a different aspect.

### 2. Language and Logic in the *Tractatus*

Throughout his development, Wittgenstein opposes a vision according to which distinguishing the thinkable from the unthinkable would determine where ‘the bounds of sense’ lie: ‘in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought)’ (TLP preface). Many important supposed truths of philosophy, however, seem to undertake this task, most obviously, the truths of logic; and the *Tractatus*’ account of the character of language is a contribution to that work’s broader attempt to show that such truths—if taken to be substantive—are illusory.
That account proposes that each and every proposition either belongs to a set—which he labels that of ‘elementary propositions’—all of which are logically independent of one another, or to a set—which he labels that of ‘complex propositions’—which are constructed from truth-functional combinations of ‘elementary propositions’. The possibility of logical inference lies in that of ‘the truth-grounds’ of one proposition being ‘contained in those of’ another (TLP 5.121) and hence requires no underpinning or explanation by reference to substantive logical truths: when proposition p entails proposition q it is simply because p and q are constructed from overlapping sets of elementary propositions such that the combinations of true and false elementary propositions that make p true also make q true.

The connectives that bind elementary propositions together to form complex propositions might, however, seem a source of such truths, the nature of these ‘logical objects’ determining that certain propositions logically entail others. That p & q entails q but p v q doesn’t shows that there is undoubtedly a sense in which the connectives make a difference. But the author of the *Tractatus* believes that his truth-table analysis of the truth-functions demonstrates that their contribution is no more than that of a syntactic device:

> It is clear that to the complex of the signs ‘F’ and ‘T’ no object (or complex of objects) corresponds; any more than to horizontal and vertical lines or to brackets. There are no ‘logical objects’.

(TLP 4.441)

One might be tempted to believe that truth-functional expressions function in much the same way as, say, names do—standing for objects of some sort—and then believe that describing these ‘logical objects’ would explain the entailment relations of propositions in which such expressions figure. But—to introduce a crucial theme—here ‘[l]anguage disguises thought’ (TLP 4.002): the truth-table analysis reveals that these expressions have no such function and, hence, name no such ‘objects’.

Wittgenstein’s account of propositions seeks to demonstrate then that the fact that some deductive inferences are valid and others are not does not entail that there are—to his mind, impossibly—substantive logical truths. That each and every proposition and all their associated entailment relations fit this account is less than obvious; indeed scrutiny of—to use one of Wittgenstein’s later expressions—their ‘surface grammar’ (PI §664) suggests they do not. But ‘from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe’ (TLP 4.002): only when appropriately analysed—only when we dig down beneath their ‘surface grammar’—do our propositions reveal an underlying logical form that fits Wittgenstein’s account. To see the myth of substantive logical truths for what it is requires then a liberation of logic from such grammar. How such an analysis was to be carried out was something of which Wittgenstein—at
the time of writing the *Tractatus*—had only a schematic sense. But his confidence that it could appears to have rested upon his account’s promising to spare us ‘giv\[ing\] logic an impossible reality’ (NB, 48). 8

Both Wittgenstein the verificationist and Wittgenstein the phenomenologist, I will propose, were spawned by the effort to make good on that promise, each attempting to show that what may seem counter-examples to the preceding account of language and logic are nothing of the sort. The putative counter-examples in question were acknowledged as such in the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein’s schematic sense of how analysis would deal with them is similar in the two cases.

3. Generality, Hypotheses, and Logical Sums

A first step is to note how the author of the *Tractatus* envisaged extending his analysis to two more so-called logical constants—the quantifiers. Though this is the subject of some controversy, 9 Wittgenstein’s retrospective comments on the *Tractatus* seem to confirm that he believed general propositions could be analysed as logical sums or products of their instances and their negations. Such an analysis renders very clear how instances and generalisations can support or contradict one another, and—more importantly, given our present purposes—would allow the *Tractatus*’ account of language and logic to ‘dissolve’ the quantifiers: they too do not denote ‘logical objects’.

But this analysis immediately points to further work that must be done:

My view about general propositions was that $(\forall x).\lor x$ is a logical sum and that though its terms aren’t enumerated here, they are capable of being enumerated. . . . For if they can’t be enumerated we don’t have a logical sum.

(PG, 268) 10

Some general statements can perhaps be understood in this way—‘The primary colours are $f$’ perhaps as ‘Blue is $f$ & green is $f$ & red is $f$ & yellow is $f$’. But others, it would seem, cannot. For example, propositions such as ‘Arsenic is poisonous’ and ‘All men are mortal’—which Wittgenstein comes to label ‘hypotheses’—make claims about a domain of indefinite extent, namely all past, present, and future men and samples of arsenic. Since indefinitely large totalities ‘can’t be enumerated’, the instances of such generalisations can’t be either; and, if so, ‘we don’t have a logical sum’.

This is not simply a claim about whether we can know such generalisations to be true or false. The logical sum or product was to tell us what such generalisation *say, which* generalisations they are. In the *Prototractatus*, we read:

[I]f signs are to express anything at all, meaning must belong to them in a way which is once and for all complete. . . . Before a proposition
can have a sense it must be completely settled what propositions follow from it.

(PTLP 3.20102–3)

But this thought, which is echoed in PR—‘[e]verything which, if it occurred, would legitimately confirm a belief, determines logically the nature of this belief’ (PR, 87)—when combined with the fact that at least prima facie we cannot ‘completely settle’ which propositions follow from hypotheses—in that we cannot enumerate all their many instances which fix their identity—entails that the ‘nature of th[ese] belief[s]’ is indeterminate. The worry is not that it is unclear that they are verified or falsified by some favoured set of ‘experiences’; rather it is that it is unclear what would verify or falsify them, what their instances—whatever nature they ultimately have—are.

