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Introduction

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Religioscape: Concept, indicators and scales of competitive sharing through time
Shared space and intersecting religious networks

Most scholarly work on shared religious sites focuses on the nature of sharing, or the lack of it, but much less attention has been given to considering what kinds of spaces may be shared. Many researchers of shared religious spaces focus on interactions at the location of a single site, such as a church, mosque, temple, shrine or tomb of a saint. Even studies of interactions in wider regions, such as shrines to the Virgin Mary in several countries around the Mediterranean or shrines shared by Christians and Muslims in Anatolia, focus on specific shrines at specific moments in time. In each case, the limitation is to a single place or to an activity in a narrowly delimited area.

Glenn Bowman, in an attempt to define the subject of study of "mixed" locations, while avoiding "extending the matter to be examined to absurd dimensions," has proposed focusing on "shrines," using that term to denote "a place associated with a divinity, sacred figure or relic." More recently, he has instead proposed adopting the Latin word *sacra* to denote "a range of sites and activities, including ancestral altars, holy places (shrine, synagogues, churches and mosques), funerals, religious processions and festivals". Our own research trajectory has tracked Bowman's in part, but it has also gone beyond it. Our initial research was also on specific sites, as locations of religious and other social activities through time. The more we investigated such sites, however, the more it became apparent that it is misleading to study any single site or activity (sacra in Bowman's usage). However, to us, what is misleading is studying any site, shrine or sacra in isolation, without considering the wider context: its interconnections with other places and practices that are associated with the various religious communities interacting there. Further, these interactions and interconnections must be analyzed through time, since the particular histories of places contribute to the contestations, or lack of them, seen at any given moment.

The interconnections of which we speak are manifested by those visitors to a site who identify themselves and others as members of larger religious communities, not necessarily as people primarily and solely connected to the specific site they are visiting. It is their perceptions of the place that give meanings to the site at any particular moment, and for any specific visitors. For example, a Christian in the Balkans might see a shrine as the tomb of a Christian saint, linked to other Christian sites, while a Muslim may see the same place as the shrine to a Muslim saint, and thus linked to other Muslim sites, even as both also stress their reverence for the saint and the importance to them of that site. Even when much day-to-day activity around a particular site involves local practices that seem to combine elements of larger traditions that are now, at least, largely defined in terms of their mutual exclusivity (forms of Christianity and forms of Islam, or of Hinduism and either Christianity or
Islam, for instance), neither the identification of believers with their separate traditions nor their connections to the larger networks of their several traditions of reference seem to weaken through their interactions with each other at shared sites.

The matter has been put very well by a writer who is otherwise a critic of the AT model, Dionigi Albera. In discussing an anthropological approach to “crossing the frontiers of the monotheistic religions,” Albera states that:

In some cases, permeability at the devotional level does . . . seem to coexist with an insistence on the “strong” identities preached by the great religions of the Book. While the violations of the exclusivism basic to all the monotheisms are flagrant and while the hybrid practices are striking, mixing with individuals of a different religion does not result, so to speak, in any evident damage to existing religious identities. Indeed, these “transgressions” usually appear to be associated with the preservation of the initial religious polarization. The adoption of highly heterodox practices can, in other words, be reconciled with respect for at least the basic principles of one’s own religion (ritualism, ethics, dogma, and so on).

Albera further notes that even in cases in which there seems to be an active embrace of the Other at a specific site and specific time, such phenomena “are fragile and clandestine. Discretion and opacity appear to be preconditions for their survival”. However, he also indicates that the more common situation is not “clandestine” or “shrouded in secrecy”, but instead “never completely divorced from elements that are potentially competitive and conflict-ridden”. Or, as another recent study put it, at sites in which members of two or more religious communities interact, “Cooperation between believers from different religious traditions should not be mistaken for religious syncretism. Deep down, this . . . is a cultural strategy developed by members of both groups for anti-syncretic purposes, that is to preserve the religious autonomy of each group”.

The potential for competition and conflict arises because people at any specific site may – and often do – draw on their co-religionists, including those from other places, to support their varying claims on the place. Making such extra-local connections a central part of the analysis is the primary theoretical move that distinguishes the AT approach from that of critics such as Bowman and Albera. Bowman provides the clearest statement of the approach that is explicitly contrary to ours: that he and his colleagues “treat religious sites and practices maintained by and closely articulated with local populations” and that “such local sites can . . . be seen to reflect and amplify images of the consociality of the communities that surround, or had surrounded, them.” To us, however, analyzing specific sites as if they were at least semi-isolated from larger religious, social, and political networks is inherently misleading. No matter how syncretic a site may seem at some moment, the people
going there, as Albera noted in the passages quoted above, are still connected to larger, non-local religious communities and their associated identities, and may draw on these wider connections. In fact, much of our work is oriented towards analyzing how and when such extra-local ties are invoked.

In our view, understanding shared sacred sites, or sacra, requires considering these connections between local practitioners of any religion and the wider communities of co-religionists linked to them. Shared religious sites, then, are best understood as nodes in structures of social interactions, between two kinds of groups, which can themselves be numerous. One group is composed of people, both local and non-local in origin, who regard this particular site or practice as sacred – although often they consider it sacred for different reasons, such as that the saint in the tomb is a Muslim, or that he is a Hindu, or a Christian. Bowman has referred to such people as mixing at a site rather than sharing it, since sharing presumes amity which may not be present, and we agree with his reasoning. As Albera noted, people in such interactions maintain their several separate identities as members of larger religious communities.

The second node of interaction is between members of such communities themselves, who have many shared understandings of the nature of the site and its relationship to other sites of their own religious community. In either case, as a node of interaction, a single site cannot be isolated from the social networks of varying scale that interact at it. Scale here may range from local communities, to regional networks, to those on a state or imperial scale, and even between states or empires, as we discuss in later chapters.

The networks involved may include communities of believers who may distinguish between their own subgroups at varying levels: for example, Muslims, including Sunni, Shia and other branches, and believers in a particular saint, such as Bektasîs or Mevlevîs – the fact that Sunni Islam generally does not favor saints, and many Sunni clerics discourage observances oriented towards saints, is part of the distinction between them. Another set of examples can be seen in Christianity, within which are Orthodox, Roman Catholic and a spectrum of Protestant churches, among others, and devotees of particular saints (with the proviso that not all branches of Christianity recognize all or even any saints). There is no difficulty in analyzing intra-Muslim or intra-Christian conflicts in terms of the AT model; after all, Locke's Letter on Toleration was itself concerned mainly with intra-Christian sectarian conflicts. Indeed, one of his examples "suppose[s] two churches – the one of Arminians [sic], the other of Calvinists – residing in the city of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has the right to deprive the other of their estates and liberty (as we see practiced elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some doctrines and ceremonies, whilst the Turks . . . silently stand by and laugh to see what cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians?" What is important is simply that members of
each community distinguish themselves and each other as Self and Other groups. As Albera has noted in the passage quoted, these mutual distinctions are robust, surviving long periods of interaction and even, as Fredrik Barth observed decades ago, accommodating (if often without acknowledging) individual movements from one group to another, which does not change the presumptively mutually exclusive categorizations of the groups themselves for their members.

The nodes of interaction of religious communities are often localized in durable structures such as churches, temples or mosques, or in temporary gatherings such as fairs or other kinds of meetings. Of course, such temporary gatherings may often take place near more permanent structures, or near a natural feature such as a sacred grove or a spring. These sites are the physical markers of the presence of a religious community, and thereby define a religious landscape, or religioscape, a concept to which we now turn.

**The concept of the religioscape**

“Religioscape” is a term that has been used by others, drawing on Arjun Appadurai’s ethnoscapes, as the “Subjective religious maps . . . of immigrant, diasporic or transnational communities who are in global flow and flux”. While adopting the imagery of marking the presence of communities in varying geographical distributions, we have developed the concept further to indicate the geographical distribution of markers of an identity form wherever they may be found, rather than limiting ourselves to diasporic or transnational communities. We also draw on the concept of “landscape” as developed in history and archaeology, focusing on spatial, monumental and performative dimensions of the built environment in identity politics.

In our usage, *religioscape* refers to the physical markers of the space in which practitioners of a given religious community interact, and thus to the spatial parameters of social presences. Temporality is important in that something associated with a religion that is no longer practiced may be evidence of a previous religioscape, but does not itself constitute one.

Two aspects of this definition should be stressed. One is that a physical place may contain more than one religious space: two or more narratives about the same place may exist simultaneously. Thus, a single place, even a single building, may contain multiple religious spaces, in which case it may constitute a node on each of several religioscapes. To give a current example, the complex known as “Meryem Ana” in the vicinity of Efes, Turkey (historical Ephesus), said by Muslims to be the house of Mother Mary (*Meryem Ana*), the mother of the prophet Jesus, is regarded by Roman Catholics as the house of the Virgin Mary, who gave birth to the Son of God, Jesus. In this case, the woman in question is the same historical personage but has very different religious
identities, with different theological significance. These differences reflect the wider beliefs and teachings of the religious communities involved. In Chapter 4, we analyze in detail the shrine at Madhi, India, which to Muslims is the dargā of the Muslim saint Shah Ramzan Mahi Savar Chisti, while Hindus say it is the samādhi of the Hindu saint Kanifnath – note that the saint is the same historical person, but with two religious identities, and neither group acknowledges the identity used by the other as valid. Hindus and Muslims have a long history of peaceful interaction at Madhi, occasionally punctuated by brief episodes of violence. We analyze and emphasize the importance of such episodes to the AT model, as well as the resulting changes in the physical structures of the shrine and in its relationship to other nodes of the larger Hindu and Muslim religioscapes.

The other important consideration is that a specific physical thing may be part of a religioscape at one historical moment yet not at another, if the community with which it is associated is no longer present. For example, in sixteenth-century Cuzco, Peru, the former capital of the Inka Empire, imperial shrines and Catholic churches formed parts of religioscapes that intersected. When the monastery and church of Santo Domingo were built literally on top of the main Inka shrine, the Coricancha

![Image](image.jpg)

**Figure 2.1** The church of Santo Domingo, built on top of the central Inka shrine, the Qurikancha (or Coricancha), or Temple of the Sun in Cuzco, Peru. The curved retaining wall of finely fitted stone is Inka.

Source: Photo by Robert M. Hayden, May 2011.
(Golden Temple), the remaining stones of the temple still formed part of an Inka religioscape (Figure 2.1).

Since the Inka state and its religion no longer exist, these same stones have become part of the Catholic religioscape, having been incorporated into the church and monastery complex. However, they now also form part of an archaeoscape, itself potentially part of state competition with religioscapes, as discussed further in Chapter 7. A religioscape can end abruptly when the community associated with it is suddenly no longer present, as was the case following the expulsion into Greece of the Greek Orthodox Christian community throughout Anatolia, effected during the population exchange of 1923. Their abandoned churches constitute evidence of a previous religioscape that became an archaeoscape – except for those that were turned into mosques and thus became elements of the Sunni Muslim religioscape (Figure 2.2).

Religioscapes as we define them are inherently fluid: people move, taking their religious practices with them, and potentially changing the built environment, too, in ways that reflect their beliefs. Yet the religioscape also reflects the connections between people who regard themselves as holding the same beliefs, or are regarded by

![Image](https://example.com/image.jpg)

*Figure 2.2* The Republican Mosque, Derinkuyu, Turkey, from the north. Built as a Greek Orthodox church dedicated to the Archangels, 1859–60, and converted into the Republican Mosque (*Cumhuriyet Camii*) in 1949.

others as doing so. The point seems simple, and yet it is precisely in this regard that writers who analyze single sites in one brief time period have put themselves under the strictures of a structural-functionalist framework. Viewing sites as isolates fails to consider how they come into being, how they are changed, and how they may cease to be associated with a local community, all processes likely to be tied to events at other sites associated with the same religious community.

A religioscape is marked by physical items, ranging from single artifacts, to small shrines, to larger religious complexes, even sacred cities, but always provided that the religious community associated with those markers is still present, so that the religioscape marks a living social space for them. The situations we are especially interested in are those in which two or more populations that are distinguished by differing religions (or variant sects of the same religion) inhabit the same physical or conceptual territory; in such cases, two or more religioscapes intersect. When two or more such religioscapes are brought into contact, the power relations of the two groups relative to each other will be indicated by features of the sites. In such situations, when the power of the dominant group weakens and there is room for competition between the groups over the control of a site, competing attempts between them to display dominance become marked.

The concept of the religioscape as we have developed it is useful because we would anticipate seeing such social horizons being marked physically in their various settings. Indeed, we can say that the interactions we are most interested in – sacred sites of two or more religious communities that may be shared, or, if kept separate, competitively contiguous – are markers of the frontiers of differing religioscapes. As these frontiers shift, the physical structures that have marked their interface may be converted, since they are no longer on a social border. The territorial spaces marked by such borders need not be coterminous with state or political borders but may become so through time.

**Religioscapes as markers of patterns of dominance through time**

Let us begin by stating the obvious: that the presence of a site that is associated with one religious community is evidence that members of that community either live near the location of the site now, or did so in the past. More interesting and less obvious, however, is that the symbolism inherent in this situation may also work in a reverse fashion, so that the (re)construction of religious sites that were destroyed during inter-group conflict is mandated by a larger power as a symbol that members of a group that was expelled still have a claim of belonging to the territory from which they were driven. Such reasoning can be seen in the insistence of the international civil servants who run the protectorate in post-war Bosnia on rebuilding mosques in places
where there are few Muslims. What is interesting about this reverse process is that it leads to the construction of religious sites that are not built in order to serve a population of believers who need them for daily use, but rather precisely because those believers are not there, to indicate that they still have a claim to be at that place. We discuss the Bosnian case in Chapter 8.

The object that is reconstructed through such activities becomes a symbol divorced from the cultural values and meanings that exist only insofar as they are embodied in what people do in a religious sense. It is perhaps for this reason that such reconstructions are sometimes undertaken by secular governments, in the name of commemorating and apologizing for past violence, or by creating secular museums from what had been sacred sites. We discuss several such cases in detail in Chapter 7, including that of the recognition of a part of Castelo de Vide, Portugal as the former Jewish ghetto (judiaria) of the town, where Jews lived in relative peace until their forced conversion in 1496–97. While the identification of that part of town as the judiaria is well grounded in archaeology, the identification of one building as a former synagogue is much less so, but this putative synagogue is not the central feature of the commemoration of the judiaria by the modern, secular government.

Commemorating even a somewhat dubious religious site as an historical marker of past presence makes clear the importance of religious sites that stake out or assert a strong tie – a belonging – to a territory even when the group commemorated

\[\text{Figure 2.3} \quad \text{Our Lady of Livramento chapel, a Neolithic tomb transformed into a shrine to a local saint, near Evora, Portugal.}\]

Source: Photo by Timothy D. Walker, June 2009.
Figure 2.4 Interior of Our Lady of Livramento chapel near Évora, Portugal. Offerings including the main local agricultural products of cork and olive oil, as well as wax or metal representations of body parts (e.g. a leg or ear) to ask for healing, and photographs of deceased loved ones.

Source: Photo by Robert M. Hayden, June 2009.

is no longer there. The politics, though, are selective. In several other towns in Portugal, the former Moorish ghettos are sometimes marked but the sites of their mosques are not, although their erstwhile presence is often evident in the time-worn names of streets or public squares. An exception is found in Mértola, where a twelfth-century mosque has been a church since the thirteenth century; this is analyzed in detail in Chapter 5. Jews are not likely to return to Portugal in large numbers except as tourists (and tours of Jewish Spain and Portugal are now marketed, 500-plus years after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, and soon thereafter from Portugal as well), but
Muslims are present in large numbers in a European Union whose non-Muslim populations are not necessarily in favor of this. By the end of the twentieth century, North African religious tourism to Spain and Portugal had begun, with Muslims from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and elsewhere visiting former mosque sites on the Iberian Peninsula, sometimes during annual “Islamic cultural festivals” organized by local tourist boards in places such as Mértola, Córdoba and Granada. This Muslim religious tourism is not always received favorably in Iberia, as seen in the 2010 statements by Catholic leaders in Spain protesting about the labeling of the cathedral in Cordoba as a “mosque–cathedral,” and asserting forcefully that it is no longer a mosque.

It is also clearly true that religious sites that attain prominence may often be adopted by, and adapted to, the uses of new religious communities that become prominent in the region in which they are located. Sometimes the histories of site transformation can be very long indeed. For example, since at least the seventeenth century, a Neolithic dolmen tomb near Évora, Portugal has been adapted as a Roman Catholic chapel, with an altar placed on the eastern side of the tomb chamber (Figure 2.3).

The chapel is dedicated to Our Lady of Livramento, the offerings to whom are mainly local products such as cork and olive oil; and pictures of threatened or deceased loved ones or wax models of afflicted body parts are left as tokens of supplication (Figure 2.4). The Virgin Mary's role is to relieve adherents from pain, disease and sorrows, but private, personal ones. The chapel key is kept by the family who, until the 1974 Portuguese Revolution, were the primary local landowners, against whom much of the energy of the Revolution was directed in the form of land confiscation and redistribution. The site, next to a Roman road (first century ce) and near other major megalithic sites, may well have been used for other religious purposes over the centuries. Similar adaptations of ancient sites are reported elsewhere in Europe, notably Greece.

Most commonly, the historical trajectories of prominent sites show their repeated use and transformation as new rulers raise new religions to dominance. Thus, in the center of the oldest part of Ankara, Turkey stands a fifteenth-century mosque; on that site we find earlier remnants of a Roman temple, probably built on top of an earlier Phrygian sacred ground, then transformed by Augustus into a temple to himself as a god, then by Roman Christians into a church, then into a Byzantine church, and, with the conquest by Muslims, into part of a mosque complex. As of late 2010, the fifteenth-century mosque was itself being transformed by the city government, under the control of a Sunni Islamist party, in ways that make it more modern and Sunni and tied less closely to the tomb of Hacı Bayram, a saint for which it is named and whose tomb abuts the mosque. Hacı Bayram is effectively the patron saint of Ankara; although Sunni Islam does not officially recognize saints, many Sunni Muslims still seek
assistance from them. We discuss this site at greater length in the next chapter and in Chapter 7.

**Measuring indicators of dominance**

Since our model sees religious sites as nodes of social interaction that also manifest political dominance, or challenges to it, we have developed measures of dominance that, we propose, have potentially universal applicability. These measures are based on what we have come to regard as important features of major religious sites – *perceptibility*, especially visibility, audibility and massiveness, and *centrality* – in our experience, a greater level of the feature in question indicates an assertion of dominance. In zones of actively contested politico-religious dominance, and thus of the intersecting nodes of competing religioscapes, vying groups will build structures that competitively challenge the height, visibility, audibility and/or massiveness of those of the rival group. However, in zones where dominance is clear, a subordinated group acknowledges its inferior power position by building in ways that do not present a challenge according to these parameters.

In some cases, a dominated group may not be able to build at all, or will refrain from doing so in order to avoid being seen as mounting a challenge. Thus, in a political context in which one religious community dominates all others, its religioscape will exhibit superior indicators of dominance within these parameters.

In locations where the circumstances of dominance are altered by political or social developments, on the other hand, if a previously subordinate religious group emerges as the dominant religious group in the region, then that group will act quickly to assert its new dominant position by constructing religious edifices that display a greater degree of perceptibility (height, mass, etc.) than those of (previously dominant) rival religious groups. AT project research has investigated many such locations where the wheel of fortune has turned and religious dominance has shifted in this way – sometimes repeatedly over time. The parameters of indictors of dominance are thus crucial.

**Perceptibility**

Major religious sites are constructed in ways that make them noticeable, a feature we refer to as perceptibility. Specific parameters of perceptibility vary. *Height* may be an intrinsic structural factor, as in the domes of Hagia Sophia and the Süleymaniye mosque in Istanbul, or the pyramids of the Aztec-Mexica, or the towers of Hindu or Buddhist temples. Height can be augmented, as by minarets of mosques, or the steeples and bell towers on churches. *Competitive audibility*, such as that between the *azaan* in Islam and bells in many forms of Christianity or in Hinduism, can be enhanced
structurally (with minarets and bell towers, for instance) and with technology, such as loudspeakers. Pure size – mass – may be pronounced, as St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, the Buddha statue in Todaiji, Japan, or the Buddha statues that stood at Bamiyan, Afghanistan, from the sixth century until 2001. Bright colors may also be used, as in the polychromatic hues of some South Indian Hindu temples, or of Mesoamerican pyramids.

Such features may be combined, so that a massive building may include a tower from which sounds are emitted – or may have one added later. However, when structures from different religioscapes are in proximity to each other, these features will be the focus of competition, such as competitive verticality between minarets and bell towers, or competitive audibility between *azaans* and church bells. Competition may also take the form of prohibition: the Ottoman Empire prohibited bell towers and church bells, but these towers were added in Balkan Christian-majority states immediately after their independence from that empire. These same states later prohibited the amplification of the *azaan* in their territories, while Switzerland banned minarets in 2010.

**Centrality**

Major religious structures are often located centrally, although what counts as “central” may vary. Thus, while the indicators of perceptibility may be quantified, those of centrality are context-dependent and relative. Centrality may refer to location within a settlement, or to the location of important political, social, religious or economic activities, to give a few examples. Certain places may be regarded as central because of their cosmological connection. Our review of the literature on the Andes leads us to believe that centrality as an indicator of religious and political dominance was the primary component of religious interactions during the process of Inka expansion, which we discuss further below and in Chapter 5. The most important shrine of the Inka Empire, the Coricancha, was symbolically located at the center of the Inkan *ceque* system, which was conceptually a structure of radiating lines that organized the shrines in the empire hierarchically. In an environment in which high mountain peaks were believed to be sacred and were highly visible, height seems likely to have been relevant; indeed, in the *ceque* system the radiating lines ran over mountain peaks, from a center that seems to have been itself defined by the lines of sight from it to these peaks.

