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Introduction

Given the recent refugee crisis and the resulting migration within Europe, now is the perfect time to highlight our wide range of offerings in the field of immigration. We are pleased to offer a representative set of seven chapters from just some of our popular texts to give you an idea of the quality and variety of publications we have available here at Routledge. The chapters presented in this FreeBook cover topics of current interest and ongoing academic debate: the global governance of migration, trans-regionalism and nationalism, immigration control and policy, securing borders, the politicization of immigration, and national identity.

Chapter 1. The Global Governance of Migration and the Role of Trans-Regionalism

This chapter contextualizes the emergence of migration partnerships within the broader conceptual framework of ‘trans-regional migration governance.’ It suggests that although the multilateral regulation of migration remains limited, this is not to say that there is no global migration governance. Alexander Betts explores the emergence of trans-regional governance through a focus on European Union (EU)–African relations.

Chapter 2. Immigration Control and Securing the EU’s External Borders

Artur Gruszczak examines the legal and practical implications of immigration control and securing the EU’s external borders. Using statistical data, documents and practices, he demonstrates how the concept of ‘Fortress Europe’ develops and how EU migration policy is built on a common perception of threats and risks underpinning an exclusionary and selective approach to non-EU citizens.

Chapter 3. A framework for studying the politicisation of immigration

Why is it that some issues are often heavily politicised, and in other instances, not at all? In this chapter, Wouter van der Brug, Gianni D’Amato, Joost Berkhout and Didier Ruedin answer this question by presenting a conceptual map of (de)politicisation of immigration and integration in Western Europe. This two dimensional process of politicisation allows them to build a typology of four different types of explanations for how an issue might (not) become.

Chapter 4. National Identity and the Challenge of Immigration

Why does immigration roil the politics of so many countries, even those with ageing and declining populations? In this chapter, Jack Citrin analyzes public opinion data from Europe and North America to show how conceptions of national identity are linked to
preferences regarding immigration policy. Findings reveal that the contrasting histories of immigration in the United States and Europe have resulted in different conceptions of where diversity fits into images of the nation.

Chapter 5. The Immigration Industrial Complex: Who Profits from Immigration Policies Destined to Fail?

The immigration industrial complex is the confluence of public and private sector interests in the criminalization of undocumented migration, immigration law enforcement, and the promotion of ‘anti-illegal’ rhetoric. In this chapter, Tanya Golash-Boza argues that the existence of an immigration industrial complex is one of the main reasons for America’s strict immigration policies. She underlines the profit potential of immigration law enforcement; highlights how local violent crime is exploited by local media in order to attract viewers; and emphasizes how ‘othering’ is used in political circles to validate increased defence spending.

Chapter 6. Modernity, globalization and nationalism: The age of frenzied boundary-building

Nationalism and modernity both indulge in practices of classification, definition and delimitation, leading to the simultaneous destruction of old boundaries and the rise of new ones. In this chapter, Daniele Conversi argues that nationalism, as a boundary-building practice, belongs to a broader ideological discourse that began to prevail with the onset and expansion of modernity that pushed towards the disruption of traditional boundaries and the rising of new ones. He also argues that, over the last decades, these trends have interacted with neo-liberal globalization, processes which corrode as well as reinforce existing boundaries.

Chapter 7. Evaluating Party Politicization of Immigration

In the institutional arena of politics, the debate over how to effectively govern multi-ethnic societies remains contentious. In this chapter, Michelle Hale Williams argues that political parties have been key architects of the contemporary debate over immigration, and that this leading role can be either constructive or destructive depending on how it is mantled. She examines evidence of the party politicization of immigration comparing the USA, Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the UK to investigate the extent to which political parties have facilitated the government response to the multicultural dilemma, and to what extent they have contributed to the problems governments face in managing ethnically heterogeneous populations.
The Global Governance of Migration and the Role of Trans-Regionalism
Chapter 1: The Global Governance of Migration and the Role of Trans-Regionalism

The international institutional framework that regulates states' responses to migration is of a fundamentally different type from the UN-based multilateralism that emerged to regulate other international issues in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Although international migration is not new, it has only relatively recently been recognized as a significant global issue that requires a debate on the role of international cooperation (Betts 2011; Ghosh 1999; Hansen 2008; Koslowksi 2009; Martin and Martin 2006). The quantitative growth in international migration has contributed to migration becoming an increasingly politicized and visible issue. Meanwhile, the qualitative change in the nature of migration, with increasing south–south movements and the internationalization of labour markets, has led states to seek cooperative ways to maximize the economic benefits of migration, while minimizing the costs associated with undesirable migration. As with other trans-boundary issue areas, states have increasingly recognized that they are unable to address their concerns with migration in isolation but that forms of collaboration and coordination are necessary.

Yet, with the notable exception of the refugee regime, there is no formal or comprehensive multilateral regime regulating how states can and should respond to the movement of people across national borders, and no overarching UN organization monitoring states' compliance with norms and rules. The majority of the formal rules that do exist in relation to migration pre-date the Second World War. The long-standing passport regime, treaties on labour rights, and the basis of the refugee regime all emerge from the inter-war years, and most subsequent formal multilateralism has merely supplemented or updated these institutions. Attempts to develop new formalized cooperation mechanisms in the post-Cold War era have been very limited and have generally failed. The limited ratification of the Treaty on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families and the degree of inter-state polarization over the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development
and the Global Forum on Migration and Development’s (GFMD) relationship
to the UN system, highlights the degree of opposition to formal multilateralism.
The limited extent of formalized cooperation is partly attributable to the fact
that the issue’s growth in political prominence has coincided with an era in
which states’ support for formal multilateralism (in the sense of inclusive,
binding treaties overseen by international secretariats) is generally in decline.
However, this alone provides an insufficient explanation for the limited degree
of formal cooperation, which is also attributable to some of the characteristics of
the issue area. Unlike many other issue areas such as climate change mitigation
or the development of a vaccine for a global pandemic, neither migration nor
global migration governance represent global public goods for which the benefits
are non-excludable and non-rival (Barrett 2007; Kaul et al. 1999). Migration
itself is a private good for which the main costs and benefits accrue to the
sending and receiving states and the migrant. Meanwhile the benefits of global
migration governance – orderliness and predictability – may be non-rivalrous in
the sense that they are undiminished by another state’s consumption but are
unlikely to be non-excludable. Much of global migration governance is therefore
better conceived as a ‘club good’ for which the benefits of its existence may well
be non-rival but can be excluded from states. This means that states do not
require all-inclusive, binding multilateral cooperation in order to maximize the
benefits and minimize the costs of mobility, but can instead often revert to more
exclusive bilateral, regional, and inter-regional ‘clubs’.
Furthermore, the international politics of most areas of migration is characterized
by a fundamental power asymmetry, generally between migrant sending
and receiving states. In the absence of a binding, institutional framework,
receiving states have discretion to open or close their borders and are thus
implicit ‘rule-makers’, while sending states have to generally accept the
decisions of receiving states and are thus implicit ‘rule-takers’.
This generally means that unilateralism is in the interests of the powerful, receiving states, while multilateralism is in the interests of the weaker, sending states. This representation of the international politics of migration plays out at both the global and the regional level and serves as an obstacle to formalized cooperation. At the global level, voting patterns at the UN on, for example, the GFMD have polarized along north–south lines in accordance with whether states have been predominantly sending or receiving states. On a regional level, it is often the more powerful, receiving states that shun binding cooperation. As long as it remains in the perceived interests of the powerful states to avoid binding rules and to retain discretion, the power asymmetry inherent to the politics of migration will represent a major barrier to formalized, multilateral cooperation.

Yet even though there is no formal, coherent multilateral UN-based governance framework, this is not to say that there has been no global migration governance. In reality there is a rich and fragmented tapestry of global migration governance, much of which has emerged in a historically ad hoc way. It exists at a number of levels. On a first level, there is a thin and incoherent layer of formal multilateralism that builds upon the inter-war years framework in areas such as the refugee regime, ILO conventions, and norms underpinning the use of passports. At a second level, there are a range of international agreements that have emerged to regulate other issue areas – WTO law, maritime law, human rights law, and humanitarian law, for example – which although not explicitly labelled as migration, have implications for how states can and do respond to human mobility. This ‘embedded’ governance has contributed to a range of international organizations and other actors becoming actively engaged in debates on migration insofar as it touches upon a broader set of mandates. At a third level, as political concern with labour migration and irregular migration has increased, new mechanisms of global migration governance have emerged that are exclusive
rather than inclusive (in the sense that they involve a limited group of states and are based on closed membership) and can be subsumed under the notion of ‘trans-regionalism’.

Trans-regional governance can be defined as sets of formal and informal institutions that cut across and connect different geographical regions. It is not reducible to ‘inter-regionalism’ insofar as it need not necessarily involve an inclusive dialogue between representatives of different regions. Instead, it may involve both inclusive and exclusive structures linking regions through a combination of regional, inter-regional, and bilateral norms and forums. The concept builds upon ideas relating to external network governance developed particularly in the work of others (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009; Lavenex 2008).

It is at this third level that global migration governance is developing most rapidly. A cross-cutting layer of bilateral, regional, and inter-regional cooperation has emerged. Northern, migrant receiving states are attempting to develop the means to control and manage migration within and from southern regions of origin. The bilateral Migration Partnerships explored in this volume (see Kunz, Panizzon, and Lavenex and Stucky in this volume) are but one aspect of the set of governance mechanisms through which northern states are attempting to develop trans-regional authority over migration, and they need to be seen in this larger context. While individual European states are trying to develop partnerships and the EU as a whole is developing a ‘Global Approach to Migration’, this chapter argues that these trends are part of a wider pattern of ‘trans-regional governance’ as a means by which northern states increasingly attempt to control and manage irregular migration. This chapter therefore focuses mainly on this level of global migration governance.

The chapter is divided into three main parts. First, it outlines the different levels of global migration governance. Second, it explains the emergence of
trans-national and trans-regional governance in relation to migration. Third, it looks empirically at trans-regional migration governance in the context of EU–African relations by looking comparatively at the development of Europe’s trans-regional authority over migration policy in the East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) regions.

Three levels of global migration governance
It has become increasingly common to argue that there is no or limited global migration governance. While it may be true to suggest that global migration governance within a formal multilateral and UN context remains limited, and that progress on the ‘migration and development’ debate within the UN has been limited, this is not a basis on which to claim that there is no global migration governance. It is simply of a different and – arguably – more complex type than many issue areas in which more neatly compartmentalized regimes emerged in the post-Second World War context. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of global migration governance as existing at three principal levels.

Inter-war multilateralism
Unlike many other trans-boundary issue areas such as trade or the environment, migration lacks a coherent, UN-based multilateral framework. It was not an area that developed strong institutionalized cooperation in the post-Second World War era when many other regimes were emerging. This was because, at the time, there was no demand for such a regime. However, subsequently the power relations between migrant ‘receiving’ and migrant ‘sending’ states have meant that receiving states with greater power have sought to retain discretion over their own migration policies rather than engage in formalized institutional cooperation.
Although formal multilateral cooperation on migration through the UN is limited, the issue area nevertheless does have elements of institutionalized multilateral cooperation. Koslowski (2009), for example, divides the global governance of migration into three broad ‘global mobility regimes’: the refugee, international travel, and labour migration regimes. He suggests that the former has the most developed multilateralism, the latter the least, with travel somewhere in between. In many ways, however, each of these regimes does provide a layer of multilateral global migration governance, primarily based on the legacy of cooperation developed in the inter-war years.

The global refugee regime, based on the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the role of UNHCR, is arguably the strongest form of formalized cooperation on migration (Loescher 2001; Loescher et al. 2008). It is the only area of migration with a specialized UN agency and a near universally ratified treaty that constrains states’ sovereign discretion in their admissions policies. The international travel regime, insofar as it is a regime, has developed a number of forms of multilateral coordination. The passport regime, in particular, relies upon large-scale multilateral cooperation. Over time, cooperation on technical standards relating to travel document security has become ever more complex. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has played an increasingly important role in setting standards (Koslowski 2010; Salter 2009).

Finally, the labour migration regime, although extremely limited, is nevertheless underpinned by a range of labour standards developed through the ILO treaties (Kuptsch and Martin 2010).

What is notable about all three of these areas, though, is that while they have all developed and evolved over time, they have their origins in the formal multilateral cooperation that emerged during the inter-war years. The most prolific era
of the ILO was prior to the Second World War, when it was one of the largest and most influential of international organizations. The basis of the passport regime – which underpins the entire notion of a travel regime – was established before the Second World War. The origins of the refugee regime can also be traced to the inter-war years and the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR). New multilateral cooperation has built only incrementally on these long-standing agreements but in many ways has adapted conservatively. Even in the three global-mobility regimes, powerful states have rarely sought to delegate additional authority in the areas of migration to a binding, multilateral framework.

Embeddedness

The concept of ‘embeddedness’ is widely used in anthropology to refer to a situation where an area of social life does not exist as a recognized and compartmentalized area but is an integrated part of the larger social system. In many communities, anthropologists have argued that issue areas such as the ‘economy’ or ‘law’ do not exist as an explicitly identifiable or atomistic area of society but are instead an integrated part of a larger social structure (Sahlins 1974; Wilk 1996; Appadurai 1988). For example, when asked, people in a particular community within many societies may not be able to point to a particular area of social life called the ‘economy’ but it may instead be an integrated and implicit part of the community. The concept can be analogously applied to global governance to highlight situations in which there may be limited explicit governance in an issue area but in which that issue area is nevertheless implicitly regulated by institutions that were created to regulate other issue areas.

Much of global migration governance is not explicitly labelled as such but nevertheless regulates how states can and do behave in relation to migration. Much of global governance, in issue areas such as trade, security, and human
rights, pre-dates the post-Cold War international focus on migration. Rather than arriving on the international scene with an institutional blank slate, debate on international migration takes place against the backdrop of the extensive pre-existing structures of global governance that have emerged since the Second World War. In contrast to 1945, when much of the existing UN-based multilateral framework emerged, new issues and problems that arise at the international level are subject to the regulation and politics of a dense, pre-existing institutional framework. While these pre-existing institutions may not be explicitly labelled as covering ‘migration’, migration is nevertheless often implicitly regulated by these institutions.

At the level of norms, states’ responses to migration are regulated by their obligations in a host of other areas. A range of areas of public international law shapes the boundaries of acceptable state behaviour in the area of migration. For example, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, WTO law, maritime law, and labour law all represent important elements of global migration governance. It is as a result of these embedded institutions that some international lawyers have argued that one may conceive of the existence of International Migration Law (IML) based on these pre-existing bodies of law (Cholewinski et al. 2007). In that regard, Alexander Aleinikoff (2007) has spoken of the global governance of migration as comprising ‘substance without architecture’ insofar as the norms exist but have no coherent institutional framework through which to apply them. The chapters in this volume serve to illustrate the embedded nature of the normative framework regulating states’ responses to migration. The global governance of highly skilled labour migration draws upon WTO law through GATS mode 4; the global governance of environmental migration draws heavily upon a range of other areas of public international law; not least international human rights law; remittances are
indirectly shaped by the global governance of security; the root causes of
migration are shaped by the governance of development, trade, and security
(Betts 2011).
At the level of international organizations, the mandates of a host of pre-existing
UN agencies and non-UN agencies may not explicitly mention migration
but indirectly touch upon migration. The cross-cutting
and embedded nature of migration means that it connects in different ways to the
mandates of many international organizations from a variety of different perspectives.
Migration is not only the domain of the most obvious organizations – IOM, ILO, and
UNHCR – but also intersects with the work of other less obvious agencies. For example,
OHCHR is interested in migration because migrants have human rights; UNFPA
works on migration insofar as it touches upon issues relating to demography and
fertility; UNAIDS touches on migration because migrants often have HIV/AIDS;
UNITAR has developed a role in migration because of the need for state diplomats
and UN officials to receive training in an emerging and complex area; the World
Bank has developed a concern with migration insofar as there is an empirical link
between economic growth and, for example, remittances and circular migration.
The existence of so many actors whose work tangentially relates to migration
makes inter-agency coordination all the more complicated. It means that a host of
agencies participate in the various coordination mechanisms that have emerged for
inter-agency dialogue on migration (such as the Global Migration Group or the
UNDESA Annual Coordination Meeting on International Migration), rendering
coordination particularly challenging.
Given the pre-existing institutional frameworks, there has been a strong and
emerging tendency towards not creating new, binding structures but towards
working within the existing ones. The purpose of this has been to adapt and
clarify the role of existing institutions to enable them to meet the emerging challenge
of international migration. On a normative level, as states have resisted the
creation of new multilateral treaties, there has been a move towards ‘soft law’ frameworks. In other words, states and non-state actors have generally not sought to create new norms from scratch but have instead interpreted and consolidated the application of existing areas of law in relation to migration. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement serve as the archetypal example of this. Rather than seeking a new international treaty on internally displaced persons (IDPs), non-state actors consolidated existing international human rights law and international humanitarian law standards in a single document, which then became independently influential in shaping states’ behaviour towards migration. Similarly, the creation of IML represents a form of soft law insofar as it is based on the application and consolidation of existing standards in other areas. Discussions of responses to environmental displacement and a set of Guiding Principles on the Protection of Vulnerable Irregular Migrants further highlights the scope for developing soft law out of embedded governance. The advantage of the soft law approach is that it is more politically acceptable than the creation of ‘hard law’, and may nevertheless later acquire status of hard law either through its incorporation within domestic law or by providing a framework for subsequent international agreements. The principal disadvantage is that even though the underlying norms may be binding, the consolidated framework is, by definition, non-binding (Betts 2010).

Organizationally, this trend in the emergence of creating soft law has been complemented by the development of new coordination mechanisms between international agencies. Rather than working towards the creation of a new UN migration organization, for example, the trend has been to work within the existing tapestry of international organizations and to develop a division of responsibility that can address emerging problems through existing organizations.
This has taken place with respect to specific areas of migration. The Guiding Principles on IDPs, for example, has been implemented through a ‘cluster’ approach that divides responsibility for humanitarian affairs between different agencies. Similarly, in the area of irregular migration, informal partnerships between agencies such as IOM and UNHCR have arisen in specific geographical contexts. Meanwhile, at the overarching level, the Global Migration Group, for example, has offered a starting point for improving inter-agency coordination.