4. ‘Wittgenstein the Verificationist’ and the Denial That Hypotheses Are Propositions

Wittgenstein’s transitional ‘verificationist’ writings, I suggest, serve to deny that hypotheses are indeed propositions, so that they and their ‘logic’—if we can speak of such a thing—no longer require accommodation within the *Tractatus*’ account. Hypotheses may look like propositions; they may share a ‘surface grammar’. But, in fact, ‘[a]n hypothesis is a law for forming propositions’ (PR, 285). This outlook develops themes already found in the *Tractatus* and finds echoes in contemporaneous work of Frank Ramsey’s, whose reflections on that book put pressure on its sketched accounts of propositions seemingly incompatible with its account of logic and language, including—as we will see—those to which ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’ devotes his attention.¹¹

Ramsey’s 1929 paper, ‘General Propositions and Causality’ includes many of the basic ideas of PR chapter XXII and links these explicitly to the inadequacy of analyses of ‘hypotheses’¹² which present them as conjunctions. Such a conjunction, which would have to be infinitely large, ‘cannot be written out’ and ‘always goes beyond what we know or want’ (1929, 145, 146). Ramsey concludes that ‘[i]f then [a hypothesis] is not a conjunction, it is not a proposition at all’; hypotheses ‘are not judgments but [instead] rules for judging of the form, “If I meet ϕ, I shall regard it as ψ”’ (pp. 146, 149). Such a rule is ‘a formula from which we derive propositions’ (p. 159), not a proposition itself. But the origins of this notion lie in the *Tractatus*, which depicts the laws of mechanics—which would appear to be propositions that hold of an indefinitely-extended domain—as having a quite different function. Such laws are ‘about the net’ we use to describe reality ‘and not about what the net describes’, embodying ‘a single plan’ using which we might ‘attempt to construct . . .
all the *true* propositions that we need for the description of the world’ (TLP 6.35, 6.343).

Aligning these texts, which helps us see the logical motivation of ‘Wittgenstein the verificationist’, solves other puzzles that they pose. It explains why the label, ‘proposition’, is being withheld from utterances which cannot be analysed as truth-functions of logically independent propositions—making sense of what otherwise seems a *non sequitur* in Ramsey’s concluding that ‘if [a hypothesis] is not a conjunction, it is not a proposition at all’. It also makes sense of how the proposal that ‘[i]f an hypothesis can’t be definitively verified’ then ‘there’s no truth or falsity for it’ (PR, 283, quoted earlier)—which may sound like an orthodox verificationist denunciation of a tool unfit for responsible thought—represents no such thing for Wittgenstein:

No, an hypothesis simply has a different formal relation to reality from that of verification. (Hence, of course, the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ are also inapplicable here, or else have a different meaning.)

(PR, 285)

One can see attempts to articulate this ‘different formal relation to reality’ in Ramsey’s claim that a hypothesis ‘cannot be negated but it can be disagreed with by one who does not adopt it’ (1929, 149), the *Tractatus*’ insistence that ‘[w]e are . . . told something about the world’ not by ‘the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics’ but ‘by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of mechanics than with another’ (TLP 6.342), and Chapter XXII’s declaration that, ‘[i]f it turns out that another hypothesis represents the material of experience more simply, then I choose the simpler method’ (PR, 283).

5. Verification and Immediate Experience

But a question remains: why should Wittgenstein—in distinguishing hypotheses from propositions—turn his attention to the possibility of verification by reference to ‘immediate experience’? Doesn’t a stereotypical verificationist empiricism reassert itself here? The importance of knowledge of immediate experience in this context is again, I suggest, tied to the early Wittgenstein’s treatment of logic. Wittgenstein conceded retrospectively not only that at the time of writing the *Tractatus* he had not produced any examples of elementary propositions but also that he had not then known how the envisaged project of analysis (that would ultimately yield such propositions) would actually turn out. But prompted at least in part by Ramsey, Wittgenstein found himself at the end of the 1920s needing to demonstrate that propositions do indeed fit the strictures that the *Tractatus* imposes; and, to do this, he had to go in search of what he had once been happy to contemplate merely in the abstract, including logically-mutually-independent elementary propositions. This,
I suggest, prompts the turning of his attention to immediate experience and, in particular, to the logic of propositions about it.

In lectures of the period, Wittgenstein asserts that ‘in propositions about sense-data . . . there is no question of different sources of evidence’, of knowing ‘the same thing in two independent ways’, whereas ‘in hypotheses there is’ (MWL, 97; WL, 16). If true, this would qualify such propositions to play the role which, in the abstract architectonic of the *Tractatus*, elementary propositions play. From this perspective, there is nothing special about propositions concerning immediate experience as such beyond their capacity to play this logical role, an attractive conclusion in the absence of arguments to ground a foundationalist empiricism in Wittgenstein’s work in, or prior to, his ‘verificationist’ phase.

But can such propositions play that role? The so-called colour-exclusion problem, to which we turn next, perhaps should have shown Wittgenstein that they can’t: it might be taken to show that there can be more than one source of ‘evidence’ for propositions concerning the immediately observable, in that other propositions of the same kind can be mutually incompatible. However, the textual evidence previously cited suggests that Wittgenstein did continue to think otherwise—struggling, as he was at the very same time, to resolve that other problem. As we will see in our consideration of ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’, the puzzle of how colour propositions are to be assimilated to the framework to which elementary propositions belong is what the colour-exclusion problem initially is for Wittgenstein.

