Exploring Peace
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Introduction

We are pleased to offer a representative set of seven chapters from just some of our popular texts to give you an idea of the quality and variety of publications we have available here at Routledge. The chapters presented in this FreeBook cover topics of current interest within the subject Peace Studies and Peacebuilding.

Chapter 1: Armed Conflict and Peace

*International Peacebuilding* by Ozerdem and Lee offers a concise, practical and accessible introduction to the growing field of peacebuilding for students and practitioners. Peacebuilding is concerned with the promotion and consolidation of peace through deterring and resolving violent conflicts, and this chapter aims to introduce a number of conceptualisations that have widely been utilised in Peace and Conflict Studies. Alp Ozerdem is Co-Director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, UK, and SungYong Lee is Senior Lecturer in Peacebuilding at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, UK.

Chapter 2: Global Trends in Terrorism

*Peace and Conflict* has been published biennially since 2000 and will shift to an annual publication beginning in 2016. Based on cutting edge research emanating from the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management, each edition of *Peace and Conflict* includes a set of recurring features including the “The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger;” “Global Trends in Armed Conflict;” “Global Trends in Democratization;” and “Global Trends in Terrorism;” the latest example of which is presented below. In addition, each edition carries a special theme with invited original chapters from a wide variety of experts from all over the world. Themes of past editions include micro level analysis of conflict and peacebuilding, policy guidance for preventing conflict, post-conflict transitions, and challenges to the stability of states.

*Peace and Conflict* is a large-format, full-color resource with numerous graphs, tables, maps, and appendices dedicated to the visual and summary presentation of essential information. Crisp narratives are highlighted with pull-quote extracts emphasizing major findings. *Peace and Conflict* has been adopted in a wide variety of schools and courses including the U.S. Army War College, research universities, liberal arts schools, and community colleges.

*Peace and Conflict* has also received major media attention in such outlets as Fareed Zakaria’s GPS, *The Washington Post*, and *The Guardian*.

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Chapter 3: Violence and Structures

*Theories of Violent Conflict* introduces students to a variety of prominent theoretical approaches, and examines the ontological stances and epistemological traditions underlying these approaches. This chapter reviews structure-based approaches to show the interconnectedness between the organization of society and violent conflict. Conflict is here explained as deriving from violence inherent to political, economic, cultural and geopolitical structures. Jolle Demmers is Associate Professor at the University of Utrecht, Netherlands.

Chapter 4: Peacebuilding and the Politics of Responsibility

This chapter is taken from a broader examination of the engagement of political science and peacebuilding research with the concepts and politics of trauma. The wider book explores the debate on trauma and peacebuilding and presents the challenges for democratization that the politics of trauma present in transitional periods. It demonstrates how ideas about reconciliation are filtered through ideological lenses and become new ways of articulating communal and ethno-nationalist sentiments. With specific reference to the Northern Irish transition, it argues for a shift in focus from the representation of trauma towards its reception and calls for a more substantive approach to the study of democracy and post-conflict peacebuilding.

This text will be of interest to scholars and students of peace and conflict studies, ethnic and nationalism studies, transitional justice studies, gender studies, Irish politics, nationalism and ethnicity.

Chapter 5: The economics of peace: is the UN system up to the challenge?

In this chapter, Graciana del Castillo analyzes the nature of the transition from armed conflict to stability, and determines that it has four dimensions – security, political, social and economic. Failure in one dimension can jeopardize success in any or all of the others. Transitions also have phases, passing from the economics of war through the economics of peace to the economics of development. It is particularly in the phase regarding the economics of peace, where the UN is most ill-equipped institutionally. The UN system needs to take a good look at its capacity in this area and the use of its resources. It also needs to develop a clearer idea of how to measure successful peacebuilding.
Chapter 6: The Peace Researcher and Foreign Policy Prediction

In this chapter, J. David Singer discusses what he perceives to be the most important task for peace researchers: the ability to forecast, with increasing reliability, the outcomes which are most likely to emerge out of a given set of background conditions and behavioral events. He analyses the important distinctions between contingent and non-contingent predictions, and goes on to explain why he feels neither method is entirely adequate. The author concludes by suggesting that peace researchers need to radically revise the style and method of social forecasting that is in use today, in order to change the course of human history.

Chapter 7: International administration

This chapter is drawn from an overview and detailed historical and political analysis of the role and effectiveness of international administration in statebuilding. It looks at how international administrations have attempted to create sustainable political institutions and to what extent they have been successful in doing so. We see how, to a greater extent than peacebuilding operations, these administrations exercise extensive authority and take over the governance of a country. Though they combine the state and nationbuilding programs of regular peacebuilding, with the political power normally reserved for sovereign states, there remains a question of how effective or successful international administrations are, and whether they lead to a sustainable peace. The book reveals that, despite years of international administration, the political institutions remain weak and rely heavily on international support, dominated by an ethnic nationalist ideology with little domestic support.
CHAPTER 1

Armed Conflict and Peace
Chapter 1. Peace and armed conflict

Peacebuilding is concerned with the promotion and consolidation of peace through deterring and resolving violent conflicts. This goal raises a number of conceptual questions, such as: What sorts of peace are the projects pursuing? On the wider scale of (absolute) war to (absolute) peace, where should we place the type of peace being pursued? What types of conflicts are we trying to address? In the specific cultural and social context in which the conflict is taking place, which methods of achieving peace are likely to be most useful? Moreover, given that each conflict has its own specific context, intervening in a conflict for peacebuilding purposes without understanding the nature of the conflict concerned would be a mistake. Regardless of its good intentions, an intervention has the potential to further damage relationships between disputants and lead to an escalation of tensions. In developing effective peacebuilding programmes, therefore, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of the concepts of peace and armed conflict.

This chapter aims to introduce a number of conceptualisations that have widely been utilised in Peace and Conflict Studies. Since the 1960s, the complexity in the concepts of peace and conflict has been analysed in various ways, and the consequent conceptual developments have determined the key features of mainstream peace-supporting activities over the previous decades. For instance, the evolution of international peace intervention over the past fifty years reflects the philosophical foundational shift that has taken place over the same period: the way in which the once-dominant concept of negative peace has gradually given way to contemporary conceptualisations of positive peace.

Out of a variety of the current approaches towards peace and peacebuilding, this chapter will primarily discuss:

- Approaches towards peace: theoretical debate on negative peace, positive peace, non-Western approaches to peace and levels of peace;
- Sources of violent conflict (cultural factors, social/economic factors and contemporary issues);
- Academic discussions on the forms of violence (intended/unintended violence; manifest/ latent violence; physical/psychological violence; and direct/structural/cultural violence).

**Peace: approaches and types**

Although peace is primarily defined as a "state existing during the absence of war"
(Collins English Dictionary 2003), it is a broad and elusive concept, and understandings of its meaning may vary. For instance, while some may assume that ‘truth’, ‘beauty’ and ‘love’ are synonymous with peace, others believe that ‘harmony’, ‘repose’, ‘truce’ and ‘friendship’ lie at the heart of the concept. More frequently, ‘human rights’, ‘justice’ and ‘freedom’ are regarded as its central values (Sandy and Perkins 2008). Hence, in attempting to understand peace-related discussions or projects, it is useful to identify exactly to which types of peace these debates or programmes subscribe.

**Negative peace, positive peace and non-Western approaches towards peace**

In peace studies, the distinction between positive peace and negative peace is one of the most widely accepted criteria. This distinction was first suggested by Johan Galtung (1967), one of the founders of peace studies as an academic discipline. Galtung criticised traditional Western approaches towards peace, categorising them as forms of ‘negative peace’ and called for a more comprehensive and functional conception of peace. This idea has been explored and developed further in many academic works.

**Negative peace**

Negative peace denotes “the absence of organized collective forms of violence” (Galtung 1967: 4). From this viewpoint, a wide range of states, from the temporary cessation of combat and separation of two enemies to the establishment of stable peace, are considered forms of peace. Moreover, this definition acknowledges spontaneous or individual violence as acceptable conditions of a peaceful society.

Many academic debates and publications in peace studies are based on the above assumption, especially those that ascribe to the realist perspective. For instance, Raymond Aron, a well-known French philosopher, argues that peace is a state of “more or less lasting suspension of rivalry between political units” (1966: 151). Consequently, peace research based on negative peace ideas focuses on eliminating or minimising active violence. Examples of strategies that employ this line of reasoning include peace mediation for the resolution of civil conflicts, military intervention to provide buffer zones between two warring enemies and the demilitarisation of ex-combatants in the post-conflict period (Barash and Webel 2009). Moreover, since the concept of negative peace defines peace as the ‘absence of violence’, the characteristics of the violence under consideration need to be identified in order to clarify the meaning of peace. Hence, in defining what constitutes peace, the following questions are frequently asked: “What type of violence? Violence by whom? And Peace with whom?” (Galtung 1996: 226).
In the West, the concept of negative peace has a long tradition. The meaning of peace as the ‘absence of war’ is found in the New Testament and is in evidence in the classical depiction of the Greek goddess Irene, whose name is also the Greek word for peace. Since the Roman era, peace has been commonly understood in terms of *absentia belli* (the absence of war), with the ‘state’ being the fundamental unit of analysis. Hence, external peace has commonly referred to a condition in which the state is not engaged in external wars (e.g. a regional war, an interstate war or a world war), while internal peace has indicated that the state has no internal war (e.g. no insurgency or civil war).

Moreover, it has been commonly believed that peace can be maintained through a ‘social contract’; and, indeed, one of the origins of the word ‘peace’ is the Latin word *pax*, which is also the root of the word ‘pact.’ The idea here is that the state of peace (defined as an absence of war) is founded on “contractual, conscious, and mutually agreed upon” relationships (Young 2010: 354). Nevertheless, although violence has traditionally been considered the opposite of peace, it has also been understood as a useful tool to achieve or protect peace. The Roman phrase ‘*sivispacem, para bellum*’ (‘if you want peace, prepare for war’) reflects the notion that peace can be established and maintained by deterring potential aggressors through the building up of defensive strength (or sometimes, offensive defence).

It was during the Cold War period, when realist views of peace became a dominant perspective in academic debates, that the basis of contemporary international relations was formed. As mistrust and rivalry between the liberal (or capitalist) camp and the communist (or socialist) camp determined the interactions between states during this period, academics saw no good opportunities for pursuing more than the absence of war in the international community. Hence, most of the peacebuilding operations conducted by the United Nations (UN) and other international/regional organisations during this period drew upon this version of the concept of peace. Examples of this include most traditional forms of international peace-supporting activities such as third-party mediation, traditional UN peacekeeping operations, military intervention for providing buffer zones between warring enemies and demilitarisation of ex-combatants in post-conflict period.

*Positive peace*

A number of Western thinkers and scholars believe that the traditional concept of negative peace is not useful in the promotion of stable peace. According to them, approaches based on negative peace are likely to fail to reflect and address the fundamental issues that lie behind the violence. Moreover, these approaches inherently possess potential for appropriation “in the interest of the status-quo powers at the
national or international levels, and... become a conservative force in politics" (Galtung 1967: 2).

Hence, the necessity of a wider and more comprehensive conceptualisation of peace had been raised for many years, which Galtung terms 'positive peace.' Since, in this context, ‘positive’ represents the most ideal condition of peace that a person can think of, positive peace has no agreed definition. Instead, people have proposed their own versions of positive peace according to their positions. For instance, although he did not use the term of positive peace, Albert Einstein defined peace as “not merely the absence of violence but the presence of just, of law, and of order” (cited in Sandy and Perkins 2008: 6), while Reardon (1988: 16) regards peace as “the absence of violence in all its forms,” which includes physical-psychological, explicit-implicit, direct-indirect and individual-structural violence. Moreover, Barash and Webel (2009: 7) propose positive peace as “a social condition in which exploitation is minimised or eliminated and in which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural violence.” Nevertheless, there are some key elements of positive peace that are commonly found in these definitions. These include peace zones (space safe from violence), peace bonds (positive relationship between social actors), social justice (fair and equal treatment of all social constituents), eco mind (harmonious coexistence between human and environment) and link mind (people's awareness of interdependency) (Boulding 2000; Galtung 1996; Standish and Kertyzia 2015; Synott 2005).

Theories based on positive peace generally pursue the creation of proactive and optimistic values in society and seek to transform negative social relations into positive ones, work towards the harmonious coexistence of different peoples, promote reconciliation between conflicting parties and reconstruct nonviolent patterns of behaviour through empathetic understanding. For instance, structural peace refers to conditions of

(1) reciprocity, as opposed to mental conditioning of one by the other; (2) integration in the sense of all relating to all, as opposed to fragmentation; (3) holism, the use of many faculties, as opposed to segmentation; and (4) certainly inclusion as opposed to exclusion, marginalization, and/or second-class citizenship. (Young 2010: 352)

Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the definition of positive peace yet and its scope still continues to expand.

Non-Western approaches towards peace – There are various approaches towards peace and peacebuilding that reflect non-Western perspectives. Although they have not been proactively reflected in recent academic discussions for conceptualising peace, these
views frequently offer highly important elements required for building solid and durable peace.

In Hinduism, for instance, the term *shanti*, while literally meaning 'peace', specifically means much more than the external or material dimensions of peace. Instead, the concept adopts as a key element of peace the notion of a person's "inner peace, with oneself, with no part of the body-mind-spirit doing violence to other parts" (Galtung 1996: 226). Moreover, *ahimsa* refers to "no harm, including to self (inner peace) and to nature" (ibid.). In the *Bhagavad Gita*, one of the most important Hindu epics, the story of Arjuna emphasises that fighting should be based not on hatred or personal desire, but on selfless duty or compassion for others (Barash and Webel 2009).

The concept of peace in the Confucian cultural tradition, such as *heping* in China, denotes "harmony between the international, social, and personal spheres as a necessary condition" for peace (Young 2010: 355) rather than mere nonviolent relations between different social actors. In addition, traditional Confucian teachings emphasise the value of obedience and order both within the person and society in the belief that true peace can be achieved only through social harmony and balance. Hence, conflict resolution in many societies in East Asia is more about correcting misarranged relations than compromising contradictory interests or perspectives.

The concepts of peace in many Muslim countries are strongly influenced by religious tradition and they frequently emphasise justice as a key element. The utmost peace can be achieved only through one's submission to Allah and only within Dar ul-Islam (the House of Submission). In Khalifah (the Islamic community), all people are equally blessed by God regardless of their background, race, language or history. In addition, justice, "the placement of everything in their proper order" is an essential part of the concept of peace in the Islamic world (Ali IbnAbiTalib cited in Mirbagheri 2012: 85).

While these perspectives present dissimilar points of emphasis, they enable recent academic discussions to develop the concept of positive peace in more diverse and nuanced ways. In addition, the illumination of such non-Western perspectives of peace creates wider opportunities for peacebuilding practice to reflect the needs and opinions of local actors in conflict-affected societies that, in most cases, do not share Western cultural backgrounds.

**Levels of peace**

Another useful framework for understanding the conditions of peace is 'level,' which views peace as a 'ladder' of stages. Although categorisation of the levels of peace varies among scholars and analysts, many studies commonly refer to the following four levels: frozen peace, cold peace, normal peace and warm peace (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Levels of peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frozen peace</th>
<th>Cold peace</th>
<th>Normal peace</th>
<th>Warm peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main issues in conflict</strong></td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
<td>Mitigated but not fully resolved</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
<td>Resolved or transcended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Channels of communication</strong></td>
<td>Unilateral communication by authoritarian actors</td>
<td>Only official level</td>
<td>Mostly official level with early-stage transcommunity or national ties</td>
<td>Highly developed transcommunity or national ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration</strong></td>
<td>None or exploitation</td>
<td>Exploratory</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Possibility of return to war</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Unthinkable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is adapted from Miller (2005: 232).

**Frozen peace**

This level refers to a situation in which coercion is the primary means of dealing with conflict. While on the surface things appear to carry on as normal, the causes of conflict (both underlying and immediate) have not been resolved and the probability for violence to erupt remains high. An authoritarian regime’s imposition of a ‘state of emergency’, which curbs basic human rights and behaviours, best describes the level of frozen peace. This level of relationship is characterised by a one-way flow of communication (orders are transmitted from the dominant group to the dominated group) and there is no cooperation or participation to achieve social goals. As a result, it is frequently debated whether frozen peace can be considered a type of peace at all. Palestine under the control of Israel is frequently discussed as an example of this level of peace.

**Cold peace**

At the level of cold peace, parties in disagreement recognise each other’s rights to existence, access resources and so on. Although there is a level of interaction and cooperation between disputants, the underlying and immediate issues surrounding the conflict generally remain unresolved. While the probability of returning to violence is reduced at this level, it has not disappeared completely and might easily be triggered. Cold peace is often regarded as a step towards the resolution of a conflict and offers an opportunity for achieving a sustainable and higher level of peace. The relation between North Korea and South Korea is frequently cited as an example of this level of peace.

**Normal peace**
At this level, the major issues that had caused serious tensions or violent conflicts between disputants have been largely resolved or mitigated, and the relations between them are more or less normalised (or indifferent). The possibility of cooperation is higher than in conditions of cold peace, and in international relations cases, transnational collaboration between civil societies emerges. Examples of this level of peace are the improvement in the relationship between China and the US in the early 1990s and the social settlement in post–civil war El Salvador.

**Warm peace**

Warm peace describes a situation in which the issues pertaining to rivalries and incompatibilities between states or within society have been addressed. This level of peace is characterised by cooperation between the various actors, effective organisation of civil society and the existence of active conflict resolution processes. Although differences between the various groups of such societies may persist, these differences are no longer seen as threats to societal security.

By suggesting the levels of peace, many studies aim to move beyond the binary categorisation of peace and conflict. For instance, the discourse on third-party peace intervention and the UN's peacekeeping operations, which had previously simply focused on whether peace could be maintained by using certain intervention methods, began to ask what types of peace can be achieved via the traditional methods. Sometimes, these levels are utilised for developing a new research project. Bayer (2010) adopts the categorisation of different levels of peace and argues that democracy can help states that maintain mid-level peace achieve a higher level of peace, but that it does not have a positive impact in terms of improving the relations within lower-level peace. Through this, he challenged a widely accepted assumption that democracy is universally more likely to improve relationships between former belligerents.

Thus, the contents of peacebuilding became diversified and professionalised by adopting the concept of different levels of peace. Through this process, since the early 2000s, international peacebuilding became more comprehensive in its scope and projects were equipped by more specified procedures of implementation that should be achieved through gradual transformation of social conditions.

**Armed conflicts: sources and forms**

As peace has been understood as the absence of certain types of violence in many previous studies, conflict has been a core topic of theoretical discourse in Peace and
Conflict Studies. In this section, two elements of conflict analysis that are particularly relevant to peacebuilding are introduced: sources and forms of conflicts.

Sources of violent conflicts

Responses to armed conflicts need to be different according to the diagnosis of their causes. Examination of thirty-four comprehensive peace accords signed in the post–Cold War period demonstrates that, although most peace processes commonly considered security assurance as a key condition for peacebuilding, there were significant variations in the contents of peace accords; and the primary determinants of these contents are the perceived causes of conflicts (Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty 2014). For instance, economic development, redistribution of national wealth and respect for cultural/ethnic diversity were important issues in the peace process in Guatemala, where extreme economic polarisation and the suppression of social minorities offered important sources of armed conflicts. In contrast, the Angolan peace process took political power sharing as a key point of negotiation because the competing economic and political interests between power elites were primary catalysts of the conflicts. In this sense, determining the sources of a military conflict is a crucial step in any effort to prevent or resolve it.

This section presents a number of representative sources of contemporary armed conflicts. Although violent human actions are highly probable under certain circumstances, violence is still by no means inevitable. Thus, although some of the major factors deeply related to contemporary military conflicts are presented shortly, these factors should be regarded not as causes but as sources of violence.

Nevertheless, identifying and defining the sources of a conflict is a complex process because there may be a large number of factors involved in its emergence (and continuation): while some may be fundamental to the outbreak of the conflict, others may function as catalysts.

Cultural factors

Cultural heritage that defines people’s identity, such as language, religion, ethnicity and nationality, can be an important source of the conflict between individuals and groups. Some scholars have posited that cultural factors are more likely to cause violent conflict than other factors since actors are less likely to compromise on such issues (Huntington 1993). Many previous examples of violent conflict demonstrate that people fight to maintain their own cultural identity or to remove others, and various discussions in peace studies point to the significant roles played by the following three
factors in the emergence and development of a violent conflict. In particular, ethnicity and religion have been argued to be two most outstanding causes of contemporary civil conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; MacFarlane 1999 cited in Haynes 2011).

ETHNICITY

Ethnic diversity itself does not necessarily bring about military conflict. Indeed, some research shows that ethnic diversity sometimes contributes to a reduction in the severity of a military conflict, as ethnic groups may learn the skills relevant to mitigating conflict and aiding negotiation of their interests while interacting with other ethnic groups. Nevertheless, when a society fails to develop effective institutions for managing the incompatible interests of different ethnic groups, the groups’ interests in obtaining or protecting their prosperity and power can lead to intense competition, and diversity may then become a significant source of conflict. As ethnicity is one of the strongest sources of people’s identity, this competition is likely to lead to exclusive ethnic nationalism within ethnic groups. Moreover, as the rise of ethnic nationalism in one group can be viewed as a threat by others, similar forms of nationalism will develop among other ethnic groups (Collier 1999; Gurr 1970). While the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Sudan (Darfur) and Sri Lanka are total civil wars mainly caused by ethnic tensions, the violence in Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia was slightly less significant.

RELIGION

Although many religious philosophies emphasise the virtue of embracing different ideas, some theological themes are interpreted in such a way so as to encourage (or at least permit) aggression against heathens and pagans. Violent actions such as suicide bombings have been hailed and encouraged by some religious groups as emblematic of self-sacrifice, heroism and loyalty to the faith. A most striking event that had huge impact on contemporary international security was the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York. Since then, Islamic fundamentalism has been cited as a major cause in the violent conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and other parts of the world. The situation has been made worse by the stereotyping of Middle Eastern countries as ‘terrorist nations’ and the indiscriminate use of the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (Rupesinghe 1998: 9). Some followers of other religions have also exhibited religious extremism. For example, Orthodox Judaism has gained strength in the political arena in Israel, and right-wing Christian movements (advocating anti-abortion policies) have gained popularity in the United States.
LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM

Although many cultural identities are inherited, they are sometimes created, modified or reconstructed. A representative example of this is the influence of colonialism on the development of cultural identities in Africa, Latin America, Asia and elsewhere. Many of the aspects of ethnic identities were strongly affected by the legacy of colonial policies, and this has contributed to the emergence of ethnic conflicts in these regions/areas. For instance, the arbitrary boundaries drawn by Europeans in their quest to establish states in Africa and Asia divided once cohesive communities and in some cases brought together groups who had long been in competition or conflict. Moreover, colonial administrations in many countries utilised the policy of ‘divide and rule,’ which led to fierce intertribal rivalries. As the colonial masters withdrew after independence, the struggle for power that ensued transformed these intertribal rivalries into bitter and protracted armed conflicts in some regions. This was particularly the case in Africa, where a number of groups are still engaged in armed conflicts over political and economic resources (Rupesinghe 1998).

Social/economic factors

There has been extensive research on the causality or correlation between a number of social and economic issues and military conflicts. If cultural factors draw clear distinctions between social groups, socioeconomic factors serve to promote the tensions and competition between them. More specifically, such research focuses on the political and economic interests of the actors who engage in conflict. If armed conflict brings huge economic returns or geopolitical benefits to individuals or even the state, there is always a strong motivation for prolonging it. Consequently, individuals and organisations need to be aware of such significant information to enable them to propose attractive alternatives when planning to intervene.

POVERTY

The academic community is largely in agreement on the role that poor economic conditions play as a long-term source of violent conflicts. If a society does not offer adequate opportunities for the fulfilment of people’s needs, the possibility of violence increases. Moreover, the competition between social groups becomes more intense in cases where resources are limited, and violent conflict is therefore more likely to erupt (Collier and Sambanis 2005). Nevertheless, some analysts insist that poverty itself does not create sufficient conditions for the outbreak of war, but in the wider context, it can be instrumental in building tensions that provoke outbreaks of violence (Rupesinghe 1998). This link between poverty and military conflict can be described as a ‘vicious
cycle: one the one hand, poverty can lead to tensions that may trigger an armed conflict, while on the other, prolonged and destructive conflicts can erode income-generating opportunities and thereby reinforce economic hardship in conflict zones. Here, one important key word emphasised by many researchers is ‘opportunities.’ A conflict does not occur simply when the level of poverty is serious; rather, people conduct military conflicts only when they see sufficient prospects of achieving their goals in this way, or at least to gain better trade-offs.

INEQUALITY
Socioeconomic inequality sometimes plays a bigger role than poverty per se in initiating violent conflicts. Inequalities in economic wealth or political power usually produce an exclusive social hierarchy that heightens social tensions. Economic growth is normally uneven, increasing the interests of some groups while subjecting others to new forms of poverty. Discrimination in public spending and taxation, high asset inequality and governments' economic mismanagement frequently make the tensions based on inequality more visible. If the disadvantaged groups' attempts to redress the social disparity continually fail, their anger and resentment is likely to increase tensions and raise the likelihood of violence. The dominant groups are also tempted to use violence to maintain their privilege against “the challenges posed by endemic economic crises, foreign competition, and workers' demands” (Chedelin, Druckman and Fast 2003: 60). Under such circumstances, people's strong anxiety can be organised rapidly if the discrimination is against certain social identity groups. The conflicts in most Central American countries, such as El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, are mainly caused by extremely unequal distribution of economic wealth and lack of other opportunities to address such problems.

POLITICAL SYSTEM
The type of political system in a country can strongly affect both the possibility of war breaking out and its progress. Societies in which people are free to express their grievances and seek their redress through peaceful means (e.g. via dialogue or political deliberation) are less likely to experience violent conflict than other types of societies. The academic discourse on the role of the political system in preventing violent conflicts increased with the emergence of Democratic Peace Theory, which argues that “democracies had rarely if ever gone to war with each other” (Russett 1993: 9). Although the empirical validity and theoretical soundness of this theory have been criticised by a significant number of academics, it has become a foundation of most peacebuilding projects operated by Western states and international organisations.
Further research has followed on the relation between the various types of political systems and military conflicts. Some studies have found that 'nondemocratic but nonautocratic' states are most war prone, whereas some have stressed that the period of transition towards democracy is the phase in which the outbreak of violent conflict is most probable (Jaggers and Gurr 1995).

Contemporary issues

In addition to the cultural and socioeconomic sources of conflict, there are two contemporary issues that have attracted particular academic attention in recent times: the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and environmental degradation.

PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
The growth in the global arms trade has made small arms and light weapons readily available to those factions able to afford them. It is estimated that there are half a billion small arms currently in circulation worldwide, causing the death of approximately half a million people annually. Unlike nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, nation states and the international community have encountered serious challenges in controlling and preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The widespread availability of small arms continues to pose a major threat to human security and has been implicated as a factor in starting and prolonging a large number of violent conflicts, since "war is possible as soon as weapons are available with which to fight it" (Smith 2004: 5).

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
Environmental degradation in many cases causes a rapid reduction in three types of renewable resources (water, forests and fertile soil), and the scarcity of these resources initiates or propels military conflicts. For instance, the lack of water due to chronic drought frequently causes serious interclan conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. When the problem of scarcity is combined with the issue of uneven distribution, the risk of violence becomes much higher. Thus, as global climate change has increased the frequency and intensity of such formidable natural disasters, the conflicts caused/catalysed by environmental degradation are becoming a central issue in Peace and Conflict Studies.

Forms of violence
What, then, are the major forms of violence that affect human beings? A narrow definition of violence might concentrate on physical and actual violence only, but there is a much wider range of forms of violence, each of which has a strong impact on human behaviour. This section presents a number of the distinctions suggested by Johan Galtung.

PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE

Whether a form of violence affects the body or mind is a fundamental criterion for categorising the type of violence. Physical violence refers to violence that harms the human body or physical objects. Galtung (1969: 169) suggests that physical violence can be categorised into two groups: biological violence and physical violence that constrains human movements (e.g. imprisonment). The effects of physical violence on human behaviour are clearly evident and have been well explored in previous peace studies (in fact, most previous academic discussion on the impact of warfare focuses on this aspect). By contrast, psychological violence includes the types of action that might affect human psychology, including “lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats, etc.” (Galtung 1964: 24), and the impact of psychological violence is not always easily identifiable. However, an increasing number of studies apply systematic analysis on psychological violence (Krippner and McIntyre 2003; Martz 2010).

INTENDED VIOLENCE AND UNINTENDED VIOLENCE

In traditional models of moral judgement, including Judaeo-Christian ethics and Roman jurisprudence, the intention or purpose of a person’s behaviour is considered more important than the consequences of their behaviour. As a result, many previous studies have tended to neglect the impact of unintended violence, even though unintended violence in human society may have devastating effects on human well-being. One example is structural violence, which has serious effects on people’s lives but may not reflect the intention of a certain person or a group to harm the people. Another is environmental pollution, in which case, although the effects may be unintentional, careless disposal of rubbish may have serious consequences.

MANIFEST VIOLENCE AND LATENT VIOLENCE

While manifest violence refers to forms of violence that are observable, latent violence denotes potential violence that may not yet be apparent. For instance, regarding the British and French colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa, although manifest violence of the colonialist powers targeted a relatively small number of people, the fear of African
populations of potential violence enabled the UK and France to control the countries. Many previous studies have failed to recognise the potential impact of latent violence. As Galtung (1969) argues, it is important to include this form of violence in an analytical framework because as the level of potential violence increases, so social tension and instability intensify. In fact, the inclusion of latent violence in the equation significantly expands the scope of peacebuilding operations to include efforts to address the ‘invisible’ dimensions of war-affected societies.

DIRECT VIOLENCE, STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND CULTURAL VIOLENCE

Galtung later devised a more comprehensive categorisation of the forms of violence by looking at three dimensions: direct, structural and cultural violence. Direct violence denotes armed hostile action that can be traced to a perpetrator. War, extortion, torture, rape, ethnic cleansing and genocide are some examples of direct violence. In most conflicts, direct violence is used extensively by an armed population to intimidate innocent civilians into submission and cooperation. Structural violence concerns the manipulation of the structures that exist in society by people/groups in order to suppress others. Although these structures generally support the functioning of society for the benefit of all, they can be exploited to engender structural violence. Suppression of human rights, gender/age discrimination, institutional violence (as within the police or military) and exclusion of some religious groups are examples of structural violence. Cultural violence has strong links with the day-to-day activities and perceptions of a social group. Various aspects of culture (e.g. religion, ideology, language) can be used to justify violence against certain sectors of society, thus preventing people from meeting their basic needs and reaching their full potential. For instance, while the common language shared by a particular social group serves to promote effective communication and social cohesion within that group, it can become a focal point for cleavage between that group and others.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered a number of the perceptual and theoretical aspects of peace and armed conflict. First, the meaning of peace was discussed, primarily focusing on the two distinct perspectives of negative peace and positive peace as well as the levels of peace. As described briefly earlier, these definitions and concepts determine the nature of field practice in various peacebuilding sectors. In fact, the scope of peace operations has constantly widened according to transformations in the concepts and theories of peacebuilding. For instance, the categorisation of negative peace and positive peace is useful for understanding the unique characteristics of previous
international peacekeeping and peacebuilding practices. Although the majority of mainstream practitioners and decision makers have advocated the realisation and maintenance of negative peace (that is, an absence of war) in peacebuilding operations during the past several decades, in recent times projects based on the assumptions of positive peace have gradually gained in popularity.

This chapter then analysed the sources of violence by focusing on three areas: cultural factors, social/economic factors and contemporary issues. However, the sources of violent conflict discussed are not mutually exclusive. Since two or more sources in combination may lie behind the onset of a military conflict, ascertaining the most salient sources of the conflict and finding ways to respond to them is a difficult part of conflict transformation. Moreover, various factors intervene in determining the forms and dynamics of conflicts. As new causes and more subtle forms of violence have been identified in the post–Cold War period, the goals and methods of peacebuilding have increasingly diversified. Hence, correctly identifying the sources and forms of targeted violence is considered key to the success of a peace process, as these factors limit the methods that can be employed in peace-supporting programmes aimed at tackling/eradicating violence. Recognising this, various frameworks for systemic conflict analysis have been adopted by many peacebuilding organisations. Some of the elements commonly included in such analytic frameworks are historical context; interaction between political, economic, social and security sources; actors; social structures; and external influence.

Finally, this chapter introduced and discussed the forms of violence conceptualised by Johan Galtung, as well as a few tools for conflict analysis. Although such categorisations are highly useful from a theoretical perspective, the primary goal of Galtung's conceptualisation was to call people's attention to the dimensions of violence that have largely been neglected. In addition to physical, intended, manifest and direct types of violence, he proposed to consider the victims of violence in its less visible and tangible forms. However, it took a long while before the field practice of peacebuilding began to address these issues. Although these ideas were first released in the late 1960s, the issues of psychological violence or structural violence only began to be reflected in peacebuilding practice in the early 2000s.

Discussion questions

• Can conflict and peace be mutually exclusive?
• Is positive peace a realistic goal in the contemporary peace process?
• Is war a socially constructed phenomenon? Why or why not?
• Are there outstanding 'new' methods of warfare? What impact do they have on the strategies for conducting armed conflicts?

• In what way does 'unintended violence' help us in understanding contemporary armed conflicts?

Note

1 In many academic discussions, institutional violence is considered a part of structural violence. It is true that institutional violence frequently represents a dimension of social violence. For instance, discrimination against women within a private company in terms of salary and opportunities for promotion may reflect the structural discrimination of a society. However, strictly speaking, institutional violence refers to the violence perpetrated by institutions and should be distinguished from general structural violence.

Recommended reading


Global Trends in Terrorism, 1970-2011

Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan

This chapter reports new results from the most recent version of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD currently includes data on more than 104,000 terrorist attacks that occurred from 1970–2011.1 The operational definition of terrorism is the threatened or actual use of illegal force by non-state actors, in order to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal, through fear, coercion, or intimidation. Thus, the GTD excludes state terrorism and genocide, topics that are important and complex enough to warrant their own separate reviews.