Trans-regionalism
The most important aspect of the emerging global migration governance is not taking place in relation to the ‘migration and development’ debates at the GFMD or at the UN. It is taking place in relation to trans-regionalism. Powerful ‘receiving’ states are striving to find ways to exert direct and indirect extra-territorial control over migration from and among ‘sending’ states in the developing world.

Trans-regional governance is the means by which they are exerting the authority to do this, developing and supporting a complex tapestry of bilateral, regional, and inter-regional mechanisms, both formal and informal, as states, through the regional organizations or through international organizations such as IOM. Trans-regional governance can be defined as sets of formal and informal institutions that cut across and connect different geographical regions, constituting or constraining the behaviour of states and non-state actors in a given policy field. It is not reducible to ‘inter-regionalism’ insofar as it need not necessarily involve an inclusive dialogue between representatives of different regions. Instead, it may involve both inclusive and exclusive structures linking regions through a combination of regional, inter-regional, and bilateral norms and forums. The actors involved in trans-regional governance may be regional, state, or non-state representatives. Trans-regionalism
offers a useful concept for capturing the proliferation of cross-cutting institutions that have emerged to regulate relations between migration sending, migration receiving, and transit regions, in particular. It is a type of governance that is – arguably – increasingly important in the context of northern states’ attempts to regulate irregular flows within and from the south.

At both the informal and the formal level, global migration governance exists at a number of different levels: regional, inter-regional, bilateral, and even unilateral. The norms and forums that exist at each of these levels are cross-cutting and intersect. The international politics of migration is shaped not only by each of these different levels having an independent effect but also by their interaction. The combination of cross-cutting forums and norms creates a rich and varied tapestry of institutions in which states can selectively engage with and include or exclude different partners in accordance with their preferences.

For example, any pair of states across two different regions might be simultaneously connected by a set of different norms and forums. Relations between predominantly migrant receiving states in the north and predominantly migrant sending or transit states in the south are increasingly regulated through a complex array of cross-cutting institutions. The US and Mexico, for example, meet on issues relating to international migration through the UN, NAFTA, the Puebla Process, and bilaterally (see Kunz in this volume). Italy and Libya, for example, are institutionally connected on migration through the work of UN agencies such as UNHCR, the EU’s relationship with Libya, the EU–AU platform on migration, the 5+5 Dialogue, and bilateral relations formalized by an agreement on readmission between Italy and Libya.

Europe’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa in the area of migration provides a particularly salient illustration of the complexity of trans-regional governance. The region has become an increasingly important unit of analysis
for migration in Africa. Cooperation on undocumented migration and labour migration has become an important aspect of the wider regional integration process within Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). RCPs such as MIDSA, MIDWA, EAC RCP, and IGAD RCP have nested within these RECs. However, the emergence of these structures has not been isolated from connections to Europe. The EU and IOM have played a crucial role in the development of regional cooperation. The RECs’ development of cooperation on migration has been supported by the AU with EU money, and the RCPs have been developed mainly with support and funding through IOM projects, which are in turn mainly funded by the EU or individual European states.

In addition to these structures of regional cooperation, a host of cross-cutting bilateral relationships have emerged connecting Europe and Africa in areas ranging from readmission to circular migration. In this context, many countries have developed privileged bilateral relationships on migration as part of wider strategic partnerships, sometimes linked to trade and development. Notable examples include strong bilateral partnerships on migration between Denmark and Kenya, France and Mali, the UK and Tanzania, the UK and Ethiopia, Italy and Libya, Spain and Senegal, France and Senegal, Switzerland and Nigeria, Portugal and Cape Verde, Spain and Morocco, and the EU and South Africa.1 Across sending/receiving states a complex set of parallel, nested, and overlapping institutions has therefore emerged (Alter and Meunier 2009; Raustiala and Victor 2004). This institutional proliferation creates a range of opportunities for states to choose between competing institutions and venues. For example, depending on the issue, a European state might choose to work in one of the following ways: unilaterally, bilaterally, through an RCP, through inter-regional dialogue, or through an inclusive multilateral forum. This creates opportunities for forum shopping; that is, allowing the selective inclusion and exclusion of
potential partner states (see also Panizzon in this volume). This poses fundamental questions about the strategies that different states adopt in selecting between institutions and competing venues, and what this institutional choice means for inter-state power relations in the area of migration. For example, the range of institutions and venues may create competition among developing states, enabling northern, predominantly migrant receiving states to engage in a ‘divide and rule’ strategy that reduces the ‘price’ of southern cooperation.

Part of the logic underlying the development of trans-regional governance is the nature of migration governance as what economists describe as a ‘club good’. It has been claimed by James Hollifield (2009) that there should be a collective interest in the development of a global migration regime because it would represent a global public good, the benefits of which would be non-excludable, in the sense that all states would benefit from its existence irrespective of their own contribution, and non-rival, in the sense that one state’s enjoyment of the benefits would not diminish those available to another state (Barrett 2007; Kaul et al. 1999). For Hollifield, the public-good nature of the benefits of ‘orderliness and predictability’ that come from global migration governance underlie the rationale for an inclusive, possibly UN-based framework.

However, this characterization misrepresents the nature of migration governance. To be strictly accurate about this point, one can divide migration into three broad areas: refugees, irregular and low-skilled migration, and high-skilled migration. The refugee regime may be characterized as a global public good – albeit with asymmetric distribution of the benefits – because the benefits of refugee protection are, to some extent, non-excludable and non-rival between states. One would therefore expect there to be a formal, multilateral regime in this area. The global governance of high-skilled migration might be a private good because is it possible not only to exclude states from enjoying the benefits of governance but, given the finite supply of skilled labour, those benefits are
likely to be rival between states. One would therefore expect this area to be characterized by mainly unilateral liberalization or bilateral agreements. However, in between these two extremes the governance of the majority of migration governance – in the areas of irregular and low-skilled migration – is more accurately characterized as a club good.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of migration</th>
<th>Dominant level of governance</th>
<th>Type of good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>Public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular/low skilled</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Club good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High skilled</td>
<td>Unilateral/bilateral</td>
<td>Private good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the positive and negative externalities of irregular and low-skilled migration governance may be non-rival, they are by definition excludable in the sense that structures of migration governance can be created that selectively involve groups of states and exclude non-members of the club from those benefits. Because migration governance regulates flows, the benefits of that governance can be confined to those states that are affected by the particular flow. Partnerships or ‘clubs’ can therefore be formed on circular migration, irregular migration control, or labour migration, for example. While there may be some externalities from the creation of these partnerships, the main externalities are generally confined to a finite number of states that can form a 'club' to address or to redistribute those externalities. The club good nature of the governance of irregular migration highlights why it is that trans-regional governance has become so prevalent in this area of migration.

The emergence of trans-regionalism

The international politics of migration is built upon a fundamental inequality of power. In the absence of a strong binding supranational authority, migrant ‘receiving’ states have the discretion to choose who they admit on to their territory, while migrant ‘sending’ states can do little to influence the decision of receiving states to admit or refuse entry. Receiving states therefore find themselves
as implicit ‘makers’ of governance in relation to labour migration, while sending states are by default ‘takers’ of the policies made in the receiving states. However, in the context of both irregular migration and skilled labour migration, receiving states, predominantly in the north, have become increasingly concerned not to stand back passively and make decisions about entry at the border of their state. Rather, they have increasingly sought to exert extra-territorial authority in order to shape the movement of people within and from other regions of the world. Indeed, the US, Europe, and Australia, for example, have all developed a range of policies intended to exert trans-regional authority over both irregular migration and labour migration. Similarly, some developing countries such as India and the Philippines have also tried to develop the means to exert authority over other states’ migration policies within other regions of the world (Court 2010).

Trans-regional governance has thus become the dominant mechanism through which an increasing number of states are embarking on attempts to exert Table 1.1 Typology of the nature of the goods involved in different areas of the global governance of migration Type of migration Dominant level of governance Type of good Refugees Multilateral Public good Irregular/low skilled Regional Club good High skilled Unilateral/bilateral Private good extra-territorial authority over migration flows. It includes, but is not reducible to, mechanisms such as trans-governmental policy networks, bilateral agreements, and inter-regional dialogues. Instead, the concept attempts to capture the combined use and purpose of these various mechanisms as a means of establishing trans-regional authority.

The RCPs have developed out of the ‘model’ of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration (IGC) created in 1985, such that there are now RCPs for just about every geographical region of the world, some being based on geographical regions and others bringing together states from
disparate parts of the world (Koehler, this volume). Such trans-governmental policy networks can be defined as non-hierarchical governance structures in which relations among government officials are repeated and enduring but where no one has the power to arbitrate and resolve among the members (Martinez-Diaz and Woods 2009: 1–2). They are often informal in the sense that they set out few binding rules or obligations for participants, and they do not work towards the development of formal agreements. Slaughter (2000) argues that transgovernmental networks have the advantages of being fast and flexible while also ‘bringing the state back into complex trans-national policy areas in which the state might otherwise be marginalized by the dominance of non-state actors’.

However, she also cautions that they may lack accountability, promote minimalist and exclusionary policy agendas, and marginalize traditional international organizations.

The focus and purpose of the RCPs varies by region. However, the principal focus of the RCPs has generally been in relation to areas that are not widely covered by formal, multilateral governance such as irregular migration, travel, human trafficking, and to a lesser extent labour migration. For example, MIDSA, MIDWA, the Budapest Process, the Bali Process, the Puebla Process, and the IGC have focused primarily on issues relating to irregular migration, although the Abu Dhabi Process has focused significantly on facilitating circular migration. Some of the RCPs have a formal link to RECs, others have no relationship with any pre-existing organizational or institutional structure (Koehler, this volume).

RCPs have been used as a means to facilitate the development of ‘good practice’ and to allow coordination of policies between states. The ‘RCP model’ has been based on a number of principles: (1) informal dialogue; (2) discussion behind closed doors; (3) the development of ‘good practice; (4) the absence of formal norm-creation;
(5) the involvement of civil servants rather than elected politicians (Nielsen 2007; Köhler this volume). Although no formalized cooperation emerges from the RCPs, they are generally seen as a vehicle through which collaboration or coordination might indirectly arise as a result. Based on information sharing and the development of ‘good practice’, more formal bilateral, regional, or inter-regional agreements may subsequently arise.

IOM has played a crucial role in the conception and dissemination of the RCP model (see Potaux in this volume). Although, IOM tends to argue that ‘state-ownership’ or ‘Regional Economic Community-ownership’ is a crucial attribute of RCPs, the reality is rather different. Over the past decade, IOM has been active and assertive in developing and disseminating the RCP concept. It often plays a central role in the development of specific RCPs providing advice, seeking funding from donor governments, and sometimes offering its own staff on secondment to supplement the secretariat of RCPs. Sometimes IOM staff even stand in for and represent RCPs at international meetings. Many newer RCPs such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, the IGAD RCP, and MIDSA have been largely conceived by and even run by IOM. In contrast to the earlier and more autonomous IGC, many more recent RCPs – especially in the African context – have been externally induced and are funded from outside the region. The RCP model is characteristic of trans-regionalism insofar as many RCPs are an externally driven form of network governance. While some of the earlier RCPs – for example, the IGC and the Budapest process – were indeed sui generis and internally driven, many of the new ones have been externally driven. In the case of the RCPs in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the funding and agendas have often been determined directly or indirectly by external influence. This matters in the sense that RCPs are conceived with the intention of enhancing states’ ‘capacity’ (Koehler, this volume) in the area of migration, but in many cases it is questionable whether they actually increase or decrease the ownership of the
country in question. In many ways, the RCP model represents the IOM creation of global migration governance in its own image. IOM is not a UN organization. It is the organizational manifestation of informal network governance. It is structured according to what it calls a 'projectized' approach, whereby its permanent secretariat and permanent budget are small. It establishes and hires staff to implement specific projects funded and supported by specific donor states. It represents itself as an inter-state organization insofar as it claims to provide services to states upon request and on the basis of funding being provided. Unlike organizations like UNHCR or ICRC, IOM has no explicit normative mandate and very little permanent infrastructure. It simply provides services through a network of temporary projects. Furthermore, the RCPs serve to create an ongoing demand for IOM's services. They create a framework through which an ongoing 'market' can be created for IOM projects. The RCPs are themselves being created in accordance with IOM's advice and expertise, within which IOM's own 'best practice' can be discussed, and on the basis of this, new IOM projects conceived.

The GFMD also follows a similar logic of informal network governance. Like the RCPs it takes place behind closed doors, it is outside the UN system, shuns formal norm-creation, and attempts to create an environment within which information sharing and dialogue can take place. It also has a significant input from IOM, which provides a significant part of the secretariat or 'light support structure' for the Forum. Unlike the RCPs, it is global rather than regional or inter-regional in scope. Although discussion is informal and no new agreements are conceived within the GFMD, formal agreements may emerge as an indirect product of the dialogue. For example, a set of pilot projects on circular migration between the EU and Mauritius have been partly attributed to discussions on the topic that took place at the first GFMD in Brussels.2
This approach is an important aspect of trans-regionalism insofar as some RCPs are inter-regional in scope and many others are established using funding from outside the region and disseminate knowledge structures that serve interests outside the region of the dialogue. However, in addition to informal networks, bilateral partnerships have become an increasingly important form of trans-regional governance. Peters (2009) suggests that there are around 145 bilateral migration treaties. Many of these have emerged in earlier waves. Between 1954 and 1965 bilateral treaties generally focused on assisted migration schemes and labour recruitment. During the 1970s, they were often developed to create privileged relationships with former colonies in the post-colonial context. Since the 1990s, however, bilateral migration treaties have increasingly been of a very different type, often focusing on issues relating to irregular migration and readmission agreements, frequently in a north–south context. Northern states, in particular, have developed a range of ‘partnerships with third countries’, often involving bargaining across different areas of migration or across migration, trade, and development (see Panizzon in this volume).

EU–African trans-regional governance
Since the 1980s there has been a significant growth in south–north irregular migration. This has led to growing political concern among northern electorates to develop policies to manage irregular migration flows. A growing part of this has been the attempt to develop cooperation with third countries in order to introduce institutional mechanisms with extra-territorial scope. This move has been most clearly exemplified in Europe through the emergence of an external dimension to the common asylum and migration policy of the EU, inaugurated through the Tampere and Seville summits in 1999 and 2002. The so-called Global Approach in which the EU is developing pilot projects with Cape Verde
and Moldova across three areas – (i) migration and development, (ii) circular migration, (iii) irregular migration – represents the latest manifestation of this (see Lavenex and Stucky in this volume). Meanwhile, an ever-increasing number of individual European states have negotiated bilateral agreements – or ‘partnerships’ – with third countries or engaged in activities ‘in the region of origin’ by using intermediaries such as international organizations. These policies all amount to forms of trans-regional governance, and have given rise to an increasingly dense tapestry of bilateral, regional, and inter-regional institutional connections between Europe and Africa, as will be discussed in more detail below. This section highlights the emergences of this trans-regional governance through looking at Europe’s trans-regional relationship with three African regions: the EAC, IGAD, and SADC, all of which have begun to develop a regional capacity for migration policy over the last decade. Figure 1.1 serves as a crude illustration of the way in which a complex range of cross-cutting institutional connections has emerged between the EU and these regions. It shows how directly, through bilateral relationships, and indirectly, through the AU and IOM mediation, the EU and individual European states have developed a growing range of partnerships to diffuse migration control norms to sub-Saharan African states. For illustrative purposes, the figure also includes the ECOWAS region.

Within the EU–African context, there have been three principal mechanisms of trans-regional governance used to regulate sub-Saharan African states’ response to irregular migration towards Europe.

First, Europe has engaged in trans-regional governance by developing regional capacity through IOM. In different contexts, IOM has played a different role in developing the capacity of RECs to engage in irregular migration control, depending on regional needs and European donor preferences. In the EAC, there was already a forum for inter-state
dialogue on migration in the form of an annual Immigration Ministers meeting, so there was no need to create an RCP for the region. However, the regional IOM’s role has focused on building capacity. In SADC, there has been greater pre-existing capacity to develop dialogue on migration, especially because of the presence of South Africa.

However, until 2000 there was no obvious forum for inter-state dialogue so IOM created MIDSA as an RCP for the region. In the IGAD regions, there was almost nothing relating to regional migration management so IOM has provided the basis of a secretariat through a secondment, and is working to develop a forum for dialogue and greater capacity for state engagement. All of these regional IOM initiatives have benefited from significant European financial contributions and have been aimed largely at disseminating ‘good practice’ in the area of the

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1.1 Trans-regional migration governance between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.

Note: The arrows illustrate the direction of norm diffusion and norm mediation.

Second, aside from its support for the RECs, several countries in Europe have developed a growing array of cross-cutting bilateral agreements, which come in addition to EU Mobility Partnerships. These partnerships have sometime been state–state, sometimes REC–state, and have focused on a range of issues. They have often connected agreements in migration to other issue areas such as trade and development, and have often had a particular focus on irregular migration
control through readmission agreements or the development of national capacity to engage in different migration management related activities. The range of bilateral partnerships has generally focused on enhancing and inducing migration management capacity in the most significant countries of origin and in transit countries for irregular migration to Europe. This trend has emerged throughout Africa. The most high profile bilateral partnerships have been Italy–Libya, France–Mali, France–Senegal, Denmark–Kenya, and the UK–Tanzania, as well as the new EU Mobility Partnerships that have emerged with selected pilot countries. However, many bilateral agreements have had less of a public profile.

Third, Europe has engaged in the promotion of regional migration management through the AU. It has developed a platform for EU–AU dialogue on migration, and has made two EU–AU agreements in the area of migration (a Joint Africa–EU Declaration on Migration and Development and a Strategic Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment). The AU has also received significant funding from the EU to cover the broad area of trade, development, and migration. Through a single member of the secretariat working full-time on migration, the AU has used part of this money to build the capacity of RECs to engage in cooperation on migration. It has attempted to disseminate an 'EU-type' model which combines with-REC freedom of movement with increased outside-REC migration management capacity. In some cases, the AU has actively funded the development of regional migration capacity – for example, through the development of the emerging IGAD RCP.