However, in some other cases, pragmatic logistic reasons may have been prominent in the designation of the center. The temples of the forum in ancient Rome were located at the center of the capital city, as well as at the heart of the empire. Similarly, the *Huey Teocalli* (Great Temple, or *Templo Mayor*) of the Aztec-Mexica, located at the center of the sacred precinct of Tenochtitlan and oriented to the cardinal
directions, was also at the political, social and economic center of the empire. Our research in Peru was driven in part by the importance of centrality to the ceque system as linked to Inka cosmology, which the Spanish conquerors disrupted, essentially reorienting the city to center it on an imposed sacred Christian structure. A similar decentering of sacred space by a conqueror of another religion has been reported from Southern India. We believe that such reorientation of a sacred site or landscape may be a common tactic in manifesting a change in dominance, as discussed further in Chapter 5.

**Centrality and perceptibility as co-relevant factors**

It has become apparent in the course of our research that centrality and perceptibility are co-relevant factors, and that a shrine may exhibit a combination of these attributes. A massive building with a high tower and amplified sound in the center of a settlement would be dominant, but, as these factors vary, dominance may be challenged. A key finding of the research thus far, however, is that *centrality is the key factor in indicating dominance*. That is, a religious structure built at a central location in a settlement is presumed to reflect dominance over shrines in less central positions. Further, in situations where a conquering power introduces a new religious paradigm, the new administrators may alter the built environment to shift the physical center of the community, thus recentering the new religioscape as an assertion of civil and spiritual dominance.

**Centrality, verticality, audibility**

Since we find that the key, co-relevant indicators of dominance are centrality and perceptibility, we have had to develop methods of evaluating sites in regard to these criteria. Centrality must be defined in cultural and religious terms, since a religious site that is located at a central location of economic or political activity may or may not be regarded as the most important religious structure (compare the Coricancha, the center of Inka religious life, with the Plaza de Armas in Cusco, or the Friday mosque with the market mosque in most Ottoman cities). Further, and in keeping with the fluidity inherent in the concept of the religioscape, centrality may change. For example, the primary temple of the Roman city of Serdica became one of the first Christian churches in the Balkans, but, as the city grew and a large church to St. Sofia was built on higher ground slightly to the west, the older church became peripheral in the city now known as Sofia, precisely after that church. On the other hand, that very peripheralism was probably what kept the smaller, older church from being converted into a mosque after the Ottoman conquest, unlike the St. Sofia and all the other churches in Sofia. In
something of an inversion of these processes, the only Byzantine church in Istanbul that was neither destroyed nor converted into a mosque, St. Mary of the Mongols in the Fener neighborhood of the Fatih district, had been a peripheral church on the outskirts of the city (Figure 2.5).

This marginal neighborhood, however, then became the heart of the Greek areas of Istanbul after the conquest and is still the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Centrality, then, must be defined in terms of location and religious significance at specific moments in time – in keeping with the fluid nature of the concept of religioscape, and, in the above example, counterintuitively, with the fluid nature of the “center” itself.

Perceptibility lends itself more to empirical measurement: verticality (height), audibility, or color contrast, to name only a few features, can be assessed through quantification. The most important of these is, we find, height. A key finding of this research is that, assuming equal centrality, indicators of greater perceptibility (and especially of height) indicate dominance.
All of these indicators require the presence of at least some of the physical signs of the other group and its defining religious tradition. This may help explain why sites may be completely destroyed rather than transformed when the message is that the other community is no longer welcome. The complete destruction or obliteration in itself would be an indicator not only of dominance, but of the intention to ensure that the other group has not merely been subordinated but has actually been eliminated from the territory. In this regard, the destruction of religious sites is much more important symbolically than simply the destruction of residences or even villages, since the latter may be rebuilt more easily.

**Directionality, decentering, recentering**

Early on in our research, in the Balkans, it became clear that the orientation of a church or mosque was potentially an indicator of whether the building had been originally constructed for that purpose. Orthodox churches in the Balkans, like Byzantine churches in general, are almost invariably oriented very closely to a west–east axis, with the main entrance to the west and the altar to the east. Mosques should be oriented towards Mecca (*qibla*), with some variations in different historical periods, so that in places such as Bosnia, Bulgaria and eastern Anatolia, the building is frequently oriented toward the southeast and the door to the northwest. One can clearly see the reorientations of Byzantine churches in Istanbul and elsewhere in Anatolia, with *mihrabs* placed at an angle to the eastern orientation of the building; well-known examples are those of the Hagia Sofia and the Church of the Holy Savior in Chora in Istanbul, or the “Byzantine mosque” in Trilye, discussed in an earlier AT project publication. Further to the east in Turkey, the *qibla* takes a nearly due south orientation, thus toward a side wall of the church, a feature easily seen in churches that were converted into mosques in Cyprus (Figure 2.6).

However, it is clearly noticeable that the Church of the Forty Martyrs in Sofia and the Church of the Assumption in Uzundzhovo, both in Bulgaria, are non-canonical, as the buildings are oriented towards the southeast; both were originally Religioscape 39 built as mosques and later converted. Similarly, in central India, as described in more detail in Chapter 4, mosques are oriented towards 280 degrees, thus towards Mecca, which indicates that certain Hindu shrines with that orientation may have been built originally as Muslim structures.

Such matters of orientation and modification are also revealing with regard to competition between churches of varying denominations. Orthodox churches, and those built before about the fourteenth century, are oriented to the east, but many later Roman Catholic churches in both the Balkans and Portugal were built on a north–south orientation, with the altar to the north and the main door to the south.3 A rather lovely example of these conflicting orientations can be seen in Dublin, Ireland
Figure 2.6 Nineteenth-century Greek Orthodox church converted after 1974 into a mosque in Tuzla, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Facing east, the frame of the iconostasis is still standing, but it now marks off the women’s section of the mosque. The qibla is marked toward south-southeast by lines on the carpet, and the mihrab has been constructed in the south wall.

Source: Photo by Robert M. Hayden, October 2011.

(Figure 2.7): the twelfth-century St. Audoen’s Church is oriented east–west, but it is now affiliated with the Church of Ireland, and thus is Anglican in confession and not Roman Catholic. Medieval English churches were built with an eastern orientation, and this is generally maintained in the Church of England. A new, Roman Catholic church of St. Audoen was built in the 1840s, literally adjacent to the older church but at right angles to it, with the main door opening to the south and the altar oriented to the north.

Another example can be seen in Google Earth shots of the old part of Sarajevo (Bašćaršija), which show clearly that the old Orthodox church (built before 1539) and
Figure 2.7 The twelfth-century St. Audoen’s church (left), the oldest parish church in Dublin of the Church of Ireland, meets at right angles the mid-nineteenth-century St. Audoen’s Catholic church (right). The older church is oriented towards the east (altar; door to west) while the newer Roman Catholic one is oriented towards the north (altar; door to south).

Source: Photo by Robert M. Hayden, June 2013.

the 1872 Orthodox cathedral are oriented towards the east, the Roman Catholic cathedral (1889) is oriented towards the north and the Gazi Husreg-beg mosque (1531) is oriented towards the southeast.

Directionality can thus be revealing of the original form, intent, and religious affiliation of buildings, while redirecting can be used as a technique of appropriation (for example, the replacement of the eastern-oriented altar at Hagia Sophia with a southeastern oriented mihrab after 1453) or of differentiation (as in St. Audoen’s Roman Catholic church). Sometimes, redirecting may be used even when the new direction is not what it should be according to the generally accepted rules of the religion into the service of which it is converted. We studied a building in Derinkuyu, Turkey that had been built as a church in 1858 and converted into a mosque in 1949. The church was, of course, oriented on a west–east axis, with the altar to the east; unusually, in our experience, the iconostasis was left in place after the conversion into a mosque, though stripped of icons and other Christian symbols. In this part of Turkey, Mecca is to the southeast, but to identify that direction as the qibla would result in orienting prayers to a corner of the building, where it would be difficult to build the mihrab and minbar. The solution was to add these structures to the south wall (Figure 2.8).
However, this qibla is actually as mis-oriented as would have been the case if the west–east orientation of the building had been maintained and the qibla set in the east. Apparently, it was felt better to adopt a different orientation from that of the church even though the new directionality was as far off the true location of Mecca as is the apse of the church, where the altar had been.

We have also come across instances of what we see as surreptitious or even malicious directionality. The mihrab of the Hacibayram mosque in Ankara, discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapters 3 and 7, is not oriented towards Mecca, but rather directs prayers to the tomb of the saint himself, although this incorrect directionality is unremarked and may in fact not be well known. Actually, this direction of prayer towards the saint is much more common in Sufi tekkes than in Sunni mosques. A more complicated and politically sensitive case is in Mathura, India, where the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb destroyed a major Hindu temple to Lord Krishna and replaced it with a mosque. When we visited Mathura in 2009, this mosque was surrounded on three sides by newer incarnations of the original temple, among the most recent of which is a small Krishna temple deliberately sited on the other side of the qibla wall of
the mosque. Thus, from the perspective of many in the Hindu community, all prayers directed towards Mecca must first pass through Lord Krishna. But Muslims may have used similar techniques themselves in transforming temples in earlier centuries in India. Tamara Sears notes that at Kadwāhā, Madhya Pradesh, in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, Muslim rulers transformed a Hindu matā (monastery) and built a mosque on the site of its accompanying temple. She notes that the Muslim builders “co-opted” the directionality of the space: since the deity faced west, and the mīhrāb did as well, “in effect, the mīhrāb stood in the direction that the deity once faced”.

Redirecting may also take the form of decentering a shrine or complex, making that which was central less so, even peripheral. This phenomenon may be most easily seen in a cultural and religious system that put great importance on centrality, that of the Inka. In an environment in which high mountain peaks were visible from almost all sides, and in a natural religioscape animated by sacred mountains and rivers, central locations would be below the peaks, yet in positions from which many peaks are visible. An aspect of centrality may have been the number of sight lines to peaks that a location afforded, since control over such a center of that sacred universe would constitute a powerful statement of domination. This argument is supported by the work of Williams and Nash, who use viewshed GIS methodology to argue that expansionist Wari elites during the Middle Horizon (600–1000 AD) built complexes oriented to, “and presumably dedicated for, rites of veneration to the higher snowcapped volcanic peaks visible” from a central location.

Given the fact that the entire landscape was deemed sacred by the Inka, the central point from which this was manifested reflected an inverse perspective, one that “unites the represented space with the real space of the viewer”. At the same time, these “external sacred” points themselves became central places, articulating lower-ranked local shrines and transforming the landscape into a well-integrated religious network.

The most important religious center of the Inka Empire, the Temple of the Sun or Coricancha, was built at the convergence of the two main rivers that run through Cusco, the Huatanay and the Tullumayu. Perhaps the most striking manifestation of the central place of the Coricancha in the symbolic organization and transformation of the built environment during Inka times is the ceque system, already mentioned in brief. This consisted of forty-seven notional lines that radiated from the center of the Inka religious world, the Coricancha in Cuzco, to the four corners of the empire. A number of shrines were hierarchically organized along these lines, forming a sacred network that covered the entire territory. Interestingly, while some of these sacred places were located in the heartland of the Inka Empire, others were located in newly conquered provinces and formed part of the religioscapes of subjugated groups. The newly
conquered religious sites that were symbolically subordinated to the Coricancha through incorporation into the ceque system were also converted into central places locally, concentrating provincial religious and political functions, as in the case of the coastal shrine of Pachacamac, or Vilcashuaman in the southern highlands. This is also indicative of the homological understanding of the temples in the ceque: namely, that a single local temple is capable of representing the whole system of temples.

In general, the Spanish in early colonial Peru and in all Hispanic America manifested dominance in ways very familiar to us from Iberia, the Balkans and Turkey: erecting churches, chapels, monasteries or crosses on top of the sites of shrines, sometimes using parts of the shrines as components of their religious structures. This practice was so common that it has been treated matter-of-factly in scholarship. Thus, Valerie Fraser in her analysis of "the architecture of conquest" notes that "churches seem wherever possible to have been placed on the site of an indigenous focus of either worship or power, or both" and "in so doing suppressed not only idolatry but native culture and society as well," although "there is often a lack of specific reference to this practice [in Spanish documents of the time] especially in the early years of the conquest". The churches, chapels, monasteries and crosses thus not only manifest dominance through superimposition, but also through height and mass. At sites such as Ollantaytambo and Chinchero, churches placed near major Inka shrines were higher than the latter, thus again manifesting the pattern of dominance that we have observed in Europe.

What is more interesting, however, is what we see as the likelihood that the Spanish may also have made use of Inka concepts of centrality as a key tactic in establishing their own dominance over shrines and sites, by disrupting their Inka orientations. While the locations or sizes of major features of the sacred landscape, such as snowcapped peaks, rivers and springs, could hardly be negotiated, the establishment of "the center" could be the subject of political manipulation, and thus reinterpreted, recentered and even decentered. Preliminary fieldwork and library research lead us to think that, in many places, the Spanish acted in ways that decentered sites and redirected attention away from what had been the focal points of the Inka shrines there. Considering the importance of centrality to Inka cosmologies, such a reorientation of sacred spaces would have served as a powerful tool of appropriation. When one compares the Inka centering in Cusco with that accomplished by the Spanish reorientation of the city's spaces, the effect of the strategy is clear: essentially, the Spanish recentered the city on their cathedral instead of the Coricancha.

By paying careful attention to issues of orientation and centrality, then, we can uncover ways in which dominance has been manifested in religious sites, and even in larger regions that include such sites. In the remainder of this chapter, we consider briefly how trajectories of contested dominance of one religious community over others
play out on larger scales, topics to which we devote much more attention in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

**Trajectories of competitive sharing on varying spatial scales**

Since we view single sites as nodes of religioscapes, and the religioscapes as changing through time, we see the spatial patterning and condition of specific religious sites in “units of contemporaneity” – meaning ethnographic presents, archaeological horizons, and other forms of temporal analytical periodization – as reflecting larger patterns of relations between the religious communities whose sites are represented then. We think that changes in distribution will follow the principles laid out above for indicating dominance.

Perhaps the easiest set of transformations to identify are those in which a change in the political dominance of a city leads to changes in the dominance manifested by nodes of the religioscapes within it. To be more concrete, it is well known that Mehmet II had the cathedral of Hagia Sophia converted into a mosque, the Ayasofya Camii, as soon as he conquered Constantinople in 1453, and, as mentioned above, by now there remains only one church from the Byzantine period that was never converted into a mosque, St. Mary of the Mongols in the Fener district. Less often discussed is the trajectory of conversions or destruction of the other Byzantine churches after the conquest. Mehmet II had taken steps to resettle Greeks into the city by guaranteeing them property rights, and only a few of the major churches were converted into other uses. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, almost all of the churches that had been standing in 1453 were either converted or destroyed. The reasons generally given in Turkish sources for such conversions were that the neighborhoods in the city became increasingly Muslim, and the churches provided ready-made buildings that could be transformed into mosques, especially as the percentage of Christians in these areas declined.

From the AT perspective, of course, the conversions changed the competing religioscapes of the city, reducing the Greek Orthodox Christian one dramatically while increasing that of Islam; and Hagia Sophia went from being the first node of an incipient Muslim religioscape to being one of the most prominent nodes of the established one. St. Mary of the Mongols, for its part, went from being a minor node on the complex Greek Orthodox religioscape of 1453, to one of very few nodes of the residual Greek Orthodox religioscape by the late seventeenth century. The transformation of the Ayasofya Camii into the Hagia Sophia Museum in 1935 transformed the building from a node in the Muslim religioscape into a manifestation of Turkish republican secularism, and into a node in what we call a secularscape, as analyzed further in Chapter 7.
Cities contested, divided, reunited and “cleansed”: pathways of violence as indicated by trajectories of intersecting religioscapes

We analyze in detail other cases of transformations at the level of a city in Chapter 5. We want to stress, however, that the AT model does not anticipate that any particular set of changes in dominance, and thus in the structures comprising religioscapes, is permanent. Quite the contrary: we think that the model works very well for understanding religious transience – the changes that occur when dominance in a site or city changes hands, even over a short period.

Vukovar, Croatia provides a fascinating contemporary example of a city with a mixed ethno-religious population that was contested and went through two resulting rounds of destruction and rebuilding of religious sites. By the census taken there in April 1991, two months before the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed it, approximately forty-four percent of the population were Croats and thirty-eight percent Serbs. Even though socialist Yugoslavia had officially discouraged religion for forty-five years, the criterion used to distinguish members of these groups was the religious heritage of their families, despite the fact that this criterion was empirically inadequate to do the job cleanly. As Brita Baillie notes, there were high percentages of intermarriage in Vukovar during the Yugoslav period. However, during the war, most Croats were driven out of the city in 1991 when Serbs created the so-called “Republic of Serbian Krajina” (RSK) in parts of Croatia that had large Serbian populations. Croats returned in large numbers to Vukovar only in 1998, when this region became fully reincorporated into the Republic of Croatia.

Baillie’s analysis of the transformations of Vukovar carefully documents the changes in the urban environment as these changes took place. She notes that about sixty percent of Vukovar’s built environment was completely destroyed in the 1991 Serbian siege and another thirty percent badly damaged, and both Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches were included in the destruction. However, after the Croat population was driven out of the city, “the destruction of [Roman Catholic] churches became a key part of the retrospective ethnic cleansing of the city carried out by Serb paramilitary groups and RSK authorities”. Thereafter, the RSK authorities planned a reconstruction of the city “in the Byzantine style” and “in the spirit of Serbian baroque,” plans that were never executed but which did lead to “the reconstruction of prominent Serb sacred symbols in an otherwise war-devastated area”. The eighteenth-century Orthodox church of St. Nicholas in the center of the city, which had been badly damaged in the war, was repaired externally and a large, distinctively Serbian form of the cross was put on top of its bell tower, making it the most visible monument in the city when the Croats returned.

The return of the city to Croatian rule, and the return of many of the Croats who had been expelled, produced what Baillie calls a “period of structural violence” in which
the authorities reconstructed Catholic religious buildings and obstructed the reconstruction of Serb ones, while also demanding (and obtaining) the removal of the distinctively Serbian cross from St. Nicholas. A new, larger Church of Lady Fatima was built to replace an older one that had been destroyed. Noteworthy from our perspective is that the new church was built on a north–south axis, even though the older one had been oriented east–west, and that it has a “towering nine story, 46.3 m campanile [that] can be read as a one-fingered reminder to Serbia and to the nearby Serb village of Borovo of the supremacy of the returned Catholic community.” Her conclusion is perfectly in keeping with the AT approach, although Baillie did her work without reference to ours: today, “Vukovar’s churches are first of all ethnic symbols; other values which they hold are secondary. Their façades, bell towers and distinct crosses enable the remapping of ethnicity and therefore ownership onto this devastated city”.

**Connections between divided cities and wider religioscapes**

A city may become contested and then divided. In such a case, we would look for the transformation of the spatial distribution of the nodes of each religioscape, and also of efforts within the divisions to reduce the perceptibility of the other group's sites while increasing the perceptibility of their own. At the same time, we would not anticipate the total removal of all of the other group's sites, in part because once patterns of dominance are re-established, peaceful coexistence can resume and is facilitated by permitting the dominated to retain some of their own religious sites. We note the continued use by Greek Orthodox Christians of Byzantine churches in Anatolian towns up until 1923, or the continued functioning of single mosques in Belgrade, Niš, Sofia and other cities in Balkan states that were newly independent of the Ottoman Empire and based their national identity on their Christianity. Sarajevo during the 1992–95 war was both contested and divided. Also interesting is Nicosia after the independence of Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriot population was besieged in “enclaves” from 1963 to 1974 and developed an unrecognized state structure that set the stage for the proclamation and structuring of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus nine years after the Turkish invasion liberated the enclaves and forcibly partitioned the island, a process to which we now turn.

The division of Nicosia shows the importance of considering the wider transformations of the religioscapes of contesting communities. The partitioning of Cyprus led to a pattern of transformation of religious sites throughout the island much like that in other formerly Ottoman territories in which Greeks and Turks had coexisted, with the conversion or destruction of the sites of the other group in the newly cleansed territories of each. In such cases, the religioscapes mark not points of competition between co-resident groups but rather frontiers between the territories of groups that
are no longer co-resident. Even in such a case, however, if the dominance of each community in its own territory is assured, members of the other group may again be permitted to visit and even use sites that they see as belonging to them. In the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Bishop of Morfou of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus is not able to reside in his city; however, since 2004 he has been able to celebrate occasional services at the St. Mamas Church there, nominally a museum but fully equipped for an Orthodox liturgy. Similarly, the Tomb of St. Barnabas near Famagusta is tended by Orthodox believers even though none live in the area and the St. Barnabus monastery is really a museum. Of course, the fact that the shrines in both cases are to saints is useful, as Muslims often seek blessings from saints even though Sunni Islam does not approve of this practice, and visits to both places by AT project researchers in October 2011 showed signs that some visitors were Muslims. We discuss these Cyprus sites more thoroughly in Chapter 8.