START relies entirely on unclassified sources, primarily print and electronic media articles, to identify terrorist attacks and systematically record details of the attacks. At present, this process begins with a universe of over one million articles published daily worldwide, in order to identify the relatively small subset of articles that describe terrorist attacks. We accomplish this using customized search strings to isolate an initial pool of potentially relevant articles, followed by more sophisticated machine learning techniques to further refine the search results. For this subset of articles, additional manual review is required to identify the unique events that satisfy the GTD inclusion criteria and are subsequently researched and coded according to the specifications of the GTD Codebook. Approximately 5,000 to 8,000 articles are manually reviewed, and approximately 600 to 900 attacks are identified and coded for each month of data collection.2

Using the GTD, this chapter provides an update on worldwide trends in terrorism, reporting baseline information concerning the distribution of terrorist attacks and fatalities, terrorist targets, tactics and weapons employed by terrorists, and the regional distribution of terrorist attacks since 1970. Unlike many of the most prominent databases on peace and conflict, the GTD can be disaggregated down to each specific event, reporting the day on which events occurred and for a subset of the data down to the latitude and longitude where each event happened. In keeping with the special theme of this volume, we also present a spatial analysis of terrorism at the county level for the United States and disaggregate global terrorist events by month and day.

Global Trends in Terrorism

Given the amount of publicity that terrorism receives in the print and electronic media,
many would likely assume that terrorist attacks and fatalities have been steadily rising since 1970, the starting point of the dataset. As Figure 5.1 shows, however, trends in terrorism over time have actually been more complex. Through the mid-1970s, worldwide terrorist attacks were relatively infrequent, with fewer than 1,000 incidents each year until 1977.\(^3\) From 1978 to 1979, however, the number of attacks increased by 74 percent, from 1,527 to 2,663. The annual frequency generally continued to increase until the 1992 peak (5,081 attacks), with smaller peaks in 1984 (3,494 attacks) and 1989 (4,322 attacks). After 1992, the number of terrorist attacks dropped dramatically to a 20-year low in 1998 (but see footnote 2). In fact, total attacks in 2000 (1,815), the year prior to the 9/11 attacks, were just a few hundred more than the corresponding figure for 1978 (1,527). Attacks rose again sharply around the time that the United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003. By 2011, total attacks (5,066) were barely less than the record level experienced in 1992. This ebb and flow results in one of the most striking features of Figure 5.1: the pronounced U-shape pattern in total terrorist attacks from 1992 to 2011.

**Figure 5.1 Total and Fatal Terrorist Attacks, 1970–2011**

Fatal attacks exhibit a similar U-shaped pattern. The specific characteristics of the trends differ somewhat: total attacks rose more rapidly than total fatalities during the 1980s and again during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Despite these differences, the two series are highly correlated \(r = 0.96\), with fatal attacks, on average, accounting for just over half of all attacks (2,515 fatal attacks per year compared to 5,081 total attacks per year worldwide). Until 1979, the GTD recorded fewer than four
hundred fatal terrorist attacks per year. Between 1978 and 1979, fatal attacks more than doubled (from 374 to 836). Throughout most of the 1980s, fatal attacks hovered close to 1,000 each year. The trend shifted again in 1988, rising to a peak of 2,175 fatal terrorist attacks in 1992. Like total attacks, fatal attacks declined after that year, bottoming out in 1998 with 451 fatal attacks and then rising again to surpass the 1992 peak in 2011 (2,515).

It is tempting to attribute the rise in total and fatal attacks before 1991 and their rapid fall-off thereafter to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, some evidence exists of a decline in attacks by Marxist-Leninist-inspired groups after 1991 (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009). At present, however, we know of no rigorous tests of this claim.

**Targets, Tactics, and Weapons of Terrorism**

Next, we examine the distribution of targets, tactics, and weapons of terrorist attacks. Our last contribution to Peace and Conflict (LaFree and Dugan 2012) included data through 2008. Therefore, we opt to present information on total attacks for the entire available time frame, then differentiate attacks from 1970–2008 and from 2009–2011, as well as provide the percentage change between these two periods.

**Targets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens and Property</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>-30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>-64.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>-6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>-43.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>-55.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institutions</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>113.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists and Media</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>-56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports and Airlines</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>-69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Terrorists</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>-9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 presents the analysis of targets of global terrorist strikes. Overall, there is considerable variation in target types. The top three targets for the entire series—and
prior to 2009—are private citizens and property, businesses, and the general
government, which together account for almost 50 percent of observations in both
periods. While we excluded many attacks against police and the military as being
noncivilian and therefore outside of our operational definition of terrorism, these two
targets still jointly account for nearly 24 percent of total attacks. The “other” category
encompasses a diverse range of targets, including telecommunication, maritime, and
non-governmental organizations. While our definition of terrorism emphasizes civilian
targets, these results suggest that purely civilian targets—“private citizens and property,”
without a specific institutional or organizational affiliation—account for just over
one-fifth of all attacks.

The share of attacks on unaffiliated private citizens exhibited the largest increase, of 10
percentage points.... Significant decreases were observed in attacks targeting airports
and airlines, the military, and journalists/media.

As Table 5.1 also shows, there have been major changes in targeting by terrorists after
2008. The share of attacks on unaffiliated private citizens exhibited the largest
increase, of 10 percentage points. General government and police ranked second and
third as targets in the 2009–2011 period, with increased shares. Over this same period,
businesses were attacked considerably less, dropping the rank to fourth. The target that
exhibited the most dramatic increase was educational institutions, whose share more
than doubled. The data also reveal a sharp increase in terrorists targeting other
terrorists. Significant decreases were observed in attacks targeting airports and airlines,
the military, and journalists/media. The first of these declines is consistent with the
conclusion that airport security has improved in recent years. The decline in military
targets is likely a reflection of scaled-back military engagements in Iraq and
Afghanistan since 2008. The large drop in attacks on journalists and the media is
interesting given recent concerns that journalists are frequently targeted by terrorists
(Carr 2012). Yet attacks against airports/airlines and journalists/media are relatively
infrequent, which means that small changes in numbers yield high percentage changes.
Despite the differences noted, the six most commonly targeted entities (private citizens,
business, government, police, military, transportation) remained the same during the
two time frames and jointly accounted for more than three-quarters of all terrorist
targets (78 percent from 1970–2008 and 80 percent from 2009–2011). Nevertheless,
there were clearly major changes in terrorist targeting over time, which would be
worthwhile to examine in more detail.

Tactics

The coding of the GTD also permits the examination of long-term trends in tactics used
by terrorists. For purposes of this analysis, we divided terrorist tactics into eight
categories: bombings, armed assaults, assassinations, facility or infrastructure attacks,
Kidnappings, barricade/hostage taking, unarmed assaults, and hijackings.

Bombings are attacks using explosive devices, including bombs detonated manually or by remote timer and suicide bombings. Armed assaults are in-person attacks whose primary objective is to cause physical harm or death directly on human targets by any means other than explosives. Hence, we classify the use of an explosive or an incendiary device as a bombing, but the use of a projectile grenade in the hands of an attacker as an armed assault. Assassinations are attacks that kill or attempt to kill specific high-profile individuals. Such attacks are considered assassinations even if accomplished with another tactic. A recent example occurred in October 2011, when suspected members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula placed a bomb in the car of an Air Force colonel in Yemen, killing the colonel and two passengers. This attack was classified as an assassination, rather than a bombing, given the colonel's prominent position. Facility or infrastructure attacks are those whose primary objective is to cause damage to non-human targets, such as buildings or monuments. Kidnappings involve hostage taking of persons or groups of persons distinguished by the intention to move and hold the hostages in a clandestine location. Barricade/hostage attacks are those whose primary objective is to obtain political or other concessions in return for the release of the hostages. Such attacks are distinguished from kidnappings because the incident occurs and usually plays out at the target location without holding the hostages in a separate clandestine location. Hijackings are attacks that involve the forcible takeover of vehicles, including airplanes, buses, and ships, for the purpose of obtaining some concession, such as the payment of a ransom or the release of political prisoners. Hijackings differ from barricade/hostage attacks in that the target is the vehicle, regardless of whether there are people inside.

In both periods, bombings are the most common tactic, followed by armed attacks, with the shares of each increasing modestly from 1970–2008 to 2009–2011.

Table 5.2 shows the distribution of terrorist tactics.5 In both periods, bombings are the most common tactic, followed by armed attacks, with the shares of each increasing modestly from 1970–2008 to 2009–2011. The largest increase in share was for kidnappings. Meanwhile, the share of assassinations dropped by more than half. Facilities attacks became somewhat less common. Hostage-taking, hijackings, and unarmed assaults were rarely used and became even more uncommon after 2008. A decline in aerial hijackings supports our tentative supposition that airport security may have improved.

Weapons

A logical tendency is to think that most terrorist strikes are complex and carefully orchestrated and rely heavily on sophisticated weaponry. This inclination is heightened
by high-profile cases like the coordinated 9/11 attacks in the United States and subsequent ones in London and Mumbai, as well as treatments of terrorism in the media and movies.

Table 5.3 examines the types of weapons used by terrorists. Contrary to the typical view of terrorism, the vast majority of terrorist attacks relied on ordinary, accessible weapons: explosives and firearms. These two types accounted for close to 90 percent of all attacks. For the most part, the explosives used were readily available, especially dynamite, grenades, and improvised devices placed inside vehicles ("car bombs"). Similarly, the most commonly used firearms were widely available, especially automatic weapons, shotguns, and pistols. Incendiaries accounted for a declining share of weapons. Given the dominance of explosives and firearms as weapons of choice, the most important shift in the use of weapons over recent years has been toward explosives and away from firearms. Equipment sabotage, where attackers attempt to disrupt the functioning of an existing system (e.g., removing bolts to dismantle vehicles or cutting cables from bridges), was uncommon in both periods, but the share of cases nearly tripled from 1970–2008 to 2009–2011. Melee attacks, where the perpetrator comes into direct contact with the target using lowtechnology weapons such as fists or knives, accounted for a consistent share. All other types of weapons declined in share. This includes the use of more sophisticated weapons that are highly regulated by the
international community and subject to sanctions, such as those involving chemical, biological, and radiological agents, which are exceedingly rare. Among the attacks, 200 involved chemical agents (183 from 1970–2008 and 17 from 2009–2011), 7 32 involved biological agents (30 versus 2), 8 and 13 involved radiological agents (all from 1970–2008). 9

All other types of weapons declined in share. This includes the use of more sophisticated weapons that are highly regulated by the international community and subject to sanctions, such as those involving chemical, biological, and radiological agents, which is exceedingly rare.

Regional Differences in Terrorist Activity

Given the high profile of terrorist attacks originating in the Middle East/North Africa in recent years, it is easy to disregard the number of terrorist attacks originating in other parts of the world. To study this aspect, we divide countries into nine regions: East and Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe. 10

The countries and territories classified in each region are listed in Table 5.4.

Table 6.4 Classification of Countries by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Countries/Territories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>China, Hong Kong, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macao, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guadeloupe, Guatemela, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the Virgin Islands (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, and Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Canada, Mexico, and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa (Western Samoa), Solomon Islands, Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam, and Wallis and Futuna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Conisia, Denmark, East Germany, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Isle of Man, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.2 displays total attacks and fatalities from 1970–2011 by region. The most striking result is that Latin America experienced the highest share of attacks (27 percent). In this region, highly active terrorist groups operated for prolonged stretches during the past four decades, including the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Over the period spanned by the GTD, militant groups in the Middle East/North Africa region were next most active, accounting for nearly 20 percent of total attacks. South Asian countries rank third, with 19 percent of attacks. This is unsurprising given the persistent conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka. The remaining regions account for 34 percent of attacks. While activity in Western European countries is now far less frequent than during the height of conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Basque area of Spain, and Italy, the region accounts for 14 percent of attacks. Both Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia/Oceania registered less than half the number of attacks observed in Western Europe. Eastern Europe, North America, and East and Central Asia each account for less than four percent of the total.

Regional patterns for fatalities are substantially different. Latin America remains the leader, but the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in this region barely exceeded the corresponding figures for the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia. In addition,
the ratio of fatalities to attacks varies widely across the regions. Sub-Saharan Africa averaged nearly five deaths per terrorist attack, compared to one death for every 2.4 attacks in Western Europe. Part of the explanation may be limitations in the data, such as selective, inconsistent media coverage. Yet a good deal of the observed variation in lethality is likely due to the political context and the extent of the security presence and access to quality medical care. Consider that seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa averaged more than 10 fatalities per attack: Rwanda (22.3), Djibouti (14.2), Mozambique (12.1), Chad (12.0), Burundi (10.9), Ethiopia (10.4), and Guinea (10.1). Also, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda staged a series of brutal terrorist attacks resulting in large numbers of fatalities throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Since 2009, the LRA perpetrated two attacks with over 50 fatalities and three others with at least 20 fatalities. Some of these incidents took place in remote, rural settings, where police and doctors are limited in number. This contrasts with the attacks in Western Europe, which often target urban areas with an existing infrastructure of elite counter-terrorism units and first responders.

Figure 5.3 compares the shares of total attacks by region during 1970–2008 and 2009–2011. Two of the top three regions in the first period—Latin America and
Western Europe—rank sixth and seventh in the second period. Only 3 percent of terrorist attacks recorded by the GTD from 2009–2011 took place in Latin America. Terrorism rates in this region during earlier years were driven up with attacks committed by leftist organizations (e.g., FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, FMLN in El Salvador), whose fortunes declined substantially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. North America and East and Central Asia also experienced declines in the shares of terrorist activity between the two periods. Meanwhile, South Asia and the Middle East/North Africa have been elevated in importance during the recent years. Likewise, Southeast Asia and Oceania and Eastern Europe exhibited significant increases in shares of attacks. Sub-Saharan Africa's proportion remained about the same.

Table 5.5  Top 25 Most Attacked Countries & Territories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of Attacks</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>24.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Peru*</td>
<td>6.71%</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>16.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>El Salvador*</td>
<td>5.91%</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>13.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>5.47%</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>10.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4.65%</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>4.28%</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spain*</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3.46%</td>
<td>Somalia**</td>
<td>2.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sri Lanka*</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
<td>Nigeria**</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
<td>Yemen**</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Greece**</td>
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<td>Kenya*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Syria**</td>
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<td>1.28%</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza Strip</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* This country was only in the top 25 from 1970–2008.
** This country was only in the top 25 from 2009–2011.
Given the substantial differences in attacks by region, it is unsurprising that they also vary greatly by country. Table 5.5 shows the 25 most frequently attacked countries/territories during 1970–2008 and 2009–2011. High-conflict territories, such as Corsica, Northern Ireland, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, are listed separately. The importance of Latin America as a site of terrorism from 1970–2008 is underscored by the fact that Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador exhibited the highest number of attacks for this period. By contrast, Peru and El Salvador are not in the top 25 list for 2009–2011, while Colombia fell to number nine. In addition, three other Latin American countries made the top 25 for 1970–2008: Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. None is among the top 25 for the 2009–2011 period.

Prior to 2009, the top 25 included four countries and territories in Western Europe, six in South and Southeast Asia, and six in the Middle East/Northern Africa. South Africa is the lone country from Sub-Saharan Africa in the top 25, while Russia is the only East European country. The United States finishes as 13th among the top 25 countries prior to 2009.

During the subsequent period, several Latin American and West European countries and territories, among others, dropped out of the top 25, a circumstance often associated with the end of long civil conflicts. They are replaced primarily by countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East/North Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. In addition, Greece entered the list, which is an exception to the general trend of declining terrorism in Western Europe. Not surprisingly, Iraq ranks highest in total attacks in 2009–2011, accounting for nearly 25 percent of all attacks during this period. Of note, only 16 of these attacks targeted US nationals—this relatively small number is a likely consequence of the fact that most attacks on American military personnel are counted as warfare, rather than terrorism, and therefore excluded from the GTD. Only three other Middle Eastern/Northern African countries or territories entered the top 25 for 2009–2011. Nevertheless, Yemen, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories combined with Iraq to make the Middle East/North Africa the region that was the most frequent target of terrorism during this period, with just over 27 percent of all attacks.

The United States failed to rank among the top 25 for the last three years of the series. The GTD includes 38 terrorist attacks committed in the United States during 2009–2011. A closer examination of these attacks reveals that the majority of them were domestic, perpetrated most often by eco-terrorist groups (21 percent) or by groups or individuals without a clear organizational affiliation (39 percent).

**Spatially Disaggregating the GTD—An Illustration with the United States**

A substantial share of the academic research on political violence has involved studies
with the country-year as the unit of analysis. A novel aspect of the GTD is the ability to
disaggregate terrorism attacks around the world by both space and time. In keeping
with the special theme of this issue of Peace and Conflict, we provide a closer look
into these features of the GTD. At present, only about 40 percent of the GTD is geocoded
to the county level. Nonetheless, we demonstrate the potential utility of such analysis,
using the United States as an example.

Figure 5.4 shows attacks within the United States from 1970–2011. In all, the GTD
includes 2,362 attacks during this period. We created a proportional symbol map to
display the concentration of terrorist attacks across 3,140 US counties.\(^{12}\) The size of the
dots is proportional to the number of events that took place in an area, with larger dots
representing a higher frequency.

**Figure 5.4 Terrorist Attacks in US Counties, 1970–2011**

Of significant note, each of the 50 US states suffered at least one terrorist attack
between 1970 and 2011. Not surprisingly, however, attacks were concentrated in major
population centers. In fact, 33 percent occurred in just five counties: New York County,
NY (Manhattan) (n=337); Los Angeles County, CA (n=158); San Francisco County, CA
(n=98); Miami-Dade County, FL (n=96); and the District of Columbia (n=81). Meanwhile,
88 percent of counties had no recorded attacks.\(^ {13}\)

**Disaggregating the GTD by Time**
The GTD also allows us to place events down to the day that they occurred. The observed variation has implications for counter-terrorism policy and operational decisions.

Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of attacks by month. The increase in terrorist violence from February through May coincides with the onset of spring “fighting season” in Afghanistan, where attacks rose by 93 percent during 2003–2011. This compares to 19 percent for the rest of the world, which includes many climates that are less sensitive to the northern hemisphere’s seasonal changes.

Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of attacks by day of the week. Attacks were most frequent on Mondays and least frequent on Saturdays—a difference of 19 percent. In fact, attacks are more common from Monday through Thursday than Friday through Sunday. This pattern may be driven by the desire of terrorists to optimize media coverage and to strike at times when people are likely to be present during the work day. All nine regions exhibit fewer attacks on Saturdays than on Mondays. The drop varies, however, from 3 percent in Western Europe to 34 percent in Latin America.
Conclusion

This chapter examined the most recently available data on terrorist activity from the GTD, emphasizing changes in trends and characteristics before and after our last report on data through 2008. Our review suggests that both total terrorist attacks and fatalities increased dramatically from 1970 to the early 1990s, declined until about 2000–2002, and then increased again during the past decade. In 2011, fatalities were at their highest level since 1970, and total attacks were just short of the peak.

As in our earlier Peace and Conflict reviews (LaFree, Dugan, and Fahey 2008; LaFree, Dugan, and Cragin 2010; LaFree and Dugan 2012), the most common targets of terrorists continued to be private citizens and property—a pattern amplified from 2009–2011. Bombings and armed assaults remained the most common tactics, followed by assassinations, facility attacks, and kidnappings, and these patterns have also grown more pronounced since 2009. A majority of attacks involved readily available explosives or firearms, with the former increasing and the latter decreasing in share after 2008.

Over the past four decades, Latin America leads other regions in terms of both total attacks and fatalities. From 1970–2008, seven Latin American countries were in the top
25 in terms of terrorism. During the period from 2009–2011, however, the most active regions for terrorism were the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia, accounting for more than 72 percent of attacks recorded in the GTD. The decline in attacks in Latin America coincides with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had important implications for leftist insurgencies and civil wars throughout the region. These results remind us that trends in terrorism do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they interact with geopolitical circumstances and events. Meanwhile, the rapid increase in terrorist attacks in the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia since 9/11 also coincides with an emergence of civil conflict in these regions. Clearly, policies that address the sources of these conflicts may have meaningful consequences for the sources of terrorism.

From 1970–2008, seven Latin American countries were in the top 25 in terms of terrorism. During the period from 2009–2011, however, the most active regions for terrorism were the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia, accounting for more than 72 percent of attacks recorded in the GTD.

The GTD can be a useful source of data on the microdynamics of conflict because it records the day on which attacks occurred and, for a subset of cases, the city or county (or province) where they occurred. We demonstrated the potential for spatial and temporal disaggregation of the GTD by showing terrorist attacks in the United States by county and by showing worldwide terrorist attacks by month and day of the week. In the case of the United States, the analysis and accompanying visualizations reveal that terrorist attacks are heavily concentrated in large cities, but have occurred in all US states at some point since 1970. We also show that the worldwide occurrences of terrorist attacks are more frequent in specific months and days of the week. In the future, we plan to undertake far more detailed analysis of GTD disaggregated by time and place.

Footnotes

1 GTD is comprehensive for this time period, with the exception of 1993 data, most of which were misplaced by the original collectors, prior to the transfer of the records to START, and have never been recovered (LaFree and Dugan 2007). Consequently, all findings exclude attacks from 1993. The GTD data are updated annually and made available publicly through START’s website: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Data collection for 2012 was underway as this chapter was being prepared. Under a contract with the US State Department, an abridged version of the GTD will support the statistical annex for the US State Department’s 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism.

2 Event databases can have limitations. The media may report inaccuracies and lies, and there may be conflicting information or false, multiple, or no claims of responsibility. Maintaining consistency is also challenging. The longer the lag between events and data collection, the greater the chances that some data will no longer be available. By the time we computerized the original GTD data, which ended in 1997, and secured funding for new data collection in 2005, we were eight years behind. In working to make the
data current, we had to rely on historical sources; for more recent years, we approached real-time data collection. Availability of sources erodes over time, causing underreporting or missing data. This is most problematic when media—especially small, regional, and local newspapers—are not archived. In addition, compiling and maintaining databases is expensive. Amid budget crises and cost-cutting pressures, data collection can be an attractive target for elimination.

3 Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) compared GTD and ITERATE data over time and found that from 1978 to 2005, the two databases provide very similar trends. From 1970 to mid-1977, however, the number of attacks in ITERATE, which is limited to international attacks, consistently exceeds the number of international attacks reported by GTD, leading us to suspect that GTD undercounts events during this earlier period.

4 The total number of targets exceeds the total number of terrorist attacks because each attack can have multiple targets.

5 Terrorist attacks can rely on multiple tactics. Thus, the number of tactics may be larger than the number of attacks. Attacks where no tactic was determined are excluded from the analysis.

6 Each attack can involve multiple weapons; this table lists all mentioned weapons for each attack.

7 Chemical agents range from letters containing rat poison to tainted water supplies.

8 Ten of the 32 biological weapons cases were the US anthrax attacks of 2001—in which seven people died. Other biological agents include salmonella and ricin.

9 Ten of the thirteen radiological weapons were monazite, while plutonium and iodine were each used once. No detail was provided about the thirteenth chemical weapon.

10 GTD identifies 13 regions. For purposes of this analysis, we combined some regions (e.g., Caribbean with Latin America, Southeast Asia with Australia and the rest of Oceania) in order to simplify the figures. Countries like Cyprus are listed according to their geography (Middle East), not their governance (Greece-Turkey).

11 We exclude two attacks that occurred in international territory and three attacks for which the country was missing.

12 The term “county” is also used for county-equivalent geographic subdivisions, including parishes and boroughs.

13 Counties and county equivalents change somewhat over time. These estimates are based on the number of counties and county equivalents in 2010. Data for 1993 are excluded.
CHAPTER 3

Violence and structures
Chapter 3. Violence and structures

The news of 6 April 2009. The first item takes the viewer to the village of Mbyo, Rwanda. Two men, Frédérique Kazingwemo and Félix Habiymana, look back at the Rwandan genocide, which began exactly 15 years ago. The voice over tells us that one is Hutu and the other a Tutsi, driven apart by the war. Frédérique participated in the genocide, 'I am a murderer' he admits. Félix fled to Burundi, and upon returning to his village he found out that most of his family had been killed. Now the two men are friends again. They stand close to each other, they shake hands. 'It was not our fault' they explain. 'It was the system.' The next item shifts to the banking crisis and its causes. A young banker, in front of a glass building, pitches his truth: 'it is not the individual bankers who are to blame for this, it's the system'.

Frédérique's and Félix's explanation of the genocide, and – although of little case relevance here – the banker's reaction to the financial crisis, take us back to the discussion on framing and blaming of the introductory chapter: by categorizing and labelling acts of violence (such as in Rwanda) we, intentionally or not, become engaged in discussions on blame and responsibility. Although recognizing Frédérique's role as perpetrator in the Rwandan genocide, the two men from Mbyo point out that it is the system that is to blame for the genocide, not the individual or collective agent. By implication, they state that they – both perpetrator and victim – merely followed the rules of the system: they were forced into certain positions and merely 'played their part'. Similarly, the banker points out that neither he, nor his colleagues, were responsible for the banking crisis that hit the world in 2008: they just went along with the system. These everyday observations on the distinction between 'the individual' and 'the system' bring us to a fundamental ontological divide in the social sciences between approaches that claim that human action can only be accounted for by appealing to some larger whole (structuralism) and orientations which claim that structures can only be accounted for by appeal to individual agents (individualism). Simply put, is it agency or structure that is most important to explain human action? Does the 'structure of the social system' determine the actions of individuals, or vice versa? And do these positions stand in a radical, and insoluble 'chicken-or-egg' relation to one another, or can they perhaps be complementary? Although a truly elaborate discussion of these issues is beyond the scope (and capacity) of this book, the agency–structure debate is inescapable in the study of violent conflict. Throughout the book, we will turn to insights from the philosophy of social sciences to help us position the various conflict approaches in their proper 'ontological boxes'. Roughly, we can state that agency-based approaches locate the sources of violent conflict at the level of individual agency. Structure-based approaches, by contrast, locate the causes of violent
conflict in the organization of society. It is this latter category which will be at the core of this chapter on structures and violence.

In their analysis of the connection between structure and violent conflict the approaches discussed in this chapter draw on two different sociological traditions: Marxian and Durkheimian. Roughly, the Marxian tradition places emphasis on the *material conditions that shape social relations*. The essence of Marxian thought is that social change is firmly rooted in material, economic conditions. Conflict, in this view, results from the inherent contradiction in the structure of the capitalist system, where those who control the means of production (the dominant class) stand in direct opposition to those whose only property is their labour time (the workers). The task of conflict analysis is to identify the main social classes and interests which emerge from the organization of production, examine the resulting conflicts of interest, and consequently, the readiness and capacity of each class and its representatives to act on its interests. By contrast, Durkheimian traditions focus on *what holds societies together*, that is, on the structure of ‘social rules’ that function to bring society (back) to order and social equilibrium. The classic Durkheimian idea presents society as characterized by a continuous struggle between forces of integration and forces of disintegration. Society, in this view, exerts its control over individuals through their participation in a shared consciousness. ‘The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience’ (Durkheim 1933: 79). Rapid social change (e.g. industrialization, urbanization, modernization) weakens the controls and attachments which normally sustain these shared beliefs and keep people in their places. From this, Durkheim derives models of three different kinds of collective action: routine, anomic and restorative. If all is stable and a society is characterized by high levels of shared beliefs these will be sustained routinely. If shared beliefs are shaken, however, this translates into a set of undesirable results: individual disorientation, destructive social life and conflict (anomie). Disorder and conflict are thus seen as the outcome of a process in which social change weakens the system that holds people in their places. It is only through restorative collective action that societies can move back to stability and a new or renewed commitment to shared beliefs.

The structure-based approaches under review here all aim to show the interconnectedness between the organization of society and violent conflict. Conflict is explained as deriving from violence *inherent* to political, economic, cultural and geopolitical structures. The influence of the above sociological traditions can be recognized in the analysis of how the incapacity of political institutions such as the state (not society in general, as Durkheim would argue) to deal with rapid (economic) change translates into anomic collective action, but also in the Marxist idea of false consciousness as discussed by Galtung, or the references to Gramsci’s views on the role
of hegemonic culture in ‘mainstreaming’ the values of the dominant classes as commonsense values of all.

This chapter has a threefold aim. First, it discusses the work of the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung, one of the principal founders of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, and in particular his notion of structural violence and the conflict triangle. Second, this chapter aims to bring to life abstract structuralism by reviewing more applied structure-based analyses that examine the interconnections between the structure of global systems and local conflict. This second part of the chapter addresses the ‘political economy of violent conflict’. It examines in particular the connections between structural contradictions inherent to the modern state system, global capitalism and global governance and contemporary violent conflict. In the third and final part of the chapter, we briefly return to the role of ‘framing’ by means of Mark Duffield’s work on the representation of the ‘borderlands’ and the biopolitics of the new interventionism of the post Cold War era. With this, we clearly move away from the focus on group formation and group dynamics so dominant in the previous chapters. Where, for instance, social identity theory does not incorporate historic, economic or political contexts into the analysis, to its structuralist counterparts context is everything.

**Manifest violence and structural violence**

I think it is safe to say that the large majority of theories that fall under the heading of Conflict Studies focus on what could be named ‘manifest violence’: violence as visible, instrumental and expressive action. It is this kind of violence that is generally defined as ‘an act of physical hurt’. Since the violent act is visible and concrete, it is an efficient way of staging an ideological message before a public audience (Riches 1986: 11). It is the kind of ‘breaking news’ violence that comes to us from our television and computer screens. That both seems to fascinate and appal audiences worldwide: the suicide attacks, urban riots, precision bombings and mass murders of our times. It is the kind of violence that is performed by identifiable individuals such as Frédérique, that made Félix flee his village, and that killed his family. It is also this violence that provokes humanitarian interventions, NGO negotiation, PhD research, humanitarian aid, weapon trade and war journalism: what can be cynically referred to as ‘the conflict industry’. If episodes of manifest violence end this is often termed peace. Although acknowledging the importance of the study of manifest violence, structure-based approaches of violent conflict argue for a much broader understanding of violence. Manifest violence is just the visible component of the phenomenon. Underlying these ‘acts of physical hurt’ are other forms of violence, sectioned into structural (or systemic) and cultural (or symbolic). This is the violence done to people in much more diffuse and indirect ways
such as the subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of exploitation and repression.

In an influential article published in the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1969, Johan Galtung, seen by many as the founding father of Peace and Conflict Studies, argued against the empiricist and behaviourist models of his time and in favour of a radical new understanding of violence. Galtung argues that violence is built into unequal, unjust and unrepresentative social structures (imperialism, capitalism, caste society, patriarchy, racism, colonialism) and should hence be defined as a situation in which actual realizations of human beings are below their potential realizations. In a reframing from 1996 he defines violence as:

> avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally *life*, lowering the real levels of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible.

(1996: 197)

The difference between actual and potential needs satisfaction can be defined by the actors themselves or by others (e.g. researchers), but it can only be seen as indicative of violence if the perceived difference is avoidable. Thus, if a person dies from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical recourses available, then this is what Galtung would call structural violence. People are caught up in structures of exploitation and repression that are harmful and damaging to them, hence – physically – hurtful, and violent. With this, the terrain of conflict research is extended substantially, including into the analysis the processes and mechanisms that prevent people from realizing their potential, that is, the silent violence of poverty, low education, poor health and in general low life expectancy inherent in the way societies are organized. Clearly, by drawing this new definitional boundary, Galtung aims to politicize and bring to the fore what is largely taken for granted. By labelling poverty and underdevelopment as violence, he is casting blame and responsibility, pointing at the underlying forces supporting and legitimizing this. He draws our attention to violence in the normality of things, for we are so obsessed and distracted by the spectacular forms of violence (the killing, maiming, war rape), that we fail to address the much less visible, but massively destructive force of structural violence that lies underneath (people dying from lack of health care, malnutrition, slavery). This profoundly rocks the analytical boat of violent conflict studies and commonsensical dichotomies of war versus peace. For what we hitherto recognized as a state of ‘peace’ (the absence of protracted manifest violence) may actually be a state of conflict. Through Galtung’s analytical lens, peace may very well be sustained by highly destructive forms of structural violence. He clarifies this by making the distinction between *negative peace* and *positive peace*. Whereas negative peace is
defined as the absence of manifest violence, positive peace is defined as the overcoming of structural (and cultural) violence as well. Slavoj Zizek in his introduction to Violence (2008: 2) eloquently addresses the ‘violent peace’ paradox as follows:

The catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as the perturbation of the ‘normal’, peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this ‘normal’ state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systematic violence is thus something like the notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all-too-visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be ‘irrational’ explosions of subjective violence.

It is indeed this connection between structural violence (or Zizek’s systemic violence) and the ‘explosions’ of manifest (subjective) violence that needs further exploration. It is the interconnectedness of violence that is at the core of the approaches under review in this chapter. Galtung’s canonical ‘conflict triangle’ will serve as entry point.

**Galtung’s conflict triangle**

Manifest violence is only one of three components that together form Galtung’s conflict triangle. It certainly is the more spectacular and visible of the three and the one that attracts most attention, but for any situation to be a conflict this ‘behavioural’ (B) component must be linked to two invisible components: attitudes and assumptions (A) and contradiction (C). I will here explain Galtung’s conflict triangle in two steps. First, we look at the triangle as a model to describe the life-cycle of conflicts. Second, we discuss how the triangle can serve as a model to grapple with the distinction between what Galtung coined ‘actor conflict’ and ‘structural conflict’, and ultimately, the relation between manifest and structural violence.

**The triangle as conflict life-cycle**

Conflict, according to Galtung, is a triadic construct. Only if we have A, B and C do we have fully articulated conflict. There is thus a manifest (B) and a latent side (A and C) to conflict. The manifest, empirical and observed side is identified by B for behaviour (violence, discrimination) and the latent, theoretical, inferred aspect of conflict is identified by A for attitude/assumptions (fear, prejudice) and C for contradiction.
Whereas A and B speak for themselves, what Galtung means by C needs perhaps a bit more elaboration. Contradiction (C) has to involve ‘something wanted’, named a ‘goal’, and its attainment a ‘goal state’. This is what Galtung identifies as the content of the conflict: ‘Deep inside every conflict lies a contradiction, *something standing in the way of something else*’ (1996: 70, emphasis added).