Each of these three institutional mechanisms of trans-regional governance uses a different mechanism of influence. In looking at the concept of power, Keohane (2003) identifies three principal mechanisms by which states can influence other states in world politics: persuasion, which relates to changing the beliefs of another actor; bargaining, which relates to inducing or coercing
another actor through use of ‘carrots and sticks’; and emulation, which relates to setting out a desirable model to pursue. Each of these mechanisms of influence has been present within EU–African trans-regional governance. The development of regional capacity through IOM has mainly used persuasion, in the sense that it has deployed structures of knowledge and ‘good practice' to change beliefs and disseminate norms about appropriate practices of migration management through a combination of expert authority and dialogue. The bilateral partnerships have mainly used bargaining, employing inducement and coercion to shape states’ migration policies. Often such partnerships have used implicit or explicit issue-linkage to connect migration to trade and development. The promotion of migration management through the AU has been based mainly on emulation, setting out an attractive model of regional integration for states to follow. The combination of these mechanisms, all of which are forms of ‘soft power', in Joseph Nye’s terms, reflect the type of normative power that Europe is increasingly using in a range of issue areas to pursue its interests and values beyond Europe (Laidi 2008; Manners 2002; Nye 2004). Table 1.2 highlights the different mechanisms through which trans-regional governance has emerged in relation to the three different African regions on which the chapter focuses. These mechanisms are then explained in the sections below.

East African Community

Since the 1990s the revived EAC has been striving to develop greater regional cooperation on migration. In particular it has been trying to develop freedom of movement within the EAC as part of the negotiation of its Common Market Protocol. The EAC existed between 1967 and 1977 but ceased to exist because of civil war in Uganda and disagreements between Kenya and Tanzania. Negotiations
on regional cooperation began again in 1993, leading to the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, of which Article 76 aspired to agree on a Common Market Protocol including the free movement of labour.4 A number of political stumbling blocks have emerged on issues such as the harmonization of standards relating to identity documents, landownership, and residency, with Tanzania remaining more reluctant to allow freedom of movement.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Develop regional capacity through IOM</th>
<th>Bilateral partnerships</th>
<th>Support through the AU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAC Training</td>
<td>Denmark–Kenya</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
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<td>Netherlands–Tanzania</td>
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<td>UK–Tanzania</td>
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<td>IGAD Secretariat</td>
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<td>SADC Forum</td>
<td>EU–South Africa</td>
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Alongside this, the EAC secretariat has been strongly encouraged to develop a set of policies on irregular migration – particularly transit migration – through the EAC from Somalia and Ethiopia towards South Africa. The EU and external actors have been keen to ensure that freedom of movement within the EAC is coupled with secure borders for those people from outside the EAC. In this context the IOM has become increasingly involved, with European support, in attempts to build the capacity of the EAC and its member states to engage in effective border management. Given that the EAC – unlike many of the other RECs – already has a forum for dialogue in the form of the EAC Chief Immigration Officers’ Meeting and already has a secretariat, IOM’s focus has been more on training than on creating a forum or building a secretariat.6

One of the most notable developments has been the creation of the ‘Tanzania Regional Immigration Training Academy’ at Moshi in Tanzania. The centre is used by the Tanzanian government to train the trainers of its immigration officers. However, it is being increasingly used by IOM – with mainly European
funding – to train senior migration officials from across the EAC countries on issues relating to border control, document security, forensics, and ‘best practice’ relating to migration control. The Netherlands is one of the main funders of the centre, providing financial support and the forensics equipment. Meanwhile the UK government has used the academy to host meetings of the member states on return and readmission, and to try to engage in dialogue on issues relating to migration control. The model followed by the centre is one of developing and disseminating knowledge and best practice through dialogue and teaching. It represents a means of disseminating norms at every level from Immigration Ministers down to Immigration Officers throughout the region.7

Given the use of East Africa as a transit region through which Somalis and Ethiopians travel to Europe via South Africa, the countries of the region have also become the target for a whole range of bilateral partnerships with different types of emphasis. Denmark has a partnership with Kenya to develop greater capacity on refugee protection, with the admitted motive of strengthening protection in the region to prevent the need for the onward movement of asylum seekers to Europe.8 Meanwhile, the UK has for a long time sought to develop cooperation with Tanzania in the area of asylum and migration, attempting to support capacity building and constantly pushing for the agreement of a bilateral third country readmission agreement.9

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

Of all the regions in Africa, IGAD possibly has the least developed regional cooperation on migration. This is unsurprising since it was only recently created and focuses on security cooperation in a relatively unstable region. Nevertheless, given the presence of Somalia in the region, and the focus of European states in addressing the irregular migration of Somalis, states outside the region have increasingly attempted to facilitate the development of greater IGAD capacity to
engage in migration management.

One of the primary means through which this has been done is by supporting IOM’s role in developing the capacity of IGAD to engage in dialogue on migration. With financial support from the European Commission, the Netherlands, and indirectly through the AU, Europe has financed discussion on the creation of an IGAD RCP. The first meeting on this was held in Addis Ababa in 2008 and led to agreement on the basis of further RCP-like meetings, for which IOM is actively seeking further European support. The AU has been especially active in promoting greater cooperation on migration within IGAD, channelling some of its funding from the EU into political and financial support for the initial IGAD migration meetings.

In this context, with European support, IOM has provided IGAD with a member of staff on secondment to IGAD headquarters in Djibouti to be the migration focus of the organization’s migration secretariat. That person has even served as the representative of IGAD at international meetings such as the Bangkok inter-RCP meeting in June 2009. Alongside this, a number of European states have provided financial support for a Mixed Migration Task Force to engage in the management of flows of Somali transit migrants crossing the Gulf of Aden.

Alongside the development of regional cooperation, a range of bilateral agreements on migration is emerging within the region. Ethiopia, as one of the few comparatively stable countries in the region – and a country of origin and transit for migration to Europe – has been a particular focus for bilateral agreements. The EU has developed an EU–Ethiopia migration platform, which also cuts across the areas of trade and development. Meanwhile, the UK has developed a strong collaborative relationship with Ethiopia, with dialogue on readmission agreements and irregular migration management.
Until relatively recently, with the exception of ECOWAS, SADC appeared to have the strongest basis for regional cooperation on migration in Africa. Negotiation of the SADC Protocol on Freedom of Movement was well established by the late 1990s. However, a difficult and polarizing dynamic emerged between ‘receiving’ states such as South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia and the other ‘sending’ or transit states in the region. The powerful, receiving states were reluctant to delegate authority and open their borders to a potentially endless movement of people from and through the rest of Southern Africa.15

Unlike the EAC, SADC lacked a permanent forum within which states would discuss and build confidence on migration related cooperation. In 2000, with the support of IOM and SAMP, MIDSA was created as an RCP for the SADC region. It has since worked to push discussion on freedom of movement within the region and to develop dialogue on issues relating to irregular migration. Among the financial supporters of MIDSA, the UK and Switzerland feature prominently, providing support through IOM. In the absence of a permanent secretariat and with limited buy-in from the SADC secretariat, MIDSA has made little progress in terms of concrete achievements. However, it has offered a context within which dialogue has contributed to the emergence of a common set of norms, in particular, ideas relating to irregular migration control (Williams 2008).

In addition to supporting MIDSA, European states have developed bilateral relations on migration with South Africa, in particular. The EU has recently created an EU–South Africa platform for migration dialogue as part of a broader cooperation agreement on trade, migration, and development. South Africa’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges that one of the primary European goals in this cooperation agreement has been to secure a third country readmission agreement.16 A range of individual states such as the UK
have also pursued close cooperation on migration with South Africa, using the ‘stick’ of retracting the visa waiver for South African citizens, while trying to use discussion in the areas of trade and development as ‘carrots’. The AU plays an indirect role in regional cooperation on migration within SADC. As the regional and continental hegemon, South Africa values playing a leadership role within debates at the AU and the adoption of common standards, and has therefore played an important role in the debates at the EU–AU level both independently and through SADC.17

Conclusion

Global migration governance is limited in terms of UN-based formal multilateralism. The polarization of ongoing debates on ‘migration and development’ and the lack of ratifications of the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families illustrate the stymied progress of an inclusive post-1945 mode of governance. However, global migration governance nevertheless exists at three principal levels: ‘inter-war’ multilateralism, embeddedness, and trans-regionalism. The last of these is the area in which the most significant developments are currently taking place in global migration governance. As states become increasingly concerned to control irregular migration and to compete in the global labour market, they are recognizing the need to develop institutional structures that enable them to influence the migration policies and practices of states outside their own region. The US, Europe, and Australia, for example, have developed a range of formal and informal institutional structures through which to engage in formal and informal forms of cooperation with regions of origin.

Trans-regionalism is an important and emerging element of global migration governance. It falls outside the type of formal multilateralism that developed in the post-Second
World War era, but nevertheless is a type of global governance that may become increasingly predominant in relation to the governance of transnational flows. Trans-regionalism is not reducible to informal networks, bilateral partnerships, or inter-regionalism but includes and subsumes all of them as part of the emerging set of ways in which states are increasingly exerting extra-territorial authority. In both substance and form this represents a different kind of governance from formal multilateralism. The combination of different forms of trans-regional governance used simultaneously – regional, inter-regional, informal, and bilateral – is a significant part of what makes trans-regional authority an effective means to regulate transnational flows extra-territorially. It is emerging as the dominant form of governance through which Europe, for example, manages irregular migration within and from sub-Saharan Africa. The case study of European–African relations on irregular migration serves to illustrate the range of means of influence – persuasion, bargaining, and emulation – that have emerged as part of trans-regional governance. Persuasion is used by developing migration capacity through IOM; bargaining is used by developing bilateral partnerships, frequently in the broader context of linkages to trade and development; emulation is used by disseminating models of regional cooperation on migration through the AU. It is through the combination of these means of influence that Europe has been able to directly and indirectly be a strong normative power in shaping policies towards irregular migration in sub-Saharan Africa.

Trans-regionalism poses fundamental questions about the role of power in the international politics of migration. While the emerging language of ‘partnership’ implies bargaining based on negotiated exchange between autonomous actors, the reality is more complex. Rather than confining the mechanisms of influence to bargaining,

EU–African relations are characterized by the interplay of bargaining, persuasion, and emulation. In this context, many of the European projects not only
aspire to negotiate with African ‘partners’ but to constitute the very basis of the
African state bargaining position through externally driven training, secretariat
building, forum creation, agenda setting, and knowledge dissemination. This interplay
between bargaining, persuasion, and emulation is reinforced by the interplay
between different venues and institutions. The regional and inter-regional
levels of cooperation serve to influence African knowledge and understanding of the
nature of the ‘problem’ as the basis for subsequent bilateral negotiation.
This is not to suggest that African states are powerless and entirely without
agency in global migration governance but that the emergence of trans-regionalism
may transfer a significant degree of authority over African migration policies to
European states. It highlights a potential paradox in the concept of ‘partnership’,
whereby initiatives that purport to enhance southern state ‘ownership’ over migration
policies may potentially have the opposite effect. This makes it important to
clearly identify the conditions under which trans-regionalism
– and the inherent notion of ‘partnership’ – actually increase or decrease southern state
ownership over migration and with what consequences for policy and practice.

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3 Interview with Kristof Tamas (Seconded National Expert, External Relations,
Directorate-General
Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission), Brussels,
1 October 2009.
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5 Interview with Mary Makoffu (Coordinator: Labour and Social Affairs, EAC), Arusha, Tanzania, 9 September 2009.

6 Interview with Par Liljert (Chief of Mission, IOM Tanzania), Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 14 September 2009.

7 Based on research visit to ‘Tanzania Regional Immigration Training Academy’ at Moshi in Tanzania.

8 Interview with Bettina Gollander-Jansen (Counsellor/Region of Origin Initiative, Danish Embassy), Nairobi, Kenya, 19 May 2009.

9 Interview with Sean Burke (Training Specialist in Migration Management, African Capacity Building Center, International Organization for Migration), Moshi, Tanzania, 10 September 2009.

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11 Interview with Mehari Taddele Maru (Programme Coordinator-Migration, African Union Commission), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1 June 2009.

12 Interview with Lily Sanya (IOM Technical Adviser to the IGAD Secretariat), Djibouti, 26 May 2009.

13 Interview with Charles Kwenin (Chief of Mission IOM), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 21 May 2009.

14 Interview with Minelik Alemu (Director General for International Law and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 May 2009.

15 Interview with Burton Joseph, (Director: Immigration Policy and Directorate, Ministry
17 Interview with Andries Oosthuizen (Sub-Director for Humanitarian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Pretoria, South Africa, 18 March, 2009.

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Chapter 2 Immigration Control and Securing the EU’s External Borders

Massive flows of migrants are one of the features and outcomes of the process of globalization. The international community has sought for decades to manage migratory pressures by combining exclusive and inclusive methods of dealing with international migrants. The securitization of policies in the field of migration, asylum and border control made the management of external borders a substantial international issue. Flanking measures adopted by numerous states allowed for a closer cooperation among police, border guards and judicial bodies, but also raised various queries concerning the humanitarian context of migrations and the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers.

In 1995, seven of the EU member states abolished their internal borders and allowed for a free movement of their citizens and legal third-country nationals across their territories. The emergence and subsequent extension of the so-called Schengen Area was a great leap forward since persons staying within this area could travel freely without border controls. At the same time, however, the external borders were transformed into dense networks of surveillance and control taking advantage of new advanced technologies of personal identity management, early warning and threat prevention regarding cross-border human and material flows. Nowadays, the Schengen Area consists of the territories of twenty-five European states bordering with the British islands, the Mediterranean region, the Balkans, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

In the course of the enlargement processes of the EU and the Schengen Area, the principle of the free movement of persons, covering such issues as migration, asylum, visa and border control policies, was increasingly seen in the context of security, threat prevention and effective control of immigration. The events of 9/11 and 3/11 – the terrorist attacks on the United States and the Madrid train bombings – followed by the 2005 London terror attacks, made the public particularly aware of negative consequences of the mobility of human individuals, ideas, beliefs and doctrines. Governments and international organizations initiated numerous plans and undertook actions and initiatives seeking to better secure their population, infrastructure and resources. Due to transnational threats like terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal migration and other forms of organized crime, in many regions borders were transformed into security policy areas where high-tech tools, professional management skills and extensive normative systems were strictly applied. However, in other parts of the globe local instability, civil wars

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and other forms of political, social and ethnic turmoil made effective management of
borders barely feasible.

This chapter takes up the issue of immigration control and border management in the EU as a matter of securitization policies, arrangements and techniques adopted by the EU institutions and the member states in the legal, technological, institutional and political fields. The notion of immigration control is reduced to a selective securitization approach to a comprehensive process of migration flows between the EU and third countries. Such a conception stems from the supposition that asymmetry between the treatment and status of third-country nationals residing legally in a member state and the attitude towards irregular migrants staying in a member state, or seeking to enter the territory of the EU, is a result of duality of policies carried out in the European Union and reflects a special sort of tension between the supranational efforts at harmonizing migration policy and national interests of the member states regarding immigration and integration of third-country nationals.

A statistical perspective on immigration and border crossing

Statistical data collected by the EU’s member states and processed by Eurostat offer a well-known picture of the EU as an immigration area with strong pull factors attracting third-country nationals. This is also an area of high mobility both within it and across external borders.

According to Eurostat (2007), there are 28.8 million foreigners living in the EU (5.8 per cent of the total population). Of these, 14.4 million (2.9 per cent) are citizens of third countries. Other sources estimate the number of migrants in the EU to be 36 to 39 million. The number of irregular migrants is estimated at 2.8 to 6 million (2007), with some sources claiming up to 8 million. More than half of the illegal immigrants entered the EU legally but became illegal due to overstay (European Commission 2008h: 2–3). The illegal foreign resident population was approx. 1.9 to 3.8 million in 2008. The total number of regularized migrants in 2007 was around 3.2 to 4 million. In 2006, approximately 500,000 illegal immigrants were apprehended in the EU and around 40 per cent of these were deported. More than 75 per cent of them were from third countries where visas to visit the EU are required.

It is estimated – on the basis of Eurostat tourism data – that in the EU of twenty-seven member states there were 300 million external border crossings per annum (data based on overnight stays). Of these border crossings, 160 million were made by EU citizens, 60 million by third-country nationals not requiring a visa and 80 million by foreigners requiring visas. In accordance with the sample data from the member states, there were 880 million external border crossings in 2005, and 878 million in 2006 (European Commission 2008)).

In 2006, there were 1,792 designated EU external border crossing points with controls:
665 at air borders, 871 at sea borders, and 246 at land borders (European Commission 2008g: 9). In the same year, over 300,000 persons were refused entry at EU external borders, most of them coming from third countries where visas were required. Comparing this to the estimated total number of entries into

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the EU by third country nationals, approximately four per thousand are refused entry at EU borders (European Commission 2008g: 9). The scale of illegal border crossing is rather moderate. In 2008, as reported by the member states to Frontex, there were 175,000 detections of illegal border crossing at the external sea and land borders of the EU – down from 300,000 in 2006. In 2008, the member states issued 140,000 refusals of entry at the external borders of the EU. Refusals at the eastern land borders of the EU totalled 30,000. Additionally, Spain reported 400,000 denials of acceptance to enter through its land border with Morocco at Ceuta and Melilla (Frontex 2009: 12–15; Spijkerboer 2007: 128–31).

Some information concerning third-country nationals has been stored in the Schengen Information System (SIS). Data available from the SIS in 2006 provide some indication of the scale of irregular or unwanted immigration. In the total of more than one million records created on wanted persons, the vast majority are third-country nationals who should be denied entry under article 96 of the 1990 Schengen convention. They are people whose entry to the Schengen zone was refused on grounds of national security and public order. They are also aliens made subject to measures involving deportation, refusal of entry or removal which was suspended, including a prohibition on entry or residence mainly on the grounds of rejected asylum applications (European Commission 2008g: 9–10).