These reinstalled elements of the Orthodox Christian religioscape in northern Cyprus may point to the slow re-sharing of space on the island, now that it is clearly partitioned into religio-national community territories. There are also some Muslim structures now being used in the parts of Cyprus governed by the Republic, thus by Greeks, although the Hala Sultan Tekkesi near Larnaka, one of the holiest sites in Islam, was attacked in 2010, and the Köprülü Hacı İbrahim Ağa Camii in Limassol was set on fire in April 2012. In south Nicosia, the Ömeriya mosque is rather like the Selimiye mosque in the northern part of the city, in that both had been built as Roman Catholic churches during Venetian rule and converted by the Ottomans. Ömeriya is mainly used by non-Turkish Muslims in Nicosia, who are not necessarily on the best of terms with the Turkish Cyprus müftüülük, the Sunni authorities. There is also a small Ottoman mosque in the south, called Bayraktar, which is controlled by Turkish Cypriots. While there has been tension involved in all of them, the fact that Orthodox Christian shrines in the north, and Muslim ones in the south, are again being used is an indication that the dominance of the Muslims in the north, and the Christians in the south, is felt to be secure.

The Cypriot example raises another possibility, which is that one group will be eliminated from a territory. Such eliminations via expulsion have been common enough since the start of the twentieth century: for example, from the major Greek population centers in Anatolia and Turkish ones in Greece in 1923; southern Cyprus emptied of Turks and northern ones of Greeks in 1974; a variety of central European cities after 1945 in what had been Punjab pre-Partition, Lahore and Amritsar . . .

This could be an extensive list, but it is a list that is very time-sensitive. A city that is contested at a time when there is partition of a territory on ethno-national grounds will itself be partitioned if it is on the border, de jure or more likely de facto, of the ethno-nationally divided territories: in the 1940s Jerusalem; in the 1970s Nicosia
and Beirut; in the 1990s Sarajevo and Mostar. But the time frame may be short. Since 1967, Jerusalem has remained contested but is no longer divided in terms of political control, since Israel controls it. Since early 1996, Sarajevo is neither contested nor politically divided since it was given entirely to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the expense of the Republika Srpska, a transfer of territory that was anticipated, accurately, as likely to lead to the exodus of Serbs from the city. Cities that de facto remain divided politically as well as ethno-nationally are those that remain on the boundary of the larger ethno-national territorial divisions. We can anticipate that, if the ethno-territorial boundary changes, the division of cities may end, but with an accompanying exodus of the population that would be the minority in the larger polity now incorporating the city, as happened in Sarajevo after 1995. We can also anticipate that cities that come to be on the boundary of an effective ethno-territorial partition may become divided as well. This consideration might become relevant for Skopje in Macedonia; the city is quite ethnically divided and is in a state territory that is also increasingly divided.

In any case, the timing of the “ethnographic present” is crucial. What may be a contested city in one moment and divided in another becomes reunited, but it may do so through the expulsion or departure of one of the groups that had contested it. This returns us to the basic characteristic of the AT model, which is that it envisions punctuated equilibrium – long periods of relatively peaceful interaction between different religious communities as long as political dominance is clear – interspersed with periods of violence when dominance is challenged or overturned. Focusing on the relatively brief periods of violence, it seems to us, obscures our understanding of the larger patterns of dominance that facilitate the long periods of relatively peaceful interaction.

Limitations and opportunities for comparison: the examples of god capture in ancient India and the pre-conquest Americas

One of the limitations of our work is that much of it has focused on the competitive sharing of space between adherents of the three Mediterranean monotheisms – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – or between members of one of these communities and adherents of a polytheistic tradition, such as Hinduism or the native belief systems of the Americas. We are able to analyze some interactions between members of polytheistic communities in Chapters 5 and 6. However, we want to end the present chapter by noting one of the unexpected benefits of our wide-ranging comparisons, which have let us bring together two literatures that are more often completely distinct: one concerning ancient and medieval India, and the other focusing on pre-conquest traditions in the Americas. As discussed in Chapter 6, in both of these
historical settings, a technique of conquest was not to destroy the religious images of an opponent but rather to capture them, and thus gain access to their power. This tactic would make little sense in the Mediterranean monotheisms, where a statue or picture may be an icon but is not itself a manifestation of a god. However, in polytheistic systems in which a statue is not simply an icon of a deity but actually embodies the deity (the Sanskrit murti or Quechua wak’a [Spanish huaca], for example), physical capture of the tangible deity makes sense. The breadth of our comparisons alerted us to the parallels in practices of deity capture in these widely different and historically unconnected settings, which have otherwise not been analyzed together. Thus, while we acknowledge that our model is unlikely to have universal application (what model of social action ever does?), we think it also makes us aware of phenomena that may otherwise pass unnoticed. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Identity, non-state actors and religion in European integration: A theoretical approach
02:: Identity, non-state actors and religion in European integration: A theoretical approach

As it was outlined in Chapter One, the review of the literature dedicated to the theories of European integration leaves the impression of a certain subjectivity and one-sidedness inhabiting the theoretical world. Indeed, representatives of the mainstream theories of European integration were, by and large, paying the lion's share of their attention to material forces as explanatory factors of the integration process. For them, economic and financial aspects of integration heavily outweighed ideational ones. For them, the logic of key and even of less important events on the European continent was dictated by pragmatic interests of the actors involved, rather than anything else. It was the dominant approach for liberal intergovernmentalism and the somewhat prevailing one for neofunctionalism, although the latter was showing more flexibility and openness for new paradigms. Explaining this openness, Thomas Risse underlined that "[t]he two founding fathers of integration theory – Karl W. Deutsch and Ernst B. Haas – both include identity-related concepts in their conceptualizations. While Haas talks about 'shifting loyalties' toward supranational institutions …, Deutsch includes a 'sense of community' in his conceptualization of integration."

However, these gleams of hope shining from one of the theories of European integration did not reveal their full strength until the advent of social constructivism, with its non-economic agenda, which "give priority to cultural over material structures on the grounds that actors act on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them, and meanings are socially constructed". At least partially, this advent was determined by somewhat new developments in the process of integration, which became quite visible with the creation of the European Union at the Treaty of Maastricht. As Lauren M. McLaren explained:

[W]ith moves to establish a common citizenship with an EU passport, the elimination of national currencies, coordination of asylum and immigration policies and the creation of European military force, integration is beginning to appear less and less economic in nature.

(McLaren 2004, p. 896)

Having pointed this out, we need to clarify that labeling these developments as completely new should be treated with caution. Some similar manifestations were seen much earlier – at the birth of European integration and its further maturing. Angelika Scheuer stated quite meaningfully that "one of the central aims of the founding fathers of the European Union was to reduce conflict and overcome hostility between European societies by creating a new, superior ingroup which eventually would lead to the development of European identifications and we-feelings". Robert Schuman was convinced that
This entity (the Steel and Coal Community, Euratom and the Economic Community) cannot and must not remain merely an economic and technical enterprise; it needs a soul, the awareness of its historical moment and of its present and future responsibilities, a political will at the service of a common human idea.

(Schuman in Vanheeswijck 1997, p. 52)

Social constructivism, thinking in a similar way and coming with the identity and non-state actors' agenda, seems to be particularly well suited for the purposes of this research. Accepting the constructivists' approach as timely and appropriate, we need to look at both points of their agenda in more detail. Also, they need to be explained in their application to the process of European integration. This is the first objective of the chapter. The next objective is to identify the role, place and influence of Christian Churches in European integration. Our key argument is that Churches should be regarded as special participants in European integration, embracing some specific and distinct features. We assume that Churches are unique and different from other participants (states and nonstate actors, including the actors of civil society), although we accept that similar features also exist. Indeed, this similarity is confirmed by the fact that the role of Churches can be analysed through the prism of the role of non-state actors. However, this is just one side of our approach. The other side is that Churches also embrace features of identity formers, contributing to the formation and development of both national and European identities. In addition, Churches can act as the providers of ethical or spiritual ethos of integration, which is the reflection of their role as ecclesiastical organisations. Finally, Christian Churches act as institutions existing within specific Church-state regimes.

The abovementioned ideas presuppose the following logic in the structure of the chapter. Indeed, it is first necessary to develop the main aspects of the constructivist vision of European integration. Therefore the chapter initially proceeds with the analysis of the concepts of national and European identities. It specifies how and in what settings these identities are applicable to European integration. It also demonstrates how the process of interaction between European and national identities occurs. Based on the analysis of the role of identities, we further explain how non-state actors are relevant to European integration. These important findings allow us to construct the framework reflecting the place and role of Christian Churches in European integration.

This is the area of enquiry of the second part of the chapter. We identify first the main approaches of contemporary scholars towards the presence of Churches in the European arena. This is followed by a detailed analysis of how Churches can be seen as non-state actors. It is further supplemented with the analysis of how Churches and identity are connected. Finally, the chapter concludes with the explanations of why
Churches can be regarded as unique and special participants in European integration.

Identity and European integration

In this section, we are going to demonstrate that identity is indeed relevant to the process of European integration. In our analysis, we do not accept a purely utilitarian and exclusively pragmatic approach towards integration, which is developed mainly by the liberal intergovernmentalists. Instead, recognising the complex and multidimensional nature of the integration process, we shall draw our attention to identity as its constituent and important part. The starting point will be with the analysis of identity per se.

The concept of identity

The concept of identity has never been in the shadow of academic debates. Perhaps, taking into account the amount of information published about identity, it was even over-theorised. The existing approaches towards identity are diverse and often incompatible with each other. Some scholars go as far as completely rejecting the existence of identity. In this vein, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper argue that “[t]he social sciences and humanities have surrendered to the word ‘identity’”, which is “[t]oo ambiguous, too torn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis”.

This radical approach can hardly be regarded as the prevalent one, but its existence underlines those complexities that surround the discussions on identity. Those scholars who do not share the above-mentioned viewpoint take a different focus in their discussions. Of course, if you accept the concept of identity, the next logical step is to consider such issues as the formation of identity and the factors which contribute to this formation. Zdzislaw Mach denotes the construction of identity as a “process of building symbolic models which give meaning to the world, offer interpretation of experience, and enable people to understand the reality of life in its present form, in the past as well as in the future”. In our approach, we also do not intend to reject identity altogether, but rather aim at confirming its applicability to European integration.

In our view, the application of identity to the analysis of European integration can be developed within the following framework. Since the European Union is the association of nation-states, then the concept of national identity needs to be taken into consideration. Since the EU is often referred to as an “emerging polity”, then the concept of European identity comes to the agenda. This also brings to the surface a problem of the interaction between national and European identities. These are the
main issues requiring further attention. The national identity will be the first aspect of our analysis.

**The national identity**

The attempts to theorise national identity are numerous, diverse and, at times, contradictory. Therefore we shall endeavour to draw attention to the key issues, derived from the writings of scholars, describing identity. The main points that need to be highlighted are as follows. David Miller points out five main features characterising national identity. First, he claims that a person identifying himself or herself as belonging to a particular nation implies that those identified as co-nationals share his or her beliefs and reciprocate his or her commitments. Second, Miller emphasises that national identity “embodies historical continuity”. “The third distinguishing aspect of national identity is that it is an active identity. Nations are communities that do things together, take decisions, achieve results and so forth.” Fourth, national identity “connects a group of people to a particular geographical place”. Finally, Miller writes, “a national identity requires that people who share it should have something in common, a set of characteristics that in the past was often referred to as a ‘national character’, but which I prefer to describe as a common public culture.” And in his definition of the common public culture, Miller includes political principles as well as “[s]ocial norms such as honesty in filling in your tax return”. In addition to this, as Miller emphasises, identity “[m]ay also embrace certain cultural ideals, for instance religious beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of the national language”.

Other scholars were also supportive of the inclusion of culture and religion in the concept of national identity. Patrick Mitchel claims that national identity “also encompasses beliefs about the nation, its origins and future destiny and relationship with other nations. For this reason it is made ‘visible’ through study of general ‘imagined’ characteristics of the nation; its myths, culture, territorial associations, symbols, rituals, and place in the world of nations”. Carina Korostelina argues, “National identity consists of numerous dimensions and parameters: political; territorial; ecological; ethnic; social; religious; senses of such values as ‘survival’, ‘prosperity’, ‘equality’, ‘freedom’, ‘development’ and justice; and understanding of national interests, priorities and goals”. John Biles and Paul Spoonley, in their introductory article of the special issue of *National Identities*, claim, “Religion, age and gender reoccur throughout as three identity markers that contest the formation and nature of national identities”. Ailsa Henderson and Nicola McEwen, discussing the role of values in the construction and development of national identity, argue, “The discourse of shared values may not, in itself, create a national identity. To uncover the factors underpinning identity formation, one would have to consider the complex interplay of economic, cultural and political...
developments within each case. However, a discourse of shared values may play a role in maintaining and shaping national identity. Shared values can give meaning to the collective dimension of national identity”.

Not only is some meaning added to identity by values. On the top of this, values play a role in the process of identity formation. Of course, the formation of national identity is a multifold process, encompassing certain historical circumstances, particularities of ethnic relations, predominant myths of a given nation and even deliberate actions of authorities. But these complexities do not make values invisible. On the contrary, they add to the process of identity formation some distinct features. David Miller explains:

[W]e always begin from values that have been inculcated in us by the communities and institutions to which we belong; family, school, church, and so forth. As we come to reflect on these values, we find we can no longer adhere to some, we find tensions and contradictions between others, and so forth. Finally, we reach a point where we have balanced the competing demands upon us and established our own scale of priorities between the different values. At that point we have worked out our own distinct identity.

(Miller 1997, pp. 44–45)

However, recognising the fact that religion and values are among the parameters of national identity (and even among the contributors to the process of identity formation), we cannot claim that they are the key ones. The opposite cannot be stated either. Rather, we can only discuss their possible weight, which is dependent on historical developments and the role of religious ideas in society. What is more important is the possibility that this weight might be changeable, with the share of parameters fluctuating from one side to another. Consequently, Churches may be interested in a further increasing of the scope of the religious parameter of national identity. Mach points out that “[r]eligious organizations in complex societies are among the most active constructors of worldviews, and compete for the leading roles as providers of meanings and orientation for society”. Although their concrete contribution often depends on the level of influence of Churches in society, the existence of this contribution implies a special role for the Churches – the role of identity formers.

**The European identity**

The concept of European identity is not without its own difficulties. One of the problems is that it is regarded as a somewhat “artificial” structure, the creation of which was encouraged by the European institutions for purely pragmatic reasons. Carey, for instance, argues, “There are normative suggestions that the creation of a European
identity will lead to increased public support for integration”. On the surface, such an approach looks very plausible, especially if we take into account some EU documents related to the issue of identity. Indeed, Schlesinger and Foret, quoting Strath, point to the “[m]obilization by the EU institutions of the concept of a European identity as a political resource”, which “dates back to the 1970s”. In December 1973, ministers of foreign affairs of the nine EC member states issued the “Document on the European Identity”. Although its name contained the word identity, in fact the “[u]nderstanding of the ‘European identity’ is not really set out in the document itself, but it is linked to the dynamic of the European integration process and is oriented towards the goal of a European ‘Union’ which at that time still lay in the distant future”.

The mentioning of European identity appears in other official publications issued later. For example, in the 1984 Green Paper of the European Commission “Television without Frontiers” it was emphasised that “European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity”. In the White Paper on European Governance, the reinforcement of “European identity and the importance of shared values within the Union” was highlighted. Obviously, one cannot deny the interest and even contribution of the EU institutions to the formation of European identity. On the other hand, it would be an exaggeration to claim that this identity is primarily created by the EU institutions. In fact, it is more logical to see the appearance of European identity more as a natural process, partly provoked by historical developments. The enlargements of 2004 and 2007, due to which the EU gained twelve new member states (mainly of the former Communist bloc), can be regarded as important events in that respect. Indeed, after these twelve countries, with their diverse history, culture and religion, entered the Union, “[a] discourse about identity developed in the European Union and in relation to the European Union; since then, there is an observable dynamic in this discourse which has led more and more to a semantic identification of ‘Europe’ with the European Union”.

Nevertheless, the acceptance of the European identity as a unified and homogenous concept is probably a remote perspective, especially due to the controversies surrounding its origin and development. In that respect, it looks logical that Bruter (quoted in Caporaso and Kim) makes the distinction between a civic component of European identity (which refers to the EU) and a cultural (which refers to Europe as a whole). The cultural component puts on the agenda the problem of a proper definition of the borders of Europe, of explaining if these borders are geographical or cultural. Depending on how this question is answered, we can make further (and more detailed) development of the concept of a cultural component, which, under certain conditions, might even coincide with the civic one. Franz Mayer and Jan Palmowski underline:
Since some identities are given, it is not difficult to argue that a European identity exists by virtue of Europe's geographical and historical position alone (Wintle 2000). Every individual and collective set of identities is embedded in this European context. It is determined through an ensemble of cultural, religious, economic and ideological factors. 

(Mayer and Palmowski 2004, p. 579)

Mayer and Palmowski also insist on the absence of European historical identity. They argue that European institutions created a distinctive profile and "serve as a common reference point for the peoples of the EU". Moreover, "European institutions could themselves become carriers of a European historical myth" and they "can even be seen as the decisive expressions of a 'new' European post 1945 identity". Therefore it is possible to claim that the institutions shaped their own identities, making them "distinct from other, national or cultural identities".

By and large, even nowadays the process of formation of European identity remains in the shadow of controversies. This is mainly the reflection of a slightly ambiguous position of European identity, which is often seen as desirable, just because it is needed for the further success of the European integration process. It seems that the EU institutions hold their own, specific interests in the sphere of identity formation – the interests which presuppose fostering of the appearance of common identity. However, even if we accept that the nature of European identity is vague and the genuine character of its formation is doubtful, this does not exclude completely the existence of a certain level of influence of European identity within the EU. Moreover, the recognition of the specific interests of the EU institutions in the formation of European identity combined with some traditional parameters of identity formation (language, ethnicity, culture, religion, etc.) make its presence more visible and its influence stronger. Therefore a complete rejection of European identity is now an obsolete concept.

**European versus national identity**

Due to the developments of the integration process, one can observe the increasing interaction of European and national identities. This is a natural process, a corollary of increased integration. The outcome of this interaction is a matter of debate, and it is discussed by scholars and practitioners in the conflicting directions of their views. On the one hand, European identity is seen as a kind of threat to national identities, because the formation of homogenous European identity is reached by means of convergence of national identities. McLaren explains that "[i]ntegration seems to pose a threat to national identity by seeking to reduce nationalist sentiment". This sets up one pole in the range of approaches. On the other hand, there is a viewpoint that the
EU does not destroy but rather encourages diversity of national identities. Cram believes that "European integration facilitates the flourishing of diverse national identities rather than convergence around a single homogenous European Union identity". As she also claims, for the understanding of the process of European Union identity formation, as well as of the nature and complex arrangements of the relationship between European Union identity and the range of national and sub-national identities, "it is important to recognise not only the importance of the context within which identity is formed but also the contingent nature of identity as a process". It is worth quoting Cram at length:

European integration need not lead to a convergence of national identities or to the development of a homogenous European Union identity which challenges or competes with existing national loyalties. This does not mean that European Union identity may never threaten existing identities or will always facilitate the articulation of particular territorial identities, but simply that this need not be, and is not always, the case. European integration has fed into domestic discourses on territorial identity in different contexts in a number of very different ways that are often overlooked by scholars focusing only on national-state identities versus a "European Union" identity.

(Cram 2009a, pp. 114–115)

In addition to that, we can point to the third approach, which can be located somewhere between the two mentioned. Developed by Thomas Risse, it endeavours to demonstrate the possibility of peaceful coexistence of European and national identities – in a specific manner, different from Cram's approach. This, according to Risse, happens in the following way:

First, identities can be nested, conceived of as concentric circles or Russian Matrushka dolls, one inside the next. . . . This model suggests some hierarchy between people's sense of belonging and loyalties.

Second, identities can be crosscutting. In this configuration, some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group. One can feel a strong gender identity and a strong European identity.

A third way of conceptualizing the relationship between European and other identities which people might hold, could be called the "marble cake" model . . . [t]he "marble cake" model of multiple identities focuses attention on the way in which national political and cultural discourses including constructions of historical memory relate Europe and the nation-state to each other.

(Risse 2003, pp. 490–491, emphasis in the original)

The three main approaches, explained in the writings of Cram and Risse, which can be
labeled as negative, positive and neutral, reflect most possible outcomes of the interaction between European and national identities. The acceptance of one of these outcomes brings certain political and ideological implications, playing in favour of either the opponents or proponents of European integration (since they may take different stances on identity). Also, the ongoing process of interaction between identities involves quite a broad spectrum of participants, which include European institutions, national governments and European and national non-state actors. Numerous actors of civil society appear to be the contributors to the identity formation. This contribution exists in addition to their specific involvement in the integration process. And the latter is the issue of concern for the next part of the chapter.

**Non-state actors and European integration**

As it was mentioned earlier, non-state actors are regarded as, at least, relevant contributors to the European integration process. This fact is admitted by the representatives of both neofunctionalism and social constructivism. Liberal governmentalists take a different perspective, belittling the role of non-state actors and prioritising the role of governments, which are allegedly driven by economic factors only.

When speaking about non-state actors, one normally refers to private firms, political interest groups, religious interest groups and various nongovernmental organisations. This diversity implies that non-state actors usually pursue quite different goals – from economic and financial to moral and ideological – and the goals are usually determined by the nature of the actors. Sophie Huber and Katrin Milzow, explaining why it is important to study the role of non-state actors in European integration, say that “[e]xploring the contributions of non-state actors at various steps of the European integration process may unveil ideological debates behind policy progresses and setbacks” and “[b]esides bridging the gap between the history of the idea of Europe and the institutional history of the process of European integration, the consideration of non-state actors again underlines the contingency of the development of European integration.” In addition to that, “[t]he study of trade-unions, political parties, interest groups, or intellectuals among others, encourages the importation of conceptual tools such as identities, socialisation, networks or the public sphere from other disciplines”.