### 6. Colour-Exclusion and ‘Wittgenstein the Phenomenologist’

Like ‘Wittgenstein the verificationist’, ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’ was driven by a concern to make good on the *Tractatus*’ account of language and logic and the key threat he addresses is that illustrated by the aforementioned ‘colour-exclusion problem’—that of understanding the relationship between colour propositions which appear to exclude one another without being direct denials of one another. For instance, ‘Object $a$ is blue all over at time $t$’ excludes ‘Object $a$ is red all over at time $t$’; but saying so does not seem to be the making of an empirical claim: such statements ‘do not express an experience but are in some sense tautologies’ (RLF, 167). Correspondingly, if one wishes to accommodate these relations within the *Tractatus*’ account of language and logic, and thereby preserve its dissolution of ‘an impossible [logical] reality’, these relations must be truth-functional and, as an understanding of exclusion, the obvious truth-functional relation is contradiction: thus, we read that ‘[t]he statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction’ (TLP 6.3751). But the author of the *Tractatus* no more than gestured at an analysis that would demonstrate that this is so, and did so unconvincingly as Ramsey’s review pointed out.
Retrospective comments from the Big Typescript both confirm this sense of a hazily envisaged analysis and show us how it was hazily envisaged:

When I wrote the Tractatus (and later as well), I believed that \( fa = fa \& \neg fb \) would be possible only if \( fa \) were the logical product of another proposition and \( \neg fb \)—and therefore \( fa = p \& \neg fb \)—and was of the opinion that \( fa \) (e.g. a colour proposition) could be analysed into such a product. In this context I had no clear idea about how I was imagining the discovery of such an analysis.

(BT, 340)

Wittgenstein goes on to explain how this model would have been applied to the case of colour exclusion:

Then, when I wanted to carry out such an analysis of a colour-statement, it became apparent // manifest //, what I had imagined the analysis to be like. I believed I could understand a colour statement as a logical product \( r \& s \& t \ldots \), the discrete factors of which specified the ingredients (if there were several) of which the colour (‘colour’, not ‘pigment’) consisted.

(BT, 340)

But Wittgenstein came to doubt the adequacy of this analytic manoeuvre, this depiction—as Ramsey put it—of ‘the apparently simple concepts, red, blue’, etc. as ‘really complex and formally incompatible’ (1923, 472).

Like Wittgenstein’s treatment of hypotheses, the point of the preceding manoeuvre was to reveal as illusory what might seem to be the basis for a substantive logic, in this case a basis that—as the following comments of Schlick’s demonstrate—our understanding of the phenomenological might seem to provide:

How do I know that such-and-such rules of syntax are valid? How do I know that red and blue cannot be in one place simultaneously? Have we not in this case a kind of empirical knowledge? . . . [H]ow do I know that precisely these rules are valid and no others?

(WVC, 76–7)

Now Wittgenstein’s understanding of ‘illogical propositions’ is that they are, as he later puts it, ‘grammatical monsters’ (NFL, 283). They are the result of our being misled by the superficial grammatical form of our propositions into thinking that combinations of words to which we have not given sense actually do have sense. So, for example, ‘[w]e say time “flows”, and then ask where to and where from’ (WL, 60), a subject-matter calling for a philosophy of time seemingly looming into view. In his early work, Wittgenstein envisaged a ‘perfect notation’ that would
‘prevent the formation of such nonsensical constructions’ (RLF, 171) and thereby render redundant the body of knowledge that Schlick’s questions might seem to envisage, the body of impossibly substantive facts that would explain why ‘red and blue cannot be in one place simultaneously’. One way of seeing Wittgenstein’s account of language as articulated earlier is as a contribution to this venture. Once analysed within its framework, we would see that the facts that explain why $p \& q$ and $\neg p$ cannot both be true are not those of a substantial logic but instead ‘treat only of the symbolism’ (MWL, 79); and entailment relations between ‘apparently simple’ propositions will turn out to be due to some of them being ‘really complex’, those relations being ones of ‘formal incompatibility’.

Chapter XXI of Philosophical Remarks opens with a call for a ‘phenomenological colour theory’ (PR, 273) and goes on to wrestle with the problem of how to represent the relationships between different colours. For example, one can describe them as mixtures of a basic set of colours. Alternatively one can represent them geometrically, locating the different shades, for instance, on a line, at the vertices of an octahedron or at the vertices and around the circumference of a double-cone. Why he is interested in such alternatives is clear:

> [Y]ou can . . . arrange all the shades in a straight line, say with black and white as endpoints, . . . but then you have to introduce rules to exclude certain translations, and in the end the representation on the line must be given the same kind of topological structure as the octahedron has. In this, it’s completely analogous to the relation of ordinary language to a ‘logically purified’ mode of expression. The two are completely equivalent; it’s just that one of them already wears the rules of grammar on its face.

(PR, 277–8)

The construction of a phenomenological language is here presented as a version of the ‘perfect notation’ solution to philosophical problems. The difficulty with which we must contend is that the propositions we use to describe the phenomena in question seem to have ‘a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities’ (RLF, 170). ‘[P]ropositions . . . which have . . . no sense in [our] way of speaking now acquire one’ (PR, 267) as the way our ‘ordinary language’ combines colour terms seems to allow us to contemplate, for example, the possibility that—alongside bluish red and greenish blue—there might also be a ‘greenish red’. To overcome this ‘deficiency of our notation’ (RLF, 170–1), we need to manufacture a ‘mode of expression’ which will save us from constructing such pseudo-propositions which appear to express possibilities but actually do not—in this case, a notation using which we can express our understanding of the phenomenological. As the title of the first section of the Big Typescript’s ‘Phenomenology’ chapter puts it, ‘[p]henomenology is grammar’ (BT, 320).
Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenological’ reflections go further than these concerns with what are immediately obviously logically-related matters. But what remains a theme is the way in which notations and their ‘surface grammar’ can conjure into existence (pseudo-) issues to which our use of those notations actually assigns no sense. For example, in *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein also identifies a ‘phenomenological language’ with ‘a way of speaking with which we can represent the phenomena of visual space, isolated as such’ (PR, 103, 98). But isolated from what? ‘From the grammatical monsters that our ordinary language conjures up around it’ is, I believe, the ultimate answer. But Wittgenstein here has something more specific in mind, linked to why such conjuration occurs.