EU immigration policy

The principle of free movement of persons was one of the cornerstones of the European integration process launched in the 1950s. For decades, until the 1985 Schengen agreement was concluded, it had been taken as an element of economic integration, one of the areas of building a common market. Migration, despite its varied intensity over the decades of economic development of Western Europe, constituted an important factor stimulating or regulating the labour market in EC member states. However, due to structural, historical, economic and societal determinants, every member state conducted its own policy towards third countries and their nationals. Despite attempts in the late 1980s at coordinating immigration policies, a common position was adopted in a few cases, concerning most of all the prevention and combating of illegal migration as well as the adoption of joint measures to stop so-called ‘asylum shopping’.
Although migration policy was incorporated into the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty and later ‘communautarized’ by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, its supranational content is still doubtful. The principle of free movement of persons continues to be one of the cornerstones of European integration, yet ways and means leading to the full respect for that freedom were more and more restrictive and exclusionary. The 2007 Lisbon Treaty did not bring about any sea change either. According to article 3.2 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU), ‘the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.’ Hence freedom of movement is intrinsically linked to flanking securitization measures established on EU external borders and enforced on third-country citizens willing to enter the territory of EU member states.

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What is novel in the Lisbon Treaty is the strong commitment to the principle of state sovereignty with respect to national security policy. Although elements of a so-called ‘national security clause’ were already present in the previous treaties, as well as in the 1990 Schengen convention, the Lisbon Treaty unanimously provides that ‘in particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each member state’ (article 4.2 TEU).

The European Union as an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers should develop policies both with a view to ensuring the absence of any controls on persons when crossing internal borders of EU member states and to carrying out checks on persons and monitoring external borders in the framework of an integrated management system for external borders (article 77 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, TFEU). Beside visa and asylum policies, the Union should develop a common immigration policy aiming to ensure the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals and to prevent and combat illegal immigration and human trafficking. To this end the Council and the European Parliament should adopt measures referring to the conditions of entry and residence, to the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in any of EU member states. Moreover, illegal immigration and unauthorized residence, including removal and repatriation of illegal aliens as well as combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children, are also subject to EU legal measures (article 79 TFEU).

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, and several days later the European Council adopted the Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens (Council of the European Union 2009: 5). This multi-annual programme of developing and enhancing the area of freedom, security
and justice contained numerous and lengthy references to migration policy, a common European asylum system and the management of the external borders. EU migration policy should reflect and implement the EU Global Approach to Migration, a broad migration agenda adopted by the European Council in December 2005 bringing together migration, external relations and development policy. On the basis of the identification of common interests and challenges, it should focus on cooperation with the most relevant countries in Africa and Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and on dialogue and cooperation also with other countries and regions in Asia and Latin America. The EU Global Approach to Migration should also maximize the positive and minimize the negative effects of migration on development through promoting concerted mobility (temporary and circular), giving opportunities for decent and productive work and minimizing brain drain.

The European Council recognised in the Stockholm Programme that labour immigration can contribute to increased competitiveness and economic vitality. Hence the Union should set proactive policies for migrants encouraging the creation of flexible admission systems (according to priorities, needs, numbers and volumes determined by each member state) and enabling migrants to take full advantage of their skills and competences. In terms of rights of aliens, the EU must ensure fair treatment of legal residents and – through an active integration policy – grant them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. This positive approach to legal migrants is intertwined with a repressive attitude towards illegal immigration. There is a strong commitment to the fight against human trafficking and the smuggling of persons, a readmission and return policy, integrated border management and cooperation with countries of origin and transit, supported by police and judicial cooperation. These actions are considered essential for effective development of a common immigration policy and a key priority to that end.

Although the European Council did its best to hide in the Stockholm Programme elements of a ‘fortress Europe’, the section dedicated to external borders contained nonetheless some elements typical of the securitization approach. The European Council acknowledged that migratory pressures, particularly at the southern and eastern borders, required from the member states as well as EU institutions and agencies the adoption of a firm stance that should consist in preventing, controlling and combating illegal migration. The EU should maintain a high level of security and – due to that – take effective and adequate measures to counteract illegal immigration and cross-border crime and strengthen border controls. For that purpose, EU agencies, especially Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) should be
reinforced and endowed with new capacities to carry out new tasks and reach new goals related to the effective management of migration flows and external borders.

The Stockholm Programme recalled the proposal put in the 2004 Hague Programme of establishing a European system of border guards and making Frontex a central element of that system, although the structure of this agency should be decentralized by establishing regional and/or specialized offices, particularly for the land border to the east and the sea border to the south.

The overall aim of strengthening border security around the EU/Schengen Area, reflected in the concept of the EU’s integrated European Border Management Strategy put forward under the Finnish Presidency in 2006 (Finnish Presidency 2006; Hobbing 2006), was decisively linked to modern technologies and IT systems. An automated border control is increasingly identified with electronic surveillance, biometric identifiers and data exchange systems. The Stockholm Programme was unambiguously enthusiastic about high-tech border management tools declaring that ‘technology can play a key role in improving and reinforcing the system of external border controls’. The European Council confirmed its commitment to some earlier projects put forward by the Commission or the member states. First of all, it declared unwavering support for the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) in the southern and eastern borders. It also called for further cooperation between the member states and Frontex in the field of automated border control and surveillance data sharing.

Data management, processing and flows are other relevant issues addressed in the Stockholm Programme. The creation of new information systems, like the SIS II (second-generation Schengen Information System) and the VIS (Visa Information System), the setting up of an administration for large-scale IT systems, the introduction of an electronic system for recording entry to and exit from the member states, and the dissemination of a fast-track registered traveller programme – these were key objectives with regard to new information technologies that should be employed in the near future (Council of the European Union 2009: 55–7).

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EU integrated border management

As mentioned above, an integrated border management system is a prospective remedy to the shortcomings and limitations of the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration and border control. The border management system is the key control mechanism for overall migration management. Effective border management combines both exclusionary and inclusionary approaches, that is, facilitation of border crossing and control over frontiers as two equally important objectives (Berezin 2003: 14–18). According to the European Commission,
the concept of an integrated border management involves combining control mechanisms and the use of tools based on the flows of persons towards and into the EU. It involves measures taken at the consulates of member states in third countries, measures in cooperation with neighbouring third countries, measures at the border itself, and measures taken within the Schengen Area.

(European Commission 2008c: 3)

The 'border package' presented by the Commission on 13 February 2008 (European Commission 2008a to 2008g) was referring to the existing EU agency for border cooperation – Frontex – yet looked decisively forward to establishing a new border surveillance system and designing a new comprehensive framework for effective border management in the EU (Carrera 2007). The EU's integrated border management (EU IBM) should work in the following dimensions:

• border control (checks, detection, monitoring and surveillance) as defined in the Schengen Border Code, including the necessary risk analysis and criminal intelligence;

• investigation of cross-border crime;

• a four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with neighbouring countries, control measures within the area of free movement);

• cooperation between the authorities in the field of border management at the national and international level (border guards, customs and police authorities, security services and other relevant authorities);

• coordination and coherence of action taken by the member states along with institutions and agencies of the European Union (Finnish Presidency 2006).

The institutional architecture of the EU IBM combines agencies with information (IT) systems and control and surveillance technologies. The elements of this architecture are:

• Frontex;

• RABITs (Rapid Border Intervention Teams);

• EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System);

• control and surveillance systems (entry/exit, Registered Traveller Programme, electronic travel authorization, Passenger Name Records);

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• large-scale information systems (Schengen Information System, Visa Information System, Eurodac).
Frontex

Frontex is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, established by Council Regulation of 26 October 2004, with a view to improving the integrated management of the external borders of the EU’s member states (Romestant 2005). Based in Warsaw, the agency had formally begun its activities on 1 May 2005 but started to be fully operational on 3 October 2005. Its main tasks include coordination of operational cooperation between member states in the field of management of external borders; assistance to the member states on training of border guards; risk analyses and technical expertise in the control and surveillance of external borders; support for the member states in circumstances requiring technical and operational assistance at external borders; assistance to the member states in organizing joint return operations; information exchange and cooperation with appropriate EU agencies and international organizations (Neal 2009: 343–46). One of the most visible areas of Frontex’s activities covers joint operations with the participation of certain member states and coordinated by Frontex. Among those with the highest relevance and positive effect on border control were: MERCURY (2009), which aimed at enhancing the cooperation with border guard authorities from the Russian Federation and establishing an information exchange between Frontex, EU member states and Russia; ZORBA (2008), which focused on illegal migration coming from Western Balkan and neighbouring Eastern countries; NAUTILUS (2006–7), conducted to tackle the migration flow in the Central Mediterranean region, targeting Malta and Italy; and HERA I to HERA III (2006–7), consisting of joint sea patrols along the coast of West Africa intended to intercept illegal migrants heading towards the Canary Islands and to divert them back to the African coast.1

For some time there has been a strong will among the member states and a commitment on the part of the Commission to strengthen the operational capabilities of Frontex and give this agency new tasks. The European Council in Brussels on 29–30 October 2009 called for the enhancement of Frontex and progress in its development on the basis of the preparation of common operational procedures for joint operations at sea, for increased operational cooperation between Frontex and the countries of origin and transit of illegal migrants, and prospective responsibility for, and financing of, joint return flights (European Council 2009).

Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs)

RABITs may be set up on the grounds of the provisions of Regulation 863/2007 of 11 July 2007. Any member state faced with a situation of ‘urgent and exceptional pressure’ of migrants at its external border may submit a request to organize a RABIT. Every member state should contribute to the so-called Rapid Pool, placing at the common
disposal an appropriate number of border guards available for
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deployment at the request of Frontex. This agency would determine the composition of
teams, but the profiles and the overall number of border guards belonging to the Rapid
Pool should be decided by the Management Board. For now, RABITs have been set up
only on a few occasions, mostly for joint border exercises and training.

European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)

EUROSUR was outlined in the Communication from the Commission of 13 February
2008. The objective set in the proposal was the establishment of a single national
coordination centre and a single national border surveillance system in each of the
member states located at the eastern land and the southern maritime external borders
of the EU. It focused on enhancing border surveillance in order to reduce the number of
illegal migrants, contribute to the prevention of cross-border crime, and provide the
common technical framework for cooperation and 24-hour communication between the
competent authorities of the member states. Moreover, EUROSUR should help the
member states achieve situational awareness at their external borders, meaning the
capability to detect cross-border movements and find reasoned grounds for control
measures, as well as enhance the reaction capability of their law enforcement services,
conceived of as the amount of time required to control any cross-border movement and
the necessary means to react adequately to unusual circumstances. Last, EUROSUR is
supposed to assist the member states in acquiring an integration capability that should
enable the establishment of an integrated network of reporting and surveillance
systems on external land and sea borders. EUROSUR is still in its conceptual phase; it
should become operational in 2013.

Control and surveillance systems

The entry/exit system is a system that should apply to third-country nationals admitted
for a short stay (up to three months). The system should include the recording of
information on the time and place of entry, the length of stay authorized, and the
transmission of automated alerts directly to the competent authorities in case of
‘overstaying’. The general objectives of the entry/exit system are to reduce illegal
immigration (especially overstayers), contribute to the fight against terrorism and
serious crime and improve the effective management of economic migration (European
Commission 2008g: 3). This system could become operational by 2015, following an
effective and complete rollout of the Visa Information System (BTT 2008a: 4; BTT
2008b: 1).

The Registered Traveller Programme is a type of automated border control system
enabling the automated verification of a traveller’s identity without the intervention of
border guards. It is thus intended to facilitate the crossing of EU external borders for bona fide travellers, while ensuring overall coherence of EU border policy (European Commission 2008g: 3). This programme is addressed primarily to third-country nationals who can present proof of sufficient means of subsistence, holding a biometric passport and, if necessary, a visa valid for a limited period. Among prospective users of this programme one can also see EU citizens crossing the external borders (BTT 2008b: 1–2).

The entry/exit system and Registered Traveller Programme could be combined as they are complementary, have impacts on the border checks at the external borders, and share a common approach to the practical border checks, information flows, and the management of resources. According to the Commission, these systems will cancel out each others’ effects as to the management of border check personnel and the average time required for border crossings (European Commission 2008g: 20).

The Passenger Name Record (PNR) is a set of personal data and technical information on individual and group travels. PNR data are contained in database records of computer reservation systems registering travel movements, usually flights, and include personal passenger data, information on the travel agent, schedule and itinerary and other relevant information. In the context of border management and security governance, the collection and analysis of PNR data should help the law enforcement authorities to identify high-risk persons and other threats to air traffic. The extensive use of PNR data was observed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack as part of US counterterrorism policy (Adam 2006).

The European Union, initially hesitant about taking advantage of the PNR data for counterterrorist purposes due to data protection standards, after the 2004 Madrid terror bombing subscribed to the US position. In the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, adopted by the European Council following the Madrid terrorist attack, the Commission was called upon to work out a proposal for a common EU approach to the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes. The Commission was once more invited to bring forward such a proposal in the Hague Programme. Meanwhile, agreements for the transmission of PNR data for travel by air were concluded between the EU and the US, Canada and Australia.

Several months after the conclusion of the EU-US PNR Agreement, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a framework decision on the use of PNR for law enforcement purposes in the EU (so-called EU PNR proposal) (European Commission 2007e). The objective set out in the proposal was to grant the competent authorities of the member states access to the data of passengers collected by air carriers for
international flights. For the purpose of preventing and combating terrorist offences and organized crime, PNRs were subject to collection and retention by state authorities and to transfer and exchange between them (Pawlak 2009: 5–8). The sensitivity of the data protection issue, potential risks to civil liberties and concerns for potential infringements of the EU data protection regime expressed by the European Parliament, the Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Court of Justice, the European Data Protection Supervisor and numerous NGOs have delayed legislative works on the framework decision on EU PNR (Mendez 2007).

The above-described elements of the EU’s integrated border management system have shown the directions of the rapid evolution and development of the EU’s internal security policy in its territorial and physical dimension. The stress on physical identification of persons crossing the external borders or residing on the territory of member states, the technologically biased management of the identity of third-country nationals, and – last but not least – high-tech systems of border surveillance, perimeter control, automated targeting and risk-profiling (Hayes 2009: 34; Mattelart 2007: 197–209) reflect the commitment of EU institutions and agencies as well as the member states to apply widely instruments of control and protection against potential risks and threats to EU internal security. In other words, EU IBM is unambiguously intended to securitize migrations and turn the external borders into automated gates.

Securitization of migrations

Security is an issue of managing difference. The EU policy of migration and border management is, to a significant degree, at least in its ‘negative’ aspect of preventing illegal entry to the EU and expelling irregular migrants from the EU, a sheer example of mechanisms of selective differentiation driven by the logic of insecurity. Physical differentiation, taking the form of visa policy, passport controls, separate lanes in border crossing points and remote digital screening, is the dominant feature of what Hooper defined as borderwork: a selective suppression and deployment of difference and identity that is not, however, ‘marked’ by relations of power, but is in fact the performance of these power relations as the will to produce and reproduce a bounded identity as a particular existence (Hooper 2004: 218; Vaughan-Williams 2008).

In a global perspective, the prevailing approach to national and international security is based on an unorthodox approach to border management as a selective securitization combined with projections of inclusionary and exclusionary techniques (Baldaccini 2008: 32–6). This could be illustrated by a metaphor of ‘gateways’ and ‘mousetraps’. Gateways stand for an inclusionary approach to migrants while mousetraps symbolize
the exclusion of ‘aliens’ on the basis of real or potentially negative consequences of their admission to the EU in terms of social cohesion, labour markets, civic identity, legal systems and – last, but not least – internal security and public order. Foucher highlights this feature in the following words: ‘On the one hand, frontier functions are disintegrating in a spatial sense. On the other hand, in certain respects, the entire national territory is now being treated as an expanded frontier’ (Foucher 1998: 238).

EU migration policy and border management, developed under the circumstances of growing threats to internal security and public order, especially from terrorist organizations and organized crime, have increasingly strengthened the syndrome of ‘fortress Europe’ (Jessurun d’Oliveira 1993: 181–2; Kantner and Liberatore 2006). As Huysmans puts it, ‘increasing border control for the purpose of making it more difficult for immigrants and refugees to enter a country is a strategy of sustaining distance between a society and dangerous external environment.’ (Huysmans 2006: 55). Even if massive flows of migrants and asylum seekers are motivated by indigenous ‘push’ factors (civil wars, poverty, hunger, natural disasters, oppressive regimes), the securitization of public discourse and a common perception of sources of threats to public order and security contribute to the re-emergence of the ‘alien’ as an archetype of a ‘folk devil’ (Cohen 2002: xxvi–xxviii). Such an attitude to non-EU citizens has further consequences,

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leaving the migrant population outside the networks of integration, socialization and protection and pushing them towards networks of crime, violence and alienation. The status of migrants is predetermined by the inventory of defensive, reactive and exclusionary attitudes of ‘insiders’: EU citizens and legal residents. Their territorially-located loyalties are directed towards the state as a source of benefits and the owner of a sort of protection shield against all external odds. Such symbolic securitization has much to do with the concept of ‘domopolitics’ implying ‘a reconfiguring of the relations between citizenship, state, and territory’ (Walters 2004a: 241). Certainly, ‘domopolitics’ should not be reduced to territorially limited enclave.

Walters points out that his concept

is not reducible to the Fortress impulse of building walls, strengthening the locks, updating the alarm system. It contains within itself this second tendency which takes it outwards, beyond the home, beyond even its own ‘backyard’ and quite often into its neighbours’ homes, ghettos, jungles, bases, slums. Once domopolitics extends its reach, once it begins to take the region or even the globe as its strategic field of intervention, then the homeland becomes the home front, one amongst many sites in a multifaceted struggle.
DOMOPOLITICS’ is one of the facets of contemporary securitization of migrations. It reflects insecurity dispositifs among state authorities and societies inhabiting the EU’s member states (Müller 2008: 206–7; Amoore 2006: 347–8). Another powerful method of securitization is biometric identification and authentication of persons crossing the external borders. Biometrics is the automated use of physiological, biological and behavioural features to authenticate people on the basis of pattern recognition systems and know their identity with certainty (Ceyhan 2008: 113; Ashbourn 2004: 1; Vacca 2007: 3–4). The general efficiency and functionality of control mechanisms is also at stake. Document-scanning devices, live biometric screening and real-time processing capabilities mean that more data can be processed for every traveller without increasing inspection time.