Maria Cowles, attempting to identify the place of non-state actors within the main theories, makes the following assumptions. Pointing out that liberal intergovernmentalism “[a]rgues that domestic actors, including non-state actors, inform the preferences of member states”, she remains critical towards this approach, stating, “Firms themselves may be part of the history-making phases of EU integration.”
Moreover, “[c]onsumer groups, environmental organizations, multinational firms, and transnational advocacy groups can participate simultaneously in international and domestic politics.” Cowles is adamant to argue that the influence of non-state actors is more substantial than liberal intergovernmentalists assume, because these actors increasingly “set agendas, participate in negotiations, implement and/or have the authority to make policy in the first place”. Speaking about the place of non-state actors within institutionalism, Cowles emphasises that “[n]on-state actors, together with institutions, can influence the calculus of principals to delegate authority, to carry out ‘incomplete contracting’, and to serve as independent regulators.” Also, non-state actors “participate in the shaping of policy proposals and agendas prior to, during, or even after the delegation of authority has been conferred”. Then, Cowles argues that “[n]on-state actors increasingly assume the traditional state or international institution responsibility of monitoring and enforcing international agreements.” One more area for attention is standards-setting, where “[p]rivate actors play an increasingly important role.” Cowles criticises constructivists for “the ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ dichotomy”, when “[o]ne group (i.e. NGOs and transnational societal groups) have values and moral authority, whereas another group (namely firms) do not”.

Dirk Jarré explains the increasing influence of non-state actors by the fact that “[g]overnment action has reached, in many respects, the limits of its possibilities and … new actors have entered the scene of global and regional developments”. As he also argues, “the complexities and the technicality of the issues” in the EU require supranational institutions to interact not only with the governments, but also with “market forces or civil society organisations”. In addition, the integration, “like in the European Union, require[s] a high degree of deliberative supra-nationalism and regulations through negotiations between all actors – state, market, and civil society”. Jarré believes that in a system like the EU (which is a complex, multi-layer one) NGOs became visible and heard “[b]ecause they have taken up the ‘voice function’ and denounced or highlighted governance deficits”. This leads to the recognition of the fact that NGOs “have gained tremendously in political and strategic importance when they have made the clear shift from pure project work to systematic advocacy and interfered strongly in politics and relevant decision-making processes”.

Robert Blood, analysing NGOs as “political corporations”, points to their increasing political importance. He in particular states that NGOs, like private corporations, “are independent of the state, autocratically run, and organised to achieve clear objectives – in the case of corporations, profit, in the case of NGOs, political impact”. Holly Jarman, quoting Brian Hocking, discusses why the European Commission has been engaged in the dialogue with the non-state actors. The suggested reason for this is that “[l]acking an electoral mandate, the Commission aims to increase its legitimacy as a policymaker by involving outside groups in the decision-making
process." Also, the officials may want to use "[t]he expert knowledge that groups can provide". This is also confirmed by Rosenow, who claims, "The European Commission heightens its legitimacy through the support and expert knowledge of the NGOs, and in turn it financially supports some of the actors, includes them in the consultation process". He assumes, at the same time, that "[t]he work of the NGOs has to be seen with regard to their own interests, which are: to heighten their legitimacy, their financial security and their influence in Brussels". Describing the role of NGOs in the sphere of trade policy, Jarman finds that "NGOs have had some success" in influencing it. Thus, their role is recognised not only as that of speakers, but also as that of policy-makers, albeit on a limited scale. These limitations should not come as a surprise: indeed, it will be difficult to assign to non-state actors (NSAs) a role equivalent to that of the national governments. However, nobody claims that NSAs aim at complete replacement of ministries and councils of ministers. Such an objective will even be contradictory to the very nature of NSAs, because, if this happens, they will turn into state or state-like actors.

There is another issue that needs to be mentioned here. Non-state actors can use their respective governments in order to promote their own interests on the European level. Indeed, the ability to pressure, lobby or persuade the national government can effectively be turned towards a convenient decision (or blocking of an inconvenient decision) on the supranational level. However, this method becomes increasingly difficult with the growing number of the EU member states and the desire of national non-state actors to promote their interests via their own authorities. As a result, non-state actors turn to the direct lobbying of the EU institutions, especially the European Commission and the European Parliament. Partially such a development became possible due to the fact that these institutions became more open to non-state actors. Also, the NSAs gained new experience and became better organised, often uniting in policy coalitions with the purpose of achieving some particular goals. Of course, the direct pressure on European institutions does not always work; therefore, non-state actors should be able to conduct some "behind the scene" negotiations, with the ability to persuade civil servants or decision-makers as to the usefulness of their proposals.

Again, we do not claim that non-state actors have assumed the role of national governments. However, their visibility and influential presence is an obvious and undeniable fact. The admission of this fact makes the arena of European integration similar to a battlefield, where different forces fight in order to achieve what they see as their victory. In military battlefields a decisive victory of one side often means a tragedy for another. In the EU battlefield decisive victories are rare and not preferred. Rather, the preference is given to the soft victories, in order not to undermine the credibility of the other side. Consequently, even if some non-state actors lose the battle, they are not
mortal wounds. More often than not their wounds can be healed and, after gaining of new "weapons" and valuable experience, they return to the European battlefields, struggling for what they see as good for European people, themselves or the Union at large. This struggle continues, and the growing cultural, religious and political diversity of the EU makes it even more sophisticated, fierce and unpredictable. The European agenda is now not possible without the presence of NSAs, which is as non-state actors natural as the fact that it was not imaginable without the national governments a few decades ago.

**Churches and European integration**

The recognition of the fact that identity and non-state actors are relevant contributors to the integration process, as well as a more detailed explanation of their contribution, forms the foundation for the further development of the main arguments of this chapter. Indeed, we can now construct the framework reflecting the place and the role of Churches in European integration. This framework is supposed to reflect the understanding that Churches can be regarded as special participants of the process of European integration, embracing unique and distinct features. In addition, it may allow us to make some suggestions about the degree of influence of the Churches at the EU level.

The unique role of the Churches can be explained by the following. First, Christian Churches made an outstanding contribution at the beginning of European integration. According to Daniel Philpott and Timothy Samuel Shah, “[t]he Catholic Church actively inspired, promoted, and shaped European integration”, while Protestant Churches were involved through the Ecumenical Commission on European Cooperation, formed in 1950. Although the Churches’ role became less visible at the later stage, they definitely increased their presence after the Treaty of Maastricht, as seen in the increasing number of the Churches’ representations in Brussels. Schlesinger and Foret claim that “Christianity and the idea of Europe have long been connected”. Even now, at least for the Eastern and Central European countries, European unification is more than just a political or economic project; it is also an idea with values, “[a]n idea which is inseparably linked to the religious-spiritual element”.

Second, Christian Churches embrace the features of the identity formers and non-state actors (we identified earlier that both identity and non-state actors are relevant to the integration process). At the same time, Churches can hardly be fully equalised with the regular interest groups, lobby groups, or NGOs. Indeed, some specific features make them different. Churches can include substantial portions of the population, especially in countries with a high degree of religiosity, where Churches represent the majority of people. Churches act within the framework of the specific
Church-state relations – a phenomenon which is not known to other non-state actors or actors of civil society. Finally, Churches are normally interested in broader questions, often involving very different areas.

In this section, we shall develop the above-mentioned aspects in more detail. Our starting point will be the analysis of the existing scholarship on the role of Churches in European integration. We shall examine in more detail how scholars conceptualise the Churches’ role in European integration and their presence at the EU level. This will allow us to see the prevalent trends.

Although the number of publications on the role of Churches in European integration is growing, the pattern of agreement among scholars in this field is hardly identifiable. We can just encounter some contradictory approaches, forming the poles of perspectives. They reflect both the limited and increasing roles assigned to Churches, and the legalistic approach.

The limited role of Churches

Christian Churches (or religion in general) are at times assigned a rather limited role, with the emphasis that the impact of religion in Europe “does not change the usual rules of the game”. Even if the increase of the Churches’ level of influence is noticed, this mainly happens, it is argued, due to the EU initiatives. The Union just looks for new methods and ways for legitimisation, which include the attempts to put citizens in the centre of the decision-making process and to improve the dialogue with civil society, including Churches. François Forêt assumes that “[t]he European Commission proposes a strictly consultative role for Churches”, which allegedly does not equip them with a realistic chance to influence decisionmaking. Consequently, a “major impact from Churches on European policies and politics” is scarcely confirmed, in spite of the fact that “religious bodies have increased their presence in the supranational arena”, mainly due to “interest representation” and “political mobilisation” in the European Parliament. Nevertheless, Forêt admits that religion was used to oppose some aspects of European policy which Churches found unacceptable (for example, homosexual marriages).

Overall, Forêt does not see anything special in the relations of European institutions with the Churches, since the former “follow the path of existing Brussels policies and politics”.

Forêt’s perspective is partly echoed by Martin Steven, who insists that the EU is “[a]n inherently secular body with no mention of Christianity in any of its treaties or directives”. Still, the integration process does not pass by Churches; it makes them more vulnerable to supranational institutions (via the increase of the latter’s possibilities to interfere in the Churches’ activities at the national level). European legislation often concerns Churches, and even if it refers to Churches indirectly (or accidentally), its influence is not necessarily marginal. Unlike Forêt, Steven does not substantially
constrain the role of Churches. He admits that they act, first, within some dimensions of the Church-state relations, exercising their influence on the voting behaviour and European values, and, secondly, as “[p]olitical interest groups, lobbying decision-makers on aspects of social policymaking which concern them”. While pointing out that no meaningful comparison can be drawn between religious lobbies in Europe and the USA, Steven does not argue that Churches “[a]re any less politically influential as a result of EU integration”. The problem lies in the assessment criteria, since it is very difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate properly the effectiveness of interest groups.

A legalistic perspective

Benoit Challand approaches the Churches-EU theme with more legalistic criteria, trying to identify the presence of religion in the EU legislation. The analysis of nine fundamental treaties of the European Communities and the European Union leads him to conclusion that “[t]he question of religion is not a central topic at all in legal terms for Europe itself”. In these documents the theme of religion appears only fifteen times (in 755 pages). In almost all cases (fourteen) it refers to the text of the European Constitution, including the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which mentions religious freedom and non-discrimination on the basis of religion. This allows Challand to argue that “[t]he collocation of Europe and religion is only a very recent construction”, and the increasing interest of the EU towards religion can be ascribed to pragmatic reasons, where the desire to separate itself from Islamic neighbours (i.e. Turkey) plays a prominent role. The opinion of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, that Europe will lose its soul if it accepts a Muslim country, is a testimony to that.

However, the presence of religion in EU legislation does not need to always come in obvious and explicit forms. Keith Jenkins specifies that EU secondary legislation “directly refers to and impacts on religion in many areas of law, including non-discrimination, labour law, data protection, culture, media law, animal welfare, cooperation, finances, customs, and economic law”. For example, issues relating to the economic competence of the Union acquire a religious dimension when they refer to the export of cultural goods, the statistics on income and living conditions in different institutions including monasteries, and so forth. Norman Doe even develops the concept of a “European ‘common law’ on religion”, which includes eight fundamental principles: value of religion, subsidiarity in matters of religion, the principle of cooperation (dialogue with religion), religious freedom, the autonomy of religious associations, religious equality (nondiscrimination), the principle of special protection of religion and the principle of religious privilege. Religious organisations are also exempt from some regulations of the non-discrimination directive, since they are allowed to introduce requirements for religion or beliefs of prospective employees. Doe makes the conclusion that:
An examination of its laws and other regulatory instruments reveals the posture of the EU in terms of its own church-Union relations. The details of its laws indicate that the Union shares characteristics most in common with the so-called cooperationist model of church-state relations, though the language of separation is also employed; however, the Union is not a state-church system.

(Doe 2009, p. 157)

Ronan McCrea suggests that the European Union limits the role of religion in important aspects of the political and law-making area in order to make sure that the member states "uphold the principles of the autonomy of the public sphere from the religious domination" and the "respect for individual autonomy ... in the private sphere". He, however, admits that the Union "permits religion to exercise influence over law as an element of civil society and, perhaps more importantly, as an element of a public morality", although on the condition that "individual autonomy is respected", and morality is promoted more out of respect for "national cultural autonomy" rather than anything else.

An increasing role

Contrary to the negative approaches, Lucian Leustean observes the increase of the level of importance of religious issues in the EU, even though the "[c]ontacts between European institutions and religious communities have officially been made relatively late in the life of the European Community". The turning point appeared at the Treaty of Maastricht, with the prominent role of the Jacques Delors initiative on the cooperation between Churches and the EU, known as the "Soul for Europe project" (see Silvestri 2009 for more detail). At present, according to Leustean, the Commission is open for dialogue with the religious communities, with the likelihood that the benefits from this dialogue will be mutual:

On the one hand, religious communities are gaining legitimacy and are becoming more assertive in influencing the agenda of European institutions, particularly on transnational issues. On the other hand, religious communities encourage the European Union to become a world player, rather than to remain a regional one.

(Leustean 2009, p. 174)

Leustean, in fact, offers some very interesting explanations of why Churches (most of all, Protestant) refrained from active participation in European integration before the late 1980s. This was related to the Cold War tensions and divisions between East and West, which inevitably involved Christian Churches. According to Leustean, "Any official association with a regional political entity in the West seemed to jeopardise the very
nature and constitution of the WCC [World Council of Churches] and, more broadly, of the ecumenical movement’. He also points out that the role of Churches was more visible at the time of the dominance of the neofunctionalist model of integration (the 1950s and 1960s), but later on the religious communities became more associated with the interests of nation-states, when the intergovernmentalist model of integration took an upper hand. In fact, Leustean explains that after the Treaty of Maastricht "a significant number of ecumenical contacts have contributed to drawing Europe together", which included the Porvoo Declaration (1993, between Anglican Churches and the Nordic and Baltic Lutheran Churches), the Leuenberg Church Fellowship (1995), issuing of the Charta Ecumenica in 2001 by the CEC and COMECE, as well as the increase of the dialogue between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches.

Thus, there are three main sets of ideas, emanating from various approaches of scholars who analyse the role of Churches in European integration. First, the presence of religion is confirmed by EU legislation. Secondly, Churches exercise their influence in different formats, including the ones of the interest groups and lobbyists. Finally, the role of Churches becomes more visible and important after the Treaty of Maastricht, and the cooperation between Churches and EU institutions is beneficial to both sides. These ideas, reflecting certain aspects of the Churches’ activities, do not provide a comprehensive vision of the Churches’ involvement in European integration. In our view, they also do not fully reflect the Churches’ character. Therefore we need to identify their unique, special and multifold role in the process of European integration, which mirrors the nature and specific features of Christian Churches. This brings the issue of Churches as non-state actors as the first point in our agenda.

Churches as non-state actors

There is adequate literature in which Churches are studied as non-state actors in different formats – interest groups, lobby groups, pressure groups, NGOs and so forth. Noting that in different cases various features of Churches are revealed, we need to see how these specific features are uncovered in the course of European integration. This poses a key question: to what extent religion is relevant to European society. Indeed, if its role has largely diminished, then the role of Churches will be reduced to the minimum. On the other hand, the greater role of religion presupposes the higher importance of Churches.

Religion in politics and society

We need to sketch first how religion can in principle be incorporated in politics and society. In our context we mean European society, and, speaking about religion, we
denote Christianity, since Christians are in the overwhelming majority in the EU. Normally, we encounter the two opposite approaches, with religion being deliberately ignored (suppressed) or adequately recognised (promoted).

Indeed, in liberal secular circles the need for the strict separation of religion and politics is normally postulated. The “privatisation of religion” is viewed as one of the “central functional conditions for liberal democracy”. Hilarion Alfeyev even writes about the desire of “modern humanism” to put religion in a ghetto, to exclude it from society and to minimise its influence on the people, especially on the youth. Thorleif Pettersson points out that a “privatised religion” is excluded from public and political issues:

Some assume that the differentiation between religious and secular institutions has led to a privatized religion which has remained relevant to personal and private matters. Religion is assumed to have been transformed and to have become increasingly assigned to the home – family life, love, and intimacy – and to have become a matter of individual and private taste (see e.g. Turner 1991, 2000). Such a privatized religion does not concern itself with public and political matters.

(Pettersson 2006, p. 233)

On the other hand, the privatisation of religion is viewed as a negative phenomenon which is not compatible with the principles of democratic state. Michael Minkenberg argues that “[t]he democratic state must guarantee the free exercise of religion in the private realm and the opportunities for religious communities to promote their values in public. From this follows that all religious communities must have the right to form political parties…. It also follows that this principle is compatible with all kinds of institutional Church-state relationship”. We could, in principle, expect the dominance of the first approach in highly secularised societies, where Churches are indeed put under pressure to leave the political/public space. This is applicable to some EU member states, but cannot be extended to the whole EU. We assume that the secularisation trend in the Union is not as great as to allow the dominance of anti-religious ideologies and the pushing of Churches to the private area.

**Secularisation in the EU**

It is not uncommon to hear that Europe is going through a process of rapid secularisation. According to Loek Halman and Veerle Draulans, “The sharply declining levels of Church attendance in Europe are often regarded as evidence that this part of the world is being secularized”. Franz Hollinger, Max Haller and Adriana Valle-Hollinger argue, “In Europe religious institutions have lost much of their former influence and
religious practice and belief have both declined in the course of the twentieth century. David Voas claims that religion in Europe is in decline, with the appearing of the phenomenon of “fuzzy fidelity”, in which people can keep loyalty to tradition without being regular church-goers.

Interestingly, the “death of religion” was a sort of “conventional wisdom” of social sciences in most of the twentieth century. Hans Knippenberg writes about “a dramatic decline of religiosity” in all aspects, including belief, Church membership and Church attendance, with the traditional Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches as the main victims. Europe has been regarded as a model of the secularisation process, which implies that the presence of religion diminishes in everyday life and the sacred “eventually becomes socially and politically marginal”. Although the secularisation hypothesis remains popular, we do not see substantial evidence that Europe (or the EU) is turning into a kind of atheistic superstate. In fact, the diversity of the EU member states and the complexity of the process of secularisation does not seem to indicate any trend applicable to the EU at large. Halman and Draulans agree that “[s]ecularization may well be a European phenomenon, but this does not imply that Europe is homogeneously secular”. Indeed, the countries of Western Europe diverge considerably in religious matters, with religious participation higher in the southern Catholic parts and lower in northern Protestant. Jonathan Fox mentions two different concepts of secularisation (when people become less religious, and when the influence of religion declines due to the moving of religion from the public to the private domain), but he admits that there is no agreement that this process is happening. We can hardly find a European society where Christianity has become a purely private matter and Churches are completely deprived of any voice or have totally lost the ability to exert an influence. Even in France, traditionally regarded as one of the most secularised countries in the EU, political leaders have begun to speak openly about the increasing importance of religion. In spite of some secularisation developments, we cannot claim that religion has been banished from the political sphere. Moreover, even if religion moves to the private sphere, “[i]t continues to influence policy because many modern ideologies that influence policymaking have religious origins…. Such influence is often indirect but nonetheless important”. Fox reminds us that religion influences people’s views, “their perception of events and their actions”, including, of course, the views of the policy-makers.

Rodney Stark assumes that the secularisation doctrine is not applicable to the EU as a whole, especially if it refers to the level of religiosity. According to him, “There has been no demonstrable long-term decline in European religious participation”. Participation has changed from time to time, but it was low in western and northern parts of Europe many centuries before the twenty-first century. With the undermining of the secularisation doctrine, there is no reason to expect that Churches will be hidden
in a ghetto or locked into a “private space”. Even in more secularised societies Churches can find their way to exert an influence and the chance not to be fully excluded from the public space. Jurgen Habermas offers the following explanation:

I am thinking here of the fact that Churches and religious organisations are increasingly assuming the role of “communities of interpretation” in the public arena of secular societies. They can attain influence on public opinion and will formation by making relevant contributions to key issues, irrespective of whether their arguments are convincing or objectionable…. Be it the dispute over the legalization of abortion or voluntary euthanasia, on the bioethical issues of reproductive medicine, questions of animal protection or climate change – on these and similar questions the divisive premises are so opaque that it is by no means settled from the outset which party can draw on the more convincing moral intuitions.

(Habermas 2008, p. 20)

Therefore, nothing prevents us from discussing in more detail how Churches are incorporated in EU politics as non-state actors. This is especially meaningful because religious actors are sometimes regarded, together with transnational NGOs and business corporations, as “[o]ne of the most important players”.

**The role of Churches as non-state actors**

First, we need to mention that all three confessions (Catholic and Orthodox more, Protestant less) are well represented at the EU level. The Christian organisations in Brussels play a twofold role: they inform their leaders about the main developments in the EU, and try to influence the decision-making process. In the latter case, they seem to be operating like other organisations of civil society, but this similarity is not as great as one might suppose. One of the differences, highlighted by Thomas Jansen, is related to the scope of the areas of work. On the one hand, the organisations, which represent economic, social and cultural sectors, are more worried about specific EU policies within the competence of one of the Directorates- General. On the other hand, the concerns of Churches and religious communities “are more general and based on the ethical and moral aspects of European unification and European policy”, and therefore their dialogue with the European Commission is aimed more at the meaning, spiritual direction and ethical dimension of European integration and related policies. Consequently, the European Commission values Churches as, in the first instance, those partners which may assist “[w]hen it comes to weighing up the ethical dimension of the process of European unification and giving it meaning and identity”.

Having said that, we do not need to assume that the role of Churches is limited
to some broad and ethically based issues. At times Churches need to be more specific and even to defend their interests or the interests originating from their moral and social doctrines (especially if the EU elaborates legislation related to the scope of these doctrines). According to Jenkins, this requires Churches “to behave much more like the traditional industrial lobby groups which surround the European Institutions, becoming closely involved with the detail of the legislation rather than acting as advocates for broad general principles”. Therefore Churches need to establish contacts with the MEPs and relevant divisions of the European Commission, and to organise lobbying of their governments. They need sometimes to persuade other actors that the decisions supported by Churches reflect some general concerns, but not the Churches’ interests only.