It arises out of our describing the contents of visual space using terms like ‘the appearance of an x’, where ‘x’ is a term from our description of physical space. By ‘incorporat[ing] the idea of a necessary connection between what we are calling the appearance and “the existence of a tree”’ (PR, 270–1), for example, this mode of representation seems to give sense to issues where there are none. This language of ‘appearance’ allows us to go on from our description of visual phenomena to ask, for example, about whether this appearance is a ‘veridical perception or a mistake’ (PR, 271); or it ‘makes it look as though nothing actual were being described, but only something whose nature was unclear’ (PR, 99). So, for example, ‘if we talk about “the appearance of a tree”, we are either taking for a tree something which is one, or something which is not one’; ‘[b]ut’, as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘this connection isn’t there’ (PR, 271). A ‘pure’ ‘phenomenological language’—‘a way of speaking with which we can represent the phenomena of visual space, isolated as such’—wouldn’t create the impression that it was, but our existing idiom does, seeming to give to our descriptions ‘a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities’. As Wittgenstein says of our case in hand, a ‘normal, physicalist language’ being ‘used . . . in phenomenology . . . cast[s] a distorting light on [its] objects’ (PR, 88), and we ‘reproach’ this ‘impure’ language of ‘appearances of . . .’ ‘with presenting what is secondary as primary and what is primary as secondary’ (PR, 271). A ‘phenomenological language’ would instead prevent our ‘misunderstanding . . . the logic of our language’ and prevent ‘propositions . . . which ha[ve] . . . no sense in [our] way of speaking’—such as those that provide ‘the method of formulating’ ‘the problems of philosophy’ (TLP preface), (impossibly) substantial logical truths, ‘and those that seem to express “connections”’ that ‘are not there’—from ‘acquir[ing] one’.

7. Liberation From Logic? Or Grammar? Or Both?

As I indicated earlier, this reading according to which logical concerns motivate ‘Wittgenstein the phenomenologist’ and ‘Wittgenstein the verificationist’ may seem to reaffirm the thought that Wittgenstein and
phenomenologists like Heidegger differ profoundly in their philosophical outlook. According to Schlick, Wittgenstein’s early work yielded ‘fundamental logical clarifications’ that are ‘simply decisive for all future philosophy’ (Schlick 1979, 169). Heidegger’s prognosis was instead, it would seem, that the ‘reign’ of concern with such clarifications is destined to end in their ‘disintegration in the turbulence of a more originary questioning’.

But considered in its context, Heidegger’s call for the liberation of grammar from logic and Wittgenstein’s for the liberation of logic from grammar are not the contraries they may seem. What Heidegger is bemoaning is ‘the science of language’ having ‘accepted as . . . standard’ an orientation ‘towards discourse as assertion’; ‘assertion . . . was the kind of logos’ that the Greeks ‘took as their clue for working out the basic structures of the forms of discourse’, and that ‘is still accepted . . . today’; but what this yielded was a ‘logic . . . based on the ontology of the present-at-hand’ (BT, 165).21 Saying why is a complex question because the questions of what the present-at-hand is and how it is connected to assertions are complex too.22 But one important aspect of these thoughts is brought out clearly in his lectures and it is the notably Wittgensteinian thought that we confront here forms of expression whose ‘surface uniformity creates the impression that their subject-matters are uniform in character too: we conflate the modes of Being of entities described by different propositions because these differences ‘need not necessarily protrude . . . in the linguistic form’ (BPP, 212).

In particular, we ‘never heed the variety of entities’ because of ‘the evenness, the undifferentiatedness of asserting and talking about . . .’: ‘[t]he equal and regular possibility of an assertion about . . . stones, trees, dogs, cars, “passers by” (human beings)’ gives the impression ‘that all beings which can be spoken about are, as it were, of the same kind’ (EP, 82, 83). In this way, a ‘science of language’ that is ‘oriented towards discourse as assertion’ is apt to inherit the latter’s ‘levelled and levelling character’, which creates the impression that the ‘manifestness of beings [is] a universally even and regular one’ (EP, 82, 83). Logic in the preceding sense, and the grammatical categories deployed by a science of language contaminated by it, are hence ill-suited to bringing to light the diverse forms of Being that the entities which we grasp exhibit. Such ‘[g]rammatical categories are’

not at all derived by regarding the phenomena themselves . . . [but instead] from . . . the theory of logos as proposition, that is, from ‘logic’. . . . The proper approach [then] is to get behind the grammatical categories and forms and to try to determine the sense from the phenomena themselves.

(HCT, 249)
This passage will immediately bring to mind comments in RLF:

[W]e can only arrive at a correct analysis by what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense *a posteriori*, and not by conjecturing about *a priori* possibilities. . . . [I]t would be surprising if the actual phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure.

(RLF, 163–4)

These passages—and Heidegger’s talk of the need for a ‘genuine philosophical empiricism’ (BT, 50 n. x)—may seem to envisage a process that one might call ‘reading logic (or grammar) off the world around us’; but it seems clear that neither philosopher believes in such a possibility. 23 In Wittgenstein’s case, what immediately prompts them is the realisation documented earlier that if one is to show that a substantial logic is an illusion, the *Tractatus*’ account of language and logic does not suffice and different ways of representing the ‘grammar’ of different kinds of proposition are needed to maintain that insight. The author of the *Tractatus* wrote that ‘language disguises thought’ but—in the eyes of the middle Wittgenstein—succumbed to that disguise in believing in that work’s one-size-fits-all account of language and logic.

This realisation is accompanied by what we can now see as a rather Heideggerian conclusion, namely, that the forms of expression favoured by the mathematical logic of Frege and Russell are part of the problem, not the solution. Frege saw that symbolism as helping us to the ‘liberating’ recognition that ‘the grammatical categories of subject and predicate can have no significance for logic’ (Frege 1967, 141). But Wittgenstein comes to believe that use of that symbolism—and the associated idiom of ‘concept’ and ‘object’—place one under the influence of just those very categories:

When Frege and Russell spoke of objects they always had in mind things that are, in language, represented by nouns, that is, say bodies like chairs and tables. The whole conception of objects is hence very closely connected with the subject-predicate form of propositions.