The European Union embarked on the application of biometric solutions to the management of migrants quite early. Already in the 1990s, the Council and then the Commission were conducting conceptual works, working out legal arrangements and building up political consensus among the member states as to the use of fingerprint techniques to support the development of a common asylum policy (Liberatore 2007: 115). As a result, a fingerprint database called Eurodac was set up on the basis of the Council regulation of 11 December 2000 (European Commission 2000) as a technical tool allowing for an effective application of the 1990 Dublin asylum convention (later replaced by the Dublin II regulation of 2003). It has been in operation since 15 January 2003, storing and automatically comparing the fingerprints of asylum applicants over the age of fourteen, and illegal immigrants, for the purpose of determining the member state responsible for examining asylum applications.

Following the events of 11 September 2001, the ‘securitization turn’ in EU justice and home affairs brought about growing commitment to biometrics.

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as a technology of risk management and threat prevention. In June 2003, the European Council invited the Commission to prepare proposals for a coherent EU approach to biometric applications allowing ‘harmonized solutions’ for documents of third-country nationals as well as EU citizens’ passports and information systems. In September 2003, the European Commission produced two draft regulations providing for the introduction of fingerprints and digitalized photographs into visas and residence permits for third-country nationals. In February 2004, under pressure from the US, the Commission proposed to introduce biometrics in passports of EU citizens. The member states began issuing biometric passports containing the digitized facial image of the holder from August 2006, and the holder’s fingerprints from June 2009 onwards. The
introduction of biometric passports should be completed by 2016 for one biometric identifier and by 2019 for two identifiers (both digitized photo and fingerprints). The biometric traits would be used in the planned Visa Information System (VIS) and in the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) for the identification of persons.

The next step in relying on biometric technologies in migration management and internal security is the integration of surveillance and control mechanisms into a multimodal screening system allowing for identity management in sensitive sites, mass events or access control of critical infrastructure facilities. One variant of the multimodal approach is a synergic interlink dataflow architecture enabling an automated comparison, checking and verification of biometric data stored in numerous systems maintained by the EU and the member states. An example of this type of solution is the Biometric Matching System (BMS) proposed by the Commission in its Communication of February 2008 on the next steps in border management in the European Union (European Commission 2008c). It was designed as a securitization tool enabling the member states’ authorities and EU agencies to deal effectively with terrorist threats, organized crime, illegal immigration, visa shopping, identity theft and fraud. Initially, it will store data needed to perform identification and verification requests by the VIS on behalf of the member states. However, it can easily be expanded to provide services to additional systems, such as the SIS II, EURODAC, the entry/exit system and a Registered Traveller Programme on the grounds of synergic and effective flows of information and data. The database will be able to store the fingerprints of up to 70 million people and process more than 100,000 verification and identification requests per day (BTT 2008c: 7).

Another multimodal application refers to the management of identity and remote sensor surveillance of people flows. Among many projects exploring multimodal biometric solutions one can mention the HUMABIO research and development project funded by the European Commission in the 6th Framework Programme. The project aimed to develop ‘a robust biometric security authentication system which derives from the multimodal fusion of a “new” biodynamic physiological profile, unique for each individual, with already existing and tested biometrics’ (HUMABIO 2006: 1). The system was designed to take advantage of such biodynamic indicators as EEG baseline, heart dynamics (ECG), and blood related parameters (Damousis, Tzovaras and Bekiaris 2008: 2–4).

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The ‘Smart Corridor’ is an example of the practical application of multimodal biometric methods to enhance security in supervised and controlled environments. The ‘Smart Corridor’ is a new-generation screening system presented by the French company
Thales. The project integrates intelligent video surveillance, biometrics and sensor technology into an automated screening system without requiring people to stop at checkpoints. The intelligent non-intrusive surveillance system performs functions such as counting people, detecting abandoned objects and suspicious behaviours. A biometrics control system permits the identification of a person with face and iris recognition devices. Sophisticated sensors detect both traces of explosives as well as metallic and dielectric objects hidden underneath clothing (Thales 2008).

The above-mentioned examples of new high-tech surveillance and control systems have proven that nowadays border security has more to do with monitoring, surveillance, filtering, protection and law enforcement than traditional defence or guarding. In a slightly Cassandra-like mood, Peter Andreas outlined such a disquieting vision of the security arrangements of the near future:

The border fence of the future may include invisible fencing (‘virtual fencing’) using non-lethal microwave technology developed by the Pentagon that creates burning sensations without actually burning the skin, and some border patrol duties may be carried out by video-equipped (and potentially armed) unmanned dirigibles and robot dune buggies. And at ports of entry, new biometric technologies, such as retinal scanning, will be increasingly utilized to identify unwanted entrants.

(Andreas 2003: 92)

Security policy-making in the European Union is evidently and increasingly dedicated to a large-scale application of technologies, with means and solutions combining traditional state-led border guard controls and migration management with advanced projects offered and provided by large European arms companies (Hayes 2006, 2009).

Conclusions

This chapter, taking as an example EU migration policy and the management of its external borders, has proven that the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice should be seen as a complex set of political activities undertaken by the member states and EU agencies in order to secure a high level of safety for EU citizens through the growing use of methods and instruments aiming to protect the member states against illegal immigrants. The EU’s identity is built on a common perception of threats and risks contributing to the identification of a single EU securitization model. For that reason, EU migration policy is built on a common perception of threats and risks underpinning an exclusionary and selective approach to non-EU citizens. Attitudes towards ‘aliens’ are built on complicated and controversial interlinks between border control mechanisms, visa policies and practices, fingerprinting of asylum...
seekers, joint return flights and forcible integration courses for refugees and legal migrants.

One of the features of the securitization approach to third-country nationals is the belief among EU institutions and member states in the power of the EU as a ‘security provider’ in its internal security area, aiming to establish ‘protection space’ for a ‘safer Europe’ (Rhinard, Ekengren and Boin 2006). As a consequence, the European Union seeks to establish an inward-oriented multi-level fusionary complex of security agencies and institutions with the aim of securing public order, strengthening internal security and effectively preventing and fighting internal and external threats. Yet this objective is hardly feasible because of conflicting regulations and institutional arrangements at the level of the member states, and the application of management schemes for the EU as a single territorial entity consisting of complex, multi-tiered, geographically overlapping structures embedded into multilayered security regimes (Müller-Graff 1998: 14–20). This places substantial limits on possibilities of progress in the area of freedom, security and justice despite the fact that EU immigration policy widens the scope of security cooperation among the member states. For example, the Schengen Information System, originally conceived of as a compensatory measure for the lifting of internal border controls, is disconnected from its original purpose and is being developed as a large-scale IT system in charge of massive external border control and in support of criminal justice in the EU.

Another relevant aspect limiting the feasibility of a common immigration policy is the perception of the Union as a security enclave. This highlights the relevance of the territorial dimension of security policies and exposes third-country nationals to a massive impact of surveillance techniques and technologies. Although the syndrome of ‘fortress Europe’ stems from the growing need to establish high standards of protection for the population and political institutions (Bosworth 2008: 203–5), it reinforces ‘enclave-like’ features of the European Union in terms of global migration, cross-border flows and cultural shifts.

EU immigration policy is facing a complex and difficult task of combining dialogue and cooperation with countries of origin and transit with enhancing border control, the fight against illegal migration, and better management of migration flows while ensuring the protection of legal residents.

Note

1 See Frontex work programmes available at the agency’s web page: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/work_programme.
Chapter 3 A framework for studying the politicisation of immigration

Introduction

When the Muslim fundamentalist Mohammed Bouyeri murdered the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in November 2004, this sparked off an intense and heated debate in the Netherlands about the alleged incompatibility between the teachings of the Koran and liberal democracy, and on the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism (Hajer and Uitermark, 2008). Earlier that year, in March 2004, Muslim fundamentalists had bombed a metro train in Madrid, killing 191 and injuring 1,800 people. In response to this terrorist attack, hardly any public discussion ensued about the dangers of political Islam and its threats to Western democracy. Why is it that the same issues are sometimes heavily politicised and in other instances practically not? Which mechanisms can explain the differences in the extent to which, and the way in which, potential issues become politicised? In this volume, we seek to answer this general question by means of a comparative study of the (de)politicisation of immigration and integration in seven Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in the years 1995 to 2009.

To a certain degree this study builds and extends upon another monograph entitled ‘Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe’ by Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy (Koopmans et al., 2005). The main aim of that monograph was very similar to ours, namely to explain cross-national differences in patterns of mobilisation in five countries: Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland in the years 1992 to 1998. Moreover, our study employs the empirical approach developed by Koopmans et al. (2005): political claims analysis. So, our study is in many ways indebted to the work of Koopmans et al. Yet, our study is not a replication of theirs with newer data and a different set of countries. It is different in three important aspects. First of all, the main aim of the study by Koopmans et al. was to explain differences between the types of actors who politicised the issue of immigration in the five countries they studied, and on the sub-issues that were emphasised. While our volume also looks at such differences, its main focus is on the explanation of degrees of politicisation, which we conceptualise in terms of two aspects: salience and polarisation. A second way in which our study is different is that it explicitly focuses on changes within countries over time, whereas this gets little attention in the study by Koopmans et al. A third way in which our study is different is in its theoretical perspective on how to explain cross-national and over time differences in politicisation. Koopmans et al. focus almost exclusively on the political opportunity structure and the discursive opportunity structure in each of the
countries. We examine a broader range of potential theoretical explanations for politicisation. In our book we develop a typology of four different types of explanations, of which opportunity structures are only one, and we explore the plausibility of each of these possible explanations of politicisation.

This study contributes to different sets of literature, such as those on migration, party politics and agenda-setting, that rarely speak to each other. By providing an overview of the ways in which the issue of immigration has become politicised, or has been de-politicised in these countries, the volume is of interest to scholars in the field of migration studies. Within this broad but substantively specialised discipline, many scholars work on the differences between countries in their migration policies, regulations and customs (e.g. Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009; Martiniello and Rath, 2010; Bird et al., 2011; Bonjour et al., 2011; Joppke and Seidle, 2012). Yet, with some exceptions (e.g. Koopmans et al., 2005; Dolezal et al., 2012), our knowledge about the politicisation of immigration and integration is limited to case studies of one or two countries (Green-Pedersen and Krostrup, 2008; van Heerden et al., 2014), which cannot be easily compared due to differences in types of data and approaches. In the next chapter we outline why the issue of immigration and civic integration lends itself well for a comparative study of politicisation.

On a theoretical level, the main contribution of the volume is to the large body of literature on how political issues emerge and evolve. Such questions are at the heart of political science, political sociology and communication science. Students of public opinion and public policies focus a substantial proportion of their research on responsiveness, i.e. the extent to which policies reflect public opinion (e.g. Klingemann et al., 1994; Erikson et al., 2002; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). In their attempt to explain the formal government agenda, such studies tend to either emphasise public policy dynamics (in the tradition of: Cobb and Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) or focus on public opinion (e.g. Erikson et al., 2002; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). Our study of politicisation focuses on the various steps that affect the relationship between social phenomena such as public opinion, and political outcomes, including public policies. The focus of our study is on the interactions of actors intermediating between the public on the one hand and public policies on the other. This includes, but is not limited to, (1) party competition, (2) political mobilisation of non-party political actors and (3) government policy

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initiatives. Yet there are several differences and similarities between our study and the literature on each of these three subjects.

Much research in the field of party politics focuses on the circumstances under which
different types of political parties aim to put issues on the agenda, while others aim to prevent this from happening (e.g. Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Meguid, 2008; De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). In explaining agenda-setting strategies of political parties, such studies on the relative party political attention to political issues tend to rely on rather crude dichotomous distinctions between government and opposition parties (e.g. Green-Pedersen, 2007) or between mainstream and ‘niche’ parties (e.g. Meguid, 2008). In addition, scholars of party political positions study party positions in relative isolation from actual, day-to-day party political interaction, for instance through the assessment of party manifestos. While the observations during election years provide strategic indications of the policies that parties propose, they provide no information about tactical short-term changes in the actual political agenda, as political debates and practices will respond to events and developments. As a result, parties will often discuss quite different issues (and position themselves differently) than highlighted in their manifestos. As further described below, we strongly rely on theories of strategic interaction of political parties but we employ them to a broader range of actors and in the context of actual political processes.

In the literature on social movements we find a relatively strong emphasis on the social dynamics underlying political mobilisation. For instance, Koopmans et al. (2005) study how institutional and discursive structures, framed in particular by the dominant concept of citizenship, affect the actions of anti-immigration parties and movements and of civil society organisations that defend the interests of migrants. More established political actors that have more ready access to state institutions, or that are part of these institutional structures, are not in themselves seen as agents of politicisation whose activities merit explanation. Our approach differs from theirs, because we focus explicitly on the actions of government agents and of political parties and our analyses will demonstrate that these actors play a crucial role in determining the degree to which, and the ways in which, the issue of immigration became (de-)politicised in the various countries we investigate.

Scholars of public policy are interested in why and how certain issues are, or become, part of the agenda of government whereas others do not (e.g. Cobb and Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Beyond characteristics of the policy field, this commonly requires a focus on ‘pre-decisional’ processes (Cobb and Elder, 1983: 12) such as party competition and interest group activities, similar to the political processes we are interested in. Beyond the government agenda, scholars may include in their study the whole ‘agenda of controversy, the list of questions which are recognized by the active participants in politics as legitimate subjects of attention and concern’ (Walker, 1966: 292). Regardless of the precise focus, the ultimate research interest in this field is in the extent to which issues gain entry to the government agenda. However, our study does not only focus on (conflicts over) the government agenda, but
also on cases in which the issues of
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migration and integration are politicised by collective actors even if no government
decisions are made at all. Further, agenda-setting studies do not take the political
position of political actors into consideration and, as highlighted by among others
Walgrave and Varone (2008), are relatively inattentive to the role of political parties.
Our volume contributes to these studies in a number of ways. First of all, we develop a
conceptual framework of the core concept ‘politicisation,’ which in our view consists of
two dimensions: polarisation and increased salience. Admittedly, we are not the first to
have pointed out that both elements are important. Yet studies that have focused on
position-taking as well as salience generally aim to explain how parties’ strategies
affect their electoral success (e.g. Meguid, 2008; De Vries and Hobolt, 2012), or to explain
the impact of successful politicisation of issues on the party system (e.g.
Carmines and Stimson, 1989). So, the politicisation of issues is an independent variable
in those studies, while in our case, it is what we aim to explain.
Second, we developed a typology of four different types of explanations on the basis of
two distinctions: (1) whether the process of politicisation is seen as a top-down, or
bottom-up process, and (2) whether we explain processes of politicisation by structural
developments or by the actions and ambitions of various actors (structure vs. agency).
We explore the plausibility of each of the four explanations for (the lack of)
policisation. Even though the topic of politicisation is at the heart of political science,
the current state of the research remains inconclusive regarding the relative
importance of various explanations. We aim to address this lacuna by (1) including a
broader range of explanations and (2) employing a more comprehensive empirical and
conceptual definition of politicisation.
Third, a substantial proportion of research on politicisation is ‘fragmented’ in separate
research traditions specialised in the role of parties (e.g. Carmines and Stimson, 1989),
social movements (e.g. Ferree et al., 2002), the media (e.g. Dearing and Rogers, 1996;
McCombs, 2004) or policy-makers (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). This study is not a
priori restricted to the role of a specific type of actor, but we instead provide an
overview of the actors driving processes of politicisation in the different countries.
Finally, we detect and explain cross-country differences in the patterns of politicisation.
A comparative research design provides us with variation on a range of factors that
potentially explain the nature and extent of politicisation. Such variation comes in
addition to changes over time between 1995 and 2009 in each country. This is the main
focus of the country chapters.
The structure of this introductory chapter is as follows. We will first outline a
conceptual map of politicisation, which we conceptualise as a two-dimensional process. After outlining two dimensions of politicisation, we will develop a typology of four different types of explanations for how an issue might (or might not) become politicised. In the final section, we will briefly outline the structure of the book.

1.2 What is politicisation?

Two bodies of literature exist which focus on ways in which issues become politicised, or not. The first tradition of research is concerned with agenda-setting. Under

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which circumstances does a social problem become defined as a problem that requires action from public officials? It is not until a social problem is defined as a problem that we can really speak of a political issue. Agenda-setting theory focuses on the different thresholds that prevent a topic from becoming a political issue and prevent an issue from reaching the stage where policies are formulated.

Agenda-setting studies in political science point to the relative attention, the salience, of issues in various arenas of politics (e.g. Downs, 1972; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2009a). In an overly simplified view of such agenda-setting approaches, issue attention travels from public opinion via the news media through party politics to the government and its policies. Such studies focus on the variation in government responsiveness to political issues. The rank-order of issues, the restricted nature of agendas and the (un)likely pathways of issue-salience are important parameters explaining differences in politicisation. These agenda-setting explanations, however, (1) miss the magnitude and character of the conflict in terms of the positions taken by the participants, and (2) conceptually prioritise the government agenda relative to other agendas. For instance, in 1953 the Netherlands experienced a major flood in the southern province of Zeeland, killing 2,551 people. Obviously, this raised enormous concern about the quality and safety of the dykes and there was large agreement on the necessity of measures to protect the country from such hazards. In terms of the government agenda, the issue of water management has clearly become salient. However, there was no disagreement on the issue. The political action was largely restricted to broadly supported public policy initiatives, which became controversial only 20 years after the event (Leemans and Geers, 1983). In contrast to public policy oriented agenda-setting studies, we include the activities, as measured through claims-making, of all kinds of collective actors, without prioritising state actors or the government agenda. We thus conceptually differentiate the government agenda from the broader political agenda.

A second body of literature focuses more on party competition in terms of conflict and positional disagreement. Scholars of political parties and party competition highlight
the importance of positional competition and the extent to which political parties (and the electorate) have different, polarised positions on the issue (e.g. Downs, 1957; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Stimson, 2004). Electoral competition is seen as a process in which parties present different choices to the electorate in terms of different positions on issues and opposing ideological positions. Schattschneider (1960: 2) highlights conflict as the key distinctive aspect of politics: ‘At the root of all politics is the universal language of conflict’. When political actors have different positions they are in conflict – the issue is polarised.