In most readings (e.g. Miall et al. 1999) Galtung’s triangle is primarily seen as a model to describe the escalatory and de-escalatory dynamics of a conflict. It is emphasized how it can be used to trace flows in all six directions, starting anywhere. A conflict spiral may, for instance, start in C. Let us say someone’s access to land is blocked by someone else (C). This may be experienced as frustration (A), and this frustration may lead to aggression (B). In return, aggressive behaviour may bring a new contradiction into the relation (for instance, the aggressive behaviour of the frustrated party may be incompatible with the other party’s concept of happiness). Hence, we have a new C, which may give rise to a new round of attitudes and behaviours, which may lead to new contradictions and so on and so forth. Violence breeds violence, and we may see an escalatory dynamics that runs its course like a fire: only stopping when the house is burnt down. Galtung describes how the parties may burn out in the A corner from emotional exhaustion, or in the B corner from physical fatigue. However, A and B may also be restrained, and the contradiction may be superseded.

Some conflicts, however, run their course in less obvious ways. The spiral may also start in A or B. A party may have accumulated a certain aggressiveness (e.g. from bad experiences in the past) and ‘when something comes along’ that looks like a problem (C), this negative energy is hitched on to this contradiction, unleashing a negative conflict spiral, with newly developing A > C > B dynamics. Used in this way, the triangle serves as a model to describe how conflict is a dynamic process in which contradictions, attitudes and behaviours are constantly changing and influencing one another. In sum, the triangle helps us to study the life-cycle of a conflict.

There is, however, more to the triangle than conflict dynamics alone, and it is this discussion, which deals with the dialectics between the manifest and the latent components of the triangle, that brings us back to the discussion on structural violence.

*Figure 3.1 Galtung’s conflict triangle*
**Actor conflict and structural conflict**

Galtung makes a distinction between *actor conflicts* and *structural conflicts*. In an actor conflict, the actor has agency, he or she is fully aware of the ‘real’ incompatibility underlying the conflict (C), and is ready to act with purpose. The actor is conscious of ‘what is’ (cognition), what (s)he wants (volition) and for that reason ‘ought to be’; and how (s)he feels (emotion). Simply put, A and C are fully conscious. And because A and C are clear and conscious, the actor can act (B) in accordance with them, that is, purposefully. This type of conflict is called ‘actor conflict’. The metaphor here is that of the actor as driver, in control of the car, clearly seeing all obstacles in his or her way. Most conflicts, however, are not as ‘conscious’. Very often, individuals have a false image of C, of what goal-states stand in the way of each other. A group of workers may for instance think that migrants are to blame for the rising levels of unemployment they experience (C) and start building up feelings of envy and hatred (A) towards them, which result in acts of aggression and discrimination (B). However, this may not be a realistic image of what is at hand. Instead, it may not be the migrants but the structure of the global economy that increasingly forces local corporations to relocate their businesses to low-tax and cheap labour regions that is causing unemployment (C). Only if they become aware of the ‘real C’ can the workers begin to act purposefully and try and resolve their conflict. When addressing the notion of false consciousness Galtung (1996: 74–5) explicitly refers to Marx, but takes a less objectivist view on what in the end determines the ‘true’ and the ‘false’. What his theory seems to imply is that by trial and error ultimately a realistic image of A, B, C will appear:

> We, party to the conflict or not, construct an image of the conflict, complete with A, B, and C of ourselves and the other party. Whether this is done by the participants or by the observer, that image will always remain a hypothesis, to be tested again and again and to be revised. False consciousness means a disconfirmed hypothesis, an unrealistic image, and that can happen to all of us. ... The test lies in what happens later.

If actors are not aware of A and C, this is what Galtung calls a structural conflict. Actors are caught up in structures of repression and exploitation but fail to recognize them as such. A and C are embedded in the subconscious: there is a contradiction but no awareness of it. There is not even false consciousness. People may feel frustrations, and even at times act upon these frustrations, but in random, senseless ways. But, we may ask, is then the term structural conflict not a contradiction in terms? What determines a conflict if not the actors themselves? With what right do we talk about a conflict at all? What is the C in structural conflict, and how are parties involved in it? Galtung’s reply to this is that the contradiction lies in the system tying them together, or to use another formulation, C lies in the *structure of the social system*. Actors are
unconscious of what is happening to them in the structure of the social system. They fail to see what it is that is standing in their way: what it is that prevents them from reaching their potential levels of needs satisfaction. While doing social life, people actually do harm to themselves. As the famous definition of ideology has it: ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it’. They fail to see the larger picture. This is what Galtung calls structural conflict. The archetypical structural conflict, in his view, has exploitation as a centre-piece. This simply means that some (the ‘top dogs’) get much more out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs (Galtung 1996: 198). Clearly, this relates straight back to a Marxian critique of capitalism as inherently exploitative and as defined by a fundamental conflict of interests between those in control of the means of production (the capitalists) and those who only control their labour (the workers). But what prevents people from seeing the larger scope of what is at stake? And what is required to transcend from structural to actor conflict?

**Cultural violence**

‘Just as political science is about two problems – the use of power and the legitimation of the use of power – violence studies are about two problems: the use of violence and the legitimation of that use’ (Galtung 1996: 196). Galtung introduces the notion of cultural violence to highlight how exploitation is legitimized and why people fail to see ‘what is standing in their way’. Culture (or rather certain aspects of culture) teaches and dulls us into seeing repression and exploitation as normal, or, rather, not see it at all. By cultural violence, Galtung (1996: 196) means:

> those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.

The study of cultural violence focuses on the way in which forms of both manifest violence and structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society. This idea of culture as sustaining and misrepresenting social structures of domination as ‘natural’ can be traced back to the work on cultural hegemony of the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937). Capitalism, Gramsci famously argued in his *Prison Notebooks*, is capable of sustaining itself not just through violence, economic coercion and political repression, but also ideologically, through a *hegemonic culture* in which the values of the dominant classes have become the ‘commonsense’ values of all. People, lost in their daily routines and worries, and guided by symbolic orders and notions of normality and commonsense, are incapable of perceiving the greater, systemic nature of socio-economic exploitation that cultural hegemony makes
possible. Gramsci’s thought importantly influenced later thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Zygmunt Baumann, Noam Chomsky and Judith Butler, and his influence is also clearly evident in the work of Galtung. We will return to the discussion on the legitimization of violence, under the heading of discourse theory, in chapter six.

We have so far identified three types of violence: manifest, structural and cultural. These forms of violence have a dialectic relation, constantly influencing and legitimizing one another. Despite the symmetry of Galtung’s violence triangle, there is nonetheless a basic difference in the time relation of the three concepts. Manifest violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs and cultural violence is permanent, remaining largely the same for long periods of time, given the slow transformation of basic culture. In describing how the three types of violence enter time differently, Galtung uses a metaphor from geology: with the earthquake as event, the movement of the tectonic plates as a process and the fault line as a more permanent condition (1996: 199). Just as was the case with the conflict triangle, causality flows in all six directions and cycles connecting manifest, structural and cultural violence may start at any corner, invoking different stories.

One such story is the way in which cultural violence both legitimizes the ‘fact’ of structural violence and the ‘act’ of manifest violence. Or how a causal flow can be identified from cultural to structural to manifest violence. Galtung gives the example of how the ‘criminalization of the poor’ is a form of cultural violence. Victims of structural violence (the exploited poor) are branded as evil aggressors when they try to break out of the ‘structural iron cage’ through the use of direct violence (see Loïc Wacquant’s Punishing the Poor, 2009). The story of slavery shows us how the vicious cycle of violence can also start in the manifest violence corner, leading to structural and eventually cultural violence (1996: 200):

Africans are captured, forced across the Atlantic to work as slaves; millions are killed in the process – in Africa, on board, in the Americas. The massive direct violence over centuries seeps down and sediments as massive structural violence, with whites as master topdogs and blacks as the slave underdogs, producing and reproducing massive cultural violence with racist ideas everywhere. After some time, direct violence is forgotten, slavery is forgotten, and only two labels show up, pale enough for college textbooks: ‘discrimination’ for massive structural violence and ‘prejudice’ for massive cultural violence. Sanitation of language: itself cultural violence.

What is repeatedly made clear here, and what is at the core of Marxian structure-based theories of violent conflict, is the violence in structures. The rules and regulations, cultural codes and norms that together make up the organization of societies, and that are largely taken for granted, are inherently violent. They are, however, often not
recognized as such. The overwhelming complexity of social life and the individual's dual structural role as both player and maker of the game, however, mean that he or she is caught up in a Gramscian hegemonic limited 'state of focus', where one cannot see out of the box.

Conscientization

Are we forever locked up in our boxes, or is there a chance of breaking out? In answering our second question (can we go from structural to actor conflict?) we run into the programmatic (transcendental) character of Galtung's work. Indeed, according to Galtung it is possible 'to lift C up from the subconscious and into the daylight'. This is called conscientization, a concept taken from Paulo Freire. Again, the link to Marxist calls for the 'awakening of the proletariat' and Gramsci's 'educating the masses' is obvious. Often, Galtung argues, actors, unconscious of the contradiction in the structure of the social system (be it on the personal, social or world level) have a 'frustration image' as a passing stage before the more realistic image of the conflict emerges. Women may feel frustrations at not being in control of their lives, working classes at never reaching middle class incomes, and these frustrations may trigger occasional acts of violence. But only when women and workers become aware of the contradiction in the social system (patriarchy, capitalism) will they be able to act purposefully, and see the very concrete actors on the other side. It is only then that they enter the arena of 'actor conflict' and can begin to work on conflict resolution. Galtung remains somewhat enigmatic about what exactly triggers conscientization, except in references to 'the spirit', and the 'reflective capacity' of conflict parties. He hints at the role of emotions, particularly frustration, as a guiding force. 'The frustration phase becomes like a crust of ice on a frosty day as the consciousness passes from the cold waters underneath into the clear air above' (1996: 77). In chapter four we will address the notion of collective action frames as a more focused analytical concept to study what Galtung refers to as conscientization. 'Collective action frames redefine social conditions as unjust and intolerable with the intention of mobilizing potential participants, which is achieved by making appeals to perceptions of justice and emotionality in the minds of individuals' (Tarrow 1998: 111).

Galtung is theoretically omnivorous, and mostly interested in how we get from being puppets on a string, to true actors. He calls for the 'freeing of the spirit', 'escaping the realm of the subconscious', to become value-directed, aware and capable of seeing the 'real' incompatibility in the structure of the social system. At times he supports an interpretative epistemology (the statement "this is a conflict" should always be taken as an hypothesis' (1996: 70, my emphasis)) but he also hints at objectivism by stating that actors only know what they want subconsciously: 'they want it but they do not
know that themselves’ (1996: 80). Above all, his work is programmatic. He clearly argues for a movement: down from the ‘rule follower’ living in the upper right quadrant of our matrix to the purposeful ‘actor’ of the bottom right box. Although repeatedly referring to Marxist thought, he keeps his distance from the more objectivist or deterministic approaches to what constitutes the real contradiction. He calls for a constructive peace studies, which builds upon both empirical peace studies (informing us only about patterns and conditions for peace or violence in the past) and critical peace studies (as pointing out what is wrong) to do just what architects and engineers are doing: take theories about what might work and bring them together with values about what ought to work in order to build new habitats and constructions. For Galtung, Peace and Conflict Studies should be understood as a socially ‘productive’ discipline only feasible in terms of investigation-action, thus breaking the barrier between theory and practice. This pedagogy of dividing academic training into three stages of (1) evidence-based analysis; (2) critique; (3) creation has become quite influential.

**Structure: force without a face**

Galtung’s work can be positioned in the wider ‘structuralist turn’ of scholarly thought of the 1960s and 1970s. Structure-based analysis, in particular Marxian understandings of the global political economy, exemplified by for instance the Latin American Independencia school and the rise of the field of Development Studies, was important in the shaping of academic thinking on issues of peace and war. Galtung’s definition of structural violence is operationalized at state and sub-state levels by a variety of authors (Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; Preti 2002: Farmer 1996; Kent 1999, for an overview see Jacoby 2008). Likewise, the idea of ‘false consciousness’ is, in a broad variety of ways, implied in structure-based conflict analyses. Authors arguing from a structure-based approach have, for instance, repeatedly critiqued dominant representations of contemporary conflicts as ‘ethnic’ as distorted, as a false image (e.g. Woodward 1995; Storey 1999). These distorted images can be understood as being brought in intentionally: ‘top dogs’ have an interest in framing the frustrations of ‘underdogs’ as deriving from religious or ethnic antagonisms, where the real contradiction is economic exploitation. However, the top dog/underdog dichotomy seems simplistic, and it is hence acknowledged by many structure-based analysts that although in the end elite machinations are essential, often the actors involved (both top and underdog) operate according to a much more implicit and ambiguous practical logic and ‘feel for the game’ (as in Bourdieu’s *Logic of Practice*). It is here that the Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony comes in with its emphasis on how difficult it is for us to see the ‘larger picture’ shaping our routines and relationships. In our times of ‘high globalization’ this picture is indeed complex. Partly, this complexity explains
the tendency – of both political leaders and audiences – to target concrete ‘evil others’ as the source of misery and suffering rather than ‘structures’, for these are not only hard to substantiate, they are also seen as uncontrollable. As Appadurai (2006: 44) puts it ‘globalisation is a force without a face’, and although the changes it brings may give rise to deep anxieties and social uncertainties it cannot be targeted in any ‘satisfactory’ way. ‘Ethnic others’, by contrast, can.

Structure-based approaches to conflict try to steer away from the emphasis on violent agents (perpetrators and victims) and focus the analysis on the underlying organization of society as shaping and sustaining violent conflict. In this, they are confronted with the question ‘what structures do we see at work?’ and the empirical difficulty of substantiating causal relations. Most structuralist theories require no clear subject–action–object relationship (I hit/shot/killed you) but a diffuse subject–object relationship, something we will discuss further in chapter four. Another important issue is how to define this ‘abstract force’ often referred to as ‘structure’. As explained in the introductory chapter by means of the Hollis matrix the authors under review in this chapter understand structures as ‘sets of meaning rules’ rather than objective, external ‘laws’ determining social behaviour. That is, they understand structures as ‘games’ with specific constitutive and regulative rules and practices. These ‘games’ are external to each individual player, in the sense that we as individuals have a tendency to follow the rules of the game obediently. But ‘games’ are seen as internal to the players collectively. Ultimately, games are socially constructed, and inter-subjective. Giddens (1979: 64) defined structures in this sense as ‘rules and resources recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems’. Structures are thus ‘rules that are articulated in social interaction and tell people how to “do” social life, and the resources on which people can call to achieve their objectives’ (Wallace and Wolf 1999: 181). Structures are hence relational, shaped by power differences (access to resources) and both enabling and constraining (telling us how to do, but also how not to do social life).

There is no set level for how to apply structure-based theory. The core assumption of structure-based approaches is that systems largely shape the actions of their units, be it at the global, regional, state or community level. The key question of this chapter on structure-based approaches to violent conflict revolves around the interconnection between structure and (collective) action. In the remainder of this chapter we will discuss the work of a selection of prominent conflict scholars who explore the connection between global structures and local violent conflict. I have deliberately selected authors who work from a global perspective, for this allows us to extend our levels-of analysis approach by drawing in national, regional and global levels. Although they see different structures at work differently, all authors explore the connections between violent conflict and the organization of society. Three global systems are highlighted: the modern state system, global capitalism and global governance.
Notably, the authors under review here are not just single voices but represent strands of thought within the academic literature on global development and conflict.

**Unending failure: the state-making paradox**

In his work on 'state-making and state-breaking' Mohammed Ayoob (2007) understands contemporary violent conflict in the global South in the context of the process of state formation. More precisely, in the context of a crisis in state formation. His main point is that postcolonial states are expected to replicate in a few decades a process that took developed states a couple of centuries and a long series of bloody wars, that is, the establishment of relatively stable, centralized modern states. Both the enormity of the time lag, and the radical difference in international norms and political contexts highly complicate state formation. It is this crisis of 'state-making' that is the source of most contemporary violent conflicts in the underdeveloped world.

At the core of Ayoob's work is the argument that the democratic nation-states of the developed world, with their relatively high levels of legitimacy and consent, did not evolve overnight. The process of sovereign state-making that took shape in sixteenth-century Europe was a top-down, elite-driven and lengthy process, by which disparate populations were cajoled and coerced to ultimately accept the legitimacy of the state and its institutions to extract resources, set territorial boundaries and control the monopoly over the use of violence. As Charles Tilly points out, this was by no means a peaceful process:

> The building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labour ... The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organisations with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities ... Most of the European populations resisted each phase of the creation of strong states.

*(Tilly 1975: 71 in Ayoob 2007 :130)*

This process of state-making antedated the formation of nation-states by at least a couple of centuries. The distinction between state and nation-state is crucial here. A state is a 'relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organization successfully claiming priority in the use of force within a large, contiguous, and clearly bounded territory' (Tilly 1990: 43). The notion of the nation-state, however, entails the idea of a state whose inhabitants form a nation: a 'shared culture' (Gellner 1983) or 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). The idea of the nation-state, and hence
nationalism as the principle that ‘the boundaries of the state and nation should be congruent’ emerged in the nineteenth century, when the rise of capitalism and industrialization created the need for a more homogeneous, standardized society. It was only then that people began to imagine themselves as being part of a nation, and that the process of national identification began to take shape. Although there is debate among scholars about the when and why of the rise of the nation-state, there is ample agreement on how it took centuries of uncivil wars, coercion and bloodshed before European states could overcome their weaknesses, remedy their administrative deficiencies, and bring ‘lukewarm loyalty up to the white heat of nationalism’ (Ayoob 2007: 131).

In the post WWII era, the imaginary of the socially cohesive, political responsive and administratively effective nation-state of the developed world became the standard ideal type. State-makers in postcolonial (but also postcommunist) countries who fail to live up to this ideal-typical template risk international ridicule and permanent peripherality within the system of states. Their states are labelled as ‘failed’, ‘fragile’ or ‘collapsed’. Ayoob argues that in order to copy the process of nation-state building, state-makers in developing countries need above all two things: lots of time and a relatively free hand. Of course, neither of these two commodities is available. For developing countries are not only under pressure to demonstrate adequate statehood quickly, in an era of mass politics and democracy, they are also confronted with a set of international norms and regulations that pressure them to do this in humane and civilized ways. In fact, developing state-makers are confronted with contradictory contemporary international norms. They have to cope with the paradox of the inalienability and ‘sacredness’ of colonial state borders in international law on the one hand, and the principle of human rights, including the right to ethno-national self-determination on the other hand. This often poses a great threat to the competence of the state. State governments are pressured to force a diversity of populations (whose ethnic antagonisms often stem from the divide-and-rule strategies of colonial rulers) to remain within the territorial boundaries of the often rather arbitrarily drawn borders of the colonial state. In contrast to earlier centuries, in the current era individuals and groups can claim rights that are independent of their memberships of individual states and that derive not from their national status but from their status as members of the human species. At the same time, newly independent states are incapable of accommodating political and economic demands from dissatisfied groups, either because they lack the necessary resources or because doing so could seriously jeopardize their territorial integrity. In particular the international recognition of the doctrine of ethno-national self-determination increases the challenge to the legitimacy of the principle that postcolonial states are territorially inviolable. Ayoob describes the core of the problem as follows:
The major problem is that standards are set by Western Europe and US, states that have successfully completed their state-building process, they can therefore afford to adopt liberal standards in relations to their populations, because they are reasonably secure in the knowledge that societal demands will not run counter to state interests and will not put them in jeopardy. However, these standards are in the Third World often in contradiction with the imperatives of state making.

(Ayoob 2007: 133)

In sum, it is the contradictions inherent to the organization of the modern state-system, in particular the unevenness in state-making processes, that importantly constrain the ability of state-makers in developing countries to reach levels of nation-statehood similar to the western world. Before we turn to the question of how this structural imbalance translates into violent conflict we first turn to another system: global capitalism.

**Global neoliberalism**

Contemporary thinking on the connection between the global economy and local violent conflict is characterized by a controversy between two common perspectives. The first is the ‘liberal peace’ interpretation, according to which free market reforms and good governance contribute to stability and the resolution of conflict through the promotion of economic growth. From this point of view globalization and market deregulation are seen to furnish the basis of stability. Underlying this view is the assumption that through the mechanism of the free market labour, production and raw materials will be automatically adjusted in ways that will rationally secure the optimal benefits for all. The free market is understood as the ultimate driving force behind rationally calculated and hence superior forms of organization and order. This position is contradicted by proponents of the second view, stemming from political economy. This interpretation claims that the doctrine of neoliberal globalization that swept the world in the 1980s, and has since become hegemonic, tends to encourage new and durable forms of division, inequality and instability. In the encounter with national and local contexts, the neoliberal market reforms of the 1980s are seen as having produced unexpected and at times unwanted outcomes, including violent conflict. Neoliberalism has deepened poverty, increased economic inequality, and has exacerbated the division of the world into ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, or ‘metropolitan’ and ‘borderland’ zones. In particular, the shift from an inclusionary to an exclusionary capitalist logic is seen to have had profound implications. Authors such as Castells (1996, 1998) and Cox (1995) have argued that with the rise of the modern informational economy of the 1980s, the logic of capitalist development is better characterized by consolidation and exclusion.
than by – classic – expansion and inclusion. Since this time, the tendency has been for production, finance, investment, trade and technology networks to concentrate in and between the metropolitan blocks of mass consumer societies at the expense of the outlying areas. The present system is driven much more by commercial investment and technology networks than by a thirst for cheap labour and raw materials. As a result, apart from ‘enclave economies’ revolving around a number of high value commodities (oil, diamonds, coltan, gold, timber) much of the ‘South’ is deemed ‘structurally irrelevant’ from an economic point of view (Castells 1996: 135 in Duffield 2002: 1054).

Proponents of the liberal peace approach recognize the rise in internal violent conflict of the 1990s. They also acknowledge the fact that the process of global neoliberalization coincided with an overall rise of parallel economies, severe financial crises in Asia and Latin America, and high levels of poverty and inequality. However, where scholars from the political economy tradition argue that these instabilities are inherent to the logic of the global capitalist system, advocates of the liberal interpretation have a quite different reading. In their view, it is not the neoliberal model that is to blame for the serial market failures and lack of progress, but rather the immature, corrupt and inefficient state administrations of developing countries and transition economies themselves. It is emphasized that global neoliberalism can only successfully proceed in a ‘sound’ governance environment. Whereas the idea of ‘more market and less state’ was the prime objective of both the stabilization programmes that started in the 1970s and the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were vigorously enhanced and extended in the 1980s, the call for less state of the Washington consensus has been gradually substituted by a call for a better state. So, where the liberal interpretations locate the sources of civil war and instability at the level of ‘bad actors’ (greedy rebels, corrupt leaders, criminalized regimes) who rationally calculate the costs and benefits of war and rebellion, the political economy approach emphasizes the need to grapple with the complexities of the relation between local war and the global capitalist logic. The argumentation of the first will be further explored in chapter five. The remainder of this section will deal with how political economy approaches understand the connection between neoliberal globalization and violent conflict. As we will see, the state again plays a leading role in this analysis.

Global structures and local conflict: the interconnections

It is at the level of the state, and state-making efforts, where the impact of economic, geopolitical and political transformation become manifest and hence researchable. It is not surprising that many structure-based approaches to violent conflict focus on this level of analysis. The argumentation followed by authors such as Mohammed Ayoob that contemporary violent conflict should be understood in the context of a crisis of
(postcolonial) state- and nation-making, and how the international standards set by established, western nation-states importantly aggravate this crisis, is acknowledged by authors arguing from a political economy stance. However, they point out, this crisis is exacerbated by an even more fundamental problem. New states are not only hampered in their efforts to monopolize national territory, they also lack control over their national economies. They are not only enfeebled politically, but also, and more importantly, economically. Whereas states in Europe went through a process of state and nation building based on the idea of the national economy and state territory as viable economic unit (the so called ‘threshold principle’), and went through phases of strong economic protectionism, thriving on colonial exploitation and a strategy of primitive accumulation, the state- and nation-building processes of developing countries are marked by very different contextual realities. Not only do they suffer the consequences of a history of extraction and exploitation, they also often have only experimented briefly with economic models of state-led growth. Clearly, the economic development and trajectories of developing countries show massive differences, from the long history of import substitution characterizing many Latin American states, to the postcolonial neopatrimonial state in Africa, the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of southeast Asia, and the economic protectionism in post-independence India and Indonesia. A central argument, however, in the political economy tradition is that although the ‘neoliberal revolution’ of the late twentieth century played out differently, it went with a worldwide erosion or disintegration of state structures. The incapacity of governments to monopolize national territories and control economic dynamics has eroded the decision-making power and legitimacy of the state in many developing countries (but also in more advanced industrial countries). Processes of state and nation building are either weakened and delegitimized, or frustrated and impeded. The effects of this are twofold: the emergence of identity conflicts and network wars.

**Identity conflicts**

Mary Kaldor’s book *New and Old Wars: organized violence in a global era* (1999) was a strong influence on the discussion of globalization and local violence. What she coined as ‘new wars’ were ‘to be understood in the context of globalisation’ (1999: 3). Kaldor contrasts the old ‘politics of ideas’ that had characterized conflict throughout most of the twentieth century, with what she identifies as the rise of a new ‘politics of identity’ of recent decades, which emerged out of the disintegration or erosion of modern state structures, especially centralized authoritarian states. The collapse of communist states after 1989, the loss of legitimacy of post-colonial states in Africa or South Asia, or even the decline of welfare states in more advanced industrial countries provide the environment in which new forms of identity politics are nurtured’ (1999: 78). In a
context where decision-making powers have shifted from the state to the market, and where the neoliberal framework has been more or less fixed by external international financial institutions (such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization) and donor agencies, and where transnational activities abound, political classes suffer from growing impotence and declining legitimacy. In the process of global market integration, national governments have been stripped of their powers to determine policies in the socio-economic realm. The inability of the state to impose rules and regulations to keep market power in check has posed problems for both democratic accountability and political legitimacy. The lack of control of the economy leaves the cultural field as the main battleground for political constituency building and opens a 'market' for identity-based politics. As a consequence, minorities, migrants and 'ethnic others' become the flash point of exclusionary discourses and are scapegoated as invaders and the source of all evil. In this sense, identity politics can be seen as a survival tactic for politicians in contexts of declining economic decision-making powers. It is hence the weakening and delegitimation of the state set in motion by the neoliberal globalization project that is at the base of contemporary ethnic conflict, nationalism and xenophobia (see also Appadurai 2006). This process is certainly not exclusively characteristic of the underdeveloped world. More than anything it is the rapidly neoliberalizing former welfare states of western Europe and Scandinavia that witness the rise of populist and xenophobic repertoires. In places such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, where the neoliberal project has, largely unnoticed, abolished the collective standards and solidarities of the post WWII era, the faces of immigrants have served as ideal, identifiable targets for new narratives of othering and belonging (Demmers and Mehendale 2010).

**Network wars**

The political economy position implies that contemporary conflicts need to be understood in the context of the economic transformations of the late twentieth century. These transformations trigger not only identity politics, but also new forms of resource competition. The rise of the so called 'war economies' in many developing countries is linked to the decline of state formation as a political project in the context of the worldwide trend of globalization and liberalization. Keen (1998), for instance, with a wink at Von Clausewitz, states that internal forms of war are now better understood as the continuation of economics by other means. The war economies that emerged after the Cold War, revolving around illegal trade in diamonds, arms, drugs, timber, and coltan and oil bunkering in Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the production of poppy (e.g. Afghanistan, Pakistan) and coca (e.g. Colombia, Bolivia) are understood to be perpetuated by local and global networks of producers, traders,
warlords, corporations and consumers. Increasingly, actors move beyond the state in pursuit of economic power. The result of this is the so called ‘post state conflicts’ or ‘network wars’ (Duffield 2002). These are often internal forms of war in which actors find it no longer necessary to project power through the juridical or bureaucratic control of a relatively fixed territory. The state has been replaced by multiple centres of authority, often controlled by warlords and local business networks who no longer consider the state the main ‘trophy’ in conflict, except perhaps as a means to solidify their commercial activities. The interconnectedness between these local economies of war and the international market is expressed in the term ‘network war’. In their aim to control strategic assets local warring parties strike deals with multinational corporations that have a vested interest in access to natural resources. In Columbia, for instance, with the growth of oil concessions foreign companies developed a complex strategy engaging the state, rebel forces and para-military (see Richani 2002). Often enough, however, local and global parties become engaged in violent competition over oil or timber. In Nigeria and Sudan, the energy security strategies of China, the US and Europe have resulted in what Watts (2008) names the ‘scramble for African oil’. This has only been exacerbated by the War on Terror. ‘It is in the intersection of a more aggressive scramble for African oil by China, and the U.S. twin concerns of secure oil supply (national energy security) and the global War on Terror that a perfect storm of political volatility is created’ (2008: 33). Together with local ethnic antagonisms, youth militancy and state repression this accounts for the Nigerian ‘oil complex’: a highly unstable and militarized corporate enclave economy. The rise of shadow economies is also enhanced in more indirect ways. International financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF preach economic integration of all societies, but in practice primarily enforce trade liberalization in poor countries. This double standard of pushing poor countries to open markets and allowing rich countries to protect their markets is greatest in such sectors as textiles and agriculture. As is pointed out by Douma (2003: 50) the continuing protectionist measures, such as massive subsidies to farmers in the North and the existence of tariff barriers and import quota, have had a detrimental impact on the prospects of poor countries to gain access to important consumer markets, which, in turn, feeds into processes of criminalization and violent conflict. In a complexity of ways, international capital rewards reinforce local structures of violence (Willett 2010). In situations where there are few sources of livelihood, joining military groups, or shifting to coca and poppy growing or coltan and diamond mining may be essential survival strategies. For example, in the case of Colombia, peasants are known to shift from growing bananas (earning 16 dollars a month) to illegal coca production (earning 100 dollars a month). All these processes have an important impact on the existence and perseverance of war-related economic systems.

In sum, the changing competence – or outright impotence – of the state is of key
importance to the understanding of the emergence and sustenance of internal violent conflict and disorder. From a political economy perspective it is the decline of state formation as a political project that results in a loss of legitimacy of political classes and nurtures new forms of identity politics. In addition, economic groups, both legal and illegal, global and local, increasingly operate ‘around the state’. What results is a rather grim picture of large parts of the excluded South as caught up in a downward spiral of violent resource competition along often heavily politicized ethnic fault lines. It is exactly this picture of breakdown and decline, evoked by the political economy approach, that is contested by a more Durkheimian reading of violent conflict. Before we move to our third ‘global system’, we will here briefly look into this critique.

A critical note: the (dis)order of violent conflict

It is tempting, for the outsider, to view the larger part of the underdeveloped world, particularly postcolonial territories, as plagued by failure, breakdown and anomie. In line with the argumentation above, the majority of conflict approaches linked to political economy regard the many incidences of intra-state violent conflict in particular the South in terms of a failure of modernity. This view is contested by a group of scholars who propose to read the forms of collective action on the ground not as anomic, but rather as restorative. Duffield (2002), for instance, argues that the political economy approach has an important contribution to make when it comes to understanding the transformations in global capitalism, but fails to look beyond the truism of the ‘failed state’. In its representation of the South as made up of ‘multiple black holes of social exclusion’ (Castells 1998: 164), it unintentionally reproduces the ‘new barbarianism’ discourse implicit in many conventional descriptions of contemporary conflict zones. The images of social regression and criminalized violence produced by the political economy analysis clearly articulate ‘popular images of borderland barbarity, excess and irrationality’ (Duffield 2002: 1054). Situations on the ground may prove to be much more complex and ambivalent than the images of failure and chaos suggest. Rather than a failure of modernity, the new shadow economies and network wars that emerged in the post Cold War era can also be understood as forms of reflexive modernization, as ‘emerging political complexes’ instead of ‘complex political emergencies’. Political actors, institutions and social groups in places such as Sierra Leone, Chechnya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Colombia have appropriated and adapted the changes that came with globalization into new, and essentially non-legal and non-liberal forms of autonomy, protection and regulation. Although there is no need to romanticize these new forms of organization – including the organization of violence – it is worthwhile to take a more ethnographic approach to the ways by which the new shadow networks offer alternative forms of social
regulation. In a similar way, Keen (2008), Cramer (2006) and King (2004) argue for a close examination of the reflexive systems supporting the 'new wars'. Rather than conceptualizing war as collapse, Keen, for instance, suggests investigating war as an alternative system of profit, power and protection. For Keen 'events, however horrible and catastrophic, are actually produced, they are made to happen by a diverse and complicated set of actors who may well be achieving their objectives in the midst of what looks like failure and breakdown' (2008: 15). Likewise, Cramer (2006) aims to show how war is not necessarily the absence of development, or ‘development in reverse’, and how war and capitalism have supported each other throughout history. What these authors argue for is that the all-too-simplistic branding of the large majority of contemporary violent conflicts as ‘failure and implosion’ leaves no moral space for different forms of reflexive and ambivalent modernity. The templates and taken-for-granted ideal types of ‘nation-state’ and ‘development’ against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed are themselves in need of critical re-examination. This brings us to an analysis of the third and final global system discussed in this chapter: global governance.

**Global governance as containment**

Part of the discussion under the heading of global governance consists of an analysis that not so much aims to account for the phenomenon of internal war itself, but rather, its representation. This brings us to the systemic analysis of Duffield (2007, 2008, 2010a) on the relation between local ‘borderland’ wars and the power hierarchy of the global governance system. In a way, this third analysis includes a warning. It points to the slippery and controversial relationship between academic analysis on the one hand, and the ‘reality call’ of its ideological and practical implementation on the other. Put simply, academic knowledge on the ‘new wars’, as discussed above, is re-appropriated, both as a concept and in practice, by global governance institutions and turned into a legitimizing discourse. Stripped of its political economy components, the concept is used as a way to categorize contemporary violent conflict as uncivil, barbaric and excessive, and hence illegitimate. Cut off from its global and systemic ‘sources’ what is left of the ‘new wars’ concept is a label. This translation of an analytical concept into a policy concept perhaps seems meaningless at first sight, but may have serious consequences. Simplified, we see a shift from an analytical understanding of new wars as connected to global systems, to a policy understanding of new wars as primarily provoked by local actors.