(WVC, 41)

In committing to analysing propositions in the Fregean/Russellian idiom, we are succumbing to ‘a priori conjecturing’ rather than letting ‘the actual phenomena . . . teach us’; we are using the idiom as ‘a norm of representation’—‘not dealing with objects and concepts as the results of an analysis, but with moulds into which we have squeezed the proposition’ (PR, 136–7); and ‘squeezing something into a mould is the opposite of analysis’ (PR, 137), not least in creating confusions when applied to the wrong subject matter. 24 So ‘the reign of [such a] “logic” in philosophy’
ends for Wittgenstein, ‘disintegrate[d] in the turbulence of a more origi-
nary questioning’ that exposed the true and rich diversity of forms that
language takes.

This shared criticism of forebears for failing to recognise the diverse
forms our understanding takes is clearly linked to others, including a shared
recognition and rejection of what one might call a Cartesian understand-
ing of the medium of intentionality, a rejection expressed in Heidegger’s
notion of Being-in-the-world and the later Wittgenstein’s insistence that ‘to
imagine a language means to imagine a form of life’ (PI §19). A description
of such forms of life could also be said to be a ‘phenomenology’ if perhaps
in a thinner sense. It is certainly not a description of ‘immediate experi-
ence’ or ‘consciousness’; but it is a description of the medium in which
the many objects of our intentionality are revealed. Describing such forms
of life could be seen as describing the many ways in which entities show
themselves as being thus and so, a project not dissimilar to Heideggerian
phenomenology, which is similarly ‘thin’ in distancing itself from any sug-
gestion that its theme is ‘immediate experience’ or ‘consciousness’. 25

But having identified these parallels—and there are plenty of others26—I
will nevertheless focus in the rest of this chapter on a difference: a radical
metaphilosophical moral that this consciousness of diversity may
seem to bear, which the later middle Wittgenstein draws but which the
Heidegger of Being and Time specifically resists. To see how, let us first
note how Wittgenstein’s evolving reflections on the notion of phenom-
enoology interwove with a changing understanding of analysis.

8. Changing Visions of Analysis and the Redundancy
of ‘Wittgenstein the Phenomenologist’

Wittgenstein’s rejection of the notion that our ‘perfect notation’ will
take something like the form of Fregean/Russellian mathematical
logic is ultimately superceded by, and subsumed under, the realisation
that there need not be such a notation at all, lying beyond the exist-
ing idioms of our language. To take one of our preceding examples,
Wittgenstein comes to think that he had been too quick to condemn
the language of ‘seeming’ when he took it to represent ‘the primary’
as ‘secondary’, and vice versa: ‘[w]e have no reason to accept that the
expression “the appearance of a tree” represents something which is
secondary in relation to the expression “tree”’, this being only an ‘ines-
ntial evaluation . . . independent of cognition’ (PR, 271). The fault
lies with our tendency to take the language of ‘seeming’ as the language
of doubt or error; ‘ordinary language [itself] makes no decision as to
what is primary or secondary’ (PR, 271). Such ‘decisions’ stem rather
from our viewing such modes of expression in a certain light, failing to
ote associations that they may have for us. Rather than construct a
new notation then, we may achieve the objective which such a notation
was to have achieved merely by eliminating our misunderstandings of ‘propositions as they stand’ (PR, 52).

Wittgenstein’s comments on the construction of a ‘phenomenological language’ illustrate this change:

The investigation of the rules of the use of our language, the recognition of these rules and their clearly surveyable representation, amounts to, i.e. accomplished the same thing, as what one often wants to achieve // accomplish // in constructing a phenomenological language.

(BT, 320)

Rather than manufacturing a means of expression free of the perceived ‘flaws’ of more familiar modes of description, we will achieve the objective such a ‘purified mode of expression’ was to have attained merely by recognising what we impose unnecessarily upon the modes of expression that we already use.

But Wittgenstein’s understanding of analysis not only shakes itself free from its previous vision of ‘perfect notation’; it also broadens to take in other activities. One way of undoing the expectations that we may unnecessarily impose on our language is by noting the variety of different modes of representation that we can use perfectly successfully in representing the same phenomena—noting ‘that, instead of such and such a representation, you could also use this other one’ (PR, 51). In the Investigations, Wittgenstein says of just such a measure that it ‘may be called an “analysis” of our forms of expression’—‘for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart’—but also that it would be a mistake to conclude that ‘something like a final analysis of our forms of language’—‘a single completely resolved form of every expression’—is ‘the real goal of [such an] investigation’ (PI §§90–1).

A key instance of this realisation seems to have been Wittgenstein’s recognising the pursuit of a phenomenology as such a mistake:

I do not now have phenomenological language . . . in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language.