The methods that may be in use by Churches are similar to the regular methods of non-state actors. First, this can be direct or indirect lobbying, used with the help of different organisations/individuals. The explanations of John Warhurst, albeit designed for the case of the Roman Catholic Church in Australia, can be applied to Europe as well. Warhurst points to what he calls the “extended Catholic lobby”, which “might include various Catholic, quasi-Catholic and semi-Catholic organisations such as the St Vincent de Paul Society, the National Civic Council, the Right to Life Association and Opus Dei, to name just a few”. Warhurst even names those whom he regards as “working within the lobby”. He states that “[s]ome are political lobbyists narrowly defined, but most are Church bureaucrats, program managers or advocates in society at large, for Church causes. This may involve working with the media and with social movements and networks rather than political institutions as such”. The second method includes political mobilisation (especially among parishioners) and more active influence on the formation of public opinion. Robyn Driskell, Elizabeth Embry and Larry Lyon indicate that “[c]lergy and religious leaders can send messages politically mobilizing Church members and organizational skills learned in the Church can extend to subsequent political participation”. David Martin outlines three ways that Churches become actors in the public sphere: mobilising political parties, acting as pressure groups and using their resources in order to contribute to the solving of social problems.

Mobilisation is a particularly strong method in countries where the trust in the Church is significant, and where either the masses can be mobilised easily or influential political groups are willing to act in accordance with the Church recommendations or requests. The mobilisation of the masses is useful to form strong public opinion with which the government, claiming to be democratic, cannot deal formally. Surely, public opinion is a changeable thing, as especially demonstrated in the referenda on important EU issues, but even these changeable instruments can be efficient in forcing governments to make decisions which are not possible otherwise. As
Zsolt Enyedi sums up:

In spite of the high risks involved, Churches often engage in political and partisan struggles. One likely explanation, often overlooked by rational choice approaches, is that Churches have other goals than that of preserving their "market position" or increasing their "market share". Often these other goals are strictly political. Clergymen are also political beings, with secular political preferences. In the democratic era, the ability of Churches to put pressure on the state depends to a large extent on how skilled they are in mobilising public opinion.

(Enyedi 2003, p. 228)

Christof Mandry explains that the Churches (or, better to say, the governing bodies of the Churches) possess adequate resources to operate and to shape public political debate. "The decisive question, however, is how far they succeed in activating allies and influencing neutral third persons," which, in its turn, brings to the surface the mobilising potential of the religious theme itself, that is the reflection on the relationship between (political) identity and religion. One can point out that "organised Christianity" has indeed established itself as "[a]n important, publicly recognized, legitimate interlocutor in the institutional space of the EU", but this establishment is not necessarily a guarantee of success. Rather, the real level of success is dependent on the mobilising potential of the theme, chosen and advocated by the Churches themselves and those acting on their behalf, which often involves identity-related issues. The correlation of Christian Churches and identity underlines their additional distinct feature.

**Churches and identity**

The role of Churches as non-state actors reflects one of the aspects of the Churches' participation in European integration. Although not defining their unique character, it paves the way for the consideration of additional aspects. These aspects are related to the historical role of Churches and the issue of Churches and identity.

The relevance of identity to European integration is broadly accepted and is normally learned through the national and European identities. Therefore, in order to reveal an additional feature of the role of Churches in European integration, we need to look at their possible contribution to the formation of both national and European identities. Arguably, the question of "[w]hether Europe can be at least partly defined as a community of values and identity by virtue of its Christian past is a matter of long-standing debate". But we are more inclined towards the viewpoint defining the European continent in this way:
National identity, particularly on the peripheries of Europe, is often built around religious values and is linked to Church-state regimes as well. Churches provide rituals, unity, and identity for community builders even in the modern world.

(Enyedi 2003, p. 223)

Since religion is regarded as a part of identity, Churches are able to contribute directly to the process of identity formation. This is especially true for the areas where religion is an important part of everyday life. Certainly, this contribution is determined by European history, by its distinct features, which demonstrate the meaningful role of Christianity. Indeed, Europe was not created from nothing, nor did it appear as a result of random coincidences. Rather, we can suggest that Europe achieved its status because it was marked by Christian values and Christian faith.

**Christian identity and the EU**

One may argue that the proposition of Christian identity for the EU is not an easy thing. This is normally explained by the denominational diversity of Christianity (i.e. no unity) as well as by the fact that "European history can hardly be written without acknowledging the centuries-long interplay between Christianity, Judaism and Islam". But the opposite approaches look more plausible. For example, Jose Casanova describes Christianity as a "central component of the personal identity of many Europeans". Ronan McCrea notes that European identity originally appeared from a shared commitment to Christianity, although he also states that this identity "has also been moulded by a strong humanist tradition". According to Daniel Nexon, "Significant aspects of European identity are tied to a long history involving the consolidation of Latin Christendom as a political-religious community". Nexon describes in detail the various events of European history, in which Christianity was a meaningful contributor and participant. Augustin Jose Menendez, explaining the views of Joseph Weiler on that matter, emphasises:

> Not only is Christianity the religion which has marked most deeply the identity of Europe and Europeans, but it is also the faith at present shared by the largest number of Europeans. . . . [O]ther believers should acknowledge that their identity as Europeans is profoundly marked by Christianity nonetheless.

(Menendez 2005, p. 186)

While acknowledging the very diverse perspectives on the idea of Christian identity for the EU, we do not see any profound reasons for rejecting this idea altogether. Christianity should be given the leading role for the following reasons. First, in spite of the presence of other religions in Europe, Christianity has always maintained the status
of the most powerful and influential faith. Christianity either gave birth to or made an outstanding contribution to the formation of European culture, literature and science. Indeed, this is confirmed in the writings of scholars, philosophers and Christian saints, as will be outlined below. There is certainly a degree of agreement among them.

For example, Sara Silvestri emphasises that “[c]lassical culture was preserved and educational institutions were founded in Europe thanks to the work of religious orders . . . [t]he much respected universities of Oxford and Cambridge were established as religious (Christian) institutions in first instance.” Monasteries were the centres of scientific research and important educational establishments. Christian architecture, embodied in magnificent cathedrals and public buildings, became a constituent part of European cities. Furthermore, the presence of Christianity was visible among the representatives of the ruling elite. Many emperors, especially after the fourth century ad, were devout Christians for whom the Gospel values played a very important role. The mood of that time could be discovered through the words of Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, who wrote to one of the emperors: “You rule with Christ, and you command with Christ. So you should imitate God’s love of man. This is the most divine feature of man, namely to do good”. It is therefore not accidental that one of the statements of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece underlined: “Europe cannot, and should not forget that its spiritual foundations lie in the Gospel of Christ”. The Gospel’s foundations of Europe formed some of the distinct features of Europeans. The fact was explicitly admitted by French poet and philosopher Paul Valéry:

The European person is not determined by his race, language and nationality, since Europe is the motherland of many languages, nationalities and traditions. The European is whoever belongs to a people that has embraced the Roman rule of justice, has comprehended well Greek education and has accepted and assimilated Christian teaching.

(Valéry in Christodoulos 2000, emphasis added)

Apart from this direct contribution of Christianity, as shown above, one should bear in mind the existence of the indirect contribution to the process of identity formation. This is connected with values as a parameter of identity. Indeed, values are related, at least partly, to religion, and there is a well-grounded viewpoint that “[t]he identity of individual Europeans, and of Europe as a Union, continues to be heavily influenced by Christian values”. In the Europe of today one can observe the existence of two sets of values: secular and religious. They are in conflict with each other; this clash of values is the reflection of the desire to construct a certain type of European identity, based on either religious or non-religious dimension. Speaking about Christian values in their application to Europe, we need to emphasise that they are, by and large, conservative ones, not eroded by the modernist trends found within some Christian factions. These
values contain a clear moral and ethical message, where, inter alia, the family is seen as the union between man and woman; human life exists and should be protected from the moment of conception to the moment of natural death; and honesty, chastity and mutual help should be promoted, rather than criticised or even mocked. However, these conservative values are contested by European secularism.

A clash of values becomes the everyday reality of the contemporary EU. In this clash most Churches take a clear stance: as the defenders of conservative Christian values. In fact, this ongoing clash of values in the EU often leaves no other option than to encourage the active participation of Churches on one of the sides of the conflict. For Churches, it is very important to ensure that those values that will be laid at the foundation of European identity will not promote a secular vision of the EU. Logically, Churches see themselves as the defenders and promoters of certain values and lifestyle not only because of their theological doctrines and inclinations of moral theology, but also out of a desire to contribute to identity formation. The type of values defended by Churches correlates with their respective theological doctrines. Thus, Churches made their way into the process of European integration, becoming the identity formers and influencing the debates on both European and national identities. This adds an important feature to their special participation.

**Christian Churches at the beginning of integration**

One more issue which must be considered in relation to the unique character of the Churches’ presence in European integration is the role of Christianity/Churches at the initial stages of the integration process. This issue remains disputable, since a degree of involvement of Churches and the level of their influence at the creation of the European Community is a matter for discussion. For example, Leustean admits the influence of religion (through Christian Democratic parties) on the establishment of the European Community, but claims that “[w]ithout the political support of other parties, the ratification of the treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957) would not have been possible”.

Speaking about Churches (in the plural), one should realise that the main role is normally given to the Roman Catholic Church, or the institutions which reflected the values and ideas existing in the Roman Catholic Church. Daniel Philpott and Timothy Samuel Shah state that “[t]he Catholic Church actively inspired, promoted, and shaped European integration”, while other Churches “played a relatively weak and sporadic role in promoting and shaping European integration”. The contribution of Churches is usually discussed via the role of Christian Democratic parties at the initial stages of the integration process and the Christian convictions of the “founding fathers” of the European Community. These are the two main points which are worthy of further
attention.

**Integration as a Christian Democratic project**

In principle, many scholars agree on the substantial contribution of the Roman Catholic Church at the initial stages of European integration, which was even "sanctioned by the Vatican". The Vatican (and the Catholic Church more broadly) were closely connected with the Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. Bryan Hehir underlines:

> The EU is built on the EC and the EC was powerfully influenced by Christian Democracy, a political movement but one directly rooted in Catholic social thought and close collaboration with the Holy See's role in postwar Europe.

(Hehir 2006, p. 103)

Timothy Byrnes states that the EU was “powerfully shaped by Catholic social teaching”. From those founding fathers of the EC who were devout Catholics, one can name French foreign minister Robert Schuman, German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Italian foreign minister Alcide De Gasperi. Schuman believed that the project of European unification "cannot do without the inspiration of its Christian sources". As he also emphasised, "Europe is the implementation of a universal democracy, in the Christian sense of the word". Rocco Buttiglione states that "faith in Jesus Christ [was] at the centre of the life of Alcide De Gasperi". According to Stefano Trinchese, the tendency of De Gasperi to make "constant reference to the holy texts as an element of salvation constituted the main features of his actions, especially in moments of pain and uncertainty". Gasperi himself wrote about the role of Christianity in the European civilisation in the following way:

> When I affirm that Christianity is at the origin of the European civilisation I do not intend to introduce any kind of exclusive confessional criterion into the evaluation of our history. I refer to the common European heritage, to that unitary morality that puts emphasis on the human being and his responsibility.

(Quoted in Guiso 2004, p. 22, Venneri and Ferrara 2009, p. 124)

It is not accidental that Venneri and Ferrara, admitting that it is impossible to explain integration without the economic analysis and pragmatic reasons, state nonetheless that "De Gasperi's cultural and spiritual predisposition towards a renewed context of international solidarity and universalism undoubtedly gave incentive to the process". Gary Wilton mentions that the Christian faith of Robert Schuman (along with the faith of De Gasperi, Monnet and Adenauer) was not somehow restricted to the private sphere but was “[t]he inspiration for a life dedicated to public service and to the rebuilding of Europe upon secure Christian foundations”. Wilton finds rather surprising that the
educational materials of the European Commission about Schuman make no reference to his Christian convictions, despite the fact that they deeply inspired his political vision for Europe. Linda Risso notes that the Christian Democratic parties of post-war Europe “based their political programme on the radical view that western civilisation was embedded in Christian values and that it needed to be protected both from the seduction of modern lifestyles and from the even greater dangers of communism”.

Pope Pius XII, who was head of the Catholic Church from 1939 to 1958, as early as 1948 “developed the theme of a possible European Union”. O’Mahony underlines that “Pius XII and his Catholic contemporaries, de Gasperi, Adenauer, Robert Schuman, in fact tried to build a ‘Christian democratic’ Europe, as a rampart against the threat of communism, but also as a concrete and relative attempt to build a just order in Europe”. Pius XII, who completely supported the creation of the European Community, saw in this “[a] historic mission for Christian Europe”. Peter Pavlovic indicates that the main aim of integration was to prevent a new war in Europe and to reconcile two old enemies – France and Germany. Economic cooperation was just one of the methods of reaching the objective mentioned, but not the main objective itself. James Barnett insists, “The origins of the European Union in the Coal and Steel Community were related to the ideal of reconciliation. The implications have always been both economic and political”. This fact, which was quite obvious in the early 1950s, is rarely remembered nowadays, although it allows one to understand better and to see the presence of Christian (mainly Catholic) aspects at the birth of the united Europe after World War II.

Paul Gallagher states that if Christianity indeed made Europe its home (which is obvious throughout European history), then “[i]t is not surprising that Catholics in particular should feel at ease and be enthusiastic about any project which emphasises the European dimension, be it political or otherwise”. Speaking about the Roman Catholic Church, he points out that “[i]ts desire to be part of the ‘European Project’ comes naturally”, because indifference will mean the rejection of the Church calling and history. Moreover, the Church has seen its close cooperation with the European institutions as “[p]art of its contribution to the well-being of the world”. Interestingly, Madeley discusses the idea of European integration as a Catholic rather than a Christian Democratic project, since the creation of a supranational body (to administer the ECSC) was in agreement with the Catholic criticism of the nation-state. Indeed, it is not accidental that in the early 1950s Protestants and Social Democrats often viewed European integration “[a]s a Catholic conspiracy of conservatives, an ideologically tainted attempt to revive clerical politics as a hand-maiden of big business, orchestrated by the Vatican”, while Catholics were supportive of the project. However, Leustean notes that as early as 1950 a transnational reflection group was formed, which included leading Protestant politicians and churchmen. This group, named as the
Ecumenical Commission on European Cooperation, was designed "[t]o offer expertise on European issues for Protestant Churches". In fact, one of the presidents of the European Commission was a member of this group. There were even suggestions that it was a Protestant man who allegedly stood behind the Schuman declaration – André Philip, French economic minister from 1946 to 1947 and president of the Commission on International Affairs at the Protestant Federation of France. Consequently, it is impossible to put Christianity aside and to ignore the meaning and contribution of Churches at the initial stages of the process of European integration.

**Conclusion**

The participation of Christian Churches in European integration is not a strange or alien concept. Instead, as we identified in this chapter, Churches are logically incorporated in the EU politics; they form a constituent part of the EU life and have been visible since the earliest stages of European integration. Identity, non-state actors and religion, even in an era which is regarded by some as the time of declining religiosity (at least in some parts of Europe), is not limited to the private space. Instead, Christian Churches act in different capacities, bringing their unique contribution to the process of European integration. They are similar, in some features, to other actors, but they are at the same time different, due to the fact of being religious, spiritual organisations. The similarities, which we identified, are confined to the following.

First, Churches are able to act as the identity formers and non-state actors. As identity formers, they are willing to contribute to the formation of their own vision of European identity, where Christian values and norms constitute a substantial or at least important part. However, the vision of the Christian element of European identity is determined by the doctrines accepted within Churches. These doctrines are not identical; the division goes along the confessional lines, or even within one confession (i.e. Protestantism). Second, there is an ongoing discussion within the Churches on their attitudes towards the European Union. The role which Churches may play (or try to play) in European integration depends on how this process is assessed and analysed. The actions they take are motivated by their attitudes, since the attitudes may foster either support or opposition. Alternatively, there can be support or opposition to certain decisions, especially the ones of a specific value dimension. The way the Churches act is confined to the following schemes:

1. Churches as opinion formers. This is one of the efficient methods of influencing the decision-making process. Churches need to deliver their message efficiently, appropriately and with good arguments.

2. Churches as the actors acting on the governmental level. This is done in a variety of ways: formal declarations, requests, lobbying via sympathetic
members of Parliament or, if the Church is recognised as an appropriate public body, applying with concrete proposals even in the form of the draft law.

Still, in spite of all the features mentioned, Churches are not the regular nonstate actors or the actors of civil society. One of the important distinctions is formed by their historic role with the prominent contribution to the initial stages of the process of European integration. Thus, it is quite obvious that the role played by Churches on the European level goes far beyond the private religious space. It requires further analysis. First, it is important to see the presence of Churches and Christian organisations at the European level. Second, we need to identify the degree of interest towards European integration/the European Union within the different Churches and their prevailing attitudes. Our final objective is to try to involve the specificities of the Church-state relations into the analysis, via their transposition from the national levels to the supranational level. This is the area of concern of another chapter of this book.
From the Chapel on the Hill to National Shrine: Creating a Pilgrimage 'Home' for Bosnian Croats
During the last few decades, pilgrimages and pilgrimage places in ex-Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), have been the focus of research by many scholars. Some of this research has concentrated on the sharing of sacred places by different religious communities and the complex relationships between those communities, which were willing to share the same sites at one point in history and then fought to the death at another. It was this kind of inter-communal relationship that prompted Robert Hayden to propose the concept of antagonistic tolerance. He explains the sharing of sacred places in south-eastern Europe as ‘a pragmatic adaptation to a situation in which repression of the other group’s practices may not be possible rather than an active embrace of the Other’. Recently, there has been somewhat of a shift in research on pilgrimage places in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, as more and more scholars have turned towards examining intra-communal interaction and relationships in and towards pilgrimage places. I follow this trend by describing the creation, development and re-creation of one particular pilgrimage place of Bosnian Croats in order to illustrate the complex relationship within this religious-national community between ‘ordinary’ people, on the one hand, and the Roman Catholic clergy on the other.

In Bosnia, the Croats are the smallest in terms of population of the three constitutive nationalities (others being Bosniaks and Serbs). They possess a distinctive heritage based around the struggle for survival over many centuries, and are confined to the smaller towns and districts which have most frequently functioned as enclaves of some sort. The Croats are surrounded by the larger Bosniak and Serbian groups of inhabitants, and are deeply attached to the Catholic Church through a special relationship with the clergy. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 has had a dramatic influence on this community, since it resulted in an even smaller population of Bosnian Croats, and made them nationally, politically and culturally vulnerable. Because Bosnian Croats have been politically divided between several parties, because economic and military conflict has forced them to leave for the European Union and Croatia, and because they are geographically dispersed across Bosnia, religion appears to be the only visible, stable, element keeping them all together. I will seek to provide an insight into the past and present situation in this particular ‘European- Oriental microculture’ by focusing on the ways in which Bosnian Croats express their religious identity through pilgrimage. I will approach pilgrimage places as arenas where religious and national ideas are manifested, and analyse and problematize what happens at one particular shrine. I will examine the Catholic Church’s relationship towards the people, in particular, and its influence on the creation and preservation of Bosnian Croat identity through building a new national shrine – Kondžilo.
About Kondžilo and the Key Themes

When I first began researching pilgrimages to Kondžilo in 2010, little did I know that this pilgrimage place would change in a very short time from a small, wooden, hilltop chapel in a forest above the village of Komušina, into what is currently perhaps the Bosnia’s largest sacred ‘construction site’. Here we can see how a sacred landscape is evolving through the addition of new sacred topoi every year, thereby expanding the sacrality of the surrounding area (see Illustration 2.1).

Kondžilo is located in the parish of Komušina, which is today part of the so-called Republika Srpska (Republic of Srpska). Although most people living in the area were Croats before the early 1990s war, by 2012, the demographic situation had changed dramatically. In most of the Croatian villages surrounding the Kondžilo hill there are now very few permanent residents and these are mostly elderly, while the nearby town of Teslić has become predominantly Serbian.

The main reason for pilgrimage to Kondžilo is the eighteenth-century miraculous painting of Mary, the Mother of God. The painting was probably brought by Franciscans, and since a Franciscan was the first to write down the oral tradition at the end of the nineteenth century about the arrival of the painting and the beginning of the pilgrimage, it seems that the Church was responsible for the creation of this pilgrimage place. Before the 1990s war, pilgrimage to Kondžilo was limited to one a year – the Feast of Mary’s Assumption into heaven, on 15 August – and most pilgrims came from the few nearby parishes. Kondžilo was just another pilgrimage place in Bosnian and Herzegovina: neither more prominent nor important than other similar shrines. After the war ended, and since the miraculous painting’s return to Kondžilo, the shrine’s importance has rapidly increased. During the last few years, the number of pilgrimages to Kondžilo has increased to three times a year, though the most important pilgrimage celebration still takes place on 15 August, when thousands of people arrive, mostly Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats ‘temporarily residing’ in the European Union, and those from Croatia and Switzerland. However, the first pilgrimage of the year takes place during May and involves young people from the Vrhbosna archdiocese, while the third is held during October and involves the inhabitants of the Usora deanery. In fact, pilgrimage to Kondžilo is one of the reasons, and frequently the only reason, for those who were displaced from the surrounding villages and parishes, to visit their houses, if only once a year. Pilgrimage to Kondžilo has become the symbol of the existence, homecoming and survival for Croats from this area, as well as for Bosnian Croats in general.