By analysing the re-appropriation of the ‘new wars’ label, Duffield not only describes the shift in framing and the construction of new dichotomies, but also conceptualizes their *functionality* in what he sees as a global regime shift from geopolitics to
biopolitics. Central to this analysis is the logic of representational transformation of parts of the global South from a series of ‘strategic states’ at the time of the Cold War into a ‘dangerous social body’ during the War on Terror era. What follows is an analysis of the contradictions inherent in the structure of this new system of global governance.

What is ‘new’ about the ‘new wars’, Duffield argues, is their alleged illegitimacy. What has changed, is not so much the nature of violent conflict, but the international denial of any legitimacy to warring parties within ‘failed states’. For most of the twentieth century, supporting conflicts waged by irregular armies was an accepted feature of international conflict – certainly during the superpower rivalry of the Cold War. Because a direct military confrontation between the two super powers was impossible, Moscow and Washington exported their geopolitical rivalry to the developing world. This resulted in the much discussed inter-state and intra-state ‘proxy wars’ and a merger of local and geopolitical antagonisms and alliances. The massive transfer of weapons to both governments and insurgents in the ‘strategic states’ of Central and South America, Africa and Asia greatly enhanced local insecurities and instabilities in these regions. Largely, however, local wars were seen as legitimate and were supported with funding, arms and political patronage. Importantly, during the Cold War development aid, and donor-led peacekeeping and conflict resolution activities were circumscribed by state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the norms of non-intervention. The end of the Cold War, however, changed all this. Warring parties in internal conflict lost their geopolitical strategic functionality. The rapid withdrawal of financial and political support after 1989 forced warring parties in the former ‘strategic states’ to turn to other sources of income and support, such as the shadow economy and overseas diasporas. Rather than strategic allies, they turned into potential threats which needed to be contained (the quintessential example of this is of course the US relation to the Mujahedien in Afghanistan). It is against this background that the ‘new wars’ label gained prominence in the countless reports of the United Nations, World Bank, donor governments, regional organizations and NGOs. Duffield points out how these conventional descriptions create a series of ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomies (2002: 1052):

*Their wars*, for example, are internal, illegitimate, identity-based, characterised by unrestrained destruction, abuse civilians, lead to social regression, rely on privatized violence, and so on. By implication, *our wars* are between states, are legitimate and politically motivated, show restraint, respect civilians, lead to social advancement and are based on accountable force. In describing their wars, by implication, such statements suggest a good deal about how we like to understand our own violence. They establish, for want of better terms, a formative contrast between *borderland* traits of barbarity, excess and irrationality, and *metropolitan* characteristics of civility, restraint and rationality.
By constructing the imagined space of the 'borderland', a powerful legitimation was established for the new western humanitarian and peace interventionism that came with the new hierarchy of power of the post Cold War era. The 'new war' label of chaos and barbarity was used as a moral justification for this increased interventionism (coined the New Humanitarian Order by Mahmood Mamdani). For, not only did internal wars cease to be politically functional, the emerging shadow economies and network wars were above all seen as dangerous, as seriously threatening western ways of life. This was of course greatly enhanced by the September 11 attacks and the Global War on Terror and resulted in the idea of underdevelopment as dangerous, and hence the *securitization of development*. For Duffield 'the bad forms of global circulation associated with non-insured surplus population penetrate the porous borders of mass consumer society, damaging its social cohesion and destabilizing its way of life' (2007: 122). It is in this light that Duffield argues for understanding the rise of 'human security' and 'state fragility' as *technologies of containment*. The renewed wave of western humanitarian and peace interventionism in the post Cold War period and its fashions of 'human security' and 'state fragility' are primarily technologies of power aimed at controlling people living on the margins of global society. The main development recipe in this context is the encouragement of local self-reliance (or 'sustainable development'). Whereas the notion of self-reliance began as a challenge to the world economy by advocating endogenously determined autonomous development, the term has been transformed over the past decades to mean support by international agencies for do-it-yourself welfare programmes in the periphery. These programmes aim to enable rural populations to achieve self-sufficiency, to contain the exodus from the borderlands to the metropolitan zones and hence create some sort of stability among populations which the global economy cannot absorb. In its transformed meaning selfreliance has become 'complementary to and supportive of hegemonic goals for the world economy' (Cox 1983: 173). Duffield applies Foucault's concept of 'biopolitics' in his critique of this liberal understanding of development. Simply put, where geopolitics is a form of politics where power is executed through a control over territories, biopolitics is the exertion of power through the disciplining and regulation of people.

Biopolitics is primarily about governing the life (and death) of the population. For Duffield, rather than a way to 'better' people, development has become a technology of security, aimed at containing the circulatory and destabilizing effects of underdevelopment's surplus labour (or 'waste life') upon the western way of life:

Rather than moving towards global equity, for decades Western politicians have proved to be either unable or unwilling to moderate mass society's hedonistic thirst for unlimited consumption. ... The expectation that those excluded from the feast – the international surplus population – will be satisfied with basic
needs is, at best, unrealistic and racist.

(2007: 70)

‘Human security’ should not be understood by its common definition as ‘prioritising people rather than states’ but as a form of long-distance biopolitics – that is – as ‘effective states prioritising the well-being of populations living within ineffective ones’ (2007: 122). What follows is the emergence of what Duffield calls ‘governance states’ – that is, zones of contingent sovereignty where the west, through complex networks of public–private governance, shapes the basic economic and welfare policies. While its territorial integrity is respected, sovereignty over life is internationalized, negotiable and contingent.

In his analysis of the rise of the ‘new wars’ label, Duffield seeks to uncover how, in the post Cold War era, ‘metropolitan’ states established a new hierarchy of power through a series of public–private networks of global governance. Although he does not directly use the term, he addresses the violence inherent in the structure of the global governance system of the new humanitarian order, and the ways governments and NGOs, at times unknowingly, sustain and police the gap between mass consumer society and those living beyond its boundaries. When discussing the connection between globalization and violent conflict Duffield points out how the new interventionism can be held partly responsible for the decrease in internal conflict after the 1990s. However, whereas the number of open violent conflicts diminished, global instability remained. According to the Human Security Report of 2005, if a wider view of human security is adopted – beyond death directly related to conflict – the number of people dying through generalized instability is increasing. Open conflict is now contained, not resolved. Clearly, Duffield’s ‘contained instability’ is not far removed from what Galtung identified, in the first part of this chapter, as ‘avoidable insults to life’, that is, structural violence.

Conclusion

In this chapter we discussed authors who situate the source of violent conflict in the organization of society. The ‘true contradiction’, that is to say, that which is standing in the way of something else, is built into the structure of the system. It is built into the structure of the modern state system, where ‘effective’ states that have completed their nation-state building processes (often at the expense of the ‘ineffective’ ones) set the liberal standards that are in contradiction to the imperatives of state-making in large parts of the South. It is built into the structure of the global capitalist system, where international rules and regulations of market integration have stripped national governments of their power to control economic dynamics. It is also built into the
global governance system where ‘metropolitan’ states through a new set of technologies of (bio)power keep ‘borderland’ populations in place.

The three questions

Let us now turn to the three core questions of the book to try and assess structure-based approaches to violent conflict. Again, we are forced to simplify a rather diverse and broad research tradition, and the answers to the three questions are clearly not unequivocal. However incomplete, the answers below do bring out a series of stark contrasts with those of the earlier chapters on ethnic boundaries and social identities. The most obvious contrast pertains to our first question: what makes a group? It is unsurprising that structure-based approaches do not indulge in long elaborations of what makes the individual or collective agent, for, as has been emphasized enough, they place the sources of violent conflict at the level of structures, not agents. Almost by implication, the group formations in zones of conflict do not fall in line with what Marxian approaches recognize as the ‘real’ parties in conflict. The ‘real’ groups in conflict are produced by the contradictions in the structure of the system. What is suggested by for instance the work of Galtung, and many of the authors in the political economy tradition, is that groups are individuals who share a similar position in the market economy. The dominant idea here is that of people having clearly defined interests. However, often people do not act in accordance with these interests (or, as in Galtung, they have no awareness of their joint exploitation). They fail to see what it is that is standing in their way. Their social anxieties and frustrations are projected onto ‘false’ enemies and threats, and hence translate into unrealistic forms of violence. The resulting conflict formations and violent actions in no possible way address, let alone resolve, the fundamental contradictions underlying them. It is this distinction between realistic and unrealistic violence which sets the structure-based approaches apart from other theoretical approaches to violent conflict. Even if people are aware of ‘true contradictions’, their room to manoeuvre is extremely limited and constrained by institutions, laws and regulations. Ontologically, structure-based approaches support a holistic stance. Holists contend that power resides in institutions and as such is beyond the control of the individual. People have little choice but to act according to the constitutive and regulative rules of the dominant social order. Particularly the orderings of the state (citizenship status, immigration laws) capitalism (consumption, production, job market, salaries) and global governance (international law and institutions, security doctrines, imperial powers) create robust and inescapable ‘facts of life’ that defy change. As long as the inherent contradictions in the organization of the modern state system, global capitalism and global governance remain, the violence that comes with them, both structural and direct, will remain as well.
The connection between structures and violence runs through the state. The fundamental contradictions in the structures of the modern state system, capitalism and global governance produce incompetent states that cannot accommodate needs and demands from society. This is the basic problem underlying contexts of instability in most of the global South. There is debate on whether this instability translates into either anomic or restorative forms of collective action, and whether the essentially non-legal and non-liberal forms of organization in conflict zones should be classified as ‘breakdown’ or ‘reflexive modernization’. Structure-based approaches, however different, contend that the forms of structural violence done to people through the organization of society, in one way or the other, prepare the ground for direct violence. What is suggested, is that the violence inherent in the structure of the system, contains the intrinsic capacity to provoke direct violence. However, this cannot satisfy its critics. Structure-based approaches are much critiqued for their inability to produce an answer to the second of our questions: how do groups resort to violence? The connection between structural and direct violence remains under-theorized, and structure-based approaches cannot explain how particular violent conflicts occur. Although structural contradictions in the modern state system, the global economic system and the global governance hierarchy, and the concomitant changing competence of the state set the larger context, they by themselves cannot explain violent conflict. Why is it that in certain situations of structural violence we see no eruptions of violence, and in others we do? How do people organize for violence? Clearly, social uncertainties or frustrations, however deeply felt, by themselves do not ‘make’ wars. In the next chapter we will discuss approaches that specifically aim to explain how people mobilize for collective violent action.

In a way, we have already answered the last question: how and why do they (not) stop? It requires structural change to end or transform violent conflict. From a structure-based approach most peace-making, reconciliation and conflict settlement attempts are rendered insufficient. The elaborate attempts by the many global and local NGOs to ‘bring conflict parties together’ through inter-ethnic or inter-religious dialogue in places such as Kenya, Uganda, the DRC or Indonesia (but also in urban neighbourhoods in the west) overemphasize the ‘attitude’ component of conflict. Thinking back to Galtung’s triangle, working on conflict attitudes (A) is primarily what reconciliation is about. Likewise, it is not enough to work on the B (behaviour) corner of the triangle. This is what conflict settlement efforts are about: to make parties refrain from fighting (‘negative peace’). Whereas reconciliation efforts focus on A, and settlement is largely about B, conflict resolution only begins when C (the contradiction in the structure of the system) is addressed (positive peace).

A few last words on epistemology and ontology. As has already been briefly discussed, most structure-based approaches to violent conflict take an interpretative
epistemological stance. They do not understand structures as in some way external or prior to actions, and as determining them fully, as is claimed by objectivism. Structures are not seen as ‘unobservable systems which exert purposive pressure on their parts’ but as ‘sets of meaning rules’ or ‘games’ with specific constitutive and regulative rules and practices. A ‘game’ as explained by Hollis is:

historically and culturally specific, with a real enough power to set the terms in which people think and relate but only in their own place and time. If so, it would not be surprising to find only overlapping or criss-crossing resemblances among the games of social life and no universal features which all normative structures have in common.

(1994: 159)

The difference here is that structures are understood not as external (as envisaged in top left box of the Hollis matrix) but as forms of life that are inter-subjective and socially and historically constructed. That is, they are external to each but internal to all (and hence fit best in Hollis’ upper right box). The approaches in this chapter all emphasize how in the specific era of the post Cold War certain ‘forms of life’ (free market capitalism, modern state systems and hierarchies of global governance) importantly shape the social world. Ontologically, structure is placed prior to agency, and collective action is largely explained as determined by the structure of social systems.

In this chapter we have focused on approaches which aim to explore the connection between the workings of global structures and local zones of violent conflict. These approaches primarily emphasize the global level of analysis, by addressing the constitutive and regulative rules supporting the systems of the modern state, capitalism and global governance. They examine the ways these rules structure relations particularly between actors in the ‘metropolitan’ and ‘borderland’ zones, and how this translates into different forms of collective action. Although the global analysis of violent conflict importantly sets the larger picture, there remains much to be said about the interplay between global structures and local realities.

Table C

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<tr>
<th>Ontology/Epistemology</th>
<th>Explaining (positivist)</th>
<th>Understanding (interpretative)</th>
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<td>Structure-based approaches (Political economy)</td>
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<td>Individualism</td>
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Further reading


Recommended documentaries

The Corporation (Mark Achbar, Jennifer Abbott, Joel Bakan, 2003)

Inside Job (Charles H. Ferguson, 2010)

Coca Mama (Journeyman Pictures, 2001)

Capitalism: A Love Story (Michael Moore, 2009)

Blood in the Mobile (Frank Poulsen, 2010)

Darwin’s Nightmare (Hubert Sauper, 2004)

Notes

1 Most scholars under review here do not qualify as 'Marxists' or 'Durkheimists': it is because they – often implicitly – follow the general logic of Marx’s or Durkheim’s explanation of structure, and its relationship to violence and conflict, that they can be classified as Marxian or Durkheimian (for a more elaborate explanation of the relation between Marxian and Durkheimian traditions and collective action see Tilly 1978: 1–51. This section is based on Tilly’s interpretation).

2 ‘War is like a delicious piece of cake’ writes the Croatian novelist Dubravka Ugresic, ‘that everyone wants a piece of: politicians, criminals and speculators, profiteers and murderers, sadists and masochists, the faithful and the charitable, historians and philosophers, and journalists’ (Ugresic quoted in Schmidt and Schröder 2001: 5).

3 This is where Galtung’s definitions remain fuzzy: I assume that he means to say that any conflict that is based on an unrealistic (false) image should also be classified as a structural conflict.
Chapter 4

Peace-building and the politics of responsibility
Chapter 4. Peace-building and the politics of responsibility

This chapter looks at the implications of the politics of trauma for building and sustaining peace. Drawing in particular on the Northern Irish example, it argues that articulating a commitment to societal responsibility is essential to building a peaceful democracy. The previous chapter (of the featured book) emphasized the idea that trauma is characterized by inarticulacy, grievance and betrayal but that aestheticization of that silencing equates to a form of depoliticization that works to reify or abstract individual hurt from historical, societal and political contexts. The politics of trauma, then, involve restoring an awareness and perhaps even an engagement and articulation with the broader landscape within which the hurt and injustice have occurred. This chapter aims to develop that argument by bringing together recent work on political responsibility by Iris Marion Young and Eric Gordy to explore how models for building democratic peace (consociationalism, deliberative democracy and agonistic democracy) may be reinforced and complemented with a consideration of ideas concerning social ties and connections. Although these ideas are implicit within the 1998 Northern Irish peace accord, I suggest that the practice of governing Northern Ireland frequently clashes with what can be seen as the 'stickiness' of the past. The chapter suggests that a policy of placing responsibility at the forefront of any policy or political initiative to build and foster peace may work to constrain these clashes.

Trauma and democracy

The relationship between the retrieval of information about historic crimes and human rights abuses and peace-building is complex. The growth of research in the field of transitional justice (arguably a sub-discipline of peace studies) in the past two decades is in part a response to the idea that accountability and justice should be key elements of any transitionalsociety.¹ A dilemma remains regarding the possibility that too much truth can be destabilizing.² The dilemma resides unresolved at the heart of the United Nations' peace-building protocols. For example, the UN advocates 'the right to truth', including the 'right of families to know the fate of their relatives'.³ On the other hand, the Oslo protocols of 2010 require states to '[r]ecognise the rights of victims of armed violence in a non-discriminatory manner, including provision for their adequate care and rehabilitation, as well as their social and economic inclusion'.⁴ A potential conflict of interests may, it could be argued, result in the 'truth' that some victims hold regarding their innocence of any violence and against the need for a 'non-discriminatory' approach that could include perpetrators who may also consider themselves to be victims.

A number of responses have been suggested to these troubling issues with one
prominent example being the South African model of a truth recovery process that offers amnesties in return for truth. Mark Osiel, for instance, has argued that when accompanied by a range of obligations that tie new regimes and leaders to human rights protocols, amnesty processes can provide some level of the truth about crimes being achieved.5 The point seems to be that amnesty serves power interests and fosters a *carte blanche* attitude to violent pasts that inevitably bolsters the interests of perpetrators over their victims. This was roughly the approach of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). As Mahmood Mamdani has recently pointed out, the South African transition was planned before the TRC was set up and that amnesty was promised to perpetrators

... not in exchange for truth-telling but, crucially, for joining the process of political reform. The negotiations were conducted with the aim of ending political and juridical apartheid. They involved inevitable compromises on both sides, without which the transition could not have been achieved.6

As such, amnesty as a set of policy tools for moving societies beyond violence goes beyond proceduralism to incorporate substantive issues concerning ethical principles and long-term, transgenerational judgments. These issues lie at the heart of Paul Ricoeur’s alternative and critical views on amnesty, which he defined as ‘organized forgetting’. Ricoeur claimed that they ‘do wrong at once to truth, thereby repressed and as if forbidden, and to justice, as it is due to the victims’ 7; instead, he advocated a historically and empirically informed approach in which critical history becomes married with a sense of justice.8

Another response is to aim for something less than a truth recovery process. Whereas some socio-psychological scholars speak of the need to cultivate empathy, acknowledgement and understanding among antagonistic groups,9 some political theorists aim for a middle ground based on what might be termed the development of a political culture of consensus and dialogue. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, have argued that ‘[c]omprehensibility of conflicting claims is far less final than reconciliation, and far more accepting of the kind of continuing moral controversy that is not only inevitable but desirable in a democracy’.10 They contend that

... the goal of creating a society with commonly shared values still lacks moral content and therefore cannot justify the sacrifice of criminal justice. At minimum, the content of the new society’s shared values must be incompatible with continuing the morally abhorrent practices of the past.11

In other words, a new constitution or agreed-upon framework of democratic principles ignores the ideological reality that differing views on the past will prevail even after violence has ended. Gutmann and Thompson are critical of attempts to solve this
conundrum that stresses the importance of reconciliation, which they argue should not be defined or framed in terms of ‘seeking some comprehensive social harmony, whether psychological or spiritual … Reconciliation is an illiberal aim if it means expecting an entire society to subscribe to a single comprehensive moral perspective.’ They suggest that although democratic societies ought to strive for reconciliation on some matters (freedom of speech, non-discrimination and equality measures), the notion of consensus on any matter or a closing down of debate is antipathetic to a healthy democracy where conflict is essential but filtered through appropriate channels.

Some transitional justice theorists have also advocated a mixed approach. For example, in a recent survey of transitional justice mechanisms, Olsen et al have argued that [t]rials and amnesties proved inconclusive for improving democracy. Truth commissions, when used alone, have a significant, negative effect. The underlying idea seems to be that there is a nebulous but very real link between democratization, peace and justice (all broadly conceived). This chapter addresses the link from an alternative angle – and one that remains somewhat under-researched and underappreciated in the peace-building and transitional justice literatures: namely, the implications for democratization that are involved in the politics of trauma. Following the discussion of Rancierè’s thought in Chapter 1 (of the featured book), I wish to argue that the key dilemma in building peace between a notion of ‘positive peace’ (justice, societal reconciliation, social inclusion and so on) and ‘negative peace’ (slowly building institutions, delayed truth recovery or simply the absence of war) sidesteps the notion that regimes of appropriateness are inherent in each pathway. This is not to suggest that the dichotomy, undoubtedly expressed with a certain lack of finesse, between positive and negative peace is false; rather, the argument suggests that peace-building and democratization work to create distributions of the ‘sensible’ that reproduce self-referencing logics. The effect of these distributions is to risk not only reifying the discourses and forms and modes of identity that precipitated and drove forward conflict, but the continued marginalization of individuals, social groups and identities that resist or stand outside of mainstream political configurations. I argue that an alternative begins not simply from a critical deconstruction of the power disparities that inhabit dominant modes of belonging or those that ensue from peace-building strategies. That approach in turn risks reifying through inversion: namely, the valorization of other identities or communities. The alternative approach, instead, I suggest, begins with a reversion; it begins with what is outwith the domain of the sensible – what Rancierè calls the ‘démos, the poor or une part des sans-part, a part without part, a part with no part.’ As Chambers explains:

[T]he part des sans-part cannot be contained by or included within the police order; it is the part that has no part within the police order. It is the part that only comes to be through politics. Thus, the unintelligible part is not hidden and for that reason
unseeable; rather, the unintelligible is not there at all.

The point of critical engagement, therefore, is not to unmask or make visible, since the police order renders it invisible. Rather, it is to emphasize and expose the points at which the marginal makes its presence felt — in other words, the points at which those outwith legislative frameworks or what is considered appropriate begin to make claims on the status quo.

It is at this point that the politics of trauma become important for peace-building and democratization. This is because, and as Jenny Edkins's work points out, the politics of trauma represent an unveiling of the relationship between those with power and those without, between those in the centre of the decision-making process and those on the margins of society and between political elites and victims of political violence. I suggest that what this unveiling gives way to is a consideration of a societal responsibility to include its most disenfranchised members.

**Proceduralist peace-building**

For purposes of clarity, I focus on how that consideration applies to peace-building efforts, particularly how democratization processes are framed in societies transitioning from violence to peace. The intention is not to re-run debates over the merits of one type of democratic vision over another, but rather to suggest that unless the politics of trauma is taken seriously within peace-making (whether that is institutional design, international involvement or grassroots initiatives) then it is somewhat premature to speak of justice or reconciliation. The chapter does not question the arguably tendentious division between peace and justice; instead, the argument, simply put, is that the links between peace-building and democratization can be strengthened if the politics of trauma are taken more seriously. The chapter represents a sketch at such an integration. The focus is on the Northern Irish case where in many ways the implications of not taking such an integration seriously are becoming increasingly clear: namely, the change process becomes jeopardized by the traumatic return of ghosts from the past in numerous and varied ways, ranging from enduring sectarianism and social segregation to debates over victims’ rights; from controversies over public symbolism and political culture to the recurring revelations of spies, informants and deals made between governments and paramilitaries. I recognize that the institutional form of the Northern Ireland Assembly – a consociational structure (see below) – may lend itself to a divided (elite) political culture and policy process. However, I suggest that an underappreciated element in the tendency for elements of the past to dominate contemporary politics lies in the failure to incorporate an awareness of the political implications of trauma – in particular, the demand for some
kind of acknowledgment of societal responsibility that accrues from these politics.

The relationship between the politics of trauma and democratization is founded on the idea that political legitimacy, stability and authority are closely aligned with memory. Thus, Edkins argues that 'memory is not an add-on to the study of politics': it does not simply concern identity issues; instead, it is integral to 'the form of political authority that the nation represents is intimately tied up with, and made possible by the way in which it invokes its memories, and with what it remembers and why'. Edkins' arguments echo those of J.G.A. Pocock, who sees memory, or what he calls historical consciousness, as the juncture at which high politics and everyday life meet together with the historical and the sociological. For Pocock, historical awareness and memories of the past flow from and into 'tradition' – the narratives that shape society and govern its expectations are also shaped and formed by society in turn. And it is a similar concern with the politics of the past that allows Edkins to infuse memory studies with a political edge. Thus, she argues that trauma is not just psychological: although it is individual and involves oppressive tendencies of incommensurability and voicelessness, it is also in large part related to others – to society and to political power. Edkins argues that although traumatic events are characterized by (recurring) powerlessness, they also involve betrayals.

Traumatic experiences and traumatic memories involve existential threats – they change the meaning of identity at a fundamental level since self-perception is closely linked to social context. Edkins argues that traumatic events 'strip away the diverse commonly accepted meanings by which we lead our lives in our various communities. They reveal the contingency of the social order and in some cases how it conceals its own impossibility'. In other words, the politics of trauma reveal the ways 'in which the social order is radically incomplete and fragile. It demonstrates in the most shocking way that what we call social reality is nothing more than a fantasy'. As Edkins continues, the politics of trauma 'question our settled assumptions about who we might be as humans and what we might be capable of. Those who survive often feel compelled to bear witness. On the whole, the rest of us would rather not listen.'

The themes of silence and silencing recur in testimonies of victims and survivors of Northern Ireland’s conflict. In a book compiled by the Wave Trauma Centre, the two themes coincide in the story of one survivor of a bombing:

Before the bomb, I was bubbly, outgoing, and confident. It has been an uphill struggle for me to remain that way. I have become withdrawn, with no confidence, I am shy, depressed and suffer from insomnia among other things. Deafness is lonely and isolating. It’s only since meeting with others who are affected by the ‘Troubles’ that I am getting any help or recognition. My husband and children are victims too because of my deafness . . . The two older girls were in drama groups putting on
musicals and my son was lead vocalist in the school choir, I went to see them but couldn’t hear them singing, that is the saddest thing of all.22

Although it manifests itself at the individual and familial level in the first instance, trauma is inherently disruptive of individuals and society. The disruption proceeds from the radical (re)conceptualization of history that traumatic events engender. Following the work of Vladimir Jankelivitch, Berber Bevernage alludes to this break in his analytical dissection of how we experience the past. Bevernage argues that a dominant mode of articulating the experience of 'pastness' utilizes the language of historiography and law: it views the past as irreversible, 'having-been' (avoir-eu-lieu), transient or fleeting. Crimes and hurts are revisited in order to consign them more firmly to the past: judgments are made and historical events are deemed finished with, 'done-and-dusted'. An alternative mode views the past as irrevocable, a 'having-been-done' (avoir-fait) and as something stubborn and tough. Bevernage explains that people

... experience the past as irreversible if they experience it as fragile and as immediately dissolving or fleeting from the present. They experience the past as irrevocable if they experience it as a persistent and massive depository that sticks to the present.23

This 'stickiness' is, evidently, a dominant element of the traumatic experience. As a response to history, it informs how we interpret, re-present and reconstruct violence and injustice.

Whereas transitional justice is a direct attempt within peace-building to tackle the 'stickiness' of the past, there is no reason to suppose that either securing peace and/or deepening democracy requires some kind of reckoning with the past. In response to this and to the perhaps overly procedural basis of early formulations such as Teitel’s, the scholarly and practitioner-based sides of the transitional justice movement have broadened to incorporate bottom-up or localized initiatives. However, as Jelena Obradović-Wochnik has pointed out, despite this increasing reach, the impetus remains the same and ‘still carries a strong focus on silence-breaking activities’.24 In an important critique, Obradović-Wochnik demonstrates how despite this aim, transitional justice works to reinforce the silence(s) that it wishes to expose. ‘Selective academic engagement’, occurs she argues, by the prioritization of ‘activists’ voices’, thereby privileging certain types of stories and reproducing power dynamics that are founded on self-serving political narratives about the past: transitional justice practitioners, concerned with public participation, often fail to consider the context that make such participation and speaking (im)possible.25

Obradović-Wochnik’s work discusses several ways in which such silencing practices
occur, including the allocation of collective blame; the construction of an imaginary, simplified 'public' audience or the ethnicization of social groups or entire populations. She concludes, however, that transitional justice practices can nevertheless be reformed to ameliorate the tendency towards silencing by focusing on the exposure of the 'mechanisms that exclude' and the revelation of the 'complexities inherent within silences'. The danger, of course, is that attempts to rebalance the deficit may create further regimes of exclusion. However, Obradović Wochnik's prescription that 'silence' ought to be decoupled from 'denial' seems pertinent to the Rancierean approach: the latter, as she points out, is typically tackled with recourse to a discourse of truth recovery that is in actuality closer to truth imposition in the form of coerced or cajoled reconciliation. Silence, on the other hand, may stand closer to the Rancierean part-without-part, in that it may be not simply an appropriate but the only response available to acts of political violence, terror, corruption and intimidation.

The extent to which transitional justice is struggling to come to terms with its built-in bias towards exclusion and deferral of silencing and trauma is, arguably, reflected in alternative strategies of peace-building. This is apparent in the practice and literature of consociationalism. Although the institutional engineering of this theory is premised on the idea that it is better to build a democratic peace than risk a return to violence through a process of coming to terms with the past, I wish to suggest that the links between it and transitional justice are substantial and problematic, but they are largely ignored in the literature. For example, the discipline's key journal, The International Journal of Transitional Justice (published by Oxford University Press), regularly features articles appraising the purportedly expanding nature of the field and offering reconceptualizations of what transitional justice is or suggestions about what it should be doing. Yet even when the focus of those articles is on division, the methodological impulse remains naively and simplistically segregationist and proceduralist. A case in point is Khanyisela Moyo's passing allusion to substantive democracy in her exploration of the limitations of transitional justice in dealing with reparations in racially divided societies (South Africa and Zimbabwe); her rather insipid suggestion is that the policy goals of transitional justice ought to be reframed to prioritize land redistribution in truth recovery processes. What this redistribution might mean in normative terms or what it would look like practically or how it would be implemented is seemingly deemed outwith consideration. Yet the underlying logic is decidedly structuralist – 'redistribution' in this case echoes consociationalists' emphasis on 'autonomy' and the unquestioning faith in group cohesion. This is unsurprising given that Moyo's point of departure is another re-imagining of transitional justice – Nevin Aiken's recent monograph Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in which 'constructivist' theorizing is mentioned but the structuralist critique of constructivism is missed. The 'gap' in reasoning leads to what may be viewed as a significant misinterpretation and
misrepresentation of reality: Nevin, for instance, complains about the ‘failure to gain any significant cross-community support for otherwise well-regarded initiatives for addressing the past such as those suggested by Healing Through Remembering [a non-governmental lobby group] and the Consultative Group on the Past [a governmental consultation exercise].’ Not only was the latter’s report deeply controversial, but Aiken appears to be setting these bodies’ work apart from the ‘highly polarized lines of group identity’ that he argues characterizes the Northern Irish political culture. The reasoning is devoid of irony and recalls Brecht’s ‘solution’: ‘To dissolve the people / And elect another.’ My point is that transitional justice tends to operate according to the same logic as consociationalism – but, critically, without consociationalists’ realism that division needs to be recognized rather than wished out of existence or ignored. In other words, it operates according to a relatively strict and underarticulated distribution of appropriateness: ethno-nationalism is reified, if not valorized, and alternative experiences of the past or of marginalization or trauma in the present are displaced. This is key to understanding the links between consociationalism and transitional justice. The exclusionary regime drawing that typifies both theories is often overlooked in the counterfactual reasoning that is typically used to both justify and attack consociationalism. I suggest that this reasoning depends on a false dichotomy between consociationalism and ‘integrationism’.

Consociationalism refers to a set of ideas about conflict regulation. Essentially, it states that if two or more contending groups exist in a region, then violent conflict can be reduced or ended by channeling disputes through political institutions. Drawing on the work of the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, consociationalists assert that in such cases, institutions should be designed according to an established set of principles: for example, majoritarianism should be avoided and instead power should be shared out between the contending groups, a series of checks and balances should be set up to allow groups the opportunity to veto legislation that may discriminate against their interests, elections should be held within proportional systems and bloc autonomy should be emphasized – particularly over issues affecting specific regions or regarding institutions such as the courts and the police. Consociationalists argue that in situations of ethnic conflict, identity tends to be difficult to change, deep rooted within culture and history and multifaceted, being reinforced within a number of overlapping socio-cultural networks (for example, language, sport, religion, political association). They contend that this durability has to be worked with rather than ignored or imagined out of existence. In a robust defence of the theory, Jonathan Tonge goes further and charges critics with ‘elitism’: ‘Instead of accepting and cherishing diversity, identity is seen [by such critics] as an affliction held by people, requiring remedial treatment.’ On the other hand, as two transitional justice-oriented scholars have argued in a complementary fashion, ‘strong and secure identities . . . can also serve
as the basis for political generosity’ and may assist attempts at challenging sectarian attitudes and practices.35

Lijphart first applied consociational theory to Northern Ireland in 197534; since the mid-1980s it has informed the joint and separate work of John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. O’Leary and McGarry distinguish themselves from Lijphart on the basis that whereas ‘Lijphart makes no important distinction between polities that are linguistically, ethno-nationally, or religiously divided; they view division in Northern Ireland as originating primarily from a ‘self-determination dispute spanning two states’.35 McGarry and O’Leary have used the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement and procedures of the Northern Ireland Assembly to revise consociational theory and, in particular, Lijphart’s idea concerning ‘conducive conditions’. In contrast, Paul Dixon has pointed to several features of the agreement that suggest it is not consociational in intention or application. Thus, the Northern Irish executive never operated as an integrated body, proportional allocation of resources and services was not provided, the British government possesses an external veto and the agreement promoted integrative measures.36

A number of criticisms have been levelled at consociational theorizing. A fundamental objection is that it is not a theory at all, but is in fact an example of post hoc or even circular reasoning. In other words, consociationalism is a cure for a problem that it defines – it is a description turned into a prescription.37 Because of this, consociationalism is seen as tending to reinforce and reproduce conflict-based and socially divided identities – both at an everyday level and within the culture of political leadership.38 In addition, the principles upon which consociationalism are built are nothing more than principles – that is, notions about ‘strong and secure identities’ being useful for building peace are untested and unverifiable, and the theory does not specify how, why or when that usefulness can be triggered.39 Other critics have argued that the empirical evidence shows that rather than regulating or ending conflict, consociationalism provides the opportunities for bloc identities to become useful once more for waging violence, in that it valorizes segregationist leaderships and provides such leaders time to regroup.40 Critics of consociationalism tend to favour alternative approaches and strategies such as deliberative democracy, electoral plurality and proportional representation, the integration of contending groups and policies aimed at the watering down of the importance of boundaries and symbols, along with an emphasis on civic society rather than ethnic leadership elites.