(PR, 51)

The changes of heart that this section identifies explain why Wittgenstein may have come to question the necessity of pursuing a phenomenological language. But they don’t explain why—in the preceding passage—he also questions its possibility. To understand that, we need to recognise the broader change in his outlook that recognition of the diversity of language triggered, a change that spells the end of ‘Wittgenstein the verificationist’, gives two further twists to the notion of ‘liberating logic from grammar’, and points to a further metaphilosophical step that Heidegger will not take.
9. The Demise of ‘Wittgenstein the Verificationist’ and ‘Wittgenstein the Phenomenologist’ and of the Pursuit of a ‘Complete Analysis’

Wittgenstein’s flirtation with verificationism is short-lived. He continues to see value in considering how a proposition is verified because that ‘shows what it follows from and what follows from it’: the relevance of the question, “How can you know such a thing?”, . . . to the question, “What is the meaning?” is that the former ‘gives the grammar of the proposition, which is what the question, “What would it be like for it to be true?”, asks for’ (AWL, 19–20). But his contrasting of ‘hypotheses’ with ‘propositions’ ceases to play the role of defending the Tractarian account of inference, an account which turns out to be not worth saving. As more and more of what we would ordinarily think of as propositions are excluded from the class of ‘genuine propositions’ on the grounds that they do not conform to the Tractatus ‘template’, then the significance of the claim that that template embodies the general form of a genuine proposition becomes increasingly doubtful. Moreover, key elements in the implementation of this general template became questionable as Wittgenstein comes to doubt ‘whether there are any primary propositions that are definitely verifiable’ (PG, 221) and to believe that ‘the question, “How is this proposition verified?”, changes its meaning from one area of grammar to another’ (BT, 290).

In the latter thought, we see logic—understood as the effort to see clearly how our language works—being ‘liberated from grammar’ in a second sense—Wittgenstein’s dawning awareness of a diversity hidden behind terms whose substantial univocity he had previously taken for granted, despite his broader awareness that language may ‘disguise thought’. Other key examples are his realisations that ‘[t]here are . . . many different “alls”’ (PG, 269) and a ‘family of negations’ (AWL, 101), realisations which make his earlier blanket account of generality and the truth-functions untenable. Though Wittgenstein repeatedly redrew the boundary between ‘propositions’ and ‘non-propositions’ during the period 1929–33, he eventually concluded that ‘[i]t is more or less arbitrary what we call a “proposition”’ (MWL, 55); and this conclusion is key, I believe, to Wittgenstein’s coming to question not only the need for a ‘phenomenological language’ but also its possibility.

In a 1936 manuscript, Wittgenstein summarises his earlier view:

Formerly, I myself spoke of a ‘complete analysis’, and I used to believe that philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of propositions so as to set out all their connections and remove all possibilities of misunderstanding.

(PG, 211)

From this perspective, particular philosophical confusions could be thought of as arising because we lack this ‘complete analysis’, and
examining how particular pairs of proposition-types become confused as pointing us in the direction of that analysis. A ‘complete’ or ‘final analysis’ would have been achieved when one had an expression of one’s proposition which made it impossible to confuse it with any other proposition-type, thereby ‘lay[ing] bare the source of all misunderstandings’ (PG, 211). The ultimate goal of such a project of analysis would be ‘a completely resolved form of every expression’, and it is to such a project that a phenomenological language appears to have been seen as contributing. But if ‘it is more or less arbitrary what we call a “proposition”’, then what one takes to be ‘every expression’—including ‘every proposition’—is ‘more or less arbitrary’ too; and if a ‘complete’ or ‘final analysis’ is meant to be the expression of a proposition in signs that make clear once and for all how it differs from ‘all other propositions’, it is ‘senseless to talk of a “final” analysis’ (MWL, 88). It would be a mistake then not only to think that such an analysis is ‘the real goal of our investigation’ but even to think that there is ‘something like a “final analysis” of our forms of language’ (PI §91): there can be no ‘perfect notation’ of which ‘phenomenological language’ was to have been a kind. Logic—the pursuit of clarity about how our language works—must then be ‘liberated from grammar’ in a third sense: from the illusion of a superior notation or grammar that would do the work of logic, itself delivering such clarity.

10. There Is Indeed No Such Thing as Phenomenology

Abandoning belief in such a notation, of which I have suggested a phenomenological language represented for Wittgenstein an instance, does not spare us the confusions it was to dispel. The language of the phenomenal remains one of the parts of our language that ‘bewitches our intelligence’ (PI §109), conjuring up puzzles such as why there is no greenish red; but Wittgenstein no longer believes that eliminating such puzzles depends upon our ‘bringing to light’ some previously unacknowledged language ‘hidden’ ‘behind’ our ‘usual forms of expression’ (PI §91). As Wittgenstein put it in Remarks on Colour, ‘[t]here is indeed no such thing as phenomenology, but there are phenomenological problems’ (RC, 248).

As we saw earlier, key to the demise of both of the Wittgensteinian figures that we have been considering is the disintegration—the coming apart, so to speak—of certain key terms, some of which are also key to his understanding of—to use an expression of his to which we will turn in a moment—the task of philosophy. Wittgenstein’s reaction contrasts here with Heidegger’s to the notion of there being a diversity of forms of Being: for him, this makes the question of ‘the unity of the concept of Being in general’ ‘urgent’, ‘demand[ing] to be raised’ (BPP, 282).

Heidegger’s principal reason for believing this, I have argued elsewhere, is that, even if the most pressing ‘task’ for ontology is ‘classifying the whole of Being into regions’ (PRL, 41), there must still be such a
'whole' if this partition is to be a contribution to something that merits
the name 'ontology'—'a science . . . [that] stud[ies] all things that are, qua
being' (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I 2 1003b 15–16). If—behind the 'surface
grammar'—there isn’t ‘any single unifying concept of Being in general that
would justify calling these different ways of Being ways of Being’ (BPP, 176),
then whatever distinctions we may be marking, they will not be entitled to
the label 'ontological distinctions'.

Heidegger’s response is, of course, to try to show that there is a ‘horizon
for any understanding of Being’, a horizon within which ‘the projection
of a meaning of Being in general can be accomplished’ (BT, 1, 235).
It is time that ‘enabl[es] . . . the thematic interpretation of Being and of
its articulation and manifold ways’, and ‘thus makes ontology possible’
(BPP, 228). ‘Otherwise’—that is, were we to lack such a general ‘horizon’
for the ‘projection’ of Being and its manifold ways—‘there could have
been no ontological knowledge heretofore’ (BT, 8).