We argue that both polarisation and salience are essential for understanding processes of politicisation. Opposing positions may exist, but when the issue is not on the political agenda, the conflict is latent. It only changes from a latent to a manifest conflict when the issue becomes more salient. This increase in salience might change the political landscape fundamentally when the actors are aligned differently on this new line of conflict than on pre-existing ones. Conflicts do not only divide those parties on the opposite sides of the conflict line, but they also unite actors who are on the same side. If collective actors want to win a conflict, they will invest time and energy into building a coalition with like-minded allies. Once such a coalition is formed and trust is built, such a coalition is a valuable asset. Especially when parties have created a government coalition, this collaboration adds to their influence on policy-making and to the career opportunities of the party leadership. Consequently, these parties have an incentive to keep the coalition intact, and therefore they will try to avoid putting issues on the agenda about which they disagree to such an extent that no acceptable compromise can be reached. Instead of fighting simultaneously at different fronts, they must decide ‘which battle do we want most to win?’ (Schattschneider, 1960: 67). A similar conceptual rationale provides incentives to parties to de-emphasise issues on which they internally disagree. Both voters and parties seek consistency among positions on various issues; this provides additional incentives to de-emphasise certain issues in favour of others (e.g. Stimson, 2004: 58–76). Whether new issues become politicised and the ways in which they evolve thus depends to a large degree upon pre-existing coalitions. This also explains why party systems are often structured by one single overarching dimension. Even when more than one ideological dimension structures the conflicting principles that guide parties’ behaviour, not all these dimensions become equally organised. Normally, parties will organise coalitions with actors that are close to them on the conflict dimension that they consider most important. This becomes the dominant dimension of conflict, because most parties avoid ‘fighting’ conflicts that do not correspond with this dimension, or that cannot be made compatible with it. So, mainstream parties have an
incentive to keep such incompatible issues off the political agenda.

Yet, neither the governing parties nor even mainstream parties as a group can exercise full control over the political agenda. New issues are often politicised by (new) parties that choose not to compete on issues that dominate the political agenda, but on other issues. Examples of this are green parties that politicised environmentalist issues and radical-right parties that mobilised issues related to immigration (e.g. Meguid, 2008). ‘New’ social movements such as the peace and women’s movements in the 1970s and 1980s also forced parties to incorporate new issues in their political profiles and to be in opposition with other parties (Kriesi, 1995).

In order to understand processes by which issues become politicised or de-politicised, we need to combine these two aspects: salience of an issue and polarisation. Such a combination of agenda-oriented and conflict-oriented approaches to conceptualise politicisation is shown in Figure 1.1. The vertical dimension addresses the extent to which the issue receives more political attention than other issues (saliency). The horizontal dimension reflects the extent to which political actors have different positions on an issue (polarisation).

The variation on these two dimensions produces four ideal-typical states of affairs pertaining to a specific topic. Note the distinction between a policy topic or field and a political issue. A policy topic refers to a substantive or institutionally defined domain of politics, which in our study is immigration and integration.

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A topic only becomes a political issue when there is attention or when there is disagreement. Without one of these two ingredients, the topic is not a ‘political issue’ (bottom left panel in Figure 1.1). This situation might even exist in situations where there is a social problem, which is even recognised as such, but which is seen as a private matter. In this case political actors agree about the nature of a problem, but they also agree that the issue does not require much attention from state officials. For a long time, domestic violence used to be considered an important social problem, but was also seen as something that belonged to the private sphere. Arranged and forced marriages, often accompanied by social pressure and even the threat of physical force, are another example of a phenomenon that was seen as a social problem, but not necessarily a political issue. As long as the topic is treated as one that does not require state action, it is not politicised; in fact, it is not even a political issue. Responsibility may then be referred back to voluntary groups, migrant organisations or women’s defence groups. In any case, the issue receives limited political attention (low saliency).

The second ideal-typical state is what we refer to as an ‘urgent problem’ (top left panel in Figure 1.1). This situation exists if a topic becomes salient, with some actors arguing
that state action is required to deal with the problem, while there is not much disagreement about the course of action. Since actors think the topic requires state action, the topic is on the agenda as a political issue, even if there is no polarisation. An example is the response to the 1953 floods in the Netherlands mentioned earlier. These types of issues are what Stokes (1963: 373) called ‘valence issues’, i.e. issues where different actors agree about the goals that have to be realised, but where parties disagree about the ways in which to realise these goals or the priority to give to the issue. Nelson (1984: 28) defines valence issues as issues in which only one side of the debate is legitimate or all positions are effectively the same as they derive from, in Nelson’s words, ‘one widely held ideal’ (also see: Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 150–152). Sometimes, but not always, such issues are championed by what Walgrave and Verhulst (2006) call New Emotional Movements. They mention the anti-paedophile Belgium White Movement, the Dutch movement against Senseless Violence and the UK Snowdrop campaign as typical cases. However, the

FIGURE 1.1 Typology of politics towards a topic.

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term ‘valence issue’ suggests that the lack of polarisation would be the result of the nature of the issue. In our conceptual framework we see the lack of polarisation as a temporal situation resulting from the way the issue is framed, and which could well change, at least potentially. In fact, when a topic is salient, conflicts might develop about the different ways in which these preferred outcomes can be realised, such as how to bring down unemployment. Similarly, the issue may become redefined in terms of a trade-off between different priorities, such as whether to stimulate economic growth at the expense of the environment or vice versa. Generally, the combination of high salience and low conflict is expected to exist only temporarily. For this reason we prefer the term ‘urgent problem’ over ‘valence issue’.

Third, in situations labelled as a ‘latent conflict’, the issue is low on the political agenda, despite the fact that actors have diverging positions on it (bottom right panel in Figure 1.1). Certain institutional arrangements (coalition governments, high electoral thresholds) may encourage implicit agreements among actors to ‘agree to disagree’, but not to take further decisions on the issue. In that case, parties attempt to decrease the saliency of certain issues. Typical examples of ‘latent conflicts’ are the ways in which Dutch parties dealt with the issues of abortion (Outshoorn, 1986) and euthanasia (Green-Pedersen, 2007). In both cases there was severe disagreement between the members of the governing coalitions on whether more restrictive or more liberal policies should be advocated on these matters. This was ‘solved’ by setting up various advisory committees, or organising new rounds of consultation with stakeholders from the medical profession. Another typical example is the issue of European integration in
national politics in various European countries (De Vries, 2007). Various individual country studies have pointed to long periods of time in which the politics of migration has been latent (e.g. Messina, 1989; van der Brug et al., 2009). By definition latent conflicts are de-politicised and off the agenda.

Four, under the label 'politicised' we include political issues that are both contested and salient (top right panel in Figure 1.1). For instance, this was the case for the political conflict around wearing (Islamic) headscarves in French schools since 1989. There was strong public and political disagreement on this salient issue (e.g. Bonjour and Lettinga, 2012). The political conflict on the issue was eventually contained by a law on banning headscarves. In practice, issues will often be highly salient for only a brief period of time. Once some kind of decision has been taken, the issue often becomes less salient. If the decision is satisfactory to most parties, there is not really an issue any more (it then falls in the bottom left panel of Figure 1.1). Alternatively, there may still be different positions, but if the salience drops (temporarily), it becomes a latent conflict (bottom right panel of Figure 1.1).

1.3 Four perspectives on the explanation of politicisation

Having discussed our dependent variable politicisation, we turn to the core question of this study: Which factors explain why an issue becomes politicised? On the basis of our reading of the literature, we might distinguish between four types of

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factors that might contribute to the degree of politicisation or de-politicisation of any issue. The four kinds of explanations derive from two dichotomies. The first dichotomy is whether we perceive politicisation as a process that is essentially initiated bottom-up by committed or organised citizens, or whether we perceive it as a process that is essentially top-down, i.e. largely controlled by authorities and by formal political institutions. A second distinction is between explanations that focus on the agency of actors and those that conceptually prioritise structural conditions.

None of these explanations would assume that politicisation is a spontaneous reaction to grievances that would not require political organisation. All explanations explicitly feature political organisations. Table 1.1 provides a typology of four types of explanations.

The purpose of this edited volume is to explore each of these four types of explanations and to assess, on the basis of the data that we collected, how plausible it is that any of the trends in (de-)politicisation is related to each of these four factors. Following Eckstein (1975: 110), such an approach to (country) cases may be labelled 'plausibility probe' and provides a 'cheap means of hedging against expensive wild-goose chases, when the costs of testing are likely to be very great'. However, we
engage in these country-case studies, not as a pilot for ‘extensive’ testing, but as a way to refine and specify the validity of different types of explanations for the politicisation of immigration and integration in each of the countries. In the final chapter of this volume, we present cross-country analyses. The explanations pertain mainly to the degree of politicisation in terms of salience and polarisation.

Societal developments (structural, bottom-up)

It is a priori plausible that all conflict arises from discontent among specific groups of citizens with the state of affairs at a certain moment. Such discontent about certain societal developments then triggers political actions on the part of citizens. We do not assume these political actions to be spontaneous responses that require no political organisations. Rather, these bottom-up activities include, for example, joining interest groups, participating in social movement activities or voting for a new party. Note that such actions may also be driven by the strategic propaganda of the leadership of such organisations – relatively independent of the actual social magnitude of the political problem. In that case the political agency of specific actors is assumed to be the primary driver of politicisation rather than the actual real-world

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<th>TABLE 1.1</th>
<th>Typology of four types of explanations for politicisation</th>
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<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Initially top down</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political opportunity structure</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Initiatives by authorities (e.g. established parties)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initially bottom up</td>
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<td><strong>Societal developments</strong></td>
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<td>Actions of specific groups (e.g. new parties, civil society)</td>
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<td><strong>Triggering events</strong></td>
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phenomenon. We classify this reverse conceptual rationale under agency approaches and discuss these in the next section. In this section we discuss approaches which assume that there is a strong link between, on the one hand, social circumstances and the interests and grievances that these circumstances give rise to, and on the other hand, the surge of political organisations that represent these interests.

The notion that structural societal circumstances form the base for political action is
assumed in several prominent theories of interest groups, social movements and political parties. First, in one of the first major studies on interest groups, Truman (1951: 104) notes that ‘interest groups come into being or are activated by disturbances’ in society. Truman’s so-called disturbance theory seems generally confirmed, though later scholars consistently note that there is substantial variation in the mobilising potential of certain ‘disturbances’ compared with others. For instance, the notion that structural social-economic factors, albeit in a complex and unequal manner, are the base on which interest organisations survive is relatively unchallenged (Gray and Lowery, 1996). In this sense, large agricultural sectors, for example, lead to large numbers of representatives of agricultural interests. Second, social movements scholars theorise that the presence of certain material or other ‘resources’ in society as, for example, money, supporters, media-attention and political alliances, produce political mobilisation and contestation (e.g. Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). This so-called resource mobilisation approach has been extended and highlights social (structural) factors rather than the political process as key drivers for political mobilisation (e.g. Edwards and McCarty, 2004). Third, political-sociological perspectives on parties point to long-term social trends which lead to political opposition (Lipset, 1960; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1998). More recent research in this tradition is exemplified by Kriesi et al. (2008) who argue that changes in West European party systems can be explained by structural societal developments. More specifically, they emphasise the differentiation between ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalisation and their associated grievances. In all three perspectives, longer-term societal changes, most prominently immigration, should, eventually, lead to the establishment of new political organisations, or the ‘activation’ on this new issue of existing political organisations. This sets in motion processes of action and reaction among these actors and existing actors, consequently producing politicisation.

However, in these traditions, research is inconclusive about the threshold on which a certain social change and associated discontent should produce a political reaction. Considering the political organisation involved, most scholars do not expect all discontent to lead automatically to political conflict. While probably conditional on other factors discussed in the next section, it is plausible that an issue is more likely to become politicised when the issue has a strong (potential) impact on society as a whole and particularly on people’s everyday lives. This raises the question as to which kinds of structural developments increase discontent about immigration. Theories regarding the support for anti-immigrant parties provide several answers to this question and are therefore applicable to our theory on the politicisation of migration and integration.

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When anti-immigration parties and movements resurfaced in the 1980s, most researchers who tried to explain this phenomenon focused on the causes of discontent among the supporters of such movements. The earliest studies emphasised ethnic competition (e.g. Betz, 1994; Betz and Immerfall, 1998; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002). The essence of these explanations is that support for anti-immigration parties comes from those citizens who feel threatened by rapid changes in post-industrial societies. Blue-collar workers with low education are more likely to lose their jobs as a result of changes in modes of production. Moreover, they are competing with immigrant groups for scarce resources such as jobs and houses (Freeman, 2002, 2005). These ‘losers of modernity’ (Betz, 1994) also support radical right-wing parties out of general discontent.

International research of anti-immigrant parties shows that radical right-wing parties indeed attract support among specific social groups, particularly the lesser educated groups and manual workers (e.g. Betz and Immerfall, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002). However, the case of Flanders shows that the presence of Turkish and Maghrebian inhabitants has a strong effect on votes for Vlaams Blok independently of their social origin, whereas the presence of other immigrants has a negative (but not significant) effect (Coffé et al., 2007). This suggests that a purely economic competition thesis has to be rejected in favour of a thesis that includes cultural elements. In addition, socio-structural models have very limited power to explain individual-level support for anti-immigration parties (Mayer, 1998; Riedlsperger, 1998; van der Brug et al., 2000; van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). The strongest predictors of individual-level support for anti-immigration parties and movements are negative attitudes towards immigrants, not social positions of voters (Kitschelt, 1995; van der Brug et al., 2000; Lubbers et al., 2002; van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Norris, 2005; Mughan and Paxton, 2006).

While socio-structural factors have limited power to explain support for anti-immigration parties, socio-demographic positions are more strongly associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. These attitudes depend to some extent upon ‘objective’ social conditions, most notably factors associated with the level and type of migration, and the state of the economy (Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2008). First, in order to develop anti-immigrant attitudes there should be at least a minimal level of migration to a country, and unexpected influxes of migrants such as war refugees or guest workers could additionally trigger attitude changes (Hopkins, 2011). Second, as regards the type of migration, Freeman (2002: 78) states that ‘citizens are especially concerned about the entry of persons who are labelled culturally or ethnically different from the socially dominant groups.’ Third, political-economic approaches highlight the effects of immigration on the labour market and, additionally, on welfare state policies (Boswell, 2008; Freeman and Kessler, 2008). In their summary of the economic literature on
migration, Freeman and Kessler (2008: 662) state that, among various effects, ‘an increase in the labour supply accompanying an influx of immigrants is likely to exercise downward pressure on wages. In such a case, class conflict, or political cleavages pitting businesses and immigrants against labour, is likely to result’.

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More to the point, to the extent that real-world developments affect the politicisation of immigration, we would expect three factors, in particular, to play a role: the numbers of immigrants, the extent to which these immigrants are perceived culturally different from the native population, and, a crucial indicator for the state of the labour market, unemployment. As will be further explicated in the section on political opportunity structures below, we must be aware of the fact that issues compete with each other for attention from the media, politicians and the public. In times when the economy is doing poorly, or when economic reforms are made, such issues will be high on the agenda and there will be less room for other issues. The political translation of economic pressures is consequently likely to be, among other political factors, dependent on these agenda-crowding mechanisms.

In addition to socio-structural developments, we are interested in the effect of events on politicisation. In terms of research interest, first, our interest is similar to researchers of the effect of so-called focusing events, ‘external shocks’ or ‘alarmed discoveries’ on policy change (Downs, 1972: 39; Kingdon, 1984: 99–105; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Birkland, 1997, 1998, 2004, 2006; Walgrave and Varone, 2008: 368). Second, our interest is similar to researchers of the effects of events that are, in part or fully, ‘created’ by the news media, and that consequently affect public opinion (e.g. McCombs, 2004: 93–94). As should be clear at this stage, we are interested in politicisation instead of policy change or attitude change. The key conceptual similarity is the fact that events may suddenly and unexpectedly increase the salience of a certain topic.

According to Birkland (1997: 3) a ‘potential focusing event is a rare, harmful, sudden event that becomes known to policy-makers and the public virtually simultaneously’. Obviously, some kinds of events are conceptually very close to the dependent variable ‘politicisation’, such as campaign events, which are initiated by political parties, media events initiated by journalists or public policy initiatives of policy-makers. These types of occurrences fall outside of the scope of our definition of events. We will focus on events which are outside the realm of ‘institutionalised’ politics, such as acts of terrorism. Moreover, we will speak of potentially triggering events instead of potentially focusing events. Scholars use the term ‘focusing’ to highlight that the event is actually a symptom of pre-existing policy failures or social trends. In the words of Kingdon (1984: 99), the event is ‘a little push to get the attention of people in and around government’. The ‘focus’ of people on some of the longer-term social trends consequently produces
new ‘policy images’. Further, as summarised by Walgrave and Varone (2008: 368) the event is ‘focal’ in the sense that government may respond by putting a new policy issue on its agenda or by modifying previous policies. Following Cobb and Elder (1983: 83–85), we prefer to use the term ‘triggering’ to highlight that (1) the event requires political initiatives (re)defining an issue and (2) that such initiatives are not restricted to government responses, but may also come from other political actors. Cobb and Elder argue that issues are created through the combination of a ‘triggering device’ (i.e. event) and an ‘initiator’. They, like us, put a stronger emphasis on actor initiatives surrounding events, instead of miraculously imputing agency.

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on the event itself, as seems to be the case in some of the studies mentioned earlier. Therefore we position ‘potentially triggering events’ in a separate cell in Table 1.1, being ‘bottom-up’ (here understood as largely ‘external’ to the political system) but simultaneously ‘structural’ and associated with ‘agency’.

Last, it remains to be said that events are somewhat unsatisfying ‘causes’ for politicisation. That is, they either are the ‘little push’ required to raise attention for ‘highly undesirable objective social conditions’ (Downs, 1972: 39), or, they are favourable circumstances ready to be exploited by strategic political actors eager to win the next political battle. Conceptually, they are not ‘causes’ for politicisation in themselves. We nevertheless think that they help us explain the relative importance of the other potential explanations mentioned. That is, to start, ‘events are much easier to pinpoint as proximate causes of agenda change at a particular moment than are social, demographic or ideological changes’ (Birkland, 1997: 5). Besides acting as triggering mechanism, in research terms they have observational benefits, because due to their time-specificity events are relatively easy to associate with changes in political oppositions, salience and arguments. Further, assuming that events catalyse the expected effects of socio-structural developments or political strategies, we may be able to falsify some of these effects in cases where they do not occur even in the most likely circumstances (when, in the words of Cobb and Elder [1983: 83] events act as ‘circumstantial reactors’). Events provide the most likely cases for the observation of some of the probable causes discussed in this chapter.