In this chapter, I will begin by analysing the events that gave rise to the significance of this pilgrimage place, and prompted the construction of the shrine, which the Bosnian Catholic Church aims to turn into a national shrine for Bosnian Croats. The Catholic Church is now working with the local population and pilgrims to
transform the small woodland chapel into a sacred landscape with multiple functions. This process of place-making crucially involves the materialization of symbols in the landscape in order to project an image and send out a story about the Bosnian Croat struggle and the need for national unity (see Illustration 2.2).

Drawing on my own research and experience as a participant in the pilgrimage, I aim to demonstrate how building a shrine and creating new places in the sacred landscape of Kondžilo affects pilgrims, their religious practices and pilgrimage experiences, as well as the perception of their community. I will focus on the four pilgrimage aspects that have so far emerged as the basis for pilgrimage research in general – person, place, text and movement – realizing that these are very complex concepts and imply multi-layered phenomena that should be analysed from many different perspectives.

My Research and the Beginnings of the Construction of Kondžilo

Most of my text is based on my experience, observations, participation, interpretations and analysis. During my research, I tried to take advantage of my role as both a researcher and a member of the Bosnian Croat community. This dual role has been highly productive, especially in my attempts to experience the researched location.
which my informants occupy and in which they act. However, it has also been very problematic, because it was difficult to make sharp divisions between these roles. On the one hand, I had at my disposal the methodology and analytical model for approaching the location, pilgrims’ practices and the information I gathered from interviews, but on the other, I frequently got carried away by certain experiences on Kondžilo, moved by inspiring speeches, and sometimes limited by my own life experience from the time prior to my ‘initiation’ into ethnology.

My first encounter with Kondžilo did not occur on any of the three pilgrimage dates. On an ordinary rainy, foggy day, I came to the village, which looked almost abandoned at first glance. The church where they kept the miraculous painting of the Our Lady was in relatively decent shape, even though it had served as a barn during the Serbian occupation in the Bosnian war. After a brief interview with the parish priest and a glance at the painting, I set out for the Kondžilo hill. The road was asphalt all the way to the foot of the hill, courtesy of the Croatian government, which in the past few years has been financially supporting the reconstruction of roads leading to certain sacred places, churches and convents. Although not an impressive structure, the chapel on the
Kondžilo hill, built in 1958 by the people from the nearby village of Podkondžilo, had a very distinct shape and a certain mystical quality due to its positioning, especially on that particular day, all shrouded in thick forest and mist. Next to the chapel, there was an old bell-tower, inside which a bell-ringer would sit during pilgrimage and signal the arrival of the procession carrying the painting. Behind the chapel stood the remnants of a pre-war building where priests used to stay, because before the war the painting and the priests would stay at Kondžilo overnight, whereas today both the painting and the priests return to the parish church. On my way down from the hill, I took a moment to visit the remnants of the old church, which had lost its function as the parish church before the war, and was destroyed to such an extent, that all that remained was the altar section and the foundations. Most of the church was completely overgrown with grass, as was the nearby parish office.

My next visit was on the very day of the Feast of Assumption. I came as a researcher, but on the outside I was just one of the many pilgrims, in no way different or more privileged. At the time, almost none of the church officials or local population knew me and I was treated like any other pilgrim. In the following years, and particularly after the publishing of the monograph about this region, I have become well-known and I’m recognized. I have been asked to come for coffee and refreshments at the parish office and eventually I was made one of the stewards, who ensured that everything went smoothly. This role has granted me access to areas and activities I had previously not been able to see and experience, but it has also made it more difficult for me to participate inconspicuously and to observe pilgrim practices.

My first Feast of the Assumption was spent conversing with pilgrims who came mostly from nearby villages, as well as watching the activities at and in the church during the pilgrimage to Kondžilo and then return to the church. At the time I was trying to find out what this painting meant to the people in the Usora region in terms of their identity. Most of the people emphasized two facts. First, the painting brings together Croats from both the locality and across BiH for the Feast of the Assumption and, secondly, most of those living outside of the country return to their homeland precisely because of Our Lady of Kondžilo. If it were not for Kondžilo they would probably visit much less frequently or practically never, since the main pilgrimage occurs only once a year. Most of these people have renovated their houses and stayed there during the ten days of vacation they had taken specifically for the feast. The process happening at Kondžilo seems similar to that in Gökçeada (Imvros) where Orthodox Christian diaspora started to return to the island during mid-August to celebrate the Assumption of the Virgin Mary (see Chapter 3 in this volume). Their pilgrimage became a major meeting-point for members of a displaced community, a chance to repair their homes, reclaim their fields and cry for the loss of the island. The Turkish authorities on Gökçeada consider these events as important tourist attractions,
but for those who were forced out about four decades ago, the pilgrimage is a way to reclaim symbolically their lost homeland and they refuse to consider themselves as tourists. Will pilgrims to Kondžilo in a few decades become tourists? Perhaps they already have.

The event that is planted in everyone’s memory and is pointed out as the turning-point in the life of this shrine is the first pilgrimage after the 1990s war. During the conflict, the painting was first kept at the house of a distinguished member of the community, but after the occupation by Serbs it went into ‘exile’ together with the people, travelling through the woods into Croatia. It then spent some time in Split, was later taken to Zagreb, and finally ended up in another very well-known national Marian shrine at Marija Bistrica. Bosnian Croats went on pilgrimage to Croatia to visit all of the locations where the painting had been in exile. The pilgrimages were emotional meetings between exiled Croats and their Mother, as they called her, who had shared the same destiny through the painting’s exodus. As a child, I had also participated in one of those meetings in Zagreb, but was unaware at the time about what was happening around me. All I could notice were women with tears in their eyes and serious-looking, worried men. According to the pilgrims, the only event more emotional than these meetings was the return of the painting to Komušina. By then, the stories of the return had achieved mythical proportions, generating legends about the troubles and miracles that had happened along the way. After seven years in exile, the painting of Our Lady was returned in 1999 on the Feast of the Assumption. These were times immediately after the war and tensions between Croats and Serbs was still intense. The arrival of Croats, especially the possibility of their return, was regarded as a great threat by Serbs and the visitors were not welcomed.

During the period of my subsequent research, the situation changed completely. Over the last few years, the pilgrimage Mass has been regularly attended by the Serbian mayor of the nearby town of Teslić and the Serbian police collaborate very successfully with the local priest and stewards, and even escort the cardinal of Vrhbosna to and from the shrine. On the 2010 Feast of the Assumption, as I walked through the village which was almost entirely abandoned only a few months before, I could hardly recognize it. In front of every house there were people sitting, having coffee and spending time together; children were playing outside and cars with foreign registration plates were parked in almost every yard. Preparations for the Feast were in full swing. Tents arrived for the live music performances, involving mostly singers of Serbian folk songs or traditional Croatian music, meat was roasting and booths had been set up for the sale of souvenirs, toys, religious items, and so on. The church car park was reserved for dignitaries, distinguished guests and priests. However, on the meadow outside the churchyard, overlooking the church, the yard and the village cemetery, dozens of tents appeared during the day. People from other villages in the
Usora region had arrived; they roasted the meat they had brought with them and drank, ate and sang almost throughout the night.

During these few days, I noticed the existence of three separate worlds that seemed to collide but were also mutually tolerated. One was the world of entertainers, traders and beggars, who were mostly not pilgrims and saw this gathering as a good opportunity to make a profit. They were mostly Serbs or Roma, although there were also Croats with their own tents and sales booths. After the afternoon Mass for the sick, which is led by Cardinal Vinko Puljić, the archbishop of Vrhbosna, the multitude of pilgrims leave the sacred place through the parish church fence and into the profane world. Prayers are replaced by songs, drink, and shopping. The second of these worlds is the world of campers. Most arrive from the nearby Usora region but a relatively large number come from other towns and parts of Bosnia by foot, horseback, or motorcycle. They, too, take the tour around the tents after Mass but soon return to their campsite for a barbecue of roasted pig, and sing late into the night.

I also stayed in my friends’ and relatives’ tent until early hours of the morning. There was a fire burning every few metres; some had brought wood and coal with them while others would chop down wood from the nearby forest. People sang a range of songs from popular to traditional and folk songs, and quite a few became drunk. When my friends went to sleep in their tent, I took my sleeping bag into the church where I discovered a third parallel world. It was filled with pilgrims sleeping on the floor or benches, as well as those praying all night in front of the guarded painting. One could hear the mumbling of prayers, some pilgrims snoring, as well as the singing, yelling, and music coming from outside. In this mixture of sounds, smells and impressions, I realized how complex this pilgrimage place (and others) really is, how many functions it performs, how many meanings are attributed to it and how many it actually has. This mix of devotion, celebration and socializing is typical of almost all pilgrimage places and it seems to me that one cannot exist without the other. This is the reason that pilgrimage places are so important for the community – they fulfil a multitude of functions – but also why pilgrimage is not reducible to one theoretical frame or research method.

In these three pilgrimage worlds – shaped by the complex relationship between the Catholic Church in Bosnia as an institution, priests as individuals, church members and executors of the ideas of the Church, and the people – the issue of power emerges. Who has the power to influence the other here? Who makes decisions related to the construction of the shrine and the creation of its meaning and symbolism? According to Paul Rabinow, ‘on the analytical level, space could be used as one of several tools to locate and identify the relations of knowledge and power’. While observing and analysing the construction of the Kondžilo shrine, from its conception to its realization, I tried to figure out these power relations. They were most evident
during the making of key decisions for the construction of the shrine, for example, the matter of the old chapel on Kondžilo. The original intention of the parish priest was simply to tear down the old chapel, since it had become useless. Nevertheless, the local population, however quietly, expressed their disagreement, thus influencing the change of decision, which resulted in the conversion and moving of the chapel, albeit only in parts.

On the other hand, I have also met pilgrims and parishioners who have expressed dissatisfaction with some of the parish priest's decisions but to no avail. These were mostly trivial issues, such as the matter of the car park or the location for putting up tents. Drawing on years of experience, the parish priest tried to organize the car park, and decide where and how cars can be parked, in order to free up access to the church for guests and priests. He also sought to clear a way for the procession (the route of which is discussed at the last minute every year), working with the stewards, who acted on his strict orders. For two consecutive years, I was one of the stewards in charge of directing vehicles. The first year, we simply directed pilgrims to their designated car park, which frequently caused dissatisfaction, with some people trying, and some succeeding, in circumventing our orders. The following year was an even more painful experience. It was decided to charge parking fees and this did not go down well, even among the stewards who expressed their dissatisfaction but only amongst themselves. However, the pilgrims, who were accustomed to free parking, expressed their disgruntled feelings very loudly, cursing in a manner one would not expect from pilgrims at a sacred place! Most did accept the rules of the game, while some decided to take matters into their own hands and ignore the priest's decisions, and got away with it.

A similar but more significant example involved the fulfilment of pilgrims' vows before the painting of Our Lady. The usual practice is for pilgrims, who are fulfilling a vow, to circle the painting three times in the direction of the sun and each time kiss and touch it, either with their hands or other objects. Since there are thousands of pilgrims with this same purpose, chaos often results and stewards once again must act as controllers. To enable all the pilgrims to come to the painting, touch it and leave a donation, they direct pilgrims towards the entrance of the space where the painting has been placed and then escort them out on the other side. This frequently causes confusion among the pilgrims and turns an atmosphere of prayer and meditation into a conflict situation. Tensions particularly arise when the pilgrims' vows include circling the painting while kneeling, since this drastically decreases their mobility. Stewards try to hurry them on but the kneeling pilgrims usually ignore them and continue their ritual. Thus, once again some individuals successfully circumvent the rules and avoid attempts to regulate their activities.

It is extremely important to stress here that people are disobedient in various
degrees only when dealing with stewards as representatives of the parish and, at that moment, of the Catholic Church. In case of a bigger problem or disagreement, an intervention from the parish priest, or any other priest for that matter, stops all discussion or disagreement. They are seen as occupying another level entirely and any attempt to debate with them is futile, since they have absolute power in this particular situation and also take all the major decisions during the construction of the shrine. Sometimes there is room for compromise, as in the case of the old chapel, although this seems to be more of an exception than the rule.

Individuals who ignore regulations, disturb the set order, and question the power of the Church, were not discussed by either Rabinow or Foucault, since both ignore the everyday resistance of individuals to spatial forms of social control. However, such everyday resistances are the main focus of de Certeau's work. Analysing pedestrian movement in the city, he concludes that pedestrians frequently circumvent set routes and rules, thereby condemning 'certain places to inertia or disappearance' and composing 'with others spatial "turns of phrase" that are "rare","accidental", or illegitimate'. Although some pilgrims circumvent set routes and rules, when the procession or any other official ritual begins, everyone fuses into one crowd and abides by the guidelines. It is the Church as an institution that demonstrates its power in practice, creating and maintaining the function of particular locations, giving them meanings which are then accepted by pilgrims, and confirmed in their practices. In the end, 'power is exercised rather than possessed'.

My next visit was in October of the same year. I came to participate in the pilgrimage that was merely local, and according to the pilgrims I interviewed, much more like Kondžilo as it 'once' was. There were no entertainers, tents, campers, pilgrims from all over BiH, cardinals, or other church and political officials. Most of the pilgrims came from the Komušina parish and a few surrounding parishes. However, people from Komušina who now live in Croatia, Slovenia and Germany also come, mostly those who have retired. The gathering begins in the early hours of the morning. People stand around the church in small groups, talking quietly while preparing to depart for Kondžilo. While observing the gathering, I wondered: would this pilgrimage look the same if it were not for the pompous celebration of the Feast of the Assumption? And would the pilgrimage in a few years be reduced to this, if it was not for the construction of the national shrine on Kondžilo?

Some of the pilgrims prayed in the church before the painting of Our Lady. When I left the church and went towards the outdoor altar, I noticed other pilgrims also praying before a painting and walking around it in fulfilment of their vows. Two paintings? I was astounded. This second painting was identical to the first one, except the frame was much more modest and there was no protective glass covering. However, the pilgrims treated it with the same kind of piety as the one inside the church. I asked
one of the stewards what it was all about. He explained that the second painting was a
copy of the original, made before the war, when the parish of Gornja Komušina
separated from the parish of Komušina but still wanted to have 'their own' Madonna. At
first glance this is a classic example of Frazerian sympathetic magic, 'whereby the
replica gains the power of the original.' Yet, this situation was odd because the 'taken'
part has returned and now exists alongside the 'original' sacred item. I was surprised
that the pilgrims' attitude towards the copy and the 'original' was almost identical. They
would stand or kneel before it with the same amount of awe, circle it on foot or knee,
touch it with various objects, and kiss it. I was even more surprised when I realized that
the copy was to be carried to Kondžilo in the procession, while the original remained in
the church?! It was as though this pilgrimage by local pilgrims was less important than
the one on the Feast of the Assumption.

As I was walking behind this other painting with other pilgrims, countless
questions were going through my mind. How could the pilgrims so calmly accept the
fact that they are carrying a copy of the painting of Our Lady up to Kondžilo? Why do
the pilgrimage at all and what was the real purpose of the pilgrimage if the miraculous
painting was not really important? Was it the location of Kondžilo? Or was the practical
side of the pilgrimage – that is, of returning home – its own purpose? As I was later
observing the attitude towards the original painting, it appeared that the official shrine
made a bigger distinction between the two paintings than the actual pilgrims. The
original painting has a more massive frame of better quality, has protective glass
covering and is guarded by stewards; the cardinal himself kneels before it, saying the
rosary. The original painting is carried up to Kondžilo only on the Feast of the
Assumption, and is situated at a special place in the church. Even though all of this
does not apply to the copy, pilgrims treat it just the same. They pay no attention to
these distinctions and do not consider the painting as any less worthy, all the while
knowing it is a copy.

A fellow steward, with whom I spent some time guarding the entrance to the
churchyard, offered a very simple answer to all my questions: Our Lady is Our Lady,
irrespective of the painting. In his opinion, the purpose of the pilgrimage, at least from
the point of view of an 'ordinary' pilgrim, is not the miraculous painting. Yet, although
Our Lady is everywhere and on every painting, every year people choose to go on
pilgrimage precisely to Our Lady of Kondžilo. It would appear that the crucial element
is the location of the pilgrimage – people are returning to the homeland. While talking
to pilgrims, who come from other parts of BiH only for the main pilgrimage on the
Feast of the Assumption, I found out that their main motive is, in fact, the painting as a
symbol of the holiness of the location. This is another example of how complex,
multifaceted and multi-vocal pilgrimage places can be. For the local population, the
pilgrimage to Kondžilo is actually a pilgrimage to one's 'roots,' and while Kondžilo is the
motive for coming, pilgrims are not taking their pain, yearnings and hopes to a special place where the divine meets the human, but rather they are engaged in a homecoming which has an almost religious significance. One other pilgrim explained that the few days he spends in his native village, swimming in the nearby Usora River and coming to Kondžilo, is a way of ‘recharging’ his batteries for another year spent in Slovenia, where he now lives with his family.

**Creating a Sacred Landscape: Kondžilo as a Symbol of Identity and Home**

Analysing pilgrimage to Walsingham, Coleman writes that pilgrimage sites involve for the pilgrim complex and varying forms of engagement with the physical environment provided by the village and its landscape. Through movement and performance, pilgrims recapitulate the complex theological, historical and mythical narratives offered by the site and its officiants. However, it is not just the engagement with the landscape that is important in the relationship between pilgrims and the pilgrimage site, but also the architecture that is built in that landscape. According to Lindsay Jones, architecture is the most visible and most powerful method of both expressing and stimulating

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Illustration 2.3  Painting of Our Lady of Kondžilo arriving at Kondžilo, August 2013
religious emotions. In this chapter, I want to show how landscape in general, and in this example, sacred landscape, emerges as an experience, as a category, as a target of political and/or religious projects and as the subject of judgements. I have tried to apply ideas advanced by Coleman and Eade in analysing the movement of pilgrims, and also examined the sacred geography and architecture which provide the material and symbolic background to such movement (see Illustration 2.3).

My next, important visit to Kondžilo almost two years later brought many surprises and faced me with unexpected changes in the appearance of the pilgrimage place, as well as the landscape. As usual, I set out for Komušina a day early, when there are not as many pilgrims and the preparations had begun for the big day. The first thing I came across was a big sign in the neighbouring parish on the road one must take to go to Komušina and Kondžilo, which said: 'Welcome back to your homes!' This was a symbolically very powerful sign, which etched itself into the memory. People were being prepared, psychologically and spiritually, for the rest of their journey and given various mental images which were food for thought. The second item that appeared in the landscape, attracting attention through its appearance, size and position, was the bell-tower by the old ruined parish church. The old parish church is situated on the hill above the current church, giving it a dominant position, but since it was ruined and overgrown, it did not stand out. Now, however, one could see from afar an imposing, hollow bell-tower, made from non-corrosive aluminium, which dominated the landscape in all its shiny glory. I headed straight up to the bell-tower. As I was approaching, I realized that it was not a bell-tower at all but a monument to soldiers who had died in the war. At the foot of the monument, on four sides were plaques containing the names of fallen soldiers, while at the front there were a few wreaths left over from a delegation visit. Later I found out that the hill had been given an official name – Kalvariija (Calvary) – symbolizing the suffering of people from that region in all wars (see Illustration 2.4).

Since the 2012 construction of the memorial park (as it is called on the official website of the shrine), many delegations have laid wreaths at the monument, including the president of the Federation of BiH, representatives of the Ministry of Defence of BiH, a number of generals and various veterans' organizations. On 10 August 2012, after laying wreaths and paying respects to fallen soldiers, a Stations of the Cross procession began, which led up to Kondžilo, thereby connecting two sacred topoi – Kalvariija and Kondžilo. The old parish church had also been rebuilt. The only part left standing – the altar section – was preserved and partly reconstructed, while the altar had become the ‘altar of peace’ dedicated to all Croatian victims throughout history. The Kondžilo hill had undergone drastic changes too. The old chapel and bell-tower had gone and half of the hillside had been ‘stripped’ in order to create a flatter surface. Where the old chapel had stood, there was now the skeleton of a new one, the architecture of which
Illustration 2.4  Calvary with the altar of peace at the remaining of old parish church, August 2012

symbolizes clasped hands directed towards Heaven. Behind it rose a large concrete building, designed to accommodate members of the clergy. There will also be a new outdoor altar, as well as a building with toilets. The Stations of the Cross procession was to start at the foot of Kondžilo and lead along a new path which helped to shorten the climb, even though the climb itself was now a bit more demanding.

As I descended to the parish church, I noticed changes there as well. Talking to local parishioners before the beginning of construction, I found out that they had opposed demolition of the old Kondžilo chapel built by their grandfathers and had asked it be given some other function. Clearly, there had been a compromise, because the old chapel had been given a new function enabling it to be both symbolically and physically close to the painting. As it happens, the old chapel was moved next to the parish church and functioned as the outdoor altar. Although the roof and roof construction had been entirely changed and the closed middle section had gone, leaving the chapel looking more like a gazebo, its familiar shape and the stone foundation, where the builders of the first chapel inscribed the year of construction (with letters which are now emphasized), did indeed confirm that this was the chapel of Kondžilo. This is where the painting is now kept during the Mass for the sick on 14 August, when pilgrims fulfil their vows and the cardinal kneels while saying the rosary
(see Illustration 2.5).
On the morning of 15 August, the procession with the painting left for Kondžilo, first passing through the old chapel as if through a door, making its way towards Kondžilo

![Illustration 2.5](image)

Illustration 2.5  Old chapel in a new role: ‘door’ for the procession to Kondžilo, October 2011

and the new chapel. This new practice connected the old and new chapels and, metaphorically, the older generations who had built the old chapel, and the new generation building the new chapel and modern shrine, which is rooted in and connected to the past and tradition. Although it is self-evident that particular architectural forms (in this case, the old Kondžilo chapel and the old parish church) have certain meanings, too often we assume that the real meaning is the one intended by the architect or builder. Lindsay Jones, on the other hand, claims that every built form functions as a multivalent symbol and evokes different meanings and responses from different audiences. This is what Jones calls a ritual-architectural event:

... architectural meaning is not a condition or quality of the built form itself; works of architecture, and the meanings they evoke, are not once-and-forall. Instead, the significances and meanings arise from situations, or ‘ritual-architectural events’, wherein people engage works of art and architecture
in a kind of dialogical exchange.