A parallel worry afflicts what I called phenomenology in the ‘thin’
sense—an examination of the ways in which entities show themselves
as being thus and so: if Being disintegrates, we have reason to think the
object of that examination will too. To adopt Heidegger’s terms, *Dasein*
is defined as the entity that ‘understands Being’ (BT, 12); but that endows
*Dasein* with a unity—such that one might undertake ‘an existential ana-
lytic of Dasein’ as *Being and Time* does—only if there are no correspond-
ing worries over the unity of Being, of what it is to be or to be-so. We can
see substance in this parallel worry if we consider the wide range of ways
that Heidegger identifies in which entities show themselves to Dasein: for
example, through its ‘being occupied with’ the *Zuhanden* (HCT, 191), its
‘purely beholding’ the *Vorhanden* (BT, 113), its ‘Being-with’ other Dasein
(BT, 118), and its ‘anxious concern’ over its own self (KJPW, 26). Is there
then a horizon against which these different ways that entities show them-
selves will themselves show themselves as different ways that entities show
themselves? If there isn’t, such a partitioning cannot be a contribution to
something that merits the name ‘phenomenology’ even in our thin sense.
That idea of ‘phenomenology’ would disintegrate in the same ‘originary
questioning’ in whose ‘turbulence’ ‘[t]he idea of “logic” . . . disintegrates’:
there would be no such thing as such a phenomenology.

Such concerns may seem remote from the Wittgenstein who identified
phenomenology with ‘the description of the immediate sense-perception
without hypothetical addition’. But they are not remote, I believe, from
the Wittgenstein who subscribed to the notion of a ‘complete analysis’
upon the collapse of which his own pursuit of such a phenomenology
foundered.

We saw earlier the moment in Heidegger’s reflections in which he
argues that unless there is a ‘horizon’ for the projection of Being and its
manifold ways, one must deny that there has been ‘ontological knowl-
edge heretofore’: there would be no topic—no task, one might say—for a
science of Being \textit{qua} Being, or for phenomenology in the ‘thin’ sense of an examination of the ways in which entities show themselves as being thus and so. There is—I suggest—a parallel moment in Wittgenstein’s thought. In 1914, Wittgenstein asked himself:

Does . . . a complete analysis exist? \textit{And if not}: then what is the task of philosophy?!!?

(NB, 2)

I argued earlier that the intelligibility of a ‘complete analysis’ depends on there being such a thing as ‘all propositions’. The parallel I want to suggest is that, for the early Wittgenstein, unless there is a ‘horizon’ for the projection of the manifold forms that propositions take—a horizon against which we can understand such a thing as ‘propositions in general’—one must doubt whether there is a ‘task for philosophy’. Heidegger’s pursuit of a ‘horizon’ against which the manifold ways that entities show themselves might be mapped, and Wittgenstein’s pursuit of a general form within which our manifold propositions can be set, are both driven by the need to give sense to such a task—Heidegger’s to his brand of phenomenology, and Wittgenstein’s to the idea of a complete analysis, to the revealing of which—I have argued—his own brand of phenomenology contributes. The radicalism of the later middle Wittgenstein is to think that there is no such task, because there is no such hidden, as-yet-undiscovered ‘horizon’ by reference to which that task would be defined: there is no such ‘horizon’ that would give sense to the notion of ‘all propositions’ and, hence, to that of ‘a definitive dissection of propositions’ that would ‘set out all their connections’. The perfection of ‘perfect notations’, including ‘phenomenological languages’, was to be their embodying such a ‘definitive dissection’. But Wittgenstein comes to believe that there is no such thing.

11. Concluding Thoughts: Philosophy and Its Integrity

Abandoning one’s understanding of philosophy’s very task naturally has wide-ranging implications. Section 8 began to show how Wittgenstein’s philosophical practice changes, a change reflecting his loss of a unifying understanding of just what philosophical confusion is—the understanding that had allowed the author of the \textit{Tractatus} to dream of ‘the problems of philosophy’ being ‘in essentials . . . finally solved’ (TLP preface). Instead, paralleling his nominalistic insistence that ‘[i]t is more or less arbitrary what we call a “proposition”’, the middle Wittgenstein concludes that ‘[p]hilosophy isn’t anything except . . . the particular individual worries that we call “philosophical problems”’ (PG, 193). ‘Philosophy’ fragments then just as ‘the proposition’ does.

From this perspective, Heidegger may seem to have failed to liberate his thinking from grammar, in believing there must be some one horizon
on to which the manifold ways entities ‘are’ are projected; he may seem naïve in believing that there is a subject matter for ‘a science of Being qua Being’ and a theme for phenomenology (in at least the thin sense). But one also might feel that such a commitment makes greater sense of our understanding of philosophy and its history than believing that ‘philosophy isn’t anything except . . . the particular individual worries that we call “philosophical problems”’. The appearance that there is an integrity of sorts to the philosophical tradition is one that Heidegger seems committed to saving, and one which perhaps needs to be saved.

All I will say here is that although this is where this chapter must end, it is not, of course, where the story ends for either of our philosophers. Crucially, a fourth twist to the notion that logic must be liberated from grammar comes in Wittgenstein’s later realisation—articulated through metaphors such as that of family resemblance—that not all general expressions need function in the same way, such that the diversity that the middle Wittgenstein comes to sense behind expressions like ‘proposition’ and ‘philosophy’ need not entail that they are hopelessly equivocal. But whether such an outlook can make sense of the integrity of the philosophical tradition, and to what extent there is indeed an integrity there of which to make sense, are questions beyond the scope of this chapter.