Actions of specific groups in society (agency, bottom-up)

Above a certain minimum threshold of migration or minimum level of discontent about the issue, the strategic initiatives of political actors to fuel discontent, create awareness and mobilise citizens potentially set in motion a process of politicisation. Consequently, cross-country differences in the level of politicisation may plausibly be explained by differences in the activities of groups in society. To understand how the issue of
immigration becomes politicised we should also focus on differences between countries in the activities of collective actors that intend to put the issue of immigration on the political agenda, in particular movements and counter-movements. In contrast to the structural societal changes that may trigger the establishment or activation of political organisations, in this section we discuss explanations that prioritise the initiative of political actors rather than, or independent of, changes in social structure or, more specifically, for instance, the number of immigrants. Furthermore, we distinguish political action by challengers ‘from the bottom up’ from initiatives of political actors who are more strongly tied to on-going policies of political authorities such as ministries and governing parties (‘top down’). This is a rather traditional distinction between, in Lasswell's (1950) terms, established and challenging elites. Challengers, by definition, are political actors who cannot make use of the formal, state-related means of politics and rely on other forms of political action such as media action or mobilisation. These are usually social movement organisations but we also include political outsiders such as some anti-immigration parties, particularly those that are treated as outcasts by mainstream parties. We discuss several of these types of actors in turn.

With regard to social movements, we are interested in the interaction between pro- and con-migration movements, in other words between movements and counter-movements. As argued by Meyer and Staggenborg (1996: 1633) we can think of counter-movements:

as networks of individuals and organisations that share many of the same objects of concern as the social movements that they oppose. They make competing claims on the state on matters of policy and politics [...] and vie for attention from mass media and the broader public. The emergence of one movement may precede that of its opponents and, early in such a conflict, it is appropriate to speak of the original movement and countermovement.

Claims by organised immigrant groups can lead to the politicisation of immigration and integration, such as when they demand the right to run their own schools or build mosques (Koopmans et al., 2005). Political claims from immigrant organisations or political actors supporting their cause increase the visibility of immigrants in public life and may give rise to reactions from other groups.

Anti-immigrant movements are, obviously, a different type of organisation to focus on when studying politicisation. Anti-immigrant movements could surge as counter-movements reacting to the claims made by migrant organisations, but they could equally arise as agents who mobilise existing feelings of economic or cultural
threat, or they might fuel such feelings and nationalistic sentiments. There are various kinds of anti-immigration movements, and substantially similar typologies exist of organisations representing the radical-right spectrum. These typologies are based upon the grade and type of their organisation, their degree of institutionalisation, ideologies (populist, xenophobic, neo-Nazi, etc.), or their action repertoires (see Rucht, 1991: 313ff.; Fennema, 1997; Skenderovic and D’Amato, 2008). These different dimensions along which we may classify these actors are not independent from each other. Neo-Nazi groupings have other kinds of action repertoires than right-wing populist parties for instance. To the extent that claims by such groups are reported in the news media, they are included in our study, even when they are violent or have only local impact.

Pro-immigrant solidarity movements form a third cluster of actors, entering the public sphere with the intention to occupy a prominent position in the political domain of migration policy (see also Giugni and Passy, 2001). Their activists do not only oppose discriminatory discourses and practices, but also attempt to improve the fate of immigrants in the countries of residence, mobilising citizens in order to regulate, for instance, the situation of ‘sans-papiers’, or defend the cause of refugees, who risk being deported, taking sanctuary in churches. Moreover, anti-fascist or anti-racist groups have been very active in opposing anti-immigration movements and parties.

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Initiatives by authorities (agency, initially top-down)

Politicians mobilise support and initiate policies. These activities and the responses to them of other political actors may well initiate a process of politicisation. To a certain extent these public policies reflect public opinion. Even though the link between citizens and policy-makers is indirect, we expect democratic politicians to be responsive to societal demands, at least to some degree. At the same time, politicians also play an active role in agenda-setting. They articulate political programmes in which they spell out which issues they intend to address and how they will do so. Politicians seem to do this increasingly by ‘going public’ (e.g. Kernell, 1993; Helms, 2008). Other political actors may publicly challenge such initiatives. For instance, studies of interest groups have shown that groups monitor activities of policy-makers and adjust their political activities in response to government initiatives (e.g. Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Gray et al., 2005; Leech et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2009b). In such cases the politicisation of an issue is triggered by the initiation of new policies.

In the countries under study, policies have been implemented to regulate the entrance and settlement of groups of immigrants. Moreover, various policies have been proposed
to help and encourage immigrants to integrate into the society of their new countries. Other policies intend to tackle social problems related to the presence of large immigrant groups. These initiatives produce winners and losers (e.g. Freeman, 2002). Particularly since such policies have direct consequences for large groups of citizens, they can provoke responses from interest organisations, opposition parties, and so on. It seems plausible that further politicisation might take place as a reaction to specific policies that are implemented.

The political opportunity structure

(structural, top-down)

Collective actors that try to put new issues on the political agenda, are more likely to do so if they expect their actions to be successful. Such expectations largely depend on the opportunities provided by the general political context in a country and the specific context of the issue, in our case migration and integration. This is what Tarrow (1994: 85) means when he defines the political opportunity structure (POS) as ‘consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure’. The POS is external to the actors involved (cf. Ruedin, 2011a).

Two conceptual remarks are in order here, as there is substantial discussion about (1) individual-level rational assumptions concerning ‘incentives for people to undertake collective action’ and (2) the extent to which discursive frames affect the ‘expectations regarding success’ and the extent to which such frames are, tautologically, shaped by movements themselves instead of being external to them (e.g. Koopmans, 1999a, 2004). We argue that these concerns do not substantially affect our research design. To start with, we are mostly interested in activities of organised political actors, not, or only partially, in movements that are still in their infant-stage in terms of political organisation. The individual-level assumptions (being rational or more sociological in nature) regarding mobilisation of new social movements are therefore not particularly consequential in our design. Furthermore, we argue that the concern regarding the discursive construction of the ‘expectation regarding success’, while fair, is not an element that should be classified as a part of the ‘opportunity structure’. Rather, we see it essentially as an aspect of the agency of the actors that manage to convince their supporters that their actions can be successful. These agency-based explanations were discussed in the previous sections.

We exclude the relatively malleable discursive component of the POS from the definition and focus only on the relatively structural aspects of the POS. Following the
advice of Meyer and Minkoff (2004), we narrow down the POS to the conflict dimensions of the party system and the formal political institutional rules in a country.

In this section we will discuss those aspects of the POS that can change within a country over time, and those that are relatively stable. A first aspect of the POS we include in our study is the structure of the party system, which constrains the likelihood of issues becoming politicised. This stems from the fact that while political conflicts divide groups they also unite others (e.g. Schattschneider, 1960: 60–75). In order to organise the support of a majority in favour of a certain proposal, actors have to build internal cohesion and coalitions with other actors, and doing so takes an investment in terms of time and energy. For this reason, majority coalitions are valuable assets and actors have an interest not to jeopardise these coalitions. Divisions cutting across existing coalitions are therefore less likely to become politicised than divisions that coincide with existing political cleavages. The inverse is also true: in cases where coalitions are unstable, it is likely that parties and voters realign themselves around new issues (Tarrow, 1994: 87). This, usually in combination with elite division (Tarrow, 1994: 88–89), creates new opportunities for politicisation. Challengers to majority coalitions (opposition or new parties) have incentives to increase the salience of dividing issues and exploit the potential instability of political alliances. Realignments are, however, relatively uncommon as ‘older conflicts’ seem to ‘freeze’ the structures of party political alliances and oppositions (Schattschneider, 1960: 73; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 1–64; Mair, 1998: 3–19). The countries that we study in this volume are rather stable established democracies. The conflict dimensions of the party systems in such countries are consequently relatively structural by nature and are unlikely to change as a result of, for instance, relatively contingent strategic choices on the part of political parties.

In other words, suppose that centre and right-wing parties are in a coalition government and they have agreed to enact certain measures in the sphere of social policies. These parties will then only put the issue of immigration on the political agenda if they agree on this issue. If they disagree, the issue could harm the unity of the government and thus hinder its capacity to enact other policies. Moreover, if the potential supporters of a party are divided over the issue, the party has a strong

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incentive also to keep the issue off the agenda. In general, we expect that the mainstream centre parties will try to keep the issue off the agenda (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Odmalm, 2008; Meguid, 2008). However, this might create opportunities for new parties to mobilise support on the issue. Such opportunities depend on the extent to which positions on immigration and integration coincide with positions on other issues, or whether there have been changes in the party system that benefit parties which are
more likely to politicise these issues. These conflict lines in the party system and the associated restriction of the political agenda spill over into political conflict more broadly (i.e. including pressure groups, bureaucratic agencies and social movement organisations). The party system is dominant, however, because, as noted by Schattschneider (1960: 57), ‘in the last analysis there is no political substitute for victory in an election’.

In addition to the structure of the party system, we will also focus on institutional characteristics, such as the effective electoral threshold, or whether the political system is closed or centralised (Kriesi, 1990), or whether it features a district system that effectively prevents the entry of small radical parties. While these institutional characteristics are important elements of the POS, they cannot explain trends within a country, because they are highly stable over time. Yet, these do help us explaining country-specific peculiarities (levels of politicisation, types of actors), because they do not only determine the opportunities for political parties to form, but the opportunities for the mobilisation of immigrants, their allies and their counterparts are also constrained by the institutional context (Koopmans et al., 2005). Two aspects seem particularly important. The first aspect refers to the degree to which migrants are able to enter the public sphere in order to address publicly their political claims. The second aspect is concerned with the means of action at the disposal of migrants that permit them to take part in the public sphere. In the country chapters, we will discuss institutional features that determine how open the system is to challenger groups. Whether it is easy for immigrant organisations to gain access to state institutions and to policy-making processes, might depend to a large degree upon institutional characteristics.

1.4 Outline of the study

In this chapter, we conceptualised politicisation as processes along two separate dimensions: salience and polarisation. This means that an issue is only fully politicised when it is both contested (polarised) and salient. We outlined a typology of four types of explanations of politicisation. Throughout the book, we will empirically assess the extent to which each of these explanations contributes to our understanding of the processes of (de-)politicisation. Our study is, therefore, highly exploratory in nature, and we will not assume a priori that any one of these explanations is superior to the others.

Having outlined the different perspectives on studying politicisation here, we will discuss our research design in the next chapter. We study the politicisation of the issue of migration and civic integration of immigrants in seven European countries, and the next chapter will discuss the selection of these countries, the reasons
for focusing on the issue of migration, as well as the measurement of the key concepts of our study. After discussing methodological issues, we turn to empirics in eight separate chapters.

This edited volume contains seven country chapters and a comparative chapter. The country chapters are ordered alphabetically (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and provide descriptive accounts of the processes of politicisation in each of the countries. At the same time, the country chapters explore the plausibility of each of the four explanations outlined in this introduction. The book is concluded by a comparative chapter which consists of two parts. First, we conduct analyses of the cross-national data to assess the extent to which we can predict the degrees of politicisation by real-world indicators (numbers of non-Western immigrants, number of asylum seekers and unemployment figures) and by the kinds of policies that were introduced. Second, a comparative part summarises the evidence gathered in all the chapters to distil general patterns.
Chapter 4 National Identity and the Challenge of Immigration

Why does immigration roil the politics of so many countries, even aging societies that need people to help finance the welfare state benefits of their declining populations? Surely a large part of the answer is that immigration brings strangers into “our land,” raising concerns about the erosion of a common national identity. The territorial nation-state remains the dominant political reality of our time; reports of its demise are vastly exaggerated. A nation is a set of people with a common “we-feeling” seeking a state of their own. The attributes giving rise to this sense of common identity may vary, but all nationalist doctrines insist that “the imagined community of the nation must be the primary focus of values, source of legitimacy, and object of loyalty and basis of identity,” overriding the claims of minority communities within it.

By changing the ethnic composition of nation-states and increasing cultural diversity, immigration poses the problem of integration, of making newcomers members of the national “team.” The greater the cultural similarity of immigrants to the native population, the less severe this problem may appear, and this has shaped attitudes and policies about who should be allowed to come, but even in the United States, often self-described as a nation of immigrants, public opinion surveys consistently show that Americans favor past immigration over more recent immigration, prefer legal to illegal immigrants, and overwhelmingly reject any conception of multiculturalism that challenges English as the country’s common, unifying language. 3

Assimilation, the gradual adoption of prevailing habits and beliefs by newcomers, is one political formula for sustaining social solidarity amid ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism, a policy, conceived in the 1970s, of encouraging the persistence of cultures distinct from the national mainstream,
is the alternative embraced by many in both North America and
Western Europe. Official support for multiculturalism peaked in the 1980s
and 1990s, but there is widespread agreement that the political pendulum
has swung toward the opposite pole. In 1999, no European country had
civic integration (assimilation) policies. By now, language training and civic
education are widely adopted as tests not just for citizenship but also for
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immigration control. The leaders of Germany, Britain, and France have
publicly denounced multiculturalism as a disaster that threatens their
nation’s collective identity and echo the arguments of some academics that
a strong overarching national identity is the better approach for integrating
immigrants and building a sense of social solidarity in a diverse society. This
chapter first reviews public opinion data from Europe and North
America to show how conceptions of national identity are linked to preferences
regarding immigration policy. Then it considers how the extent to
which a country adopts multicultural policies is connected both to public
attitudes toward immigrants and to trends in conceptions of nationhood.
The evidence comes largely from International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
data collected in 1995 and 2003 and the European Social Surveys (ESS)
collected biennially between 2002 and 2010. Cross-national comparisons
show that the contrasting histories of immigration in the United States and
in Europe have resulted in different conceptions of where diversity fits into
images of the nation. Yet the two forms of national identity often distinguished
in the literature—the ethnic and the civic—are widely in evidence in
the United States as well as in Europe, and these conceptions relate similarly
to individuals’ immigration attitudes in all countries.

MEANINGS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

The construct of national identity has cognitive, affective, and normative
dimensions. The cognitive facet refers to self-categorization, the answer to
the question “who am I?” The affective dimension refers to the strength of
one’s identification with one’s country. Patriotism, defined as pride in and
love of one’s country, is the standard referent here. Finally, national identities
have normative content, by which is meant the criteria that define a nation’s
uniqueness. These are the attributes that distinguish “us” from them. In this
chapter, I consider both the affective and the normative dimensions, paying
particular attention to whether the subjective boundaries of the nation are
defined in ethnic, “ascriptive” terms or in civic, “achievable” terms.

MEANINGS OF MULTICULTURALISM

In a descriptive sense, multiculturalism refers to the presence within a political
society of many distinct religious, ethnic, or racial groups. Viewed this
way, the United States, Canada, and virtually all European nation-states are
and will remain multicultural societies. A second meaning of multiculturalism
is ideological rather than demographic. In this incarnation, multiculturalism
affirms the enduring moral and political significance of ethnic group
consciousness and endorses policies designed to support minority ethnicities
through special recognition and representation.

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Proponents of multiculturalism assert that the welcoming stance adopted
toward immigrants, distilled in the phrase “you can be yourselves and still
belong here,” will succeed in incorporating newcomers into the political community
as loyal citizens. Once this is seen to happen, skeptical natives will no
longer view immigrants as a threat to prevailing values and come to accept
cultural heterogeneity as compatible with national cohesion. Advocates of
assimilation regard these predictions as naïve at best and perverse at worst.
In their view, multiculturalism elevates ethnic identification at the expense
of commitment to a common democratic culture. Insistence on the value
of “difference” provokes resentment that spills over into prejudice as well
as an unwillingness to support redistribution measures because they might
benefit those who are perceived as undeserving immigrant claimants. Only if
immigrant minorities acculturate, advocates of assimilation argue, will they
be accepted as full-fledged members of the national community and achieve
both social integration and economic advancement.
In exploring the relationships between public opinion about immigration
and the presence of multiculturalist policy regimes, I use the Multiculturalism
Policy Index for Immigrant Minorities (MCP) developed by Banting and
Kymlicka. 7 This measure assigns scores to countries by summing the number
of the following policies of official recognition and representation for
cultural minorities adopted: 8
Constitutional, legal or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism;
The adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum;
Inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the public media; 9
Exemptions from dress codes or Sunday closing legislation;
Allowing dual citizenship;
The funding of ethnic group organizations for cultural activities;
Funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; and
Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.
Countries that adopt all these components of the MCP Index receive a
total score of 8. Those adopting fewer than three of the eight policies are
classified as having “weak” immigrant minority policies. Countries with
scores between 3 and 5.5 are categorized as having a "modest" multicultural regime for immigrants, and those with scores between 6 and 8 are "strongly" multiculturalist.

Data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index show that, with the exception of the United States, the "settler" societies in North America and Australasia had more robust multicultural regimes than most European countries. Still, between 1980 and 2000, there was a decided shift toward the adoption of more multicultural policies. Five countries moved from the weak to the modest category and two from modest to strong. No country had a lower 20 Jack Citrin
MCP score in 2000 than in 1980. For the years between 2000 and 2010, the pattern of change is more mixed. Five countries actually moved in the direction of multiculturalism, as measured by the MCP Index, usually by changes in the content of media and school curricula. Prompted by electoral pressures, the Netherlands alone moved decisively to weaken its policies, which handle the administration of education and welfare policies separately for religious communities (Catholic, Protestant, and then Muslim). Yet, while many multiculturalist policies remained intact between the late 1990s and 2010, most Western European countries adopted civic integration requirements for naturalization, and several were imposing language requirements for new immigrants, policies that reflected a retreat from multiculturalism toward assimilationist views. And clearly the shift in rhetoric and policy was in part a response to the emerging electoral strength of radical-right political parties opposed to immigration.