The counterfactual that both consociationalism and integrationism depend on is that unless their policies are implemented as the core part of peace-building, then the risk is that conflict may recur or that policy will be ignored (in the face of the historical reality of division or changeable identity). The underlying point is that each framing
works to harness a set of ideas about appropriateness; or, put another way, each school of thought constitutes its own distribution of the sensible. The counterfactual works because of this harnessing. In other words, both consociationalist and integrationist proposals are possible because they depend on establishing some kind of centre: for consociationalists, this centre is divided into autonomous ethno-national blocs, whereas for integrationists, it is created out of a new identity. Tonge’s critique of integrationism hints at this idea but does not follow its logic towards consociationalism: “[T]he collectivization of identities into a single core begs the question, which core? Integrationists may deny that their project is assimilationist, arguing that a core single national, or post-national identity does not entirely eradicate previously-held identities.” Tonge goes on to criticize integrationists for their ‘lack of clarity’ over these terms and over their projects. He may well have a point, but even though consociationalists are more up-front about taking ethno-nationalist identities at face value and working with those deeply held beliefs, that does not really mitigate the tendency towards centrisim or core building. The critique that integrationism is elitist or paternalistic – given the tendency of academics or liberals to urge others to give up what are perceived as nationalistic prejudices – may well be levelled at consociationalism, where the tendency is to valorize particular aspects of identity that academics and practitioners see as important. The flat-packed version of peace-building that both depend on – that is, the notion that some kind of pre-established entity can be constructed from a range of objects – is ultimately exclusivist; the question, then, of whether consociationalism or integrationism is more or less elitist is a matter of degrees or perception. Moving beyond what might be called the Ikea logic of peace-building requires investing the design phase with a concern for the parts of society left out – in particular, those groups on the margins of political deliberations, victims and the traumatized. The following sections locate some of where these exclusions occur within peace-building in Northern Ireland.

**Governing Northern Ireland**

The Northern Ireland Assembly was established under the peace accord of 1998. It is a 108-seat body with a wide range of primary and secondary legislative powers that have been devolved from London. The Assembly is elected by proportional representation and the executive constituted through the d’Hondt mechanism – excepting, that is, the ministry with responsibility for policing and justice, which was awarded outwith d’Hondt to the cross-community Alliance Party. This section explores how assumptions about justice underpin the workings of the Assembly and governance in Northern Ireland in general and how those mechanisms work to constitute a realm of appropriateness. The 1998 agreement has almost facilitated a definitive break with the
violence of the past (which has continued at a much reduced level in the form of republican anti-agreement shootings and bombings, and which obviously retain the potential to cause massive loss of life), and it would most likely have been impossible to agree on a mechanism for dealing with the past at the time of the signing; however, the recurrence of historic issues can be linked to the outworkings of the peace settlement. Although the agreement pledged parties to ‘firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all,’ I wish to argue that these sentiments need to be buttressed with a commitment to societal responsibility as a first step to creating stability around the politics of the past. This can be seen in alternative visions of democracy at work in Northern Ireland – in particular, consociational and deliberative democratic schemes. The final section sketches alternative visions.

As alluded to earlier, consociationalism is among the most prominent visions of democratization and peace building, particularly in the case of ethnic conflict. Consociationalists argue that ethnic division needs to managed and filtered into political processes through institutional frameworks that guarantee shares of power and protected autonomy. The Northern Ireland peace settlement has been seen as emblematic of these ideas and is suggestive of the need to create a robust structure to contain and manage ethnic division. Consociationalism is traditionally critiqued along the lines that it reifies and perpetuates division; it tends to take ethnic identification as a given and does not allow for fluidity or a breaking down of strongly held views. Indeed, this is seen as a strength: Clancy and Nagle, for example, argue that ‘it is a quixotic undertaking to try to redirect ethno-national identities; it is possible, though to try to make them more benign and less threatening … Conflict remains, but it is channelled [sic] through democratic institutions.’

In evidence to the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Assembly and Executive Review Committee, Professors Brendan O’Leary and Christopher McCrudden argued for the maintenance of the consociational governance structures. Referring to the on-going debate over whether one of the executive parties should leave to become an unofficial opposition, O’Leary claimed that ‘the existing arrangements are better than they might appear, even to those schooled in the orthodoxies of the Westminster model. We think that it is politically inappropriate to prefer the Government and opposition model for Northern Ireland’. He recommended ‘enhancing MLAs’ policy and administrative scrutiny capabilities through increasing resources available for expert assistance, which is also good for building party capacity’. O’Leary and McCrudden’s evidence reflects the fundamental consociational idea that stability is key to peace-building and that even if it means delimiting political opposition or potentially delaying truth recovery mechanisms, those concessions are the price that must be paid in order to ensure the end of violence. It is ostensibly unfair, then, to criticize consociationalism for not paying...
attention to victims’ issues. The point is subtler: despite the emphasis on post-war or post-conflict institutional engineering, nevertheless an idea of justice underpins consociationalism – namely that the best that can be hoped for is to end violence and filter contention through a network of political institutions. Justice occurs through constraining democracy. The focus on managing division by bolstering intra-bloc politics neglects the question of the responsibility that those blocs have to each other to govern and work within the same polity. Regardless of whether it is the ultimate desire of groups to reform or end that polity (the Irish nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, for example, wish to end the current constitutional settlement and reunify the island of Ireland under one jurisdiction), that issue of working, governing and living within a current polity remains. The politics of trauma work to reveal that issue, and questions of responsibility pervade post-conflict societies. Arguably, those politics logically precede institution building (whether those institutions are consociational or truth recovery commissions) precisely because they speak to cultural attitudes and informal practices, which institution building seeks to constrain, circumscribe, harness or police. As Vivian Lowndes and Mark Roberts have recently pointed out, in situations of institutional constraint, it is not sufficient simply to focus on rules or protocols. Although these are important, the ‘narrative’ that attaches to an institution must also be taken into account because any change process must involve the developments of new understandings.47 The point being that the narrative underpinning consociationalism remains the understanding that unless a ‘core’ is established out of ethno-nationalist political leaders who can ‘carry’ their constituencies, then the risk of falling back into violence remains. That narrative works to frame key actors within the public sphere as critical to peace-building and allocates them roles within a set of rules.

The issue that characterizes much of the debate over consociationalism is what follows from that narrative – as McCrudden and O’Leary’s intervention in Northern Ireland demonstrates: the key questions seem to be how fair and transparent are the rules and procedures? Ian O’Flynn sidesteps the type of institutional problems that preoccupy consociationalism: ‘[C]itizens will not be able to think of themselves as sharing a common national identity unless there is some common basis upon which they can engage with one another on non-ethnic terms’.48 In contrast to consociationalists’ emphasis on rules and elites, engaging civil society lies at the heart of O’Flynn’s vision:

[D]eliberative democracy requires us to shift away from an elite-driven process towards a process in which the decisions that result can, in a meaningful sense, be understood as expressions of the will of the people – where “the people” is construed, not narrowly in terms of ethnic leaders and those they purport to represent, but in terms of the full diversity of views and positions in society.49
What happens, however, where ‘the people’ can be extended to include their ‘ethnic leaders’, where, for example, electoral returns broadly mirror other societal divisions (including education, housing and culture)? In other words, what happens when ‘elites’ do not ‘purport to represent’ their ‘people’ but largely coincide with them? Luskin et al have recently tackled this problem in relation to Northern Ireland, arguing that [o]rdinary citizens may actually have less intractably opposing views than the elites who speak for them, and the experience of grappling together with policy issues may both help them to see this and bring their views still closer. Sustained engagement in deliberation may, they argue, make it harder for elites to ‘play the ethnic card’. These arguments seemingly have merit, and other evidence from Northern Ireland reveals the multiple ways in which people negotiate, transcend and transgress ethnic boundaries in their everyday lives. Deliberative democrats have also recently explored ways in which identities can be articulated in a non-confrontational fashion that does not need to be buttressed by consociational architecture. John Boswell, for example, has suggested that narrative provides an alternative to deliberative democracy theorists’ usual emphasis on argumentation. For Boswell, the concept of ‘narrative’ lies between anecdote and discourse: like the former, they display discernible structural features and have plots that link events; they frame particular concerns or protagonists as important and become reified and ‘canonical’. As with the latter, they are fluid and are built up in a performative fashion over numerous interactions and iterations. Following John Dryzek’s critique of Jurgen Habermas, Boswell argues that deliberation does not in reality only take place in single spaces and in a monologic fashion; instead, it occurs in ‘complex systems’ and involves ‘take as well as give’. He argues that narrative plays a crucial role in facilitating these conditions and that, furthermore, it provides for communication and sense making. Although Boswell views narrative as a ‘rationalising’ device that provides space for discussion and deliberation, he also admits that its structuring role may also work to exclude certain individuals or marginalise their claims. More problematically for divided societies in particular, Boswell admits that the danger is that mutual adherence to a vague narrative may result in apparent consensus, while still allowing conflict to fester unresolved.

The idea that a deliberative democratic approach can be brought to bear in such societies and that it may contribute positively to moving beyond the impasse of entrenched narratives lies at the heart of many approaches to truth recovery and transitional justice. Leigh Payne, for example, argues for a ‘contentious co-existence’ in post-conflict societies, which she describes as an approach that

... does not require elaborate institutional mechanisms, but rather is stimulated by dramatic stories, acts, or images that provoke widespread participation, contestation over prevailing political viewpoints, and competition over ideas ... in other words ...
Payne works in a somewhat sceptical fashion, breaking down conceits and deconstructing self-serving apologies, and her idea of competing narratives works to open debate: '[u]nsettling accounts do not replace one prevailing political view with another. Instead, they generate political competition over how to interpret dramatic political events, how to use them, and what they mean for contemporary political life'.

This seems rather unsatisfying, particularly for societies where openness and democracy might be seen to be the problem rather than the solution. The politics of trauma in such societies can be harnessed to democratic and institutional politics in ways that actually close down and exclude victims' voices. In Northern Ireland, as was mentioned earlier, the 1998 institutional arrangements were established with a view to moving forward as opposed to revisiting the past. Again, this point is indirectly but critically linked to Payne's theorizing because in politics such as Northern Ireland, the idea of open political competition maybe a misnomer: political competition may occur within progressivist discourses that sideline or defer consideration of ideas about historical truth recovery or justice. Payne, understandably perhaps, avoids prescriptions: '[u]nsettling accounts and contentious coexistence do not heal democracies. Indeed they cannot even guarantee particular policy changes. What they do is change the political context and put into practice the democratic art of participation, contestation, and competition'.

In Payne's account it is assumed that competition is good and that openness is conducive to democratic deepening. These assumptions are intuitively attractive, but what happens in asymmetric relationships such as those that occur between perpetrators and their victims? Once intrinsic and established unfairness in voice and experience is taken into account, the risk then arises that the deliberative democratic presumption of politics may actually work to undercut the possibility of politics. In short, appeal to narrative is never enough in divided societies. Kirk Simpson's work on victims in the Northern Ireland context represents one attempt to circumvent the inherent problems within deliberative democratic theory. Simpson argues that law and governance 'only accrue validity and potency by acquiring the consent of the governed', which, in the context of divided societies, necessarily entails issues of accountability and scrutiny of past violence and historic conflict. Simpson borrows from Habermas's writings on 'ideal speech situations' and argues that 'competing truth claims can only be resolved through rational discussion aimed at the creation of a consensus'. For this to take place, a series of steps needs to be adhered to: first, he writes 'an objective speech act can be considered "true" when it is accepted as referring to a [state] of affairs in the world'. Second, 'a normative speech act is considered to be correct whenever it fits within a complex array of competing social values and norms'. Finally, 'evaluative speech acts are considered to be truthful when they are made by
sincere communicative actors. Simpson points out that such a model requires a number of other conditions to function, including equal participation, freedom from constraint and authentic engagement by participants. I suggest that, at a minimum, these terms need to be underpinned by a narrative sense and a political commitment to societal responsibility; otherwise, they remain open to interpretation and politically informed revision. That is to say, the invisible or the part without part will remain outwith the speech act simply because of the possibility that perpetrators may feel that they are being sincere, whereas their victims may feel humiliated. Despite this possibility, Simpson's model seems to be one of the most nuanced and far-reaching schemas devised in relation to the Northern Ireland transition. His model proceeds from an emphasis on victims' rights and an appreciation of victims' choices and thus provides a basis for securing recognition of the stories and experiences that remain otherwise invisible within frameworks derived from transitional justice, consociationalism and deliberative democracy.

One vision of democracy that seems able to incorporate these divided, contentious politics of Northern Ireland is that suggested by Chantal Mouffe. In part, Mouffe's point of departure is a critique of the Habermasian and liberal democratic faith in reason that she sees as underpinning deliberative democratic approaches. She argues, via Wittgenstein, that agreement on the procedures of dialogue presumes agreement on the language to be used; rules and institutions, then, cannot be divorced from the practices and modes of behaviour that constitute everyday life: 'distinctions between "procedural" and "substantial" or between "moral" and "ethical" that are central to the Habermasian approach cannot be maintained and one must acknowledge that procedures always involve substantial ethical commitments.' For Mouffe, everyday life is centred around and saturated with questions of power – and, in particular, asymmetric power relations: 'if we accept that relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the main question of democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic values.' Her alternative is to implicate each individual within the political – since power is all-embracing and all-invasive, we cannot escape it through systems of rules; instead, we must learn to ameliorate its oppressive tendencies by cultivating agonistic, pluralist democratic values. She locates agonism in

... a different mode of antagonism because it involves a relation not between enemies but between "adversaries", adversaries being defined in a paradoxical way as "friendly enemies", that is, persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this common space in a different way.

Mouffe's schema allows for the persistence of conflict alongside democratic openness
in ways that neither consociationalists nor deliberative democrats could feasibly or plausibly tolerate (given their fundamental insistence on filtering contention through particular channels). However, when viewed through the lens of post conflict and deeply divided societies, agonistic democracy’s very openness may result in the reproduction of inequities and injustices. A key element of victimhood, for example, will always be political powerlessness, marginality and being in a position of unequal voice and agency vis-à-vis perpetrators. For victims to move beyond and through trauma necessitates complex processes of working through their pasts; inevitably the negotiation of the stultifying nature of trauma involves political dynamics as new ways of articulating identity are found. Mouffe’s notions of contestation and fluidity of power either speak past this process or may actually work to reinforce disparities. In other words, victims become re-victimized through the ostensible focus on contest and plurality. Andrew Schaap has attempted to develop Mouffe’s formulations towards the area of reconciliation after conflict. He contends that she overstates her argument in a number of ways. First, her reading of deliberative democratic theorists (particularly the key text by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson) is misleading. Even if such theorists downplay the contested nature of reasonableness and rationality, neither they nor Mouffe’s alternative of respect can be worked out in advance. Second, he argues that ‘the kind of vibrant clash of identities that Mouffe advocates may be more likely to harden or reify existing identities than to transform them’. Finally, he argues that Mouffe’s schema does not really provide for decision making. In this, he builds on Dryzek’s idea of distinguishing between sites of deliberation and decision; however, helpful and clarifying as his intervention undoubtedly is, it seems that Schaap does not really get around the ‘stickiness’ that the past exerts in divided societies. In part, the problem lies with Dryzek’s idea – it does not apply to places such as Northern Ireland where the very nature of the state is the object of contestation, where ethnic competition is about inscribing ideas about the past and the future onto the decision-making apparatus. In other words, the delineation between decision making and deliberation only confuses analysis of and does not really apply to places where decision making reflects partisan (ethnicized) interests and where legislation, in turn, contributes to the reproduction of those voices. Again, the deferral of consideration of these issues works to usher in a regime of appropriateness – contention is viewed as a positive force without regard to those remaining outside of the realms in which democratic debate is cultivated.

**Guilt and responsibility**

An alternative vision is, however, implicit within Mouffe’s ideas and is perceptible in her allusion to sharing. If Mouffe is correct and some kind of basis is needed outside of
cognitive or legalistic strategies and frameworks for contestation and debate, then what might that foundational agreement or that shared space look like? Again, is it possible to ameliorate the exclusionary effects of the kind of predominating approaches to peace-building and democratization that I have described in this chapter? I want to suggest that Iris Marion Young’s work on political responsibility provides one answer to these questions. Although Young does not specifically locate her work in deeply divided societies, her ideas on responsibility and guilt seem to have some implications for post conflict arenas. Young situates her reflections, for example, in a structuralist understanding of politics – responsibility for the well-being of society is, in part, shared by all its members. Responsibility is, however, limited – as members of society, we share in an imperative to try to end injustice, but the fact of injustice occurring does not make us personally liable – unless, of course, we can be ‘specifically identified as causing the harm’ and know what we are doing.70 What she calls the ‘social connection model of responsibility’ sees responsibility as deriving ‘from belonging together with others in a system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits and aim to realize projects’. Responsibility for injustice, then, is not simply the result of living together within a legally or constitutionally defined polity; rather, it results from ‘belonging together’ – in other words, from ‘participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce structural injustice’. Thus, she concludes that responsibility ‘is essentially shared. It can therefore be discharged only through collective action’.71

Young’s model of social responsibility depends on five elements: First, whereas responsibility is general, guilt is particular – individuals are culpable and blameworthy for their actions and omissions. Second, in ascribing guilt and blame, it is important to be precise about the context in which harm or injustice occurs. Third, the emphasis on responsibility rather than guilt necessitates the adoption of a forward-looking lens that focuses on resolving injustice. Fourth, responsibility is therefore shared by individuals and finally it is discharged collectively. The individualizing of responsibility and guilt enables Young to avoid the trap of watering down blame – that is, if everyone is responsible for injustice, then, by definition, no one is culpable and nothing has to be done to remedy it. She asserts that the emphasis on society defers the possibility of absolving some people by blaming others. Thus, although individuals may be culpable and liable for injury and injustice, everyone is implicated in resolving as far as possible the wrongs that have been caused: ‘Responsibility spreads’, she writes, ‘it isn’t confined’.72

Young’s emphasis on the future-orientation of responsibility serves to distinguish it from and delimits the more backwards-looking tendencies of blame and guilt. However, in post-conflict and deeply divided societies, the emphasis may work to undercut Young’s key concern with developing shared obligations; for in those situations, the
future tends to be justified through historical narratives that often act as taboos on belief and behaviour – the teleological urge of nationalism, in other words, fills ideas of responsibility and the future with received truths regarding historical obligations relating to the past. The answer to this problem may be located in Young’s early work on difference politics, which fundamentally serves to justify practices of positive discrimination. In that work, Young conceives justice in terms of oppression and domination and argues that these are socially prior to individuals. Compensation, in her view, is not simply a matter of repairing past injustice, but of correcting its legacies in the present.

Young’s views have been criticized as being inherently essentializing and implicitly unhelpful to the Northern Irish situation. For instance, Carmel Roulston has argued that at the core of Young’s early writings lies the notion that ‘exclusion and subordination’ can be countered by ‘facilitating and encouraging the oppressed to organise and articulate their needs, interests and values, but also of recognising identities’. For Roulston, this is similar – ‘a variant’ – on the consociational impulse to ‘attempt to find ways of making liberal democracy work in states divided by ethnicity, language or religion’. She concludes that whereas consociationalism stresses elite accommodation, Young suggests ‘that governments and states should create mechanisms which would allow all oppressed or minority groups to meet, discuss and formulate policy’. As Roulston points out, Young does not intend that groups be closed or become reified, but that risk remains in deeply divided societies; it also requires groups and individuals on the fringes of power and the margins of society to assert their own identities and make claims for rights and resources. Yet, in the case of the politics of victimhood and individuals who may have been traumatized by violent events, such a course seems somewhat idealistic.

A similar or related argument has been proposed by Adrian Little in relation to Mouffe’s theorizing. He, for example, suggested that the radical reconceptualization of the political located in Mouffe provides the beginnings of an answer to the question ‘how do we proceed to debate on institutional design if we do not have a sufficiently mature conception of democracy?’ This vision ultimately leads towards civil society as an alternative to elite and popular division; but even in societies such as Northern Ireland, where vibrant civil society/societies exist, government continues to act as the main repository of resources and, as the victims’ debates show, easily legislates groups into and out of existence. Little also points to a further vision of democracy that may at first glance circumvent that limitation and, although he points out the difficulties involved in application of the principle, he approvingly refers to Dryzek’s idea of ‘workable arrangements’ that are agreed to by participants ‘for different reasons’. This seems to place working prior to agreement and as such can be seen as analogous to (or at least a thin version of) the consociational-type approaches Little and Dryzek challenge.
insofar as it begins with an idea of what works and shapes society to fit. This actually
overturns Mouffe’s introduction of sharing, which starts (in an almost Rawlsian ‘original
position’ fashion) with an idea of shared values that are built from rather than towards.
The same impulse lies at the heart of Young’s other work on communication in which
she broadens the idea of justice to include not simply issues of distribution, regulation
and redistribution, but also is concerned with voice, marginalization and recognition.
Democracy, then, becomes not about maturation or depth, but just, fair, open and
balanced relationships between and among elites and ordinary citizens. If trauma is
taken as a form of disarticulation, a rupturing of communication and a forcible removal
of understanding, then the political science/legalistic debates between
consociationalism, deliberative democracy and agonism will never really speak to
questions of historic grievances.

Proponents of these theories could easily suggest that they were never designed to
tackle historic grievances and that, even in the case of consociationalism, which is the
field of thought most particularly dedicated to peace building, the preference is clearly
for peace and stability over justice. The point of exploring the issue from the point of
view of the politics of trauma is to highlight the fact that that type of argument does
not really hold in societies transitioning from violence to peace; or, rather, it sits
alongside the argument from the politics of trauma, which focuses on issues of
betrayal, trust and accountability. The point, then, is not to suggest an overhauling of
these theories, but rather to reinvest them with an emphasis upon societal
responsibility; where those theories work to exclude marginalized groups and
individuals through the institution of regimes of the sensible, the impetus then must be
to reverse their logics. In other words, if democracy is to mean anything beyond
formalistic principles, then it must be invested with a sense of justice as reparation,
communication and positive and affirmative discrimination. In the Rancierean sense,
this implies going beyond procedural definitions of democracy to look at the general
political culture.

This point is underscored in a recent book on the attempts to come to terms with the
past in Serbia, in which Eric Gordy refers to the idea of the German sociologist Max
Weber that ‘bureaucracies once founded tend to take on a life and logic of their own’.
The sentiment is, arguably, reflective of the main lessons of the book in which Gordy
maps the ‘genuine achievements’ of transitional justice in the region together with its
demonstrable inability to really tackle received wisdoms about the past and the
resilience of sectarian and segregated ideologies in the present. For Gordy, the
institute of a trial process at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and, specifically, the prosecution of Milošević – despite his evading justice
through his suicide – worked to ‘set a precedent for the reach of legal responsibility’
Yet, as he points out, despite – or perhaps because of – pressure from the international
community and influential organizations such as the United States Institute for Peace, the impact at an everyday level is negligible: ‘Memories of the past remain disputed, and transitional justice initiatives have not bridged those cognitive divisions. In this regard it could be said that legal “truth” has not contributed to social “reconciliation”’.

As the institutional roll-out of transitional justice mechanisms gathered pace in the first decade of the 21st century, Gordy argues, so, too, did stories about the conflict(s) of the 1990s become more and more entrenched. The problem, as he sees it, lies in the sectional focus of transitional justice initiatives in Serbia or, more precisely, the confinement of activity to targeted groups. The paradoxical effect of institution building has become a filling out of a legal space with little or no impact on the political or social realms. Gordy explains the limitations of the law as follows: ‘While it is not wholly implausible that a legal cause could lead to a social or cultural effect, a deeper understanding of the environment is required’. For Gordy, the implication is clear: it is in the cultural processes of understanding that the past becomes salient and divisive. As he explains, ‘responsibility has to do with our sense of who we are, our sense of one another, and people’s sense of us. Collective perceptions and feelings are involved at all these levels’.

Gordy’s vision of responsibility is based on a reframing of Karl Jasper’s ideas about guilt – particularly his notion of metaphysical guilt, which he views as stemming from the ‘co-responsibility’ that individuals bear for tackling ‘injustice and unfairness’. The notion of responsibility, for Gordy, works to emphasize the importance of ‘states of feeling or judgment operating on the level of relationships, perceptions, and individual self-assessment’. As such, it corresponds to Young’s vision and is suggestive of an incrementalist approach to building peace based on an acknowledgement of the shared nature of politics and democratization. Although her final book circles around a handful of hypothetical examples of ‘real world’ situations, the one compelling empirical example she offers of this type of model in action relates to an ordinance passed by the city of Chicago requiring firms to state whether they benefitted from the slave trade. She argues that although this ordinance might be construed as blaming corporations, what it also does is encourage public discussion of the historic injustice of slavery among Americans, not only in schools and universities, but also in commercial and industrial enterprises. To this we might add that it also sets down a benchmark: that is to say, responsibility is not simply about the re/production of ideas, but an awareness of their reception, and reception itself is, therefore, not simply to do with perception of validity but an inter-subjective relationship. The notion of a benchmark enters into that relationship to demarcate something (benefiting from slavery) as wrong, as beyond the pale, and it firmly establishes a clear chain of responsibility – in this case between citizens (through their public representatives and public bodies) and capital.
Conclusion

Young's example echoes the attempts to legislate for lustration-type mechanisms in Northern Ireland. It allows us to see how once a first step is taken to admit and proffer responsibility, that, in itself, acts as a catalyst and triggers a dynamic of social connection. The point echoes a recent conclusion by Landon Hancock where he argued that there are few lessons to be learned from the Northern Irish experience of building peace. One exception to this is that in order to 'maintain support for peace and to provide the space for further shifts in identity salience', a key policy aim should be 'to reduce the focus on political concerns'. He goes on to explain that it 'is not as though highly contentious political issues are going to disappear, nor are they going to become easier to solve'. However, a failure to shift emphasis to 'bread and butter' issues may result in further alienation of sections of the Northern Irish community from (peaceful and democratic) politics and 'may contribute to the sense that the peace process is stalling instead of moving forward'. The sentiment seems reasonable, but politicians may, in practice, find it difficult to distinguish between 'political' (symbolic and emotive) issues and 'bread and butter' (routine) ones. This may be due, perhaps, to voter pressure and/or the possibility that in places such as Northern Ireland where the nature and shape of the state itself (such as it is) is the subject of competition, questions of resource allocation or (re)distribution are in essence zero-sum calculations (what one 'side' gets or is conceded, the 'other side' loses).

In cases such as Northern Ireland's, where the 'stickiness' of the past continues to inspire divided identities and hold individuals trapped in traumatic prisons, the potential for factionalism seems inherent. I have argued that Iris Marion Young's late description of social responsibility may serve in some way to fill that gap by precipitating an outward movement of connection, attention and awareness of injustice, along with the imperative of attempting to remedy it. The emphasis on a connected model of responsibility may work to forestall some of Hancock's fears through a kind of path-dependent fashion, such as that envisaged in the work of Jennifer Todd on political change in Northern Ireland. Todd, for instance, has argued that ideas can work as 'wedges' or 'footholds' within political discourses, making their effects felt gradually over time. This notion coincides with Hancock's proposal and the central premise of this chapter – that building peace requires some kind of articulate and articulated commitment to connection and responsibility. Of course, that idea may be rebuked on the grounds that not everyone in ethnically divided societies professes social responsibility. After all, the idea of clan, tribe, family or blood underpins the logic of us/them that characterizes contention in such arenas. I have argued that rather than presenting a limitation or a stumbling block, such a reservation actually enhances the
necessity for articulating a commitment to the principle of social responsibility. The idea is implied but not articulated in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of 1998 in committing politicians to peace, tolerance and human rights; whether that vision is worked out according to consociational, deliberative democratic or agonistic principles, I have argued that it is imperative that that outworking give serious attention to the question of societal responsibility.

Notes
11 Ibid p. 28.
12 Ibid, p. 35.
13 Daniel Philpott argues that this kind of thinking is too prescriptive of change. ‘Liberal skeptics’ of reconciliation practices, such as Gutmann and Thompson, he believes, ‘implicitly propose a wall that seems to divide transformations of moral outlooks into a politically legitimate sort that involves respect, reciprocity, and trust and a sort that does not belong in politics, like forgiveness, repentance, and harmony’. For Philpott, this conceptualization of reconciliation is too ‘thin’: ‘It does not deal with the past. Each of the wounds of political injustice uniquely diminishes the human flourishing of the several parties involved in the injustice’. Here the emphasis seems (in my reading) to be not so much on liberalism versus illiberalism (despite the framings by Gutmann and Thompson and Philpott), but more on distinctions or gradations within a liberal approach to dealing with the past: societal reconciliation at one end of a continuum and


15 See Edkins, Trauma; Edkins 'Remembering Rationality'.


20 Edkins, Trauma, p. 4.

21 Edkins, Trauma, p. 5.


26 Ibid, p. 347.


29 McGrattan, Memory, p. 133.


33 Peter Shirlow and Kieran McEvoy, Beyond the Wire: Former Prisoners and Conflict Transformation in


41 Tonge, *Comparative Peace Processes*, p. 49.

42 'The Agreement' [1998]. Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm; accessed on 9 May 2014.


44 See, for example, Paul Dixon (2011) 'Is Consociational Theory the Answer to Global Conflict? From the Netherlands to Northern Ireland and Iraq', *Political Studies Review*, 9(3): 309–322.


50 R. C. Luskin, I. O'Flynn, J. S. Fishkin, and D. Russell (2014) 'Deliberating across Deep Divides', *Political...
51 See McGrattan and Meehan, *Everyday Life*.


63 Ibid, p. 332.


65 Ibid, p. 753.


70 Young, *Responsibility*, p. 104.


76 Cited in ibid, p. 107.
78 Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience*.
80 Ibid, p. 60.
81 Ibid, p. 68.
82 Ibid, p. xiv.
83 Ibid, p. 68.
84 Ibid, p. 19.
85 Ibid, p. 18.
The economics of peace: Is the UN system up to the challenge?
Chapter 6. The economics of peace: Is the UN system up to the challenge?

Graciana del Castillo

Several countries in the Middle East and North Africa are emerging from war and violence, and the Syrian civil war will not go on forever. With risks not only for the region but for the world as a whole, the time is past due for the UN system to engage in a broad-based debate on how to improve its record in dealing with countries embarking on the complex transition to peace and stability. This chapter analyzes the different dimensions of such transitions and focuses on the economics of peace, on the UN system’s operational capacity, and on the premises, lessons, and practices of previous cases that should be debated in order to improve the world body’s record in assisting war-torn countries. It also provides a cautionary note on how to measure success in such situations.

The multidimensional transition to peace and stability

Despite the peculiarities of each case, countries need to address the root causes of conflict to make the complex transition to peace and stability irreversible. It is in this context that countries embark on a multidimensional transition to establish security (the security transition); create participatory political systems, and respect for the rule of law and human rights (the political transition); foster social cohesion and national reconciliation (the social transition); and engage in the economics of peace so as to create stable, dynamic, and inclusive economies that would enable ordinary men and women—including the youth and uneducated—to have jobs and earn a decent living (the economic transition).

Since countries came out of Cold War–related confrontations in the early 1990s, this transition has proved incredibly difficult, not only for the countries involved, but also for the international community of states that has been ill-prepared to support them effectively. Failure in any one of the four dimensions of the transition would—as indeed it often happens—put the others at risk. It is understandable, and to be expected, that such an overwhelming process would necessarily take a long time and would entail formidable challenges (see Table 8.1). This is why effective support from the UN system is so important for countries undergoing transition.

Humanitarian relief to provide food, shelter, potable water, and medical care helps to save lives and provides minimum levels of consumption for subsistence in the short run. Delivering such aid through UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations
Table 8.1 Complex and multidimensional transition to peace and stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>From:</th>
<th>To:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Violence and insecurity</td>
<td>Improving public security; Creating national security forces; Disarming and demobilizing former insurgent groups; and De-mining of roads and fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Lawlessness and political exclusion</td>
<td>Developing a participatory government at the national and local levels; Promoting respect for the rule of law; and Promoting human, gender, and property rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Sectarian/ethnic, religious, ideological or class confrontation</td>
<td>Promoting national reconciliation and social cohesion; Developing framework to address grievances through peaceful means; and Reintegrating demobilized combatants into society and productive activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>War-torn and corrupt war economies, state-controlled policies and large macroeconomic imbalances</td>
<td>Rehabilitating infrastructure and services; Eradicating illicit activities; Establishing a simple and flexible macro/microeconomic framework; and Creating dynamic, inclusive, and sustainable economies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NGOs) has proved rather effective and financing has been generally available—even if less than the amounts requested by governments.

However, economic reconstruction that stimulates investment, production, food security, and job opportunities has proven largely unattainable in states emerging from war or other violent chaos. Such countries cannot move into sustainable long-term development unless they engage first in an intermediate and distinct phase—"the economics of peace"—which must aim at reactivating the economy while minimizing, at the same time, the high risk that these countries have of relapsing into conflict.¹

Indeed, over the last decade every new civil conflict took place in countries where conflict was endemic.

Reactivation of the economy in war-torn countries requires that they move along the following path (with terms used interchangeably in brackets):

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¹ Source: [Reference](https://example.com)
To avoid a relapse into conflict, the reactivation of the economy requires conflict-sensitive economic policies—unlike many of those advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions—to create the kind of growth that benefits the large majority and is sustainable, meaning that it is not going to disappear as soon as foreign forces and civilians leave the country and aid withers. The reactivation of the economy is also essential so that the other dimensions of the transition—security, political, and social—can be carried out and financed without the country falling into an aid dependency trap.