Notes

1. I give references to English translations of referenced works where available, though I diverge from them on occasion. As the two available translations of Sein und Zeit also give the pagination of the German original, I give references to the latter, though generally I will follow the translation of Macquarrie and Robinson (1962). I would also like to thank Adam Beck for access to his translation of EP.
2. Not that there aren’t connections; see, e.g., note 23.
4. MS 113, 123r, translation adapted from Ometiță (2015, 82).
5. Quite what it is to be a ‘verificationist’ is no clearer than what it is to be a ‘phenomenologist’. One product of the surge of interest in the history of analytic philosophy in the 1990s was the demonstration that the stereotypical Galtonian pictures of ‘the verificationist’ and ‘the logical positivist’ are produced not only by superimposing Ayer, Carnap, Neurath, Schlick, Waismann, etc. but also by a superficial reading of all of these principal protagonists. (See, e.g., Coffa 1991; Uebel 1992; Friedman 1992; Richardson 1998 and the papers in Uebel 1991 and Giere and Richardson 1996.) But I cannot explore such complexities here.
6. Cf., e.g., Hacker (1986, 134); ‘There can . . . be no doubt at all that in 1929 Wittgenstein was propounding what later became known as the principle of verification.’
7. For an illustration of this temptation at work, see Russell (1984).
8. For further documentation and discussion of the issues on which this section touches, see McManus (2006 and 2009).
9. For discussion, see McManus (2006, Chapters 11 and 12).
10. Cf. also WVC, 39; MWL, 89–90; and AWL, 5–6.
11. Monk (1990) provides a detailed account of Ramsey’s acquaintance with Wittgenstein.
12. Ramsey calls them ‘variable hypotheticals’.
13. Elsewhere Ramsey declares ‘extremely plausible’ the view that he ascribes to Wittgenstein ‘that all propositions are . . . truth-functions of elementary propositions’ (1925a, 172) and accepts what he refers to as ‘the view of Mr Wittgenstein’ that general propositions are to be analysed as logical sums and logical products (1927, 48–9).
14. See, e.g., MWL, 87–91, cf. BT, 340, and his well-known reply to a query of Malcolm’s—‘whether, when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a “simple object”—that at that time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing’ (Malcolm 1984, 70).
15. This was clearly an issue that they had discussed. Cf., e.g., Ramsey (1925b, 19): “Socrates is wise” is not an atomic proposition . . . And according to Wittgenstein, with whom I agree, this will be the case with any other instance that may be suggested, since we are not acquainted with any . . . atomic propositions, but merely infer them as presupposed by other propositions.’
16. Addressing how this concern relates to those of members of the Vienna Circle would require an exploration of the discussions that note 5 mentions. Key, for example, would be the Circle’s debate over ‘protocol-sentences’, where two very different conceptions of what it is to be ‘true to the empirical’ clash: an understanding of such sentences as expressive of private, subjective sense-experience is challenged there over its consistency with standards of publicity and intersubjectivity that science seems to require. (See Uebel 1992.)
17. In the light of this absence, Cook resorts to the claim that Wittgenstein never defended his empiricism because he did not even recognize it as a philosophical theory—‘because it never occurred to him to challenge the empiricist’s notion of “experience”’ (Cook 1994, 52). My reading spares us the need to make that kind of claim.
18. The transitional writings show Wittgenstein experimenting with a number of different responses to such problems, including the introduction of numbers into the analysis of elementary propositions. (See RLF.) This kind of proposition could continue to play the role of elementary propositions and the proposal that there are a multitude of different ‘evidential’ propositions (‘a is red’, ‘a is not-blue’, etc.) would be exposed as a deceptive appearance. But while this might be seen as a refinement of the Tractatus’ overall account, it actually undermines Wittgenstein’s key ambitions for it. For discussion, see McManus (2006, Chapters 11 and 12) and McManus (2009).
19. See Ramsey (1923, 473).
20. Cf., e.g., PR, 51.
21. Cf. BT, 129: ‘traditional logic . . . has its foundation in an ontology of the present-at-hand’.
22. They are central questions in McManus (2012).
23. In what is surely a descendent of the Tractarian theme that ‘[t]heories which make a proposition of logic appear substantial are always false’ (TLP 6.111), Wittgenstein insists that ‘grammar’ is ‘arbitrary’ (PG, 184)—‘cannot be justified’ (WVC, 126). A parallel conclusion, I would suggest, is Heidegger’s that ‘Being can never be explained by entities’ (BT, 208).
24. Cf., e.g., PR, 120–1 and PG, 266.
25. It is, of course, that distance that prompts some—such as Iris Murdoch—to believe that ‘[w]hether or not Heidegger is a phenomenologist is an interesting (even important) question’ (Murdoch 1993, 233).
26. For further examples, see McManus (2013b) and the other essays in the volume to which it belongs.

27. Wittgenstein does continue to reflect on the nature of hypotheses and describes them in very similar terms to those used in PR Chapter XXII (cf., e.g., PG, 219–23). But the collapse of the Tractarian perspective on hypotheses is the loss of a proposed solution to the puzzle of how general propositions relate to their instances, not its solution. One might also see a continuing concern with that puzzle in, for example, Wittgenstein’s later rule-following considerations.

28. Cf. Wittgenstein’s worry that the hypothetical is ‘essential to every description of the world’ (MS 105, 108, translation quoted from Ometiţă 2015, 85).

29. Cf., e.g., AWL, 12 and 77.

30. Published as Appendix 4B of PG.

31. Cf. PR, 84, where Wittgenstein concludes that ‘[t]here is not—as [he] used to believe—a primary language as opposed to our ordinary language, the “secondary” one’.

32. See McManus (2013a).

33. In terms of his equally famous metaphor of the rope, the third twist is the realisation that, with some concepts, there may not be ‘some one fibre [that] runs through’ all their instances (PI §67): ‘there may be nothing in common between the two ends’ (MWL, 104). The fourth is then the realisation that there need not be for a concept to ‘yield a single meaning’ (PI §561); its integrity may lie in ‘the overlapping of many fibres’ (PI §67). I discuss these issues at greater length in McManus (1995 and 2006), section A.7–9; cf. also recent work by Stephen Mulhall, such as his 2013 and 2015.

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