The change in the original meaning is most evident in the case of the Kondžilo chapel built by parishioners in 1958 and the old parish church. Not only does their meaning today vary, but so does their function, thus entirely changing the meaning, in order to accommodate new needs and circumstances (see Illustration 2.6).

Like every year, in 2012, the Mass for the sick was once again led by the Bosnian cardinal, Vinko Puljić, a great orator whose sermons have always been well received by
the masses, since he emphasized the return, the home, the survival of Croats in Bosnia, and so on. In his homilies, the cardinal also addresses current political issues. Hence, in 2012 he discussed the war, the situation after the Dayton Accord, and the need to return to one’s roots and protect the homeland:

There is no truth about the war, and without real truth, there is no stable peace. There is no true justice without stable peace, because the peace after Dayton is a straitjacket ... Children must learn about their roots. One must know how to protect one's roots ... If you sell your father’s and grandfather’s house, you have not sold a house, you have sold your father. You may leave your homeland, but your homeland will never leave you.

The cardinal proceeded to discuss the local elections occurring in Bosnia that year, encouraging people to vote and urging those living outside BiH to come and vote, in order to help those who live in Bosnia but were unable to exercise their rights: ‘At the time of the election, everyone must show that they love their people. We have the power to legally secure our rights. Thus, it is necessary to understand the importance of solidarity with one's birthplace, one's homeland, one’s people.

Suffragan Bishop Pero Sudar led the procession towards Kondžilo the next day, which passed through the old chapel and by the old church, now converted into the peace altar, and past the monument to fallen soldiers. He led the Mass on Kondžilo, the first ever on the new altar and on Kondžilo under construction. And for the first time, the painting stayed at what was at the time still the skeleton of the new chapel. Bishop Sudar also delivered a passionate speech, relating the home (referring to the sign in the neighbouring parish I mentioned) and the return of Croats to Bosnia, with Kondžilo and the Mother of God, ‘our Mother’. His voice echoing through the speakers all over Kondžilo and the valley, and the view of the thousands of people around the altar, stirred mixed feelings among the pilgrims, making some of them cry (see Illustration 2.7).

The construction and changes that had happened after my last visit has intensified the significance of this pilgrimage place and introduced some new practices. It has also created a sacred landscape consisting of a prominent topos, where the emphasis is put on the home, the Croatian struggle during the war, the sacrifice of those killed, Christ's Way of the Cross, as well as Kondžilo itself as the central place and symbol of Croatian survival in Bosnia. Together, all of the topoi in this sacred landscape constitute the fundamental mission, which Kondžilo as an institutional pilgrimage aims to promote: the sanctity of the home, the necessity of Croats' return to Bosnia, honouring one's ancestors and fallen soldiers, and keeping the faith in Christ and our Mother – the Queen of Croats. Deliberately or not, it is as if the religio-political programme is present in the landscape, and while walking through this space, one can easily learn what our foundation is, what the reality is and how we should work on the future.
Illustration 2.7  Construction site of new national pilgrimage place of Bosnian Croats, August 2013

Although all this looks like a political programme, there is no politics here – at least at first glance. Politicians do visit Kondžilo every year in a private capacity, or in delegations, but I do not have the impression that they have had any major influence on the shrine's construction or appearance, or that their visit has had any major influence on their political success or failure. The project for the construction of the shrine and its surroundings, its appearance and the messages it conveys, appear to be exclusively the expression of the Catholic Church in Bosnia. The Church is once again, much like during the Ottoman Empire, reasserting the primacy of preserving and building national unity and the national survival of Croats in BiH. The fact is that today's Kondžilo, with its sacred landscape, was created and persists through interventions from above, that is, from the Church which aims to institutionalize an otherwise quite informal pilgrimage place. However, pilgrims were quick to accept new practices and have, whether consciously or subconsciously, confirmed by their performances the status of Kondžilo as a national symbol of Bosnian Croats. Through movement, their bodies and performances, pilgrims have kept alive and given meaning to all of these locations built and created by the Church.

The Komušina parish priest and keeper of Kondžilo published a letter, available on the parish website, happily announcing the commencement of the shrine’s
reconstruction and the motives behind it:

This is an old Marian shrine in the Vrhbosna archdiocese. It was completely devastated in the last war, as was Komušina. Due to the war, many have left Bosnia, cutting the number of members of our Vrhbosna archdiocese in half. Many are wondering whether there is a future for the Catholics and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina! Those who remained in the homes of their great-grandfathers, just like those who have come back from exile, carry in their hearts the wounds of the war, the feeling of humiliation, and being abandoned by everyone. Once brave and proud, full of faith and perseverance, people are today broken down and hopeless. And whenever times were hard and troubled, the Catholics in our archdiocese turned to Our Lady for help and consolation. We need Her today, now more than ever. With Her as our advocate and protector, we wish to ask God for mercy and new spiritual strength to rise above, strength for renewal and zeal. We wish to renew our ancient faith, to strengthen our national roots and once again build our familiar Catholic identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Kondžilo shrine will offer all this, to both old and young. The Blessed Virgin Mary has always been the refuge of sinners, comforter of the afflicted, and the help for the sick.

This letter clearly reflected the fundamental ideas behind the construction of the shrine and actually outlined the plan of the events which were to occur after its publication and the beginning of construction. The key messages, which the Bosnian Catholic Church as a whole and certain priests were trying to convey whenever they had the opportunity in the last few years, have been materializing at Kondžilo and its surroundings. Kondžilo is becoming a religious-national theme park, where visitors/pilgrims can see and experience all the things that make them a part of the Bosnian Croat community, and the things that make Komušina and Kondžilo a Croatian place.

However, if this process is to be successful, it must work both ways. Although the Church as an institution was the main instigator of the construction and the leading creator of key ideas and symbolism, without the participation of pilgrims (whose donations were the main source of funding for the construction), the development would not have been possible, nor would it have made any sense. Coming on foot from neighbouring parishes and wearing T-shirts and carrying signs with the image of Our Lady of Kondžilo, the pilgrims pass through the ‘warscape’ of villages and towns in Republika Srpska, almost as if to demonstrate their presence and refusal to fade away. They also pass through the old chapel, next to the former parish church, and the monument to fallen soldiers, and walk the Stations of the Cross all the way to the new Kondžilo chapel. Here is the pilgrims’ response to the calls of the Church: a confirmation and re-energizing of the symbiosis between Bosnian Croats as a people
and their Church in Bosnia.

The strength of the bond between Croats and the Catholic Church in Bosnia, and especially the Croatian connection with the Franciscan order (the only order which was allowed to exist throughout Ottoman rule), is best seen in the old local name given to Franciscan friars – uncles (ujići). According to legend, the name comes from the time when Franciscans were forced to hide from their Ottoman persecutors and were presented as members of the family or uncles who came to visit, when Ottomans visited the village. Although all the available literature stresses the close connection between the Franciscans and Croats in BiH, which has almost fused their histories, Lovrenović warns that their relationship must be observed through a more layered and dialectical approach. Although the two groups are inseparably intertwined, they also differed in material, existential and cultural terms, and in terms of interests.

Most authors, who have studied the Franciscans and Bosnian Croats, agree that the Franciscans were responsible for the survival of the Catholic Croatian people in Bosnia, as well as Croat religious-cultural, and national identity. However, Loverenović points out that ‘this frequently meant that the Franciscans had some sort of absolute power over the people, both on the outside before Turkish authority, and even more so on the inside, in every aspect of this community – spiritual, customary, familial, social ....

The situation changed drastically for the Franciscans with the onset of Austro-Hungarian rule and the founding of the Vrhbosna archdiocese in 1881. They lost their influence and their parishes, and became embroiled in a conflict with the bishop in Sarajevo which has more or less lasted until today. Although many parishes, including Komušina with its Kondžilo shrine, are no longer Franciscan, the relationship between the Church and local people and its influence has not weakened. Although the Bosnian Catholic Church is not the same as the one which was dominated by the Franciscans, Lovrenović claims that it is still an institution influenced by the religio-political views established by the first Bosnian archbishop, Josip Stadler. However, I cannot entirely agree with this claim, since I believe that the contemporary Catholic Church in BiH must be studied in the context of the current political and social situation, which is very complex, especially for Bosnian Croats. Although Lovrenović is right to point out the occasionally rigid attitude of the Church leaders and their engagement in national-political activities, I do not believe that this is rooted in history; it is rather a reflection of the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where religion in general, especially since the war, has become once more the main vehicle for expressing national identity.

**Conclusion**

Places, in general, are ‘politicized, culturally relative, historically specific, local and
multiple constructions’ and yet another example of a pilgrimage place – Kondžilo – shows how this also applies to sacred places in particular. Sacred places are complex, multifaceted, and multi-vocal and like other pilgrimage sites, Kondžilo is not reducible to a single meaning or experience; it is felt to be in everyone’s interest but for many different reasons. As Rodman points out, ‘For each inhabitant, a place has a unique reality, one in which meaning is shared with other people and places. The links in these chains of experienced places are forged of culture and history.’

Even though a particular place may have a unique and special significance for each person, places also have significance and values which are shared among the community. In my research, I have tried to apply the ideas of Coleman and Eade and analyse the movement of the pilgrims. I have combined this analysis with an exploration of the sacred geography and architecture which provide the material and symbolic background to such movement. At the same time I have not neglected the triad of person, text and place. By drawing on my experience as a pilgrim, a steward at a pilgrimage shrine, an ethnologist and a local, I have sought to shed some light on the development and re-creation of a pilgrimage place of Bosnian Croats, and use it to illustrate the complex processes taking place within this religio-national community.

It seems that this Christian pilgrimage place was actually started by the Church. The Franciscans brought the painting of the Madonna with them to Komušina village and they were the first to write down the tradition explaining the miraculous arrival of the painting, thus giving to pilgrims a mythical story of the sanctity of place. They were very eager to spread this narrative to pilgrims coming to Kondžilo, and they are now creating a national shrine that is based on the historical roots of Croatians in this region and the divine choice of this particular place. The construction and changes that have happened at Kondžilo and its environs recently have intensified the significance of this pilgrimage place, introduced new practices, created a sacred landscape consisting of prominent topoi, which seek to promote the sanctity of the home and the need for Croats to return to Bosnia to honour their ancestors and fallen soldiers, and to keep the faith in Christ and His Mother – the Queen of the Croats. This programme is materially present in the landscape, and while walking through this space people can easily learn what their heritage is, what the reality is and how they should work on the future. This process works both ways. Although the Church as an institution was the main instigator of the construction, and the main creator of key ideas and symbolism, without the participation of pilgrims and their donations, construction would neither have been possible, nor would it make any sense. By coming on foot from neighbouring parishes, passing through villages and towns in Republika Srpska, passing through the old chapel, next to the old parish church, and the monument to fallen soldiers, and walking the Stations of the Cross all the way to the new Kondžilo chapel, pilgrims respond to the Church’s calls and confirm the symbiosis between Bosnian Croats as a
people and their Church in Bosnia.

In the relationship between individual pilgrims and the pilgrimage 'worlds' that coexist with the institutional Church, we can see how the latter exercises its power. Its officials direct pilgrims to their designated car park, forbid merchant tents near the churchyard, constrain the fulfilment of pilgrims' vows, design and decide about the construction and new look of the sanctuary and inscribe meaning into space. The Catholic Church is, in fact, the only stable factor keeping the Bosnian-Croatian community, more generally, together. By building churches and shrines, especially such national pilgrimage places as Kondžilo, the Church seeks to materialize its role and influence in the community, and leave a permanent stamp on physical space. In the process, the Church asserts the permanent presence of Croats in Bosnia, despite their declining population and deteriorating economic and political situation.
Introduction: Public religion, homophobia and the politics of homosexuality in Africa
04::Introduction: Public religion, homophobia and the politics of homosexuality in Africa

- Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, who in 1995 already infamously stated that homosexuals are people who ‘behave worse than pigs and dogs’, and since then has continued to frequently spew overt homophobic rhetoric.
- The Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, first tabled in Nigeria’s National Assembly in 2006 and finally passed in 2013 to be signed into law by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan on 7 January 2014.
- The presumed ‘gay couple’ arrested in Malawi in December 2009 and sentenced to 14 years in jail after being convicted of ‘gross indecency and unnatural acts’ in April 2010, only to be ‘pardoned’ a month later by President Bingu wa Mutharika, following an intervention by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
- The Anti-Homosexuality Bill tabled in the Ugandan Parliament in 2009, and signed into law by President Yoweri Museveni on 24 February 2014, which originally included the death penalty for ‘aggravated homosexuality’ (the Act was later annulled by the Constitutional Court of Uganda on 1 August 2014).

All these cases, and similar ones from other countries, can be referred to in order to illustrate the relatively recent manifestation of political and state-sponsored homophobia in Africa. The apparent rise of such cases led one commentator in British newspaper, The Observer, to the (not unproblematic, as explained below) conclusion that the ‘inconvenient truth’ is that Africa ‘is the most homophobic continent on Earth’. A closer look soon makes clear that generally, religion is part and parcel of the anti-homosexuality language that is voiced, and policies that are initiated, by political leaders and other public figures. For example, even when Malawian President Mutharika pardoned the two ‘gay men’, he nevertheless stated that ‘these boys committed a crime against our culture, our religion and our laws’. In Nigeria and Uganda, the new pieces of anti-homosexuality legislation were largely driven by religious agendas (as the first two chapters in this volume make clear). Thus it is no surprise that in the Western media, the narratives of Africa as (one of) the most religious and (one of) the most homophobic continent(s) often are presented as mutually explanatory. The three main religious traditions of Africa (African Traditional/Indigenous Religions, Christianity and Islam) have been singled out as contributing towards ‘African homophobia’. The general picture tends to suggest that religion and culture have joint their forces to deny freedom to homosexuals in Africa.

Obviously, issues of same-sex relationships and LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) rights are subject of public and political controversy in many African societies today. In addition to the new anti-gay laws in Uganda and Nigeria, the Gambia in 2014 amended its criminal code to introduce a new crime, of ‘aggravated homosexuality’, with a sentence of life imprisonment. In many other countries, such as
Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Zambia, similar proposals to toughen existing laws, or introduce new legislation, have been made in recent years by politicians and/or opinion leaders. Despite all the attention that these cases have recently received, so far little energy has been expended in understanding these controversies in all their complexity and appreciating the critical role religion plays in them. Our intention is that the present book addresses this gap and enhances such an understanding, exploring issues of religion, homophobia and politics of homosexuality in Africa from various perspectives and in different contexts. To begin with, this introduction introduces and problematises some of the key concepts and it accounts for the approach followed in this volume to foreground the public role of religion in order to understand the politics of homosexuality in contemporary Africa.

**Homophobia and the politicisation of homosexuality**

As mentioned above, in the media Africa is sometimes represented as (one of) the most homophobic continent(s) of the world. In response to this representation, Ryan Thoreson has recently problematised the narrative of ‘a wave of homophobia in Africa’ that is perpetuated by the media as well as by some activists and academics. His concern is, first, that homophobia is not a very useful analytical concept because of its specific origins and meaning, and second, that such a narrative lumps ‘disparate incidents together’, homogenises ‘complex responses to sexual acts, identities, and politics’, and ‘elides local specificity’. Furthermore, referring to Jasbir Puar’s work on homonationalism, he points out that the narrative of ‘African homophobia’ too easily reinforces racist and colonialist perceptions of ‘the black continent’ as inherently hostile to sexual minorities. ‘By glossing both “homophobia” and “Africa” together, these tropes leave little room for the nuance and specificity of sexual politics in postcolonial settings’. A similar argument has been made by Patrick Awondo, Peter Geschiere and Graeme Reid in their critical interrogation of a monolithic image of one ‘homophobic Africa’, popular both among African leaders and in the international media, which is often portrayed vis-à-vis a progressive (or depraved) West. Indeed, there is a promising trend in academic studies of homosexuality and antihomosexuality politics in Africa to go beyond these simplistic and stereotypical depictions. Thus, Awondo, Geschiere and Reid propose a focus on the politicisation of homosexuality in Africa, in order ‘to highlight the historicity of recent explosions of homophobia, especially the way they are linked to the colonial and postcolonial background’. In other words, the plurality of homophobias is increasingly acknowledged and attention is drawn to the political economies that produce them. Thoreson prefers the term ‘anti-queer animus’ instead of ‘homophobia’, acknowledging that there are ‘manifold expressions of prejudice or violence against same-sex activity, LGBTI mobilization, and queer transgression and
those associated with them', and that not all these expressions are necessarily rooted in fear, as the term homophobia suggests, or are about homosexuality per se. We notice the point made here, but agree with Ireland that ‘although not a true phobia, “homophobia” has become the rubric’ under which expressions of hostility towards homosexuality are being discussed, and ‘the term covers a range of negative attitudes towards homosexuality and those who are or are perceived to be homosexual’.

Various studies have begun to explore the diverse causes of, and (I)actors in the manifestations of homophobia and anti-homosexual politics in various African countries, examining the structures underlying them, the discourses through which they are expressed, and the responses they evoke. They highlight and unravel the complex intertwining of colonial legacies and postcolonial sensitivities, local politics, socio-economic factors, religious developments and cultural dynamics, in relation to global discourses of LGBTI identities and human rights. Building on this body of scholarship, the chapters in this book explore how and why issues related to homosexuality recently have become so central in public and political debates in different countries across the continent – with case studies ranging from Egypt to Zimbabwe and from Senegal to Kenya. They particularly examine and problematise how religious dynamics map onto the trajectories of the politicisation of homosexuality.

Complicating the role of religion

We suggest that the role of religion (religious beliefs, worldviews, sacred texts, religious leaders and institutions, faith communities, etcetera) is likely to be more complex, ambiguous and multifaceted than is often suggested. Part of the concern that inspired this volume was not only the monolithic depiction of ‘homophobic Africa’ but also of ‘religious homophobia’ in Africa. The scholars cited above, all calling for a more nuanced analysis of anti-homosexual mobilisations, tend to write in a rather generalising way about ‘conservative religious belief’, ‘religious fundamentalisms’, ‘religious orthodoxy’ or ‘Christian conservatives’ and ‘fundamentalist Islamic groups’ to explain homophobia in Africa. The suggestion here seems to be that the orthodox, conservative or fundamentalist character of religion(s) in Africa as such has contributed to the recent politicisation of homosexuality. This is problematic, not only because the meaning of the terms ‘orthodox’, ‘conservative’ and ‘fundamentalist’ is not defined, making them analytically imprecise and unhelpful, but also because the major religions in Africa, Christianity and Islam, are enormously diverse; a monolithic depiction of these faiths as conservative, orthodox or fundamentalist (whatever these terms may mean exactly) overlooks the differences in beliefs, practices, world views, social roles and political attitudes that exist within each religion. As far as Christianity is concerned, the
politicisation of homosexuality is often associated with the rise of Pentecostal forms of Christianity in Africa and their link to the American Christian Right. However, the question to what extent Pentecostalism – itself an umbrella term for an enormous variety of movements and groups – is orthodox, conservative and fundamentalist is debatable, as is the question why many African Pentecostal leaders have come to demonstrate such a concern with homosexuality. On the other hand, the Catholic Church – also a major player in the African religious field – certainly considers itself to be orthodox but is generally seen to be less involved in actively fuelling social and political homophobia (though this varies from country to country) in spite of its clear views on homosexuality. Thus, terms like ‘orthodox’, ‘conservative’ or ‘fundamentalist’ faith are hardly helpful analytical and explanatory frames to discuss the links between religion, homophobia and anti-homosexual politics in Africa today.

Awondo, Geschiere and Reid have suggested that recent explosions of homophobia in Africa might have their background in ‘a growing disappointment with the promises of development’ that makes people seek ‘refuge’ in homophobic religion. Of course this might help to understand some of the dynamics, yet as an overall explanation it is far from being satisfactory. In particular, it does not help to understand why precisely in the last decade – in which many African economies have grown considerably and the narrative of Africa as a ‘rising continent’ has become prominent – many African societies simultaneously witnessed the rise of socio-political homophobia, certainly not only among the ‘losers’ of economic development but, as it seems, certainly also among the growing middle classes and the political elite. Further, the religious groups that are most vocal about (or against) homosexuality tend to be urban, typically attracting educated professionals rather than economically disadvantaged people. If there is a link between development, religion and homosexuality, it is a more complex one; as Barbara Bompani suggests in her chapter in this volume, it relates to contesting understandings of what ‘development’ actually means and how it is envisioned. Obviously, modernity and globalisation have made homosexuality and LGBTI rights – being modern concepts themselves – an issue of public and political concern in contemporary Africa, and have also led to same-sex or ‘queer’ identities and communities becoming more visible in society. Yet Shmuel Eisenstadt’s (2002) work on ‘multiple modernities’ in our contemporary world, and the related Africanist debates on ‘African modernities’ or ‘multiple trajectories of modernity’ in Africa make clear that there is no singular progressive and liberal narrative of ‘modernity’, neither in the West nor in Africa. Rather African societies navigate their own paths of modernity, and these do not necessarily lead to a greater cultural, social and political acceptance of same-sex relationships or recognition of LGBTI rights. What we observe today, in many of the controversies over homosexuality in Africa, are conflicting versions of modernity with clashes between different understandings of sexuality,
personhood, human rights and the relation between religion and politics.