**UN operational capacity**

While different aspects of humanitarian relief are covered by different UN agencies, economic reconstruction per se has proved to be, to paraphrase Jeffrey Sachs, an "institutional orphan" in the UN system: no one organization has a specific mandate to address it.\(^2\) Some multilateral organizations and donor governments have created or expanded specialized departments to deal with issues of reconstruction but there is no organization within the UN system with a specific mandate. For example, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the World Bank has a new Center on Conflict, Security and Development (CCSD). Operationally, however, the process of economic reconstruction has proved to be mostly fragmented, chaotic, and wasteful and has often incurred large costs in terms of peacekeeping operations or military forces to keep the peace.

In 2000 the Brahimi report (named after its chair) noted that effective "peacebuilding" is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict. For this reason, it concluded that the UNDP was best placed to lead peacebuilding operational activities, in cooperation with other UN agencies and the
World Bank.\textsuperscript{3}

Given that such development organizations as the UNDP and the World Bank have a clear mandate to collaborate with governments, former insurgents and those who should give up arms cannot generally see them as impartial players. As argued in my book \textit{Rebuilding War-Torn States}, only the UN Secretariat can be an impartial arbiter in the negotiations between governments and armed groups that need to be reintegrated into society and into productive activities. This impartiality is the key to establishing programs and in allocating funds during reconstruction, where different groups or different parts of the country cannot necessarily count on the government's goodwill at a given point in time, but should nevertheless be beneficiaries of government services and aid money.

The UN Secretariat, however, has several operational shortcomings that prevent it from playing a leading political role in economic reconstruction. Although peacekeeping missions now have a deputy special representative for "humanitarian relief and reconstruction," it is normally the UNDP's executive director who is appointed to that position and makes all decisions regarding the economics of peace. The UN, therefore, loses its comparative advantage as an impartial arbiter. Having one person in charge of two very distinct activities—requiring not only different policies but also different expertise to implement them—conflates the basic distinction between "humanitarian aid" and "reconstruction aid" that Allen Dulles made in his book, \textit{The Marshall Plan}.\textsuperscript{4} This distinction was the key to the effective reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In the post–Cold War period, the same distinction can clearly be associated with failure in reconstruction leading to aid dependency.\textsuperscript{5}

In 2005 UN member states made the decision to create the intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO) within the UN Secretariat to make lasting the transition from war to peace. But the PSO lacks any operational capacity, which is indeed a problem since that is where the UN has largely failed in assisting countries in the transition. The UN Secretariat needs such capacity since economic reconstruction and national reconciliation, including through reintegration of former combatants, have proved critical in supporting the transition to peace and stability—but also in derailing it. Their neglect has led to a dismal record: the UN itself reckons that roughly half of the countries that embarked on a multifaceted transition to peace since the end of the Cold War—either through negotiated agreements or military intervention—have reverted to conflict within a few years.\textsuperscript{6}

Of the half that managed to keep the peace, the large majority ended up largely dependent on foreign aid.\textsuperscript{7} A few countries such as Afghanistan have the infamous record of having both relapsed into conflict and becoming one of the most
aid-dependent countries in the world, along with Liberia. Moreover, aid dependency has not necessarily led to improvements in the well-being of the population. Mozambique, for example, often hailed as a success story by the UN and the World Bank for keeping the peace and growing fast, remains at the bottom of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI).

There are only a few exceptions to this dismal record; El Salvador, for example, stands out on both grounds. Compliance with the UNbrokered peace agreement led to a perfectly observed ceasefire, in stark contrast to so many others—Angola, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Iraq, and Afghanistan relapsed into even bloodier conflicts. El Salvador also managed to keep the peace and more than triple income per capita with unusually low levels of aid for a war-torn country.8

The dismal past record requires soul-searching on the part of the UN, its programs and agencies—including the Bretton Woods institutions—on how to improve their assistance to countries in the difficult transition to peace and stability.9 At the same time, the UN lacks an institutional memory10 in this area that could facilitate learning from relative success stories such as that of El Salvador, and particularly from positive and negative lessons experienced in the country.11

Both soul-searching and the creation of an institutional memory are particularly necessary as aid becomes scarcer in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which has brought unimpressive growth, higher unemployment, crumbling infrastructure, fiscal imbalances, and larger taxpayer scrutiny in donor countries. Aid to war-torn countries competes with funding to address issues of long-term development, pandemics, natural disasters, and environmental problems worldwide.

What follows are some ideas for reflection and debate on how the record could be improved, particularly as the UN system embarks on future operations. Funding such operations is going to be particularly difficult as taxpayers—ranging from those in the United States to those in China, and all in between—become more skeptical about providing aid to distant countries through the UN system as reports on waste, incompetency, and corruption increasingly make the headlines.12

Premises, lessons, and best practices for debate

Ignoring the peculiarities and special needs of war-affected countries—strikingly different from those of other fragile states—as well as carrying out economic reconstruction under the misguided policies and misplaced priorities of development as usual, has been a major factor in the dismal record of economic reconstruction. Although each country is different and requires its own strategy, the experience of the
last two decades has allowed us to identify a number of premises, lessons, and best practices that national policymakers and the UN system, as well as other bilateral and multilateral stakeholders and non-state actors, should keep in mind to improve the provision of aid and technical assistance to war-affected countries.

The economics of peace phase has proved particularly challenging, since the country must reactivate the economy while moving away from the economics of war—that is, the underground economy of illicit and rent-seeking activities that thrive in situations of armed conflict or chaos and that will make the establishment of governance and the rule of law difficult, if not impossible. This key move requires overcoming the interests of spoilers that have an economic stake in drug production and trafficking, smuggling, arms dealing, extortion, and the many other illicit and profitable activities that thrive during wars. As Thomas G. Weiss and Peter Hoffman note, unusual predatory economic opportunities abound during reconstruction. In addition to those already listed, aid manipulation is an important factor to deal with.\(^{13}\)

Because countries emerging from domestic armed conflict, as those at war, do indeed share a number of characteristics with weak countries in the normal process of development, they are often lumped together as “fragile states.”\(^{14}\) The similarities, however, should not lead to the conflation of their needs. In fact, during the economics of peace phase, countries coming out of conflict have special needs and face a double challenge— that is, a “development-plus” challenge. Moreover, policymaking in war-torn states, as in other crisis-affected countries, must be quite distinct from those unaffected by war or other kinds of chaos.\(^ {15}\)

Policymakers should start addressing the normal socioeconomic challenges of the country very early on in the process. This was particularly needed in the case of poor countries such as Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, or Afghanistan, which exhibited some of the worst social and economic indicators in the world and which perennially were at the bottom of the Human Development Index. At the same time, however, these countries had to accommodate the extra burden of peace-related commitments.

Indeed, a number of activities—which are not necessary in weak countries not affected by conflict—are critical to address the grievances and special needs of groups involved in civil conflicts and to ensure their support of the peace process. These activities include the rehabilitation of services and infrastructure throughout the conflict-ravaged country; the creation of a simple and flexible macroeconomic framework for effective policymaking and for the accountable utilization of large volumes of aid that are typically given to post-crisis countries; the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and the clearance of mines in villages and in the fields as a precondition for resettlement and production.\(^ {16}\) They also include the reform
of the armed forces and the creation of a civilian police force to maintain public security, as well as the demobilization of militia groups and their reintegration into society through their inclusion into the security forces or productive activities. All of these peace-related activities targeted at conflict-affected groups have serious financial implications, but are indispensable for the effective reconstruction of the country and the reconciliation of its people. Without them, security would easily deteriorate, as in fact it has in many countries in transition.

Because the economics of peace takes place amid the complex and multidimensional transition to peace and stability—not independently from it—and because of the extra financial burden of carrying out peace-related projects, economic reconstruction is fundamentally different from development as usual. The most important challenge is to prevent the recurrence of hostilities—that is, to make peace irreversible. This entails the complex political task of addressing the root causes of the conflict, and it is for this reason that the UN is best placed to take the lead in establishing the economics of peace. 17

Because there cannot be development without peace, it should be accepted by all parties involved that the objective of peace and reconciliation should always prevail over that of development—if the two ever clash as they often do, particularly with regard to budgetary allocations. Moreover, hard-learned lessons from the past indicate that policy in war-torn countries, just as in other crisis situations, should be tailored to take into account five basic differences from development as usual (see Table 8.2).

These differences arise from: the horizon over which economic policies can be planned (i.e., short versus medium and long term); the treatment of different groups (i.e., preferences versus equal treatment for all); the amount of aid (i.e., sharp spikes versus low and stable flows); the establishment of the rule of law (i.e., national government

<table>
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<th><strong>Table 8.2</strong> Policymaking under normal development vs conflict situations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Normal Development</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium- and long-term framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Application of the “development principle”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low and stable foreign assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government establishes rule of law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political involvement of international community considered as interference</td>
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</table>
versus foreign forces); and the involvement of the international community in national affairs (i.e., intense and intrusive versus nonexistent).\(^\text{18}\)

Because the overriding objective in war-torn countries is to avoid reverting to war or generating new social conflicts, emergency policies should be adopted without delay, even if they are not optimal in the long run. This means that policymakers lack the luxury, typical of development as usual, of planning with medium- and long-term framework in mind. At the same time, aid to groups most affected by the conflict, that is, the "reconstruction principle," should have priority over the "normal development or equity principle" of treating equally all groups with the same needs.

Because aid spikes follow crises, national ownership of reconstruction policies must be assured even amid the large interference from the international community of states, which is inevitable in the presence of such a large amount of aid and often of foreign troops. Also, corruption needs to be checked since large volumes of aid facilitate it.

Because of these five basic differences, it should come as no surprise to anyone that optimal economic policies are not always possible or even desirable during this phase. This was not accepted (in fact, it was almost heresy) when the author first raised it at the Office of the UN Secretary-General in the early 1990s as well as at the IMF in the late 1990s.\(^\text{19}\)

Paul Collier, a former director of the Development Research Group at the World Bank, acknowledged as much in 2008 when he wrote:

> Indeed, until recently, the organizations dedicated to economic development did not systematically distinguish post-conflict settings as requiring a distinctive approach. Yet policy in the post-conflict phase needs to be distinctive, both that of the government and that of the donor agencies. It should not be simply development as usual.\(^\text{20}\)

In the same year, in a major speech on countries in reconstruction, World Bank president Robert Zoellick finally recognized that "development projects may need to be suboptimal economically—good enough rather than first-best."\(^\text{21}\)

But organizations are slow to change, even if their leaders acknowledge the need; development organizations and experts may resist a choice that seems obvious. In fact, they often insist that the country adopt optimal economic policies from the very beginning, even if such policies threaten the consolidation of peace, as has occurred in different ways in countries as far apart in time and distance as El Salvador, Haiti, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan. Rather than making peace, stability, reconciliation, the elimination of the illicit economy, and food security the focus of the intermediate phase, these organizations focused on establishing highly productive policies and programs, and world-class institutions, and on achieving poverty alleviation and the UN
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Experience shows that countries need to move through the economics of peace and away from the economics of war before they can fully engage in the economics of development.\textsuperscript{22}

By proposing that development organizations lead peacebuilding operations, the Brahimi report promoted a continuation of the failed development-as-usual approach to economic reconstruction, which has proved so ineffective in consolidating peace.\textsuperscript{23} Such policies, which ignore political and security realities, have normally benefited a small elite over the large majority. By neglecting to reactivate the subsistence rural sector on which the large majority often depends for food and livelihoods, policies have often led to food and aid dependence and large trade deficits that these countries can ill afford. Such policies have been a major factor in the dismal record in establishing lasting peace and stability in war-torn countries across the world.

Development-as-usual policies have also been a factor in the high costs that the international community has incurred to keep the peace in countries such as Liberia, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In Liberia, for example, the UN peacekeeping operation (UNMIL) cost the equivalent of two-thirds of the country’s GDP in 2009–11. As UNMIL departs, the government must make a major effort to maintain security, which will require a painful reallocation of budgetary resources. Similarly, as foreign troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the government will need to assume operational and maintenance costs for security that will be difficult to sustain. More effective and inclusive economic reconstruction policies adopted from the very beginning, in which a large part of the population receives a peace dividend in terms of better living conditions and improved livelihoods, would have made such excessive security expenses unnecessary.\textsuperscript{24}

How to measure success?

An important issue for debate in the UN system is how to measure success in war-torn countries. Different organizations often compliment themselves on the high growth rates of countries that they support in the transition to peace and stability. They call attention to growth in Liberia and Afghanistan, for example, to validate their strategy and to conclude that they are on the right track to building peace in those countries. With substantial aid flows and a large international presence (both civilian and military), such high rates of growth are hardly surprising when starting from a low base. Reactivating growth under such conditions is rather easy to achieve but very hard to sustain. Moreover, it often creates a number of economic and social distortions such as inflation in non-tradable goods, difficulties for the most vulnerable groups in accessing services and meeting basic needs, and a poor quality civil service, since the few people
who are qualified for such positions are naturally drawn to higher paying jobs with international organizations. These distortions may affect the country for years to come.

Similarly, the degree of aid dependency should be factored into measures of success. Many complain that countries in Africa get much smaller levels of aid per capita than those in the Balkans. But this measure is grossly misleading because it does not show how the aid affects peoples' lives. What matters is not the nominal amount, but what aid represents in terms of peoples' income and in terms of the purchasing power in the respective countries.

Table 8.3 shows that in the 10-year period following the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnians received $221 per person on average for this period (t0–t9). This is significantly more than the $72 that Mozambicans received during a similar period. However, in the case of Bosnia, the amount received per capita represented less than 20 percent of the average per capita income of the population. In the case of Mozambique, aid added 40 percent to per capita income, more than twice as much. Furthermore, the same dollar amount could buy a significantly larger amount of food and other basic necessities in Mozambique than in Bosnia, a much more expensive country. Thus the relative impact of aid was larger in Mozambique than in Bosnia.

Table 8.3 also shows that in some countries (Bosnia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and El Salvador) aid fell over time and the average for the first 10-year period is lower than in the first 3-year period (t0–t2). In others (Afghanistan and Liberia), however, aid flows increased during the first decade—a clear indication that dependence was not falling, as it should have been. What the table does not show is that Mozambique continued to receive aid amounting to 24 percent of its GDP on average during the second decade. After two decades of such large aid flows, the 2013 HDI placed Mozambique 185th among 186 countries. This is indeed striking, and clearly calls into question not only the definition of success—since the World Bank and UN organizations often refer to Mozambique as a fast-growing and successful post-conflict country—but also the nature of the support that the UN system is providing for economic reconstruction in the country.

Donor policies are often focused on improving infrastructure and services that mainly benefit domestic elites and foreign investors. Success should be measured by whether the lives and livelihoods of the large majority of men and women have improved and by whether the country can stand on its feet and move into a normal development path.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>$t_0$</th>
<th>$t_1$</th>
<th>$t_2$</th>
<th>$t_3$</th>
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<th>$t_0-t_2$</th>
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<tr>
<td>Per capita (US$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan$^1$</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia$^2$</td>
<td>293</td>
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Source: Calculated by author using data from the World Economic Outlook Database (April 2013); OECD total ODA (accessed 12 May 2013).

Notes: The table reports aid during the first decade of the transition to peace in the reported countries; it also reports the average aid flows during the first 3 years ($t_0-t_2$), 5 years ($t_0-t_4$), and 10 years ($t_0-t_9$).

3 Liberia: 2003–2011 (hence last column averages aid over 9 years instead of 10). As of November 2013, data for ODA in 2012 was not available.
Conclusion

How can the UN system provide more effective assistance? There is indeed a desperate need for more efficient use of available aid and for better directed technical assistance to war-torn countries in their transition to peace and stability. The United Nations, together with its programs and agencies, is best placed to support countries in such a transition. The UN system should focus on how to achieve these goals, particularly in light of the fact that new donors such as the Gulf countries, which will be key in financing policies in the Middle East, and China, which is playing an increasing role in Africa, are reluctant to channel aid through the UN system because of its high cost, ineffectiveness, and waste.

Among the things to be debated is how the UN system uses its resources. Should it continue to spend money on repetitive reports and conferences, unnecessary translations, and first-class travel, or should those resources be channeled toward supporting war-torn countries to create local capacity and improve local livelihoods, which constitutes the only way to achieve lasting peace and stability? Clearly, cutting resource waste should be a priority concern.

The UN system needs also to debate specific ways to make itself more relevant in supporting war-torn countries through the economics of peace phase. Such debate should involve practitioners throughout the UN system, policymakers and parliamentarians in donor countries, other multilateral and bilateral donors, academics, and nongovernmental actors, including NGOs and private companies that are increasingly operating in war-torn countries. Just as importantly, it should involve policymakers and other experts from these countries, who are not normally participants in discussions about their own future.

Several proposals have been made to improve the effectiveness and accountability of aid and to create a level playing field for the majority, including through the creation of “reconstruction zones.” By putting foreign investors and local communities in a position to work together, such zones could help countries achieve food security, provide viable employment for the large majority including the youth, and become less aid dependent. Given the poor record of the past, debating this and other such proposals that contribute to thinking outside the box could be productive.

The UN system should also explore ways that aid can be channeled increasingly through the government so that it can subsidize micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in the agricultural, manufacturing, and services sectors to hire workers—including former combatants and other conflict-affected groups. With labor costs thus reduced, and with strong support from the UN system, existing and potential
local entrepreneurs could decide to invest both for the domestic and foreign markets, even under the conditions of uncertainty and high risk that characterize those countries.29

These and other policies focused on employment creation, the utilization of local ingenuity and local inputs, and foreign capital could help war-torn and other conflict-affected countries to move toward peace and stability. The UN system needs to debate ways to improve its support of governments in rebuilding their own countries and to reduce its own operational and overhead costs. Otherwise, direct cash payments to the poor will become increasingly used as an alternative to channeling aid through the UN system, particularly since it seems to be working well in different settings.30

Only by helping governments to establish their legitimacy in the provision of security and services, and in the creation of a level playing field for the large majority in the rural sector and in the establishment of a favorable business climate for other sectors, will the UN, its programs and agencies, succeed in reducing young people’s motivations to embrace insurgencies and uprisings.

Notes


5 For a discussion of the relevance of the Marshall Plan to transitions to peace since the end of the Cold War, see Graciana del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States; and Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan (Bloomington, Ind.: Xlibris, 2014).

6 Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned this figure in his report In Larger Freedom (New York: UN, 2004), 70. The UN does not seem to have updated this figure, and we have seen many countries reverting to war since. Analysts using a wider sample, which includes countries that are not going through the complex multidimensional transition discussed above, have estimated probabilities of relapsing into conflict ranging from 40 to 50 percent. What matters more than an exact figure is that war-torn countries have a much larger probability of going back to war than others, and that is why policies should be conflict-sensitive.

7 OECD Official Development Assistance (ODA) data used in this chapter include only economic and
humanitarian aid at concessional terms, and exclude military and counter-narcotics assistance. They also exclude private sources of aid (NGOs, foundations, and private individuals). Thus, they are an underestimate of total aid.


9 The Bretton Woods institutions have improved the way that they support these countries, although much remains to be done. For a detailed analysis of how those institutions have assisted these countries over time, see Graciana del Castillo, “The Bretton Woods Institutions, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding,” in Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, ed. Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann (London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), Chapter 4; Rebuilding War-Torn States, 66–77; “Economic Reconstruction of War-Torn Countries: The Role of the International Financial Institutions,” Seton Hall Law Review 38, no. 4 (2008): 1265–95; and “Post-conflict Economic Reconstruction and the Challenge to the International Financial Organizations: The Case of El Salvador,” World Development 29 (December 2001): 1967–85.

10 Three of the most important initiatives that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali supported to deal with reconstruction in war-torn countries are largely unknown, including An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities (New York: UN, 1997); the International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies (Vienna: UN, 1995); and the Minimalist Monetary and Fiscal Frameworks prepared for the IMF at the request of the secretary-general for these countries. See del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 31–33, 55–56, 72–74, and 280–81.

11 See Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 1994): 69–83 for some of the early problems that the UN faced in El Salvador; Marrack Goulding, Peace-monger (London: John Murray, 2002), 241–43 for problems with the renegotiation of the land program that he claims saved the peace process; del Castillo, "Arms-for-Land Deal: Lessons from El Salvador," in Multidimensional Peacekeeping: Lessons from Cambodia and El Salvador, ed. Michael Doyle and Ian Johnstone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) for an analysis of the problems with implementation of the program; and del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, Chapters 7–8, for a detailed analysis of the experiences of El Salvador and Kosovo with economic reconstruction, the role of the UN in them, and the problems the organization faced in assuming the leading role.

12 See, for example, Jack Healy, "In Afghanistan, A Village Is a Model of Dashed Hopes," New York Times, 8 August 2011, for the waste with the UNDP’s Alice-Ghan housing project for returnees in Afghanistan.


than optimal policies” in their economic reform efforts so as to accommodate the additional financial burden of reconstruction and peace consolidation.

16 In some countries the need for de-mining was urgent and expensive. After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan, for example, had become one of the most mined countries in the world. De-mining was imperative not only for the safety of the population but also for the reactivation of agricultural production.

17 Both the UNDP and the World Bank rejected requests by the UN Secretary-General’s Office to support the land program on the grounds that they supported “all farmers.” See del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, Chapter 7. 18 Ibid., Chapter 4.


22 For empirical evidence on how these issues were addressed in these countries and other countries, see de Soto and del Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding”; and del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States.

23 Despite his well-known diplomatic skills, Lakhdar Brahimi has never shown any special interest on the economic issues that could have provided support to his political policies in Afghanistan and elsewhere. See del Castillo, Guilty Party.

24 IMF balance of payments data show that the cost of UNMIL was $600 million a year on average in 2009–11, in a country where GDP only averaged $900 million a year. The security costs in Afghanistan have been detailed in del Castillo, Guilty Party, Chapter 20.


26 Mozambique is one of the UN’s pilot countries for Delivering as One (DaO). However, the UN has been criticized for taking a non-strategic approach to development assistance and for having lost influence, especially because it represents a small fraction of total ODA to Mozambique. Operationally, in spite of DaO, “the UN’s challenges are fragmentation, duplication, lack of focus, competition between the agencies for funding, inefficiency, inadequate coherence, inefficient operation.” See UN Mozambique, Delivering as One: Country-led Evaluation 2010, 54, www.mz.un.org/orpor/Resources/Publications/Delivering-as-One-Evaluation-Report, 2.

27 For evidence on waste and inefficiencies, see del Castillo, “The Economics of Peace.”


30 See, for example, Joseph Hanlon, Armando Barrientos, and David Hulme, Just Give Money to the Poor: The
The peace researcher and foreign policy prediction
Chapter 6. The peace researcher and foreign policy prediction

Introduction

With all of the foolishness that has characterized the "futures" game over the past decade or so, it is clearly time to put this question on the agenda of a group which is committed to an applied social science. No matter how I turn it over in my mind, the number one task for peace research always turns out to be that of prediction: the ability to forecast, with increasing reliability, the outcomes which are most likely to emerge out of a given set of background conditions and behavioral events. And it seems to me that this holds whether our concern is to aid, augment, bypass, or subvert those who now decide questions of war and peace.

One important distinction should, however, be made at the outset, and that is the distinction between contingent and non-contingent predictions. In the contingent prediction, we explicitly recognize—no matter how strong the historical momentum may be—that conscious human intervention can deflect the march of history. That is, one may look into the future and spell out the expected conditions with no mention of those events which could effectively intervene between the prediction and the outcome. This deterministic sort of forecasting has been the dominant mode throughout history, and is still very frequently used, but it strikes me as grossly inadequate.

Even though it may be academically stylish and "realistic," as well as psychically and morally comfortable, the non-contingent prediction appears to me as empirically and ethically unsound. From the purely scientific point of view, we know that some of the variance in any set of social (or even technological) outcomes is accounted for by events which occur shortly before the observed outcomes. How much of that variance is, of course, an important empirical question [...] And from the ethical point of view, the responsible social scientist must care about that non-determined variance, try to measure it, and then go on to explore the ways in which it can be exploited by and for humanity.

My point, then, is that if we peace researchers are to nudge human history onto a slightly different course—and we can strive for nothing less—we must radically revise the style and method of social forecasting as we know it today. Let me devote my remarks tonight toward that end.

Some current methods of prediction

Leaving aside such dubious methods as the contemplation of one's navel, the distributions of tea leaves and chicken entrails, the patterning of palm lines, and the
positions of the stars, one may discern four major orientations.

First, there is simple projection or extrapolation, in which we assume that past trends will continue in direction and rate of change through the present and into the future. One of the more interesting, but risky, examples […] was the Pentagon projection of Soviet and U.S. production rates in the late 1950s, leading to the prediction of a missile gap which never developed. In the absence of any other information, this basis of forecasting is better than nothing, but it contains six serious flaws. One, of course, is that it is completely fatalistic, in that it ignores the possibility of any future modification in the human behavior which produced the prior pattern of events. Second, it ignores the very frequent occurrence of upper and lower limits, and tends to assume that growth and decline curves do not flatten out at some upper or lower threshold. Third, it ignores the real possibility that the causal relationships among the variables that are affecting the trend line might themselves undergo change.

Fourth, simple projection ignores the possibility of self-correcting or self-amplifying mechanisms in that the very growth or decline in the variable itself could exercise an effect on one of the variables affecting it, and thus indirectly influence its own rate and direction of change. […] Fifth, it is often based on so brief a time span, or so few observations, that we might be extrapolating from a short-run perturbation rather than a long-run trend. Finally, when observations are insufficiently frequent, there is the possibility that what appears to be following a secular trend is really a cyclical phenomenon. Despite these and other dangers, extrapolation continues to be widely used for predictive purposes in social systems.

A second major method of forecasting is the "seat of the pants" scenario, made famous by some of our more enterprising military and political analysts […]. Essentially, this is little more than combining imagination with the conventional wisdom, and […] it offers greater flexibility than straight extrapolation […]. While this is merely a paper and pencil formalization of what often happens in foreign ministries, it does have the virtue of revealing how other-directed the respondents are […] but it is hardly a basis from which confident forecasts can be made.

A third major method is the game or man–machine simulation […]. In this case, rather than have one or two specialists brainstorm their way to a scenario, we assign roles to professional students or practitioners and instruct them to play out a scenario from some given point of departure. This basis not only depends on the accuracy of the conventional wisdom, but also—depending on how carefully programmed it is—lacks the reproducibility which we can at least get from the written reasoning behind the armchair scenario.

A fourth method is the computer simulation. And even when it proceeds from
hypothetical data and naive untested models, it offers a more solid basis of forecasting than the first three methods. This is because it requires us to make explicit the variables we employ, our guesses as to their magnitude, and the processes which allegedly lead to the simulated outcomes. But if the data inputs are imaginary and the model is merely a formalization of the shared hunches of the analysts, a policymaker would have to be most imprudent to take the results seriously. I will return to this particular and rather promising method in due course.

There are many variations on these four basic themes, and volumes could be written to summarize and evaluate the procedures and results to date. But our concern this evening is not so much to belabor the more familiar methods but to lay out some of the problems and possibilities associated with a more rigorous strategy.

**Preferred methods of prediction**

Having spoken critically of some of the more familiar methods of foreign policy forecasting, it is incumbent on me to suggest some preferred alternatives. As I see it, there are two, with one being essentially an extension of the other. The first might be called the postdict–predict method and the other—and much to be preferred—might be called the theory-based method. Let me try to illuminate the difference while describing each.

**From postdiction to prediction**

By this caption, I mean nothing more than a method by which we first ascertain the direction and strength of association among one or more predictors and an outcome variable in the past, and then project that historically observed correlation into the future. This method is likely to be the most feasible one in the short run, but it has some of the earmarks of simple projection. There are, at the same time, some important distinctions.

In simple extrapolation, one merely estimates or measures the value (magnitude) of a given variable at several points in the remote and recent past, plots them on a time axis, fits a straight, curved, or sinuous line to those points, and then continues that line out into the future. […]

In the method proposed here, however, we extend or project the observed prior relationship between or among two or more variables. That is, if we have discovered that underdeveloped nations of a certain class become less conciliatory in dealing with one another as their gross national products move upward to $280 per capita, and more conciliatory after they exceed that threshold, we can (with certain caveats) use
that observed historical relationship as one possible basis for predicting into the future.

To return to an earlier issue, note that these are contingent predictions rather than fatalistic ones. That is, they tell us that if certain nations exceed the GNP per capita threshold, their foreign policy behavior patterns are likely to change, and that if the threat–promise ratio is kept low, wars will be less frequent. Thus, we articulate our model, operationalize the predictor and outcome variables, and then test the bivariate or multivariate relationships implied by the model for some relevant time–space domain in the past. To the extent that our postulated relationships are borne out by the historical facts, we can say that our simple models have postdictive power. Further—and this is the important caveat—to the extent that we are willing to assume a continuation of those observed relationships from the past into the future, we may use them for purposes of prediction. And, as Rapoport reminded us in last year’s presidential address (1972), this can be a risky assumption. […]

A third and obvious caveat is that, no matter how strong and consistent the postdicted correlation may be, the ceteris paribus assumption just may not hold into the future. […] To illustrate, the correlation between the threat–promise ratio and war may be based on a fairly long period in which the larger international system had a rather low bipolarity index. But if new alliance formations were to produce a sharp increase in bipolarity in the period just ahead, third and fourth parties may encourage their allies to stand firm at the critical moment in a diplomatic conflict, even while their early verbal exchanges remained below the critical threshold. And so on.

To sum up, observed historical associations will almost certainly increase the accuracy of our contingent predictions […] And while this is a considerable improvement over what we can do without such correlational knowledge and postdictive models, it still offers a weak reed in a tense or unstable environment. If the peace researcher is to appreciably enhance the survivability of mankind, he or she must do better.

**Theory-based prediction**

Two points emerge from the preceding discussion: (a) correlational knowledge is not the same thing as explanatory knowledge; and (b) the closer we come to the latter, the more accurate our predictions are likely to be. But what constitutes explanatory knowledge is very much a function of one’s point of view or scientific purpose. For example, some operations researchers will claim to have an explanation for some outcome pattern as soon as they’ve found the equation that produces a predicted distribution close to that which is actually observed. At the other extreme, some social scientists might insist on establishing the connection from predictor to outcome
variables, via the intra-psychic (or even the bio-chemical) processes of those whose
decisions and behavior allegedly link up those two sets of variables. In between these
extremes are many other views as to what constitutes an adequate explanation, and to
which level of analysis one must descend (or ascend) in order to produce a satisfactory
descriptive sequence of events and conditions. For our purposes here, let us settle for a
statement of the sequential events and conditions which link together several predictor
variables and an outcome variable in a sufficiently self-evident, compelling, and
plausible fashion to gain the assent of most competent observers.

[...] Note also that the word "causal" is not used. While we can speak with some
confidence about "causal" processes of a very primitive sort (such as pressure on this
lever causes this gate to open [...]), the social scientist would be wise to forget about
(or, at least, sidestep) causality. Almost any social process of interest can occur via so
many different and unobservable routes that we would have to make inferential leaps
of heroic proportions in order to specify causality.

Returning, then, to the need for a theory in order to make really solid contingent
predictions, I would define a reproducible and compelling explanation of a given class
of events as a theory. Conversely, the term "theory" should not be applied to a hunch, a
vague suspicion, a widely accepted scenario, an untested mathematical model, or even
a clearly demonstrated bivariate or multivariate correlational pattern. Given this view of
an explanatory theory (to be redundant), what can it do for predictive purposes that
observed correlations cannot do?

The key difference lies in the weakness of prediction based solely on observed
correlations out of the past. [...] [T]hey give us only the crudest hints as to when, and
why, the general pattern does not hold. To put it another way, they reveal little about
the timing, direction, and magnitude of changes in the often interdependent
relationships among our predictor variables. Nor do they offer much guidance in
helping us explain those almost inevitable system dynamics which act continuously on
the ways in which the predictors impinge on the outcomes. In the absence of such
knowledge, it is almost as dangerous to project an historically observed correlation into
the future, as it is to project a single variable's magnitude into the future. In sum,
correlational knowledge can carry us part way, but until we have built and empirically
tested a theory which offers a compelling explanation of the changing as well as the
constant associations in the past, we make predictions of less than desirable solidity. As
Comte reminded us (and I paraphrase), on doit savoir pour prévoir.

Routes to policy-relevant theory

It is, of course, one thing to agree that solid explanatory theories offer the most reliable
basis for making foreign policy predictions, and quite another to agree on the most promising routes to the construction of such theories. While I cannot go here into any thorough discussion of alternative theory-building strategies, a few subjective comments might be in order. Restricting ourselves to theory in the scientific sense used here, let me outline and comment upon five general orientations.

One strategy is the heavily inductive one, in which we articulate and test a number of simple hypotheses against the relevant historical past. As we test, discard, modify, test again, and confirm these hypotheses (or, for the purists, disconfirm their null versions), we can begin to assemble them into an increasingly integrated and internally consistent body of predictive and explanatory knowledge. While this is not the route to theory that the philosophers of science and the textbooks usually advocate, it often turns out to be the most effective. But that effectiveness also depends on the researcher’s theoretical sophistication, epistemological subtlety, and “feeling” for the data.

At the other end of the spectrum is the heavily deductive strategy, in which one constructs a theory out of the whole cloth, as it were. That is, we think of alternative possible explanations for the outcome phenomena which concern us, select the one which seems most plausible, most internally consistent, is most compatible with our general theoretical orientation, and (less often) most consistent with the findings of others. We then articulate the putative explanatory model in mathematical, diagrammatic, or verbal form. Some of us would then claim to have produced a theory, but most would agree that the formalized model must be refined further into operational language, and then subjected to a series of systematic empirical tests against the relevant past.

As a matter of fact, most successful scientists work with a mix of these two strategies, moving back and forth between the building of models and their systematic testing. Pure inductivism is ineffective because it offers little guidance for selecting and then synthesizing the tested propositions into a coherent and internally consistent whole. And pure deductivism is ineffective because our discipline has virtually no larger body of theory worthy of the name from which to begin, and because the resulting explanation may—despite its elegance and plausibility—be quite inconsistent with the historical facts. […]

A third strategy is that of analogizing, in which we build models on the basis of assumed similarities between the world of international politics and that of small groups, industrial organizations, urban communities, and so forth. While it is highly desirable for all the social sciences to borrow and compare across disciplinary boundaries, it is quite risky to assume that nations behave analogously to individuals, sales divisions, or metropolitan agencies in comparable situations […].
Fourth is the all-man or man–machine simulation, in which individuals or small teams are assigned roles as nations, given a description of the state of the world and told to go ahead and play out the scenario. When this activity is highly structured and controlled, it can help alert us to the less obvious implications of our models, but when run in the more informal gaming mode—as suggested earlier—it is a waste of time, if not downright dangerous. [..]

A fifth strategy, and in my judgment, the one toward which we should move with all deliberate speed, is that of the computerized simulation [..]. As I see it, this approach to theory building offers us the major virtues of the other four strategies, with only one serious liability: that of cost. [..]

But the advantages are (in principle, at least) very impressive. If we build our computerized models in the form of component sub-routines, we can experiment with a large number of contending explanations. If we begin with a reasonably extensive and accurate database, we can experiment with differing magnitudes of our key variables. And if we are willing to move back into the referent historical world when we run into dead ends in the simulation, we can achieve a valuable interplay between our deductive and inductive emphases. These and other virtues add up to a method in which we can ultimately—by a systematic trial-and-error procedure—“reproduce” diplomatic history. [..] The chances of getting a good fit for more than a few of our historical cases are not very good, so we continue to modify the sub-routines to reflect changes in the relationships among the key variables. If a series of such experiments leads eventually to a fairly good fit, we are fortunate. More often at this stage in our discipline’s development we will conclude that some important variable has been omitted, and we then must either gather the time series data reflecting the historical values of the variable, or make some reasonable estimates of those values, to see whether its inclusion improves the postdictive–predictive power of the model.

One serious problem, however, is that—if the early findings from the Correlates of War project are accurate—the relationships among key variables are not constant over long periods of time [..]. That is, we not only find that most of the more interesting variables show appreciable variation from month to month and year to year, but that the correlations among them also change, albeit less obviously. The 1890s, for example, produce a change in the direction of the relationships between alliance patterns and war, and between capability concentration and war; some systemic conditions which predicted to war in one century predicted away from war in the other, and vice versa [..]. These inconvenient but apparently genuine shifts can be a source of frustration, but they can also be a source of inspiration, helping to identify important watersheds which historians may (or may not) have noted and interpreted accurately.

For purposes of policy prediction, the computer simulation strategy does more than
this. First, it offers the most feasible way of ascertaining when, and in what fashion, the theoretical dynamics of the international system change. Second, it helps us to identify the factors that most strongly account for those changing relationships among our variables. Third, and most important for predictive purposes, the well-designed and carefully tested simulation has built into it the mechanisms which account for and produce such systemic dynamics. Thus, we can move from runs of the past to runs of the future, and be much less likely to commit the sin of mechanical extrapolation from past into future. […]

Epistemology, education, and prediction

So far, I have outlined several methods by which to make foreign policy predictions and discussed some of the ways in which we might build toward the more promising of those methods. But the construction of sound explanatory and predictive theories is only part of the game. What doth it serve us if our potential clients are incapable of distinguishing between shoddy merchandise and that which more closely approximates the real thing? It is, of course, no coincidence that most of the producers of foreign policy analyses and predictions come out of the same intellectual subculture as the consumers. […] Outside of that unfortunate aberration exemplified by the U.S. Defense Department’s "whiz kids," we find very few scientifically oriented people staffing these agencies around the world. And the same would seem to hold for most of those who serve as their advisors and consultants.

Rather than look for some conspiratorial explanation, we would do well to look at ourselves and the several roles that we do or should take on. While most peace researchers are in their 20s and 30s and thus hardly responsible for the epistemological innocence and theoretical clumsiness of today’s foreign policy elites, we are not doing nearly enough to change that state of affairs. The implication, then, is that we have to be more than creative and careful researchers; we have to assume a variety of educational roles as well.

Perhaps the most important educational role is, paradoxically enough, in our research. By and large, macrosocial scientists do a poor job of explicating their models or writing up their findings. Insufficiently attentive to the canons of scientific reproducibility, the untidy organization and semantic imprecision (not to mention the virtual absence of grace or wit) of our books and articles can do a great deal of harm. First off, we lose many of our prescientific readers, in and out of government, early in the opening paragraphs. Thus, the specific piece of work seldom gets read, not to mention understood, in policy-making circles. Secondly, and more harmful, our writings help to reinforce the prejudices and make more credible the general skepticism with which a
graduate of the Fletcher School, Ecole Pratique, or Oxbridge approaches this behavioral science stuff. Given their educational preparation, it is little wonder that even our elite clientele is often left confused or bored. Let me plead with all of you, then—and especially those of you who edit or referee for the various peace research journals—to give considerably greater attention to the quality of our written work. From the choice of title and statement of the problem, through the description of data-making and data analysis procedures, to the interpretation of results, there is enormous room for improved literary craftsmanship and semantic clarity.

Second is the educational role we might play in our public lives. As consultants to governmental and intergovernmental agencies, for example, it is essential that we make clearer the reasoning behind our recommendations, the epistemological criteria we hope to satisfy, and the very real limitations on our ability to give much guidance. We have discovered precious little about war, peace, and social conflict to date, and it is incumbent on us to give as much emphasis to our ignorance as we do to our expertise. […]

Closely related are the missed opportunities to call public and elite attention to dubious analytical arguments, primitive procedures, and ignorance of the available evidence. Since fewer than perhaps 5 percent of all media executives, reporters, and commentators have had any formal or informal training in scientific method, the opportunities should be legion. And even when the media people are substantively and methodologically competent in reporting and interpreting foreign policy material, we can be fairly sure that those governmental officials who dish out the “news” will not be.

The third educational role is, of course, in the classroom. An overwhelming majority of peace researchers are employed by schools and colleges to perform a pedagogical role. And while we seem to be doing better at this than at our less institutionalized teaching tasks, a few constructive criticisms seem to be in order. My particular concern is with undergraduate courses in the social sciences and our tendency to underestimate our students’ intelligence and motivation. Thus, we work hard to instruct our graduate students in the basic rules and fine points of scientific method, and then turn up in undergraduate classes sounding all too similar to our most prescientific colleagues from departments of speech or history. […] In sum, the undergraduate education sector may well be the most important one to which we address ourselves. Most of the world’s foreign policy elites are college educated, as are those who serve in the mass media; and increasingly, the rest of the world’s ordinary citizens will follow the lead of the Western nations in receiving some sort of higher education. If we can help to equip these people with an appreciation of the difference between authoritative assertion and reproducible evidence, their political leaders will find it much more difficult to sell them one absurd bill of goods after another.
To conclude this argument, then, there seems to be a strong connection between the research we undertake and the educational roles we assume. No matter how solid the base from which we make policy predictions, it could easily be for naught. The policy elites must understand the difference between and among the various methods of prediction, and not be impressed with anything less than the most rigorous and careful, no matter how familiar the accents in which delivered, or the stature of the source. The media must begin to examine foreign policy pronouncements and predictions with considerably greater competence, no matter how symbiotic (or antagonistic) their relationships with the political elites. And the attentive public must experience a marked improvement in its ability to discriminate, and in its willingness to press both the government and the media when the usual foreign policy propaganda begins to flow. Each sector can reinforce the more wholesome tendencies in the other, thus creating a system of national states in which foreign policy is more intelligently—if not more humanely—formulated. It is not too strong to say that the world needs an epistemological revolution, and peace researchers can play a central role in that revolution.

Conclusion

[...] Let me conclude, then, by putting the prediction question into a somewhat broader context. As I see it, war—and other large-scale dramatic events—may be seen as a consequence of three kinds of factors. These are: (a) deterministic; (b) probabilistic; and (c) voluntaristic. Needless to say, they are neither independent of each other nor easily disentangled.

By the deterministic factors, I mean those events and conditions over which it is too late to exercise any control, and whose impact markedly limits our options as we seek to ameliorate (or, for some, amplify) a conflict before it spills over into overt mass violence. [...] 

Then there are the probabilistic factors, reflecting both the inadequacies in our models and measures, and the stochastic element that is probably inherent in all social phenomena. While a goodly share of what appears to inhere in the latter will, in due course, turn out to be really a function of the former, we nevertheless must reckon with those unpredictables (including human capriciousness) that are not the fault of an inadequate knowledge base. [...] 

But this latter element—cited by cynics as well as romantics as the reason why we can never build a science of peace—may be our salvation as well as our frustration. I refer, then, to the third kind of factor, the voluntaristic one. This element may be crucial in two ways. First, precisely because humans are different from lemmings, we need not act
as certain scientific models predict we will act. With reasonably solid and credible knowledge as to the consequences of repeating the behavior of similar groups in similar situations in the past, we need not march, lockstep, over the cliff.

Second, the better our knowledge about the processes by which groups move from incompatible interests to conflict to mass violence, the more readily we can distinguish between those factors which are beyond our control, and those which we had best try to modify. If, near the brink, it is too late to change certain structural, cultural, or material properties of the system, but still possible to change others, the knowledge which permits us to make that distinction is of no mean consequence. […]

In sum, there seems to be a reasonably clear line from theoretical knowledge to contingent prediction to adaptive behavior. First, of course, our existential, correlational, and explanatory knowledge must expand. Second, that knowledge must be integrated into coherent theoretical form. Third, it must be evaluated critically and understood by the leaders and the led. And, fourth, it must be used to generate contingent predictions which are credible as well as careful. If we peace researchers can contribute to all of these objectives, we will have earned our keep.
International administration
Chapter 7. International administration

Like any peacebuilding operation international administration aims to establish the foundations of peace. The means it deploys, however, are rather particular. This chapter starts with an overview of international administrations that have been established in the past. The conceptualization used for this overview is primarily based on the work of Wilde (2001, 2008). His conceptualization consists of the notions ‘administration’ and ‘international’. First, Wilde defines administration (he uses the term territorial administration) as: ‘a formally-constituted, locally-based management structure operating with respect to a particular territorial unit, whether a state, a sub-state unit or a non-state territorial entity’ (Wilde 2008: 21). Second, the term international refers to actors (for example the UN or the League of Nations) whose spatial identity is international, and thus distinct from the local identity. This makes international administration a rather specific phenomenon, because normally (in a sovereign state) administration is conducted by actors who have the same spatial identity as those whom they are administering, rather than by an international organization such as the UN (Wilde 2008: 37). Wilde (2008: 95) argues that while international administration is not a permanent feature in international politics, it is an institution which has regularly been made use of since the end of World War I. Since international administration is often associated with political concepts such as ‘protectorate’, ‘occupation’ and ‘trusteeship’, an overview of institutions which are analogous to and closely associated with international administration are given as well. After this overview, I further conceptualize international administration by discussing the purpose and authority of international administrations.

The second part of this chapter focuses on institutionalization. Building democratic political institutions is arguably the most important activity undertaken by an international administration. In the end the international administration will leave and stable domestic democratic institutions are needed to uphold the peace. Stability is defined in terms of the capacity to endure (and not crumble down the moment the international administration leaves), decisional effectiveness (as opposed to decisional paralysis) and authenticity (in the sense of democratic institutions not being a mere façade for non-democratic institutions) (Eckstein 1966: 229). The institutions do not only need to be stable, but also domestic in the true sense of the word. Initially created by – or at least under the authority of – the international administration, they need to become domestically owned. The process through which an institution is created and becomes domestically owned is defined as domestic institutionalization. Using Sisson’s (1973) theory of institutionalization in an adapted form, it can be argued that domestically owned institutions need three things. First, they need to be independent from the international administration in their functioning. Second, the
political system, in which the institutions take part, needs to be congruent with the political culture. Finally, the institutions need to be supported by the domestic population.

The final part of this chapter elaborates on the notion of conflict management. Based on the work of Galtung it is argued that conflict emerges from incompatibilities, hostile attitudes and violent behavior and that a conflict is resolved when all three ‘conflict atoms’ have been sufficiently addressed. Understanding when a conflict is resolved and when it is not is important for this study, since it will be argued that the establishment of international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo have led to the creation of weak political institutions and have failed to resolve the conflicts in both territories. While the international administrations have been successful in conflict management (in the sense that armed violence did not reoccur), they have not succeeded in resolving the conflict.

**International administrations between 1920 and 1945**

After the end of World War I, four international administrations were established: in Memel, Danzig, the Saar and in Leticia. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the cities of Memel and Danzig were put under the authority of the Allied Powers. Memel (Klaipeda) had been liberated from Germany by the Allied Powers in 1919. Since Germany renounced its sovereignty over the city in the Treaty of Versailles, it was held by a temporary condominium of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and France (Chesterman 2004: 23). On 8 May 1924, an agreement was reached which ensured Lithuanian sovereignty, but which also included provisions to protect the German community and to guarantee the access of Poland to the economically important harbor of the city. The Port of Memel was recognized as a harbor of international concern and its administration was entrusted to a Harbor Board (Wainhouse 1966: 40–42). The League of Nations was entitled to appoint the chair of the Harbor Board and as such became involved in international administration (Wilde 2008: 50).

The status of Danzig (Gdansk) was decided upon by the Allied Powers. Until the end of World War I, Danzig had been a German city with a predominantly German population. After the war, Poland claimed the city, because Danzig was crucial to ensure its free and secure access to the sea. The Allied Powers decided that Polish access to the sea and the interests of the German community were ensured most effectively by declaring Danzig a Free City placed under the protection of the League of Nations. In the interim period between the German renunciation of sovereignty and the Free City’s creation in November 1920, Danzig was put under the authority of the Allied Powers (Wilde 2008: 115).
They were represented by a British diplomat while British and French troops maintained law and order (Chopra 1999: 40). This Allied administration ended in November 1920, after which the League of Nations became responsible for ensuring the city’s free status and settling possible disputes on the interpretation of their respective rights and duties between Danzig and Poland. The Free City lasted until September 1939 when it was occupied by Nazi Germany (Chesterman 2004: 20–21).

As mentioned above, the League of Nations exercised some administrative authority in the cities of Memel and Danzig. However, the first time that the League of Nations assumed complete and direct responsibility for the international administration of a territory was in the case of the Saar territory (situated between France and Germany) (Chopra 1999: 41). The Saar territory contained iron ore and coal. As part of the German reparation payments the Treaty of Versailles established that the coalmines would be transferred to French control. The inhabitants of the territory, however, were predominantly German and did not accept French administration. A solution was found in placing the territory temporarily under the responsibility of the League of Nations until a plebiscite decided the fate of the territory (Wainhouse 1966: 20). Until the plebiscite was held in 1935, when the inhabitants decided in favor of Germany, the territory was administered by an international administrative commission which was obliged to report to the Council of the League of Nations four times a year. The tasks and the mandate of the commission were considerable. The commission had received the authority to appoint and dismiss domestic administrators, to provide certain public services, to establish administrative and representative organs, to maintain the rule of law and to levy taxes (Wainhouse 1966: 21). The international administration was supported by a force of 3300 troops from Britain, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands (Chopra 1999: 41).

The fourth and final case of international administration in the interbellum was Leticia; a disputed territory between Colombia and Peru. In September 1932 Peru invaded Leticia; a territory that the country had ceded to Colombia in 1922 (the treaty was ratified in 1928). After mediation by Brazil failed, the matter was referred to the Council of the League of Nations. According to international law, Peru was obliged to retreat and an agreement on the withdrawal of Peruvian forces was signed on 25 May 1933. A commission of the League of Nations was established in order to administer Leticia on behalf of Colombia (Chesterman 2004: 24–25). The commission got a mandate for one year, and by the end of its term Peru and Colombia signed a border agreement (May 1934) and control over Leticia was transferred from the League of Nations to Colombia (Wilde 2008: 129).

**International administrations since 1945**
After World War II, most international administrations have been established by the UN. These administrations can be referred to as ‘trusteeship-type activities’, because they concern operations that were associated with the tasks of the UN Trusteeship Council, but were authorized by the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council (Groom 2001: 164). The involvement of the UN Security Council particularly explains why these administrations are most often referred to as peacekeeping operations rather than international administrations. Nevertheless, in all of the ten operations mentioned below (leaving out Kosovo) the UN has executed tasks that involved international administration.

The first operation worth mentioning is the case of Libya. Libya was under the international administration of the UN between 15 September 1948 and 24 December 1951. Libya had been a colony of Italy since 1912. During World War II, French and British forces succeeded in taking control over the territory after which both countries established a military administration (occupation) in their respective spheres of influence. The 1947 Peace Treaty between Italy and the Allied Powers (the United States of America (USA), the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom (UK) and France) included the provision that the ‘big four’ would decide on Libya’s future. However, with the unfolding Cold War, the allies were unable to reach agreement. As a result the case was passed to the UN General Assembly on 15 September 1948 (Pelt 1970: 34). Within the General Assembly several proposals for the future of the country were presented, ranging from making it a trusteeship to carving up the territory. In the end, UN General Assembly Resolution 289 (IV) decided that Libya: ‘shall be constituted an independent and sovereign state’ (United Nations General Assembly 1949). In order to assist the Libyans in gaining their independence it was decided that the General Assembly would appoint a UN Commissioner. This post would be given to the Dutch diplomat Adriaan Pelt, who was unanimously chosen on 8 November 1949. Together with an International Council, consisting of several international and domestic representatives, Pelt assisted Libya in drafting a constitution and creating an independent government. In Resolution 289, the British and French administrations were summoned to take all necessary steps to prepare Libya for independence, which it gained on 24 December 1951.

A second example of international administration is the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC 1960–1964). ONUC was the first peacekeeping operation which involved (de facto) some administrative responsibilities for the UN troops. The mission was aimed at holding Congo together after a separatist civil war had broken out (Durch 1993b: 316). The original mandate consisted in the provision of military and technical support to the Congolese government, until it could maintain law and order by itself (Chesterman 2004: 83). The complicated situation led twice to a strengthening of the mandate, so that in the end ONUC had a peace enforcement mandate, rather than a
peacekeeping mandate. That mandate did not include the explicit authority to execute administrative (executive) authority. However, since the Congolese government was not able to maintain law and order in its territory, in practice ONUC became the effective authority in many areas of the country. As a result, the troops protected lives and property, disarmed the combating factions, reorganized security forces and exercised extensive policing powers (Chopra 1999: 45). Although the presence of ONUC had a stabilizing effect in the early weeks of the mission, it could not create the basis for a lasting peace (O’Neill and Rees 2005: 71).

The third example to be examined occurred at the same time as ONUC, when the UN established the United Nations Temporary Authority (UNTEA 1962–1963) in West New Guinea (currently the Indonesian province of Papua New Guinea or West Irian). Since 1848, New Guinea had been part of the Dutch colonial possessions in Indonesia. When Indonesia became formally independent in 1949, the status of New Guinea was contested. Whereas Indonesia claimed New Guinea as an integral part of its territory, the Dutch argued that the Papuans formed a culturally and ethnically distinct people who had the right to self-determination. This stand-off between the Netherlands and its former colony resulted in a crisis in December of 1961 when Indonesian President Sukarno prepared for and threatened armed conflict (Durch 1993a: 286). An agreement was negotiated under the supervision of the UN as the result of strong political pressure from the USA. The Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) was signed in New York on 15 August 1962 and provided for the transfer of the territory to Indonesia. A transitional regime of six months was accepted in the form of UNTEA. Under Article V of the Agreement, the Chief of Mission got: 'full authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to administer the territory for the period of the UNTEA administration in accordance with the terms of the present Agreement' (Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) 15 August 1962). These administrative powers were endorsed in UN General Assembly Resolution 1752 (21 September 1962), which authorized the Secretary General to 'carry out the tasks entrusted to him in the Agreement.' The UNTEA mission lasted from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, when authority was transferred to Indonesia. The New York Agreement provided for a UN-supervised popular consultation in order to give the Papuans the freedom of choice in determining their future. The consultation in 1969 led to a vote in favor of remaining within Indonesia. According to most observers, this outcome was more the result of careful political orchestration by Indonesia rather than the genuine expression of the will of the people (Chesterman 2004: 67; Durch 1993a: 297).

The fourth international administration after World War II was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG 1989–1990). UNTAG was created in order to
prepare South-West Africa (the current Namibia) for self-determination. South-West Africa had been a colony of Germany until 1915 when it was conquered by South Africa. After the end of World War I, the territory became a Class C Mandate under the supervision of the League of Nations. After World War II, South Africa refused to acknowledge the UN Trusteeship System's authority over South-West Africa and claimed it as its own territory (Fortna 1993: 353). The issue became important for the UN when large parts of Africa started to become independent. Another factor that contributed to its appearance on the international agenda was that South Africa extended its apartheid laws to South-West Africa. Several actions were taken by the UN to end South Africa's control; in 1966 the General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate to administer the territory and in 1971 the International Court of Justice ruled that the South African occupation was illegal (Fortna 1993: 354). Preparations for an international operation that would prepare the territory for independence started in 1967 when the UN Council for Namibia was created. In January 1976, five Western nations (Canada, France, UK, USA and West Germany) formed a Contact Group. Half a year later it proposed a settlement which called for the creation of UNTAG (Fortna 1993: 354, 355). This was done by UN Security Council Resolution 435 (29 September 1978), which provided the mission with the mandate to prepare Namibia for independence by organizing free elections. South Africa's refusal to accept UNTAG resulted in a delay of ten years, but a decade of negotiations finally resulted in the Namibia Accords on 22 December 1988. The Namibia Accords allowed for the implementation of Resolution 435 and the actual deployment of UNTAG. Based on Resolution 435 and some subsequent refinements in the shape of informal understandings and protocols, UNTAG was assigned three tasks: monitoring the elections, monitoring the police and supervising the cease-fire (Fortna 1993: 359, 360). Next to this explicit mandate, the added value of UNTAG consisted above all in balancing South Africa's presence and maintaining security (Fortna 1993: 362). Elections were actually organized in November 1989, after which the territory became independent.

The mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO, since 1991) represents the fifth example of international administration even though it has never materialized. Western Sahara had been a colonial possession of Spain and after its withdrawal in 1975 both Morocco and Mauritania claimed the territory. The claim of both countries was opposed by the domestic population in general and in particular by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) which started an insurgency. In 1979, Mauritania renounced its claim, but Morocco continued. In 1988, as a result of good offices provided by the UN and the Organization of African Unity, the Settlement Proposals were concluded. Based on these proposals a plan was created which consisted in holding a referendum in
which the domestic population should decide whether to become independent or to integrate with Morocco. The UN would deploy a transitional authority in order to supervise the process (Chesterman 2004: 68). MINURSO was created by Security Council Resolution 690 which made it solely and exclusively responsible for all matters relating to the referendum. MINURSO was allowed to promulgate and repeal laws, maintain law and order and assume the role of territorial authority (Chopra 1999: 164). However, MINURSO never had the chance to implement its mandate, because of a genuine lack of will among the parties to support the agreement (Chesterman 2004: 68).

The sixth UN international administration was established with the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–1993). UNTAC was asked to create a neutral political environment and organize elections in a country that had been torn apart by war since 1975. The conflict in Cambodia was part of what has been called the ‘Third Indochina War’, involving the regimes of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Peou 2002: 501). Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge, after coming to power in Cambodia in 1975, terrorized the country until Vietnam intervened in 1978. The Vietnamese occupation force actively supported a Vietnam-friendly regime in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which changed its name to the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989. Yet Vietnamese intervention could not end the civil war. Regional powers condemned the intervention as a violation of international law and supported several resistance groups.6 Faced with a protracted military stalemate in Cambodia, a weakened political and diplomatic position and domestic economic problems, Vietnam withdrew its military forces in 1989 (Peou 2002: 502). Attempts to start negotiations were made from 1987 onwards, but a breakthrough only occurred in September 1990, when the four major Cambodian parties to the conflict agreed to the establishment of a power sharing mechanism in the form of the Supreme National Council. The peace agreement was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991 (Peou 2002: 503). An important part of the agreement was the establishment of UNTAC. The mandate of the mission included a specific task of civil administration:

In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, all administrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information will be placed under the direct control of UNTAC, which will exercise it as necessary to ensure strict neutrality.

(Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict 1991)

The seventh international administration to be mentioned is the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II 1993–1995). UNOSOM II was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 814 and was authorized: 'to assume responsibility for
the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia (UN Security Council 1993). UNOSOM’s mandate has been described as ‘a testing ground for new peacekeeping ideas’ (O’Neill and Rees 2005: 115). Although the mandate did not include legislative authority, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General exercised de facto legislative authority by declaring that the former Somali Penal Code of 1962 would be the criminal law in force (Chesterman 2004: 85). Just like in the case of ONUC, the absence of an effective functioning domestic authority made UNOSOM the de facto authority of the territory. Moreover, unlike peacekeeping operations before, UNOSOM II was allowed to use force to achieve its mission objectives (O’Neill and Rees 2005: 115). Part of the objective of maintaining a secure environment was the disarmament of Somali militias. Together with the institution-building character of the mandate, the disarmament attempts led to violent confrontations with Somali factions which resulted in the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in March 1995 (O’Neill and Rees 2005: 116–117).

The eighth international administration since World War II involved a city, like Memel and Danzig after World War I. Well before the OHR was established in Bosnia, Mostar had been put under international administration by the EU. Mostar had been the scene of fierce fighting between Bosniaks and (Bosnian) Croats after their alliance had broken down in 1993. As a result of the Washington Agreement, which renewed the alliance, the EU took over the administration of the city on 1 August 1994. The German politician Hans Koschnik was appointed as the international administrator of the town. The administration was confronted with many difficulties; Koschnik survived several attacks on his life and he had to face intense opposition from hardline Bosnian Croat ethnic nationalists (Iazvic 2001). The elections for the city’s community council on 30 June 1996 led to the end of the EU administration, after which the OHR took over the responsibility of Mostar with a regional office.

The ninth international administration, the United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES 1996–1998), was created as a result of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Eastern Slavonia is situated in the Danube region of Croatia. As a region with a Serb majority it seceded from Croatia when that country declared itself independent in 1991. Heavy fighting in the fall of 1991 resulted in Serb control over the region which led to an exodus of Croatian inhabitants. In the summer of 1995, Croatian forces regained control over two other territories that had been occupied by the Serbs: the Krajina and Western Slavonia. Under pressure from the international community, the Croats renounced plans to proceed and re-conquer Eastern Slavonia. On 12 November 1995, Croatia and the Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia signed the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (the Erdut Agreement). The Erdut Agreement contained a request for the Security Council to: ‘establish a transitional administration which shall govern the Region during the
transitional period in the interest of all persons resident in or returning to the Region' (Basic Agreement 1995). After the international administration ended in 1998, Eastern Slavonia was reintegrated into Croatia.

Finally, the tenth international administration was the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET 1999–2002). UNTAET was established on 22 October 1999 by UN Security Council Resolution 1272. It had been preceded by a multilateral intervention under the leadership of Australia and was endorsed by both the UN Security Council and the government of Indonesia. The intervention was the international response to the violence that emerged as a result of a referendum held on the question of whether East Timor should become independent or remain part of Indonesia. From 1515 to 1975, East Timor had been a Portuguese colony. Portuguese rule was only briefly interrupted by the Japanese occupation (1941–1945) during World War II. In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor after the sudden withdrawal of Portugal and the subsequent fighting among rival political factions. On 28 November 1975, one of the leading opposition parties to Portuguese rule, Fretilin, assumed governance. On 30 August 1999 a referendum was organized in order to let the East Timorese choose between integrating into Indonesia as an autonomous region or becoming independent. The referendum was organized by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which had started in June 1999. The participation rate was 98.6 percent of eligible voters and a majority 78.5 percent voted for independence (Smith and Dee 2003: 18). After the international military intervention ended the violence, UNTAET was established. The mission ended on 20 May 2002 when sovereignty was returned to East Timor and when the country became independent.

In addition to these ten cases of international administration since 1945, three other more specific cases can be identified. First, the cases should be mentioned where an international administration is established through 'international appointees'. An international appointee is

an individual of foreign nationality who sits on a body concerned with some form of territorial administration and whose appointment in this regard involved an international actor such as an international organization or a member of an international court or tribunal.

(Wilde 2008: 70)

International appointees were established in the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. In Lebanon, for example, the tribunal concerning the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2004 consisted of Lebanese and foreign judges who were all appointed by the UN (Wilde 2008: 73). Similarly, several foreign members were included in the Sierra Leone Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (Wilde 2008: 85). Second, international administrations have been established in the form of internationally administrated refugee camps. A refugee camp can be considered an international administration when a state hands over the responsibility of running the camp to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. This has for example been the case with the Dadaab camps of Kenya (Wilde 2008: 61). Also included in this category (although representing a less extensive form of international administration) is the UN Relief and Works Agency in Palestinian refugee camps (Wilde 2008: 60–62). Finally, the distribution of humanitarian supplies sometimes involves international administration. This was for example the case with the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program in Northern Iraq from 1996 to 2003 (Wilde 2008: 64).

**Cases analogous to international administration**

There are different terms to describe territories which in some way or another are dependent on individual foreign states, groups of foreign states or on international organizations. The use of a particular term usually depends on the particular constitutional relationship that exists between the territory and the foreign power (Chowdhuri 1955: 6). In the section above, international administration has been presented as one particular form of foreign dependence. This section contains an overview of operations which are analogous to international administration. Wilde distinguishes five institutions analogous to international administration: protection; colonialism; representative bodies; the mandate system of the League of Nations and the trusteeship system of the UN; and occupation (Wilde 2008: 299). In contrast to international administrations, the analogous institutions are constituted by ‘a state, a group of states, or a collectivity of state representatives’ rather than by an international organization (Wilde 2008: 311).

Protection in the form of a protectorate is one of the oldest features of international relations (Crawford 2006: 286). The idea of a protectorate can be summarized as: ‘The assumption by a comparatively powerful state of the duty of protecting a weaker state’ (Kamanda 1961: 17). The term has a long history and can even be traced back to antiquity in the form of the *civitates foederatae*: cities which did not belong to the Roman Empire, but were subordinate to Rome as far as their foreign relations were concerned. Also, in the Middle Ages several protectorate type of arrangements existed too; Andorra has been a protectorate of France and Spain since the thirteenth century (Krasner 2001: 244). Finally, in the sixteenth century, protectorates were used by the French kings as an instrument of expansion. Cities like Cambrai, Verdun and Strasbourg first became protectorates before they were incorporated into the kingdom of France (Kamanda 1961: 17–18). The modern protectorate was born in the nineteenth century.
These protectorates were established by a transaction (often a treaty) between two or more subjects of international law, whereby the dependent entity surrendered to the protecting State or States at least the conduct of its foreign relations, and often responsibility for such relations together with various rights of internal intervention, without being annexed or formally incorporated into the territory of the latter.

(Crawford 2006: 287)

In the nineteenth century protectorates were used by European states to ensure access to foreign markets and to prevent territorial control by rival powers (Wilde 2001: 602; Crawford 2006: 286).

Crawford (2006) distinguishes three different types of protectorates: protected states; international protectorates; and colonial protectorates. First, protected states are entities which still have substantial authority in their internal affairs, retain some control over foreign policy, and establish their relation to the protecting state on a treaty or another legal instrument. Protected states still have qualifications of statehood. Historical examples of protected states are Bhutan (with India as protector), San Marino (Italy) and Liechtenstein (Switzerland). Second, international protectorates are territories whose governments retain a separate international status, but lack some qualifications of statehood. Historical examples are Tunisia and Morocco (both under the protection of France). Some contemporary international administrations can also be perceived as protected states. Wilde (2008: 300) argues that international administration is an internationalized form of protection in the sense that 'the actor in the “protector” role is an international organization rather than a state'. As such, he contends than Kosovo could be described as a 'protected state territory' and Bosnia as a 'protected state'. The term 'protected state' is more accurate than 'international protectorate' given the fact that both Bosnia and Kosovo had some qualifications of statehood (Kosovo as a territory being part of Serbia under UN Security Council Resolution 1244) (Wilde 2008: 301). Finally, colonial protectorates are territories in which the protecting state exercises internal administration on the basis of the formal autonomy of the dependent entity. Many territories in Africa used to fall into this category, as well as Aden and the Solomon Islands (both protected by Britain) (Crawford 2006: 288–302). This latter category, however, is challenged by several international lawyers on the grounds that the territories under protection often were considered to be part of the sovereign territory of the protecting states (Wilde 2008: 162, 300, 303). The protecting states used the term 'protectorate' merely to 'avoid the responsibilities that would flow from the enjoyment of sovereignty' (Wilde 2008: 300). Therefore, colonial protectorates would better qualify as colonies.
Colonialism, the second institution analogous to international administration, refers to several different forms of foreign dominion, as it ranges from:

raising a claim over territory without introducing any substantive presence, to
informal control exercised by corporate identities such as the East India Companies,
to direct administrative presence by European states exercised on top of local
structures of governance, to more intrusive and extensive administrative conduct.

(Wilde 2008: 303)

The most relevant form of colonialism in the context of historical predecessors of
contemporary international administration is the form of colonialism that involves
'some kind of direct administrative control exercised over the colonial territory by the
imperial state' (Wilde 2008: 303). By the end of the nineteenth century, this was
especially the case in Africa.

Next to protection and colonialism, so-called 'representative bodies' can be regarded as
institutions which carry out international administration-type activities. Representative
bodies are 'bodies made up of representatives of certain states, acting in a
categories of representative bodies can be identified. First, representative bodies have
been established to exercise administrative tasks in disputed territories. Examples are:
Krakow, which was administered by Austria, Russia and Prussia between 1815 and
1846; Shanghai, that was administered by the international Shanghai Municipal Council
under the control of the USA and Great Britain from 1854 to 1943; Tangier, which was
under the international administration of Great Britain, France, Spain between 1923
and 1957 and from Italy since 1928; and Crete, that was administered by a Commission
of the Consuls existing of Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia from 1897 to 1909
and Albania from 1913 to 1914 (Wilde 2008: 307; Ydit 1961). The second category of
representative bodies are the international waterway commissions that were
established in the nineteenth century in order to exercise joint administration over
waterways that crossed the boundaries of different nations. Examples are the Central
Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine (since 1815) and the International Danube
Commission (since 1856) (Wilde 2008: 307). The third category are the international
plebiscite commissions created by the Treaty of Versailles (Wilde 2008: 307). These
commissions organized plebiscites in Upper Silesia, a contested territory between
Germany and Poland, in Schleswig, a territory between Germany and Denmark, and in
Allenstein and Marienweder, both situated between Germany and Poland (Chopra 1999:
40; Wainhouse 1966: 33–35). Finally, representative bodies in the form of mixed
(combining domestic and international officials) commissions have been created (Wilde
2008: 307). An example is the Mixed Commission that was established in Upper Silesia
(1922–1937) after the Allied Commission in that territory had finished (Wilde 2001:
597, 603; Chesterman 2004: 21). Another example of a mixed commission was the commission created in 1923 with the purpose 'to “supervise and facilitate” the compulsory exchange of Turkish and Greek minority populations between Greece and Turkey' (Wilde 2008: 307).