To provide a more in-depth understanding of the nexus between religion and the politicisation of homosexuality in Africa, we propose a focus on the notion of ‘public religion’. This enables an analysis of the conflation of religion with politics and public life that is characteristic of the configuration of religion – specifically the major religions, Christianity and Islam – in contemporary African societies and that is clearly reflected in the debates about homosexuality. The notion of ‘public religion’ is derived from sociologist José Casanova who, in his 1994 book Public Religions in the Modern World, develops the thesis of the deprivatisation of religion in the modern world and its renewed manifestation in the public sphere:

By deprivatization I mean the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them. Social movements have appeared which either are religious in nature or are challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and the market economy. Similarly, religious institutions and organizations refuse to restrict themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls and continue to raise questions about the interconnections of private and public morality and to challenge the claims of the subsystems, particularly states and markets, to be exempt from extraneous normative considerations.

(Casanova 1994, 5)

As Casanova has acknowledged himself, his thesis about the deprivatisation of religion is rather Western-centric. The abundance of scholarship on religion in Africa makes it clear that in Africa (as in many other parts of the world) religion has never been a private affair and has always conflated with politics and public life. This applies to African indigenous religions where ‘religion’ cannot even be separated from ‘politics’ because both find their roots in the perception of spiritual power, as well as to Christianity and Islam that, in the twentieth century, have become the main religions on the African continent (not simply by replacing indigenous religions but by incorporating indigenous worldviews, beliefs and practices through complex processes of negotiation and dis/continuity). Despite its western-centrism, we believe that

the notion of public religion is relevant also outside the West, not simply because religions in Africa and in other parts of the world are ‘public’, but – more interestingly – because these public religions relate in dynamic and complex ways to secular regimes of knowledge, power and politics both nationally and globally. Processes of (re-) enchantment, where ‘secular’ issues such as homosexuality and human rights are perceived and responded to from
a deeply religious perspective, are part of this dynamic.

(van Klinken 2013a, 521–522)

Furthermore, even though it is hard to speak about the deprivatisation and resurgence of religion in African societies in a meaningful way, the public manifestation of religion in Africa is not static but dynamic. Contemporary Christian and Islamic groups are ‘public,’ that is, they seek public visibility and political influence, in different, more explicit, competitive and contested ways than indigenous religions did in the past. Our interest, therefore, is in the current forms of public religion and the changing configurations of the relationship between religion, politics and public spheres in contemporary African contexts.

More precisely, our interest is in the relation between ‘public religion’ and (homo)sexual politics. As Marion Burchardt suggests with reference to South Africa, ‘the concomitant rise of the public presence of sexual minorities’ politics and of “public religion” is often fashioned antagonistically’:

In South Africa and, albeit in a different fashion, other parts of Africa, the resistance against the progressive institutionalization of equality before the law of same-sex partnerships can even be viewed as a key motif of the emergence of particular kinds of public religion. In other words, both religious and sexual rights mobilizations may depend on and thrive in reaction to one another, sometimes entering a symbiotic social existence.

Of course, South Africa is unique on the African continent for its progressive constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and its legalisation of same-sex civil unions (which nonetheless has not led to widespread social acceptance of same-sex relationships). In other parts of the continent same-sex sexualities and identities have also become more visible, not at least as a result of global discourses and politics; they have become central public concerns and evoked particular public religious responses.

Burchardt distinguishes three scenarios of how public religion and the publicness of same-sex identities and ideologies can be productively combined in different types of society:

First, in societies with strong public religion, particularly at the level of the state and political society, same-sex relationships and practices may be unproblematic as long as they are resolutely privatized, i.e., they are neither publicly displayed, are not the subject of public discourse, nor demand legal protection. (. . .) Second, the public presence of same-sex sexualities in terms of legal recognition and political activism seems relatively unproblematic if and where religion has been privatized in the sense of being a personal,
inward-oriented issue of faith. ( . . ) Third, the configurations in which both
religions and same-sex communities are highly active in the public domain
appear to be more problematic.

(Burchardt 2013, 242–243)

Burchardt suggests that the first scenario until recently seems to have been the case in
many African countries. This corresponds with Marc Epprecht's thesis of the relative
'culture of discretion' that surrounded issues of sexuality, and same-sex relationships, in
many African societies. The second scenario can be found in some Western European
societies, but in Africa it is hard to observe either a privatisation of religion or an
unproblematic recognition of same-sex sexualities. As an example of the third scenario,
in which the relationship between public religion and public same-sex sexuality results
in confrontation, Burchardt refers to South Africa. Indeed, in post-apartheid South Africa
a highly public visibility and activity of both religious and sexual minority organisations
can be observed, with each group mobilising for a recognition and protection of their
rights, often in conflict with the other. The question is whether this scenario also
applies to other African contexts. Even though many African countries in recent years
have witnessed public controversies over homosexuality, often inspired by religious
actors and beliefs, in most cases they do not have a similar public visibility of sexual
minority groups mobilising for their rights. They certainly do not have a similar judicial
context as in South Africa, where sexual minority rights are constitutionally
safeguarded and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is prohibited.

It seems that we need a fourth scenario to capture the situation in many African
countries where public religion is mobilised in order to circumvent same-sex
communities and LGBTI identities from becoming socially visible and to prevent sexual
minority rights from being recognised. This scenario can most clearly be illustrated
with what has been called 'anticipatory legislation': 'In many African countries,
[same-sex] marriage and adoption of children [by people in same-sex relationships] are,
of course, not issues that gays there are concerned about, yet bills or laws are passed in
anticipation'. Nigeria's Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act, 2014, discussed in Ogunotola-
Laguda and van Klinken's contribution to this volume, is a good case in point. It is the
legalisation of same-sex marriage in other parts of the world that inspired Nigerian
legislators to propose and pass a Bill preventing similar developments to happen in
their country, even if there is no sign that local same-sex communities think about
campaigning for equal marriage rights since they are concerned about much more basic
issues. In other words, more than a strong, visible and active local same-sex or LGBTI
community, in many cases it is international developments and foreign factors, and
their possible empowering effects on local communities, that give rise to religious, as
well as political and judicial, mobilisations against same-sex sexuality in Africa.
This volume

In the call for papers through which we solicited contributions to this book, we stated that ‘as editors we share, on the one hand, a concern about the apparent rise of anti-homosexual rhetoric and politics in African contexts, and on the other hand about the image of a generally homophobic Africa that is popular in the West.’ We included this statement to make clear to possible contributors that as much as this book is an academic project, any contribution to this project is political as well. This is not only because of the way homosexuality has become politicised in recent years, which makes it almost impossible to take a neutral or objective scholarly stance. More fundamentally, we believe that in addition to academic reasons, there are at least two other reasons making homosexuality and homophobia important issues for scholarly investigation, particularly in Africa. In agreement with Patrick Ireland, we hold that, ‘First, human beings are discriminated against, hurt, and even killed because of who they are; making homosexuality a human rights issue as it relates, among others, to the rights to freedom of expression, privacy, equality and dignity; and ‘Second, despite the odd dissenting view, the general public health consensus is that homophobia increases the risk of HIV infection in both gay people and the general population’, making homosexuality a public health concern. In fact, our interest in homosexuality has been inspired, among others, by our work on issues of HIV and AIDS in relation to gender and sexuality.

Against the emerging understanding of homosexuality as an issue of human rights and public health, it is rather surprising that the subject so far has received very little attention in the circles of either African theology or the study of religion in Africa. Just as an illustration, the Journal of Religion in Africa, a leading journal in the field of African religious studies, until 2013 had never published an article explicitly focusing on issues of homosexuality. The study of religion in Africa, according to Chitando, is characterised by a ‘utilitarian approach’, meaning that it examines both the negative and constructive roles of religion in a variety of socio-political issues and practical concerns, but so far this has not resulted in a systematic engagement with homophobia and same-sex sexuality. On the contrary, it seems that scholars until recently shied away from addressing these controversial issues. Against this background, we hope that the present book is a timely intervention adequately addressing this gap in existing research. The response to the original call for papers was rather overwhelming, and as a result this volume will be complemented by another book volume focusing specifically on Christianity. We are particularly pleased by the fact that a significant part of the contributors are scholars from Africa. This is important, to quote S.N. Nyeck and Marc Epprecht because ‘it immediately challenges one of those stereotypes about non-normative sexualities in Africa that opponents of sexual rights often cite: that non-normative sexualities are not a topic of particular interest to African intellectuals.”
or a serious research priority but rather reflect a purely Western-driven agenda or elitist frivolity.

With regard to terminology, discussing same-sex sexuality in African contexts is rather complicated. Several critics have problematised the ways in which Western concepts of homosexuality, gay and lesbian identity, LGBTI or queer, have been used to analyse and conceptualise African expressions of sexual and gender diversity. There is now a substantial body of scholarship on African homosexualities showing the rich history of diverse gender and sexual practices that for a long time have been tolerated, and in some cases recognised, in African societies, which, however, often do not fit in the categories developed in and emerged from Western contexts. In recent times, however, Western discourses and concepts of homosexuality, LGBTI identities and queer politics have been introduced to African contexts, and to a considerable extent have been adopted by local sexual minority communities and activists. This book neither aims to examine this process, nor to enter into the theoretical debates surrounding it. We do acknowledge the complexity and have left it to the individual authors to choose the terms that they think are appropriate in their study. Generally, the contributors seem to agree with Sylvia Tamale when she writes:

[[If we were to totally jettison Western concepts and theoretical frameworks, we would spend considerable resources reinventing the wheel – an unnecessary enterprise. There is a lot of sense in using existing theoretical bases as a starting point and then correcting/revising them in light of the contextual evidence collected in current studies.

(Tamale 2011, 25)]]

Thus, several authors engage the work of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, to mention two leading Western theorists, creatively utilising it for their case studies. In several cases, they also question and challenge, more or less directly, Western theories of sexuality. The most promising theoretical field opened up in some contributions is the interrogation of the perceived secular bias underlying queer theory and its negative attitude towards religion. As Nathanael Homwood argues in his contribution, this needs to be addressed vis-à-vis African contexts where LGBTIs often express a profound religiosity, which calls for further reflection upon the positive link between religion and homosexuality and upon the possibility of religion as a resource for queer empowerment.

With regard to religious traditions, the chapters in this volume explore Christian, Islamic as well as Rastafari contexts. As far as Christianity is concerned, the focus is mostly, but not exclusively on Pentecostal forms of Christianity, which arguably have contributed more directly, actively and explicitly to the politics of homosexuality and LGBTI rights in Africa than other denominations. The Pentecostal concern with
homosexuality reflects the broader dynamic of Pentecostalism as a public religion, or a political spirituality, in contemporary African societies. Although in several chapters reference is made to beliefs from African traditional religions, it seems that these religions have less directly contributed to politics of homosexuality. This might be a result of their relatively marginalised status in modern African societies, or to their lower levels of institutionalisation, but another possible explanation might be that these religions are more ambivalent when it comes to recognising same-sex practices than Christianity and Islam, as they allow for a certain level of diversity and fluidity when it comes to gender and sexuality.

This volume is organised in three parts. Section I, 'The Politicisation of Homosexuality', follows the proposal of Awondo, Geschiere and Reid to explore and examine the processes through which homosexuality has been and is being politicised in contemporary Africa. The section presents case studies from different countries across the continent. These include the infamous cases of Uganda, known worldwide for its controversial Anti-Homosexuality Act, and of Nigeria, that recently also passed anti-homosexual legislation in the form of the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act. Both countries present examples of how the politicisation of homosexuality resulted in the introduction of new legislation, and as Barbara Bompani shows for Uganda (Chapter 1), and Danoye Oguntola-Laguda and Adriaan van Klinken show for Nigeria (Chapter 2), this legislation is inspired by particular religious agendas mapping onto politics and nationalism – in the Ugandan case the emergence of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity as a new political discourse, and in the Nigerian case the attempt to bridge the Christian-Muslim divide in the country by a joint mobilisation against homosexuality. The focus on legislation is continued in Chapter 3, where Serena Tolino shows how in Egypt even though Islamic law is not applied and the country has no law against homosexuality, homosexuals are increasingly prosecuted – a development that coincides with the recent growth in the number of fatwa-s on homosexuality and articles about homosexuality published in Egyptian Islamic media, as well as coeval Egyptian judicial verdicts. Interestingly, the chapter demonstrates that Egypt – a country not seldom considered as Middle Eastern rather than African – is affected by similar dynamics as other countries on the continent, both with regard to the public significance of religion and the politicisation of homosexuality. Thus the other three chapters in this section continue unravelling the intersections of religion and politics in the politicisation of homosexuality in various countries. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe already since the mid-1990s opposes homosexuality and LGBTI rights with much fervour, engaging in popular religious rhetoric and with enthusiastic support from religious leaders. Even though, as Molly Manyonganise shows (Chapter 4), it is not clear how serious Mugabe and his government really are about the issue – the rhetoric might just be for political gains – it is clear that political and religious elites have
contributed to a deeply homophobic socio-political climate. In contrast to this ‘politicisation from above’, in Chapter 5 Hassan Public religion 11 Ndovu shows how Muslims in Kenya out of their sense of being marginalised in Kenyan, largely Christian-dominated politics, and as part of their struggle for the preservation of presumed Islamic and/or African identity against ‘Western (Christian) culture’, have mobilised against homosexuality, thereby ironically disregarding the traditions of same-sex sexuality in coastal Muslim communities. Finally, in Chapter 6, Joseph Hellweg presents a case study of the politicisation of homosexuality in a francophone context, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). Different from Britain, France did not impose anti-homosexual laws in its colonies, and different from fellow former French colony Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire has not adopted such a law after independence – in fact the country has been relatively tolerant towards LGBTI people. Yet recent years have witnessed an increase in religious and political homophobia as well as an emergence of state-sponsored anti-gay violence. Hellweg explains this with reference to the country’s recent history, arguing that in the aftermath of a long political crisis, grounded in debates over national identity phrased in idioms of religion and ethnicity, a new definition of autochthony emerged, based on sexuality. In particular, the legalisation of same-sex marriage in France allowed religious and political leaders in Côte d’Ivoire to affirm national sovereignty over and against neo-colonial influence, negotiating the country’s place in the broader political economy of global neo-liberalism.

The chapters in Section II, ‘Global and Local Mobilisations’, analyse and discuss how the politics of homosexuality and the contestation of LGBTI rights in contemporary Africa are informed by global developments and dynamics, on the one hand, and by local mobilisations of power, on the other hand. It opens with a chapter by Kapa Kaoma offering a general account on the politics of homosexuality in sub-Saharan Africa in the age of globalisation (Chapter 7). Kaoma here adopts the concept of glocalisation to show how, in various African contexts, interest groups employ and adapt external ideologies and tactics to negotiate and shape their local socio-political landscape. This applies to local LGBTI groups as much as to those mobilising against them, and Kaoma particularly highlights how anti-gay politics in Africa, though claiming to protect ‘African culture’ against foreign influence, in fact are often informed and inspired, directly or indirectly, by certain American Christian Right agendas. Chapter 8 by Jia Hui Lee both illustrates and nuances Kaoma’s picture with reference to the case of Uganda, as it highlights the political agency of local actors involved in the passing of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill, while they negotiate and resist particular transnational networks of resources and power. Taking up Bayart’s notion of extraversion, Lee examines in particular the role of Anglican and Pentecostal leaders in Uganda who, through their anti-homosexual politics and their management of relations within global Christianity, have been able to transform themselves from local pastors
into global representatives of a truly 'biblical' and 'evangelical' Christianity. Counter-balancing the emphasis in some studies on the Western export of homophobia to Africa, in Chapter 9 Ashley Currier and Joëlle Cruz document indigenous anti-LGBTI organising in the context of Liberia. Their focus is on the New Citizens Movement, a group formed in 2012 by both Christian and Muslim leaders to guide Liberia’s moral development which soon initiated an anti-gay rights campaign. Drawing attention to grassroots collective action by local anti-LGBTI activists who genuinely believe that they are defending the nation’s welfare, Currier and Cruz not only highlight the local-rootedness of mobilisations against homosexuality in Liberia, but also raise the question how such a mobilisation might serve to temporarily quell or assuage interreligious tensions in the country – a question also explored in Chapter 2 with reference to Nigeria and in Chapter 6 vis-à-vis Côte d’Ivoire and calling for further comparative study. A similar concern with the nation’s welfare, in particular a concern with HIV prevention, is reflected in the mobilisation against homosexuality in Senegal, examined in Chapter 10. Here, Christophe Broqua points out how in Senegal homosexuals, or the group of men having sex with other men, were initially included in the country’s national AIDS control plan. This changed dramatically in the late 1990s and early 2000s when Jamra, an Islamic organisation that itself is involved in AIDS control, started to mobilise against homosexuality, successfully constructing it as a public problem and as a threat to the ‘religious morality’ that should prevent the spread of HIV. As a result, homosexuality became deeply politicised, hindering not only attempts to decriminalise same-sex practices but also prevention campaigns targeting on vulnerable groups including men having sex with other men. Continuing the focus on local mobilisations but going beyond the focus on Christianity and Islam that characterises other chapters in this volume, in Chapter 11 Fortune Sibanda foregrounds the Rastafari community in Zimbabwe and their role in the politicisation of homosexuality in the country. He argues that Rastafari, being a ‘queer’ phenomenon in Zimbabwe’s religious landscape and being marginalised by the political and religious establishment, have yet joined the bandwagon of popular homophobia in society in order to increase their visibility and fight for their own rights. Critically, Sibanda employs the Rastafari tenet of ‘One Love’ to point out that there are potential resources through which Rastafari can become a truly queer community welcoming, instead of chanting down, same-sex love. In the closing chapter of this section, Prince Guma examines the complex reception history of a story that has become foundational to Ugandan Christianity, the story about the Martyrs of Uganda (Chapter 12). Open to various interpretations and throughout the years having been used for different socio-political ends, this story about the late nineteenth century stand-off between the Buganda King and Christian missionaries following the conversion of a group of royal pages has most recently gained new significance in Ugandan debates about
homosexuality. Guma explores how the story, which in its popular interpretation equates the arrival of Christianity to the struggle against same-sex practice in Uganda, is currently used to incite anti-gay sentiments and justify anti-homosexual legislation in a country that increasingly defines itself as ‘a Christian nation’. At the same time, the shifting interpretations and appropriations of the story leave open the possibility of alternative and possibly queer readings.

Section III, entitled ‘Contestation, Subversion and Resistance’, then presents various cases of how public religion and anti-homosexual politics in contemporary Africa can be, and are being, challenged, questioned and disrupted. Public religion, by its publicity, makes itself the subject of public criticism and debate. One field in which popular religious homophobia has begun to be addressed is African literature, as Pauline Mateveke shows in Chapter 13 with reference to recent Zimbabwean literary writing. Taking up Achebe’s notions of the writer as a public critic and of literature as a means to social reform, Mateveke explores how two literary texts – one fiction, the other (auto)biography – have ‘dared’ to tell the story of homosexuality in the Zimbabwean context. These writers thereby interrogate the patterns of silencing and stigmatising homosexuality in society, question the antagonistic narrative of Christianity and homosexuality, and foreground the potential in indigenous religions to appreciate same-sex sexuality. In Chapter 14, Adriaan van Klinken examines another case of contesting religious-based homophobia. He discusses how a local Zambian NGO has taken up the cudgels for gay rights, not using a secular human rights discourse but presenting an inculturated narrative of human rights. Importantly, this NGO presents a marginal yet significant counter-discourse against popular rhetoric, using an explicitly Christian rationale and reversing the argument of Zambia being a Christian nation in order to support its stance. The case demonstrates that there exist conflicting visions within African societies, and within African Christian circles, centred around questions of sexuality and human rights, and hence it helps to debunk monolithic depictions of ‘homophobic Zambia’ as part of a larger ‘homophobic Africa’ populated by a ‘homophobic Christianity’. The latter is done more radically in Nathanael Homewood’s account on what he calls ‘counter-intimacies’ in Zimbabwean Christianity (Chapter 15). Drawing on the stories of four ordinary, gay Zimbabweans about their sexual and religious experiences, Homewood argues that in a society that explicitly forbids and bans same-sex practice, the performance, formations and explorations of male-on-male eroticism has moved to alternative spaces including Christian churches. Where counter-intimacies by queer theorists such as Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner are conceptualised as forms of ‘sex in public’ that are radical, anti-normative and actively aggressive politically, Homewood explores and seeks to understand the possibility of non-radical resistance – an alternative form of queer worldmaking within the very heteronormative public spaces of Christianity. Hence he concludes that there are
innumerable ways of being queer, and whether the queer theorist likes it or not, in African contexts religion offers a space conducive to many such variations and riffs. The concluding chapter (16) also presents an example of resistance, but from quite a different theoretical angle. In this chapter, Richard McCarty and Jay Breneman engage the popular idea of homosexuality as un-African and a Western invention, and of LGBTI rights advocacy as a form of Western imperialism. Instead of deferring to cultural and moral relativism and simply accept that the values of one people are not the values of others, the authors search for a middle ground to make the case that LGBTI rights are actually good to promote. They find such middle ground in the framework of critical realism – a philosophical perspective that can provide reliable descriptions of human sexuality and gender identity, as well as the relationship of these to personal development and wellbeing. Whether or not their proposal will convince more nation-states, political parties, and people groups in Africa to exercise respect and justice toward LGBTI people is yet to be seen, but at least they open up a space for renewed dialogue and present an intervention in the popular rhetoric against homosexuality and LGBTI rights. Such an intervention is also presented by the African LGBTI Manifesto, written during a roundtable session of various African LGBTI activists in Nairobi in April 2010, which several authors refer to and therefore has been included as Appendix in this volume.

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