The fourth category of institutions analogous to international administration includes the mandate system of the League of Nations and the trusteeship system of the UN. After the end of World War I, the Allied Powers decided that the colonies of Germany and the territories belonging to the Ottoman Empire should be placed under the authority of the League of Nations. This authority was of an indirect nature, because the actual administration of the mandated territories became the responsibility of particular states. A direct consequence of this indirect rule of the League of Nations was that the mandatories could administer the territory as if it was a proper colony, because formal supervision by the League of Nations was limited to an annual report to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The international mandate system was followed by the trusteeship system of the United Nations in 1945. Most mandated territories were turned into trust territories and the Mandate Commission was replaced by the Trusteeship Council. An important difference with the international mandate system was that all trust territories were being prepared for self-government or independence (United Nations 1945). However, the effectiveness of the trusteeship system in promoting independence can be disputed, because trust territories did not receive their independence significantly earlier than other non-self-governing territories. Just as had been the case with the international mandates, individual states were responsible for the administration of the territory which meant that its administration was not very different from the administration of a proper colony (Chopra 1999: 41).

Finally, occupation can be considered as an activity closely associated with international administration. The end of World War II led to the creation of three Allied occupations in Germany (1945–1949), Austria (1945–1955) and Japan (1945–1952). The three territories were jointly administered by the military forces of the USA, the UK, France and the SU. More recently, the USA established the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after operation Iraqi Freedom had toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Coalition Provisional Authority was a military occupation like those after World War II. The common objective of these occupations was to establish viable democratic regimes and many of the tasks were similar to the tasks carried out by contemporary international administrations. However, a crucial difference with international administration is that occupations are not authorized by and answerable to an international organization such as the League of Nations or the UN (Caplan 2005: 2). Consequently, occupations are motivated by the particular national interests of the
individual occupying states. National interest also plays a role in international administrations, but as Zaum (2007: 3) argues, the dominance of these interests is mitigated because of the international character of the mission.

**The purpose of international administrations**

The overview above shows that international administrations and analogous institutions share a common characteristic in that they both involve territorial administration by a foreign actor. In this way, Wilde (2008: 312) refers to both categories collectively as 'foreign territorial administration'. However, as pointed out above, the difference between international administration and the other foreign administrations is that the latter are state-conducted institutions rather than institutions conducted by international actors (international organizations and international appointees).

A distinction can also be made between international administration on the one hand, and state-building or peace operations (in particular peacebuilding) on the other. According to Wilde (2008: 191 – 235) the range of tasks international administration can be used for is much broader than the terms state-building and peace operations suggest. Wilde categorizes the many tasks that international administration can carry out according to two broadly defined purposes. The first purpose of an international administration is to respond to a sovereignty problem. In that case the status of the territory in question is contested and an international administration is established in order to facilitate a solution to the problem. The case of Kosovo is mentioned as an example, because of its disputed political status. The second purpose for which international administration can be used is to respond to a governance problem. In that case the problem is not about who governs the territory, but about the quality of governance. The government is either incapable or unwilling to govern the territory well in the eyes of the international community. Wilde mentions Bosnia, with its legacy of ethnic nationalist politics (bad governance from the perspective of the international community), as an example of international administration as a reaction to a governance problem; the international administration attempts to establish good governance by promoting 'a multi-ethnic social and political culture' (Wilde 2008: 219).

As a distinct activity, international administration is not synonymous with state-building or peacebuilding, but even Wilde admits that – at least when addressing a governance problem – international administrations 'perform what is usually called a “state-building” role' (Wilde 2001: 601). Activities that are associated with state-building or peacebuilding are important components of international administration. That is not only illustrated by the actual cases of Bosnia and Kosovo,
but also by the academic definitions and conceptual understandings of international administration. First, Caplan regards international administration to be a peace-operation which is more comprehensive in scope and more political in character than other peace operations. Like Wilde he also distinguishes international administration from military occupation and state-building (Caplan 2005: 4–5). At the same time, Caplan (2005: 12) acknowledges that international administration has much in common with complex peacekeeping, peacebuilding and state-building and that ‘one must not be pedantic or dogmatic in drawing too sharp a distinction’. According to Caplan (2005: 44), the chief functions or purposes of an international administration can be divided in five categories:

1 establishment and maintenance of public order and internal security;
2 repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;
3 performance of basic civil administrative functions;
4 development of local political institutions, including the holding of elections to these institutions, and the building of civil society; and
5 economic reconstruction and development.

Second, Chesterman conceptualizes international administration (which he calls transitional administration) as a special form of state-building. He defines state-building as: ‘extended international involvement (primarily, though not exclusively, through the United Nations) that goes beyond traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates, and is directed at constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security’ (Chesterman 2004: 5). International administration, then, is a special type of state-building which is carried out by assuming ‘some or all of the powers of the state on a temporary basis’ (Chesterman 2004: 5). Chesterman (2004: 57) identifies five different types of international administration based on their purpose and trajectory. In some way or another, all five types are related to state-building, which makes Chesterman’s classification consistent with his definition of international administration as a special type of state-building. The first type of international administration is the one which is established in the context of a process of decolonization (UNTAG and UNTAET for example). The second type is international administration established with the purpose to facilitate the transfer of territory (UNTEA, MINURSO and UNTAES). Third, international administrations have been established in order to organize elections (UNTAC). Fourth, international administrations can be established in order to implement a peace process (the OHR and UNMIK). The fifth and last type of international administration mentioned by Chesterman is the one established in the context of state failure (ONUC, UNOSOM II).
Third and finally, Zaum (2007: 51) defines international administration as: 'international bodies exercising governmental functions over a territory, which are locally based, and most recent of which have been engaged in the establishment or reform of that territory’s political and social institutions.' Zaum considers international administration also to be a form of state-building. This is not only evidenced by his definition, but also by his description of the key objective of international administration as: 'the establishment of effective and legitimate control of the national political institutions, based on a specific model of organizing domestic society' (Zaum 2007: 5).

Making an analytical distinction between international administration on the one hand, and state-building or peace operations on the other hand, is necessary in order to avoid making the concept ‘empty’ (Bain 2003: 146). In that respect, Wilde’s argument that international administration should be considered as a specific institution in international politics is compelling. However, it is important to recognize that the purposes of most international administrations closely resemble the purposes of peacebuilding and aim to establish the foundations of peace. After all, most international administrations have been established in response to armed conflict (Stahn 2008: 23). Therefore, based on the conceptualization of Chesterman (2004) and Wilde (2008) I consider international administration to be a distinct activity in which an international authority (rather than a foreign authority) ultimately aims to build peace through state-building; the construction or reconstruction of political, social and economic institutions. What really distinguishes international administration from peacebuilding more in general is not its purpose, but its authority.

**The authority of international administrations**

In the section above I mentioned briefly that international actors are responsible for conducting international administrations. These international actors have extensive powers at their disposal. Therefore, next to the purpose of international administration, the authority of these actors is also a defining characteristic of international administrations. Caplan points out that by administrating Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, the international authority in question has assumed ‘responsibility to a degree unprecedented in recent history’ (Caplan 2005: 1). Caplan has made a distinction between a rather limited scope of international authority and a more substantial scope of authority. He positions international administration on a continuum with two extremes. One extreme is international administration with relatively little authority in the form of international *supervision*, while the other is a type of administration in which the international authority is extensive and engages in *direct governance* of the territory (Caplan 2002: 13–16; 2005: 17–18). A more detailed continuum has been presented by Chopra and Doyle. Chopra distinguishes four types of
international administration, ranging from little authority to more political authority. The first type is assistance, where the international authority acts as an independent advisor. The second type, partnership, refers to a situation in which the international authority serves as a partner of the domestic authority. The third type is control; a situation in which the international authority acts throughout the domestic authority structures. The last type is governorship, in which the international authority takes full responsibility for the functioning of the territory (Chopra 1999: 16). Doyle also distinguishes four types of international administration, which he calls 'ad hoc semi sovereign mechanisms'. His scale of international transitional political authority ranges from monitoring, administrative authority and executive authority to full sovereign rule (or 'supervisory authority' as he calls it) (Doyle 2002: 83–86). Arguably, the three classifications are more or less overlapping as is shown in Table 2.1.

On one side of the spectrum, the supervision of Caplan could be regarded to be the same as the assistance of Chopra and the monitoring of Doyle. An example of an international administration of the supervision, assistance or monitoring type is UNTAC. On the other side of the spectrum, Caplan's direct governance is similar to Chopra's governorship and Doyle's sovereign rule. All three are based on the notion of total international political authority over the administered territory. Examples of the direct governance, governorship or sovereign rule type of international administrations are UNTAES, UNMIK and UNTAET. In all three cases the international administration functioned as the sovereign power. The international administration of Bosnia should be considered as a control (Chopra) or executive authority (Doyle) type of international administration. The difference between governorship and control is that in the former case the external state sovereignty is exercised by the international administration, while in the latter case the external state sovereignty lies with the domestic authorities.

The question is whether the categories of supervision, assistance, monitoring, partnership and administrative authority do enough justice to international administration as a specific institution. According to Zaum, international administrations have in comparison to other instances of institution-building 'the most comprehensive mandates and the most comprehensive authority over local institutions at their

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<th>Richard Caplan</th>
<th>Jarat Chopra</th>
<th>Michael Doyle</th>
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<td>Supervision</td>
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Table 2.1 Classification of international administration based on the level of authority
disposal’ (Zaum 2007: 3). Zaum (2007: 52) argues that ‘international administrations are involved in governance, rather than monitoring and assistance, distinguishing them from less intrusive incidents of international involvement such as election monitoring or development work’. Similarly, Wilde (2008: 33) argues that ‘the difference between supervision/control/conduct, on the one hand, and mere assistance/advice, on the other, is (...) a key component in defining the nature of the involvement in territorial administration by international actors’. Given the specificity of international administration as an institution in international politics, the term international administration can better be reserved for those operations in which the level of authority is of the governorship type (Kosovo) or the control type (Bosnia). Thus, international administrations which involve ‘soft’ mandates with little authority (the first two rows in Table 2.1) and no governance functions are not regarded as international administrations for the purposes of this study.

Defining international administration

In the two sections above it was pointed out that international administrations are conducted by international actors that have extensive powers at their disposal. International administrations also develop in response to sovereignty or governance problems and most often involve state-building activities with the purpose to establish sustainable peace. Taking these elements into account and taking several definitions presented above as starting point, international administration is defined as: a political authority which is established by an international organization and which aims to develop political, social and economic institutions in a specific territory by assuming some or all sovereign powers of the state on a temporary basis. This definition includes two important aspects.

First, it includes the extensive political power that is executed by an international administration. The definition allows for a distinction in the level of authority. In the case of Bosnia, the OHR has assumed ‘some sovereign powers’ whereas in the case of Kosovo UNMIK has assumed ‘all sovereign powers’ of the state. This variation is important, because it is argued that the difference in authority might explain the different trajectories of both international administrations when it comes to institutionalization.

The second important aspect of the definition is that it includes the notion that international administrations aim to develop political, social and economic institutions; i.e., that they are involved in institution-building or state-building. Institution-building is considered to be an important task of international administrations, because the assumption is that stable institutions promote peace. In this study institution-building
is regarded as the core activity of international administration.

**Institutionalization**

The establishment of political institutions (institution-building) by international administrations does not necessarily mean that they will continue to exist by default. A (continuous) process of institutionalization is necessary in order to prevent institutions from breaking down. According to Samuel Huntington, institutionalization gives institutions ‘value and stability’ (Kopecky 2001: 10). More concretely, institutionalization is defined by Sisson (1973: 19) as: 'the creation and persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior that enable the successful accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and/or demands within a given organization whether it be a party, a legislature, or a state.' Sisson (1973) developed a theory of institutionalization in which the internal and external structures of institutions are analyzed. The internal structure refers to the relationships among different actors within the institution; for example, within a parliament, the relationship between parliamentary party groups and parliamentary committees. The external structure refers to the relationships between the institution and its environment, which include other institutions or society as a whole.

In this study I focus on the external structure of domestic political institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The focus is, on the one hand, on the relationship between the political institutions and society and, on the other hand, the relationship between the political institutions and the international administration. Institutionalization is composed of two phases. Following the definition of Sisson, the first phase is about the creation of institutions (defined as valued rules, procedures and patterns of behavior). This is done under the direction of the international administration and not by the domestic authorities and in this way the institutions cannot be regarded as embedded in domestic society. Again following Sisson’s definition, the second phase is about the persistence of institutions. Within the context of international administration, this means that the institutions become embedded (or not) in the domestic societies. I refer to this process as (domestic) institutionalization. The second phase is the focus of this study.

More needs to be said regarding the selection of the political institutions that are analyzed for this study. This study focuses on Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political system as a whole and on three particular institutions at the central state level: the presidency, the government and parliament. The choice for these institutions is motivated by the international administrations’ focus on the central level of governance in their institution-building programs. Although projects for local government reforms have
been initiated in both territories, the central level has been the principal target of institution-building. To adapt the theory of Sisson to suit the purpose of studying domestic institutionalization under international administration, three indicators are used: (1) institutional autonomy; (2) institutional congruence; and (3) institutional support (Sisson 1973: 25; Kopecky 2001: 12–13). In the next three sections, I elaborate on these three criteria of institutionalization.

**Institutional autonomy**

The first criterion of institutionalization is autonomy. Being autonomous is important for every institution since: 'Autonomy affirms the separate identity of a social unit and suggests that its persistence is not primarily a function of directive action from other institutional spheres' (Sisson 1973: 25). Some academics regard the existence of boundedness, or the ability of a particular institution to demarcate boundaries between itself and the environment, as the conceptual core of institutionalization (Judge 2003: 514). The concept of autonomy is widely discussed in the literature and many definitions exist (Groenleer 2009). The autonomy of institutions in this study refers to the independence of domestic political institutions from the international administration and to the strength of domestic political institutions (institutional capacity). Thus, it goes beyond most definitions of autonomy which focus on the element of institutional independence. In this case, institutional capacity is included, because independence from an international administration only makes sense if an institution is able to carry out its functions.

At the start of the mission the domestic institutions are not independent. It is the international administration rather than the domestic political institutions that has the authority of government. Ultimately, however, an international administration aims at creating independent domestic political institutions. During the process, it gradually transfers governance functions from the international level to the domestic level. In this way, the domestic institutions get the ability to demarcate their boundaries with respect to international involvement step by step. This can be done in two ways. First, institutional independence is increased by a transfer of authority from the international level to the domestic level. There not only needs to be a formal transfer of powers, but authority should also be transferred in practice. Full autonomy in the sense of 'independence' will be considered to exist when all fundamental decisions (for example the appointment of high ranking bureaucrats or the initiation and implementation of legislation) are being left to the domestic institutions. This indicator holds mainly for the case of Kosovo, where the UN executed a governorship mandate. Second, independence increases when the number of interventions (decisions) carried out by the international administration decreases. This indicator is relevant for the case of
Bosnia, where the international administration operated mainly through interventions in the domestic political process. Institutional independence is measured by analyzing Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political system as a whole, rather than specific political institutions.

Next to autonomy in the sense of independence, in this study autonomy is also understood as institutional capacity. An institution might formally be independent, but if this is not matched by a corresponding capacity it is not fully autonomous. Institutional capacity is about the strength of the institutions or the ability of institutions to: ‘plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently’ (Fukuyama 2004: 9). The World Bank, for example, defines institutional capacity or ‘government effectiveness’ as ‘the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies’ (Kaufman et al. 2006: 4). Thus, institutional capacity says something about the quality of work of political institutions and is part of an institution-building policy (Caplan 2005: 99). It can be expected especially after a war that institutional capacity will be weak. However, institutional capacity can be enhanced through capacity-building programs where the quality of, for example, parliamentary work or the civil service can be improved. In this study institutional capacity is studied on a more abstract level, i.e., the ability to take decisions and to implement them without the support of the international administration. At this level, international administrations can contribute to institutional capacity by creating, developing and/or reforming institutions which are able to take and implement fundamental decisions in the conflict-ridden political environment of a post-war society. When actual improvement can be identified, institutional autonomy in terms of institutional capacity has increased. Institutional capacity is measured by analyzing three selected political institutions in Bosnia (the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly at the level of the federal state) and in Kosovo (the Presidency, the Government and the Assembly).

**Institutional congruence**

The second criterion of institutionalization is institutional congruence, or the congruence between the political institutions and the political culture. Whereas the indicators of institutional autonomy and institutional support are (partly) analyzed at the level of the three particular institutions, for institutional congruence the level of analysis is the political system; or the total of formal political institutions. Political culture is defined as: ‘a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their country and the role of
the self in that system’ (Diamond 1999: 162). This broad definition includes ideology, such as nationalism. In their classic *The Civic Culture* Almond and Verba (1963: 3) argued that the political system is closely associated with political culture. The formal democratic institutions (including political parties, elective legislatures, universal suffrage etc.) therefore require a political culture which is consistent with it. If not, then there is incongruence between the political system and the political culture. A similar argument was made by Eckstein who contended that political culture is crucial in determining the stability of the political system. Eckstein’s notion of cultural congruence pointed to the extent to which the ‘authority pattern’ of a government is congruent with the ‘other authority patterns’ in society (Eckstein 1966: 234). Notwithstanding the criticism that Eckstein’s theory invoked, there is an added value in applying the notion of cultural congruence when studying peacebuilding, state-building, nation-building and/or international administration. The question whether and to what extent the political culture supports the new democratic political system is important because it might be unstable because of institutional incongruence.

Incongruence may be expected to exist, because of the normative nature of peacebuilding operations and international administrations. When a territory is governed by an international administration, its domestic political system and its political culture are strongly influenced by that external body. International administration is not neutral in character, but is biased towards Western concepts and values (Caplan 2005: 130). Although in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo it was the entire ‘international community’ that was referred to as being responsible for the international administrations, Western states and institutions were the most deeply involved (Zaum 2007: 13). The international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo devised a political system which can be characterized as a market democracy; a liberal democratic political system combined with a market economy (Paris 1997: 56). This is clearly reflected in the preamble of Bosnia’s constitution, in which it is stated that democratic institutions and procedures are needed to produce peaceful relations in a pluralistic society and that the promotion of a market economy is necessary for creating welfare and economic growth (General Framework Agreement 1995: Annex 4). The ambition to create a market democracy is also reflected in Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework (Kosovo’s provisional constitution). In the document it is stated that UNMIK aims at enhancing democratic governance and at developing a market economy (UNMIK 2001a).

The political culture which the international administrations aim to promote is one based on the ideology of civic nationalism. Civic nationalism reflects the idea that a political authority rules on behalf of citizens who ‘base their appeals on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective’ (Snyder 2000:
24). A civic nation is a ‘territorially bounded, sovereign legal–political community (…) whose members are citizens participating in a mass public national culture’ (Smith 2006: 170). The opposite of civic nationalism is ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is based on the idea that a political authority rules on behalf of a particular ethnic group which shares ‘a common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or the myth of a shared kinship’ (Snyder 2000: 24). In contrast to civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism defines ‘citizen’ as a member of a particular ethnic community rather than as a member of a legal–political community. Ethnic nationalism was a driving force behind the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo in the sense that it was used by politicians to mobilize the different ethnic groups. Consequently, at the start of both international administrations the political culture was dominated by ethnic nationalism.

The OHR and UNMIK have tried to replace the ethnic nationalist ideology with a civic nationalist (often referred to as ‘multi-ethnic’) one. The extent to which the international administration succeeded in establishing civic nationalism as the dominant ideology can help determine whether the political system can be considered to be institutionally congruent with the political culture. One outcome of institutional congruence would be that the international administration has indeed succeeded in making civic nationalism the dominant ideology. In that case there would only be institutional congruence if the ideology is reflected in the political system. In other words, in the political system there should be an emphasis on individual citizenship rather than ethnic group membership. The opposite outcome would be the dominance of ethnic nationalism in combination with a political system, which is based on an ethnic nationalist logic (i.e., ethnic group membership). The two other outcomes entail institutional incongruence (see Table 2.2)

**Institutional support**

Domestic institutional support is the third indicator to assess the level of institutionalization. Support manifests itself in positive attitudes and in positive behavior (compliance) among the elites and the majority population towards the institutions. Attitudinal support for a political institution is defined as: a predisposition to act on behalf of the interests of the institution (Sisson 1973: 32). Compliance is defined as: ‘the congruence between authoritative prescription and subject action’ (Sisson 1973: 33).

Institutional support is problematic in the context of international administrations. Since the domestic political institutions are often created by the international administration and since they must operate in a post-war environment it is not unthinkable that the institutions are challenged by opposing domestic actors. There is institutionalization when there is substantial support for and compliance with the
political institutions. In order to make the analysis as specific as possible, a distinction is made between support and compliance on the elite level and support and compliance on the mass level of society. Although one could argue that, because of their disproportionate power and influence, political elites matter most when it comes to support for and compliance with political institutions, it is not sufficient to include the elite level only. Especially in the long term, the support and the compliance of the population at large may be highly relevant (Diamond 1999; Gunther et al. 1995).

Establishing just how much support is substantial enough always includes some degree of arbitrariness (Diamond 1999: 68). In the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, it would make little sense to adopt quantitative thresholds when assessing the level of support for and compliance with political institutions. As far as the attitudes of the political elite are concerned, it requires that all significant political leaders (of all major communities) believe in the legitimacy of the institutions and believe that the institutions merit their support. These attitudes should be expressed in public rhetoric, ideology, writings and symbolic gestures (Diamond 1999: 69). As far as elite compliance is concerned, all significant political leaders need to comply with the institutions. With respect to the majority of the population, it is equally important that it massively supports and complies with the political institutions in order to be able to speak of institutionalization.

On top of the indicators of support and compliance, two additional conditions are to be taken into account when analyzing to what extent the political institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo are supported by the population. First, support and compliance should exist for some period of time. For this study, the period of time examined begins when the institutions were first established and continues until December 2011. Second, those rejecting the political institutions should not be politically relevant. With these conditions in mind, then one can speak of institutionalization in both territories once all significant political leaders and the overall majority of the population support and comply with the political institutions.
Conflict management

A basic argument of this study is that the development of Bosnia's and Kosovo's political institutions into domestically embedded institutions has been impeded by the absence of conflict resolution. The international administration in Bosnia was established after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed between the conflicting parties. The Agreement was imposed by the international community, which shows there was little commitment to conflict resolution. In the case of Kosovo the absence of conflict resolution was even more evident. UNMIK was established while the conflict, the political status of the territory, had not been addressed at all. Instead of being resolved, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo were being managed. In order to understand the concepts of conflict management and conflict resolution, it is necessary to first take a closer look at the concept of conflict.

In everyday language, conflict has a negative connotation. However, many conflict researchers stress the positive sides of conflict. In his classic article Conflict as a Way of Life, Galtung (1969a: 16) concluded that: ‘conflict can be basically seen as one of the major motivating forces in our existence, as both a cause, a concomitant and a consequence of change, as an element as necessary to social life as air to human life.’ According to Reychler (1999: 141) conflict has value, utility and even healing power. Finally, Coser (1956) states that conflict can contribute to society in a positive way. All three authors recognize the functional element of conflict, without denying its potential of destruction; next to a functional, constructive manifestation, conflict can, and often does, manifest itself in a dysfunctional or destructive form.

Most definitions of conflict include the notion of ‘incompatibility’. Ramsbotham and colleagues define conflict as: ‘the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 27). Galtung (1969a: 13) defines conflict as an ‘incompatibility between goal-states, or values held by actors in a social system.’ Curle (1971: 3) writes: ‘By conflict I mean, essentially, incompatibility.’ Based on these definitions one can safely conclude that ‘incompatibility’ lies at the heart of a conflict. However, Galtung pointed to the equal importance of attitudes and behavior when analyzing conflict. He developed a model, the conflict triangle, in which he described the dynamics between the incompatibility of a conflict and the attitudes and behavior supporting it (see Figure 2.1). The conflict triangle shows three elements of conflict which continuously influence each other. The first element is the incompatibility (also called ‘contradiction’ by Galtung), the second element is the hostile attitudes and the third element is the hostile behavior of conflicting parties. One can speak of a fully articulated conflict when all elements exist (Galtung 1996: 72–73).
Incompatibility should essentially be understood as the content of the conflict, i.e., what the conflict is actually about. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines incompatibility as 'generally incompatible positions of the parties to the conflict' (Harbom and Wallensteen 2008: 84). Although it is often not possible to identify one single cause of a particular conflict, in most cases a primary reason for the incompatibility of the conflicting sides can be identified. The UCDP makes a distinction between two broadly defined incompatibilities: one concerning governmental power (a conflict about the political system or the composition of government) and one about territory (concerning the status of a territory) (Harbom and Wallensteen 2008).

As I argue in Chapter 3 (of the featured book), in Kosovo the incompatibility of the conflict was the political status of the territory. The conflict in Kosovo has been described as 'an ethnic conflict with strong territorial and cross-border/international dimensions' (Wolff 2003: 79). In Bosnia, the incompatibility was also about the political status of the territory. The main issue was concerning the question whether the country should be one (federal) state or split into separate political entities, as will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3. Burg and Shoup (1999: 128) describe the content of the conflict in Bosnia as follows: 'The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina involved an internal struggle among ethnic nationalists over the definition and control, indeed the very existence of the state, as well as an international struggle between the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its neighbours'.

Conflict researchers, including Galtung, often regard incompatibility as the most important element of conflict. However, it is also recognized that conflicts may start from the other two corners of the conflict triangle. First, a conflict may be born out of the attitudes, or the actors' perceptions and misperceptions of each other. Such a conflict starts with hostile attitudes, fostered and transmitted through ideology and
tradition. Attempting to justify his attitudes, an actor may search for an incompatibility and initiate violent behavior (or the other way around). Second, a conflict may start as a result of violent behavior. Behavior is the visible and manifest aspect of conflict, while attitude and incompatibility are the latent aspects of conflict. A conflict could start with violent behavior and subsequently be legitimized by hostile attitudes and an (invented) incompatibility (Galtung 1969a: 14).

How can conflict be resolved? Based on the conflict triangle, Galtung identifies three types of what he calls 'conflict interventions' (Galtung 1996: 103). These interventions aim at resolving the three specific conflict elements and aim at ending the three types of violence that are associated with the three elements of the conflict triangle, namely: direct violence (associated with violent behavior), cultural violence (associated with hostile attitudes) and structural violence (associated with incompatibility).

The first type of conflict intervention is focused on the behavioral element of the conflict triangle. Galtung (1969b: 170) defines behavioral violence as 'direct violence', or 'the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct' (emphasis in the original). The intervention is aimed at controlling the actors to such an extent that direct violence stops. A concrete example of a conflict intervention which ends direct violence is a cease-fire. The second type of conflict intervention focuses on the attitudinal element of the conflict triangle. Violence emerging from people's attitudes is defined as 'cultural violence', or 'those aspects of culture ( . . . ) that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence' (Galtung 1996: 196). The intervention is aimed at diminishing the hostile attitudes of the conflicting actors to such an extent that it leads to mutual acceptance of each other. Reconciliation efforts, for example, could be regarded as belonging to this second type of conflict intervention. Finally, the third type of conflict intervention identified by Galtung is focused on resolving the incompatibility. Violence associated with incompatibility is called 'structural violence', or violence where there is no specific actor, but which is 'built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances' (Galtung 1969b: 171). The intervention is aimed at ending the inequality in the system. A concrete example of this type of conflict intervention is a negotiated peace agreement.

As has been argued above, a fully articulated conflict includes incompatibility among groups of people, violent behavior and hostile attitudes. Therefore, a resolved conflict includes a solution to incompatibility, which is supported by non-hostile attitudes and non-violent behavior. Only when this is the case can one speak of conflict resolution. As such, conflict resolution 'implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed' (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 29). A resolved conflict means that a new status quo has been found that is accepted and sustained in word and deed by all.
parties to the conflict. In the case of Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement settled and contained the conflict but it did not resolve the underlying issues of incompatibility. The Agreement was imposed rather than freely accepted by the conflicting parties and resulted in the establishment of an international administration in order to ensure that the provisions of the Dayton Agreement would be carried out. In other words, the focus of the international involvement was on addressing violent behavior and hostile attitudes; the first and second types of intervention. The third type of intervention was absent in the sense that the international administration was based on the Dayton Peace Agreement, in which the incompatibility was incorporated.

In the case of Kosovo the incompatibility was not resolved either, because the political status of the territory remained undecided. The hostile attitudes and violent behavior of the conflicting parties were contained by the international administration, yet their incompatibility persisted. In the case of Kosovo the international administration functioned as a buffer between, on the one hand, Kosovo Albanians who wanted independence and, on the other hand, Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian government who opposed Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. As in Bosnia, the international administration in Kosovo focused on the behavioral and the attitudinal aspects of conflict, rather than on the incompatibility.

Focusing on the attitudes and behavior of conflicting parties without properly addressing the incompatibility in this study is defined as conflict management. This corresponds with the definition of conflict management as used by Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 29) who define it as the ‘settlement and containment of violent conflict’. Settlement and containment is not the same as conflict resolution (which also addresses incompatibility) and results in different outcomes. Conflict management often leads to what is referred to in the academic literature either as frozen conflict or negative peace. Frozen conflict is a situation in which (direct) violence is ended, but in which the incompatibility remains unresolved (Crocker et al. 2004: 8, 36). Frozen conflicts have been associated with classic peacekeeping operations in which a buffer zone separates two warring parties (Pugh 2001a: 123). An example of a classic peacekeeping operation that has resulted in a frozen conflict is the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which was established in 1964 (De Wijk 1998: 11). The peace in such a situation is a ‘negative’ one, meaning the absence of (direct) violence (Galtung 1996: 31; Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 41).

Negative peace is often contrasted with positive peace, which goes beyond the mere absence of violence. Unfortunately, Galtung is not very clear and consistent about the concept of positive peace and it can only be understood in relation to his conceptualization of negative peace. First, Galtung (1969b) defines negative peace as the absence of direct violence and positive peace as the absence of direct violence and
structural violence. Later, however, he defines negative peace more ambitiously as the absence of all kinds of violence (i.e., direct, cultural and structural) and positive peace as a ‘cooperative system beyond passive peaceful coexistence’ (Galtung 1996: 61). Galtung has never been very clear on what this cooperative system is about. That might explain why many academics working in the field of conflict resolution prefer to use Galtung’s earlier definition. Following Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 41) this study defines negative peace as the absence of direct violence and positive peace as the absence of direct, structural and cultural violence. The ultimate challenge for international administrations like those in Bosnia and Kosovo is to avoid freezing the conflict and to establish positive peace, rather than negative peace.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I showed that contemporary international administrations have quite a few historical predecessors. Based on a literature review I pointed out that the main elements that define an international administration are:

1. that the institution is created by an international rather than a foreign authority;
2. that its purpose is to respond to sovereignty and governance problems;
3. that the response often comes down to state-building; and
4. that it has sovereign powers at its disposal.

I further argued that the term international administration should be reserved for the international control and international governorship types of international administration. Only when international administrations are regarded as activities which include governance or territorial administration can it be distinguished from less intrusive activities like monitoring elections or providing humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, international administration was defined as: a political authority which is established by an international organization and which aims to develop political, social and economic institutions on a specific territory by assuming some or all sovereign powers of the state on a temporary basis.

**Notes**

2. The British took control over the regions Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and French forces occupied the Fezzan (Pelt 1970).
3. The Council consisted of representatives from Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, the UK and the USA as well as one representative from each of the three regions in Libya (United Nations General Assembly 1949).
4 The initial mandate, established on 14 July 1960 by UN Security Council Resolution 143 (1960a) and confirmed in Resolutions 145 (1960b) and 146 (1960c), was expanded in Resolution 161 (1961a). Next to providing military and technical assistance to the Congolese government, Resolution 161 allowed ONUC to take 'all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war'. The use of violence was allowed if necessary. UN Security Council Resolution 169 (1961b) strengthened the mandate for the second time by allowing ONUC to take 'vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force'.

5 The Namibia Accords included a settlement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba. All three countries were involved in the conflict (Fortna 1993: 355).

6 The most important of these were the Khmer Rouge, the National United Front for a Cooperative, Independent, Neutral and Peaceful Cambodia (FUCINPEC) and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front. Pressured by China and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the resistance groups loosely organized themselves in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) (Peou 2002: 502).

7 Government effectiveness is one of the six governance indicators used by the World Bank: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political stability and absence of violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; and (6) control of corruption (Kaufman et al. 2006: 4).

8 For an extensive critique of Eckstein's work see the special issue of Comparative Political Studies, 31, 4 (August 1998).

9 These conditions are drawn from Larry Diamond's work on democratic consolidation (Diamond 1999).

10 An alternative term for 'conflict resolution' is 'conflict transformation'. In Galtung's work both terms are defined as an effort to solve the incompatibility (Galtung 1969: 15). Galtung (1996: 96) and several other conflict analysts prefer the term 'transformation', because 'resolution' has a too definitive connotation to it. Alan Tidwell (1998: 72) even speaks of a 'school' of theorists who reject the notion of resolution and write about transformation instead. Nonetheless, recognizing that it does not entail a definitive solution, the term conflict resolution is used in this study, because it is the most common term applied in the literature.

11 In the academic literature incompatibility is also referred to as the 'structure of the conflict' (Crocker et al. 2004: 99).

12 In his earlier work Galtung had argued that a conflict may start in all corners of the triangle, but in later work he conceded that it often starts with incompatibility (Wallensteen 2002: 35).