THE CONTOURS OF PUBLIC OPINION
The United States and Europe approach the dilemmas of immigration policy from radically different historical perspectives, as spelled out by Schain’s chapter in this volume. Despite ambivalent public views, immigration
is a fundamental part of America's founding myth. Most Americans acknowledge that all of “us here now” or our ancestors—Native Americans aside—came from somewhere else. In Europe the story is quite different. Immigration does not figure in the construction of national identities of most nation-states in the ever-expanding European Union. Moreover, unlike the American case, immigrants came to Western Europe more recently, largely in reaction to a series of convulsions in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Against this background, the data from the 2002 ESS and a companion Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy (CID) American survey show more support for cultural diversity in the United States than in European countries. This assertion derives from the level of agreement to these statements: “It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions.” “It is better for a country if there are a variety of religions among its people.”

Figure 1.1 presents the country-level means for each item, coded so that high values equal support for homogeneity, along with the 95 percent confidence interval for each country’s mean. The vertical line in each graph indicates the midpoint of the scale, so a country plotted to the left of the line is less committed to cultural homogeneity than a country to the right of the line. Figure 1.1 shows that countries are relatively evenly distributed between a tendency to support religious homogeneity and a tendency to oppose it. But National Identity and the Challenge of Immigration the majority in 19 of 21 countries agreed that a country would be better served if everyone shared the same customs and traditions. Only the United States and, to a lesser extent, Sweden fell on the accepting side of the midpoint. It appears that the long history of cultural and ethnic diversity in the United States has produced a distinctive and more favorable orientation.
toward cultural heterogeneity. This does not, however, extend to support for linguistic diversity. The American public is among the strongest in the conviction that speaking the host country's language should be a very important qualification for admitting immigrants, and those Americans who value cultural homogeneity are just like their European counterparts in opposing immigration. 12

To explore how subjective conceptions of national identity influence immigration attitudes, I rely on questions embedded in the 1995 and 2003 ISSP programs. These surveys include a battery of questions asking respondents how important various criteria are in making someone a "true" national (American, Briton, German, and so forth). In the 2003 survey, the attributes included ancestry, nativity, having lived in the country most of

Religious Homogeneity
Support for Homogeneity
Cultural Homogeneity

Figure 1.1 Beliefs about Societal Homogeneity

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one's life, being a member of the country's majority religion, speaking the country's principal language, having respect for the country's law and institutions, and "feeling" like a national. (The 1995 ISPP omitted the question about ancestry.)

These attributes of nationhood were chosen in part to capture the ethnic/civic distinction prevalent in the nationalism literature. 13 Admittedly, the face validity of some is unclear. For example, neither religion nor language ability is as fixed as ancestry or nativity. Accordingly, Wright and Citrin and Wright pruned these items and created "ascriptive" (ethnic) and "achievable" (civic) national identity indices by summing responses about ancestry and nativity on the one hand and respect for laws and feeling like a national on the other. 14
Wright further reports a consistent tendency of ascriptive or ethnic nationalism to be associated with believing that the level of immigration into one’s country should be reduced and that immigrants should not automatically have the same rights as citizens. In the aforementioned study, Citrin and Wright find the same pattern of relationships between ascriptive nationalism and the belief that immigrants should adapt to mainstream values rather than maintain their original customs and traditions in every European country and the United States. These data have two implications: first, the public should be more willing to accept culturally similar immigrants; second, greater acceptance of ethnic diversity requires a redefinition of the boundaries of nationhood on more ethnically neutral civic terms.

The former expectation is borne out by survey data. In the United States, Gallup polls conducted from 1984 to 2006 consistently show that newcomers from Europe are most welcome, followed by those from Asia and Latin America. For example, in 2002, the proportion of Americans saying “too many immigrants are being admitted” was 27 percent for Europe, 32 percent for Africa, 43 percent for Asia, and 49 percent for Latin America.

Instructively, opposition to immigration is centered on those groups that are providing most of the newcomers. Analysis of the 2008 American National Election Study shows that negative feelings about Hispanics are more strongly related to opposition to immigration than are similar feelings about Asians. In the 2010 ESS, national samples from 26 European countries were asked about how many people should be allowed to be admitted from three different groups: people of the same race or ethnicity as the majority, people of a different race or ethnicity than the majority, and people from poorer countries outside Europe. (The latter two groups clearly overlap.) In the pooled sample of 48,620 respondents, the proportions saying “just a few” or none were 33 percent, 50 percent, and 55 percent, respectively. This opposition
to culturally dissimilar immigrants prevailed in every country, ranging from
highs of 86 percent in Greece and 88 percent in Cyprus to 29 percent in
Poland and 11 percent in Sweden. Multiple regression analyses of the pooled
2002–2010 ESS surveys (not shown here but available on request) with
controls for demographic variables, country, and year of survey show that
opposition to admitting culturally dissimilar and poor immigrants had much
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stronger effects on beliefs about the negative consequences of immigration
for a country’s culture and economy than did feelings about newcomers with
the same race or ethnicity.
In sum, in both the United States and Europe, immigration from the
“southern border” is feared. Moreover, in both continents, as Table 1.1
shows, patriotism, measured as pride in one’s country, is associated with
anti-immigrant sentiment in every country except Portugal, Canada, and
New Zealand. Affective as well as normative facets of national identity
shape attitudes toward immigrants. The implication for policy may be that
promoting a more accepting outlook could depend on a more selective policy
or on a stronger commitment to programs of assimilation.
DO MULTICULTURAL POLICIES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Have trends in public attitudes varied in countries depending on the strength
of their multicultural policies? Regarding conceptions of national identity, it is
useful to compare the 1995 and 2003 ISPP surveys, given that this period saw
the policy pendulum in Europe begin to swing toward assimilation and also
that it was punctuated by 9/11. By insisting on the preservation of difference,
multicultural policies can be perceived as threatening ideas of nationhood
based on a common culture. So, to the extent that immigrants fail to assimilate,
one might expect subjective definitions of national identity to become
more “ascriptive” where there is stronger official support for multiculturalism.
Of the 11 countries surveyed in both ISSP studies, Australia and Canada fall into "strong" MCP category; the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Sweden are in the "modest" group; and Austria, Germany, Ireland, Norway, and Spain are coded as having "weak" MCP regimes. Figure 1.2, reproduced from Citrin, 16 tracks the change between 1995 and 2003 in the proportion of respondents naming nativity (being born in the country), religion (being a Christian), language (speaking the national language), respect for the country's laws and institutions, and psychological identification (feeling like a national) as "very important" for making someone a "true national."

Table 1.1 The Effect of Pride on Anti-immigrant Sentiment, by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pride Country Pride Country Pride</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>.133***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>.094***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>.093***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>.090**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>.084***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>.081***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Conceptions of national identity in Australia and Canada, the countries at the top of the multiculturalist heap, moved in an "ethnic" direction, with nativity, religion, and language being deemed more important, in the aggregate, than eight years previously. Overall, the middle MCP group also moved in the ascriptive direction. Disaggregating the results shows statistically significant increases in the proportions of the American public calling nativity, language, and religion very important. In New Zealand, opinion made a similar, if less pronounced, shift, but there was no such change in either the United Kingdom or Sweden. In the "weak" MCP countries, there
was little noticeable change in outlook. One interpretation is that the movement toward more ascriptive definitions of nationality in the settler societies with growing immigrant populations indicated discontent with the purpose of multicultural policies. But one should not overlook the possible impact of 9/11, not just in the United States but in the other English-speaking countries with strong ties to America.

The ISPP data also show that between 1995 and 2003, concern about the cultural threat of immigrants grew concomitantly with stronger support for the assimilation of cultural minorities. 17 Agreement that immigrants posed a cultural threat rose regardless of a country's MCP score, but there was no corresponding increase in perceptions of immigrants as an economic threat whatever a country's MCP score. Wright confirms these shifts in outlook between 1995 and 2003 with a much more rigorous multilevel regression analysis. 18 He concludes that there is some evidence of an ethnocentric backlash against immigration in countries with stronger multicultural regimes.

The European Social Survey (ESS) conducted between 2002 and 2010 provides more recent data for a set of European countries. Using these data sets, I constructed an Immigrant Level Index by combining responses to questions about whether more immigrants with the same ethnic background as the host country, immigrants with ethnic backgrounds different from that of the host country, and those coming from poorer countries should be admitted and recoding them to give scores ranging from 0 to 1 (most anti-immigrant). Figure 1.3 presents the fluctuations in these attitudes between 2002 and 2010, with countries grouped by the strength of their multicultural policy regimes. The weak MCP countries are consistently more hostile to increased immigration. But the data also point to a sharp rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in the stronger MCP countries (Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Sweden) between 2008 and 2010. These
were not the European countries where the economic downturn was most marked, so one can speculate that resentment of multiculturalism catalyzed by elite rhetoric and the rise of anti-immigrant parties helped produce the shift in public opinion, already predisposed to oppose immigration. The radical right, in a sense, is lighting already combustible material. Overall, though, aggregate attitudes toward immigration in most European countries changed very little between 2002 and 2012; reluctance to admit many more newcomers, regardless of their race, remained the dominant point of view.

1995 2003
.7 .65 .6 .55 .5 Born in Country
.3 .35 .4 .45

Christian
.75 .8 .85 .9

National Language
1995 2003
.78 .8 .82 .84 .86 .88

Institutions and Laws
.75 .8 .85 .9

Feel Like National
1995 2003

Figure 1.2 Trend in Ethnic Nationalism by Multiculturalism Policy Category

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Indeed, Citrin and Wright find that there is a negative association between opposition to more immigration and political trust in all European countries sampled in the ESS and that this relationship is accentuated in countries with the strongest multicultural policy regimes (as measured by the MCP Index). 19 The implication is that multiculturalism can drive a wedge between those
who are sympathetic to immigration and the larger group, which is hostile.

A SPECULATION ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

This chapter has emphasized the importance of subjective conceptions of national identity in undergirding opposition to immigration, which connects to the overall argument about the importance of media narratives of identity and immigration. Immigration policy focuses on who should be admitted, how many, and their rights and responsibilities. Research in social psychology has demonstrated a seemingly innate human tendency toward ethnocentrism. 20 Social identity theory based on the minimal group research paradigm has repeatedly shown that categorization of people as either "us" or "them" and in-group favoritism are ubiquitous, if not universal. 21 And, if this is true in the laboratory, how much more potent must the effects be when we consider ethnic groups deeply committed to their own way of life. So, when immigration brings people into impersonal contact with Figure 1.3 2002–2010 Trends in European Immigration Attitudes

National Identity and the Challenge of Immigration 27 others who are visibly different and when the latter demand cultural rights or receive government benefits that are viewed as unearned, negative political reactions are predictable.

And one factor that can exacerbate the natives' sense of threat is overestimation of the number of immigrants, as noted in the Introduction to this book. In a 2007 national survey of Americans, Sides and Citrin found that the median estimate for the number of immigrants in the country was 27 percent of the total population, more than double the census figure, and the median estimate for the number of illegal immigrants was 21 percent, almost seven times the official estimate. 22 The magnitude of these overestimates predictably was strongly related to beliefs that the level of immigration into the United States should be greatly decreased. More interesting perhaps is that
correcting misinformation by telling respondents the official census data did not make attitudes significantly more favorable to immigrants. Since overestimation was correlated with living in areas with a recent influx of immigrants, one wonders whether the extent and nature of media coverage may have contributed to public misperceptions and in this way helped sustain restrictionist beliefs.

CONCLUSION

In this era of globalization, immigration cannot be willed out of existence even by those most opposed to it. Migration will continue to take different forms. In North America, liberal policy regimes remain intact, and the United States, in particular, will continue to grapple with the influx of illegal immigrants across its porous southern border. In Europe, EU citizenship provides the right of residential mobility, and this is one source of immigration, along with continuing pressure to admit refugees and a burgeoning problem of illegal entrants from Africa and the Middle East. So, despite the public’s preference for restriction, with mass deportation probably off the table and the demise of the European Union a long shot, governments will have to continue to address the problem of integration.

The evidence of the surveys presented here does indicate a trend toward more support for assimilation and widespread belief in national identities founded on a common language and culture. In addition, a strong sense of national attachment linked to an ascriptive concept of nationality is associated with more negative opinions about immigration and less support for multiculturalist policies, particularly of the strong variety.

Assimilation can have coercive implications and take the form of a wholesale assault on the traditions of immigrants. But this need not be the case. If the United States can serve as an example, favoring individualism over group rights and assimilation over cultural separation has not excluded accepting
the introduction of new streams into the common culture. Historically, 28 Jack Citrin
the core of American assimilation encompasses learning English, venerating the country's political institutions, and national loyalty. If this is what Europe's new civic integration policies require, many multicultural policies can remain intact. Indeed, despite some concerns about the integration of Latino immigrants in the United States, the evidence is that their pattern of acculturation resembles that of their earlier European counterparts. By the third generation, most are monolingual in English, and patriotism is as high among the offspring of Latino immigrants as among white, native-born Americans. 23 So it may be that the swing toward assimilation in Europe contributed to stabilizing opinions about immigration between 2002 and 2012.
The task appears to be developing adequate programs to encourage linguistic and political assimilation of immigrants, and this may require a two-pronged approach. While evidence presented here suggests that multicultural policies can create an ethnocentric backlash among the native population, Wright and Bloemraad reach a tentative conclusion that countries with strong MCP regimes have somewhat greater success in raising the civic participation of immigrants. 24 So more research is needed to identity more precisely the potentially cross-cutting effects of these policies.
To the extent that multiculturalism enhances the place of ethnic identifi
cation as the fount of political identifi cation and behavior, it creates obstacles for the inculcation of the inclusive conception of civic national identity that is open to immigration and to eroding some of the barriers between "us" and "them." In cross-sectional analyses, multiculturalist policies do not have a strong or consistent effect on anti-immigrant attitudes or political trust. Rather, they seem to function as latent predisposing factors
that are triggered by situational factors—terrorist attacks, the demand for sharia law, the building of a giant mosque, debates about the burqa, debates about gender inequality—that evoke feelings of cultural threat and the sense that the politics of difference undermines national identity. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the turmoil about immigration in Europe is at its core about the integration of Muslim migrants who fill low-skilled positions or the unemployed ranks—and these immigrants dominate a substantial segment of media coverage in France, as Zamith’s study in this book found, supporting the argument made by several of the journalists’ chapters that issues of visible difference tend to dominate media and public discourse.

To conclude, attitudes toward immigration are founded in large part on conceptions of nationhood and ethnocentric attitudes toward outsiders. These beliefs are entrenched but not immutable. How the immigration issue is framed may matter, and this is where an analysis of media choices can be important in either contributing to or narrowing the gap between elite attitudes and policies on the one hand and the preferences of publics that in a democracy constrain what governments do.

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NOTES

1. This chapter represents a synthesis of research on immigration often conducted jointly by John Sides, Matthew Wright, Morris Levy, and me. I am grateful for their assistance and to Morris Levy for his special help in preparing this chapter.


8. A related indicator not included in this measure is whether citizenship is based on jus soli or jus sanguinis, with the former policy clearly more open to a multiethnic polity.

9. This generally is implemented by rules allocating certain amounts of programming to minority groups, whether through foreign language programming or just control of content. One example, interestingly, is the representation of different kinds of music in the US Armed Forces Radio Network: a certain amount of R and B, soul, and rap, a certain amount of country music, and so forth.

10. Jack Citrin and John Sides, “Immigration and the Imagined Community in
11. Reprinted from ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism:
14. Matthew Wright, “Policy Regimes and Normative Conceptions of Nationalism
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and Matthew Wright, “The Collision of National Identity and Multiculturalism
among Mass Publics,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, April 4–7, 2008.
15. Jack Citrin and Matthew Wright, “The Politics of Immigration in a Nation
of Immigrants,” in New Directions in American Politics, ed. Raymond La
Raja (New York: Routledge, 2013), 245.
16. Jack Citrin
17. Ibid.
18. Wright, “Policy Regimes.”
19. Jack Citrin, Morris Levy, and Matthew Wright, “Immigration, Multiculturalism,
and Political Trust: A Janus-Faced Outcome?,” paper presented at the 19th
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20. Donald R. Kinder and Cindy D. Kam, Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations
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Chapter 5 The Immigration Industrial Complex: Who Profits from Immigration Policies Destined to Fail?

In previous chapters, we learned how immigration policy is detrimental to immigrant communities as well as to citizens. We have seen that the inability of many migrants to remain legally in the United States is cause for social concern, yet the policies that have been implemented have done little to alleviate challenges associated with undocumented migration. Why haven’t policy makers come up with better solutions to the current crisis? A discussion of the immigration industrial complex will help address this key question.

The immigration industrial complex refers to the public and private sector interests in the criminalization and marginalization of undocumented migration, immigration law enforcement, and “anti-illegal” rhetoric. This concept is based on the idea that there exists a convergence of interests that drives the United States government to pass and then avidly enforce a set of immigration policies that consistently have failed to achieve their stated goals. The profit potential is at the root of this human rights crisis, yet political power plays a significant role. In this chapter, I explain how the failure of immigration policy is due to a confluence of powerful interests that prevent the passage of laws that would ameliorate the situation of undocumented migrants and their families.

The Failure of Immigration Policy

The majority of immigration policies implemented in the late twentieth century and debated in Congress in the early twenty-first century have been more effective at making life difficult for immigrants than at achieving any long-term solutions that could benefit both citizens and noncitizens. None of these measures provide a real solution to the crisis of deaths at the border or to the crisis of a large marginalized population in the United States. They fail to take into account the impossibility of sealing the 7,000 miles of borders that encircle the United States. They often ignore the motivations for migration explained in
the first chapter, particularly the fact that U.S.-based corporations, the military, and the CIA have engaged in activities that have created migration flows and attracted migrants to the United States. In addition, they do not account for the dependence of many employers on the temporary workforce that migration policy and industry practices have created. Nearly all the proposed measures enhance the marginalization of some sectors of the migrant population.

As discussed in Chapter 1, “Roots of Immigration to the United States,” our country has depended on immigrants for centuries, and U.S.-based legislators, corporations, and employers are largely responsible for migration flows. This complicity almost never forms part of the legislative debate. I have also explained, in Chapter 2, “The Department of Homeland Security and the Immigration Enforcement Regime of the Twenty-First Century,” the wide array of problems generated by the surge in interior enforcement. The escalation of interior enforcement has been tremendously expensive and ineffective. In the 2006 raid on the Swift meatpacking plants, ICE agents arrested nearly 1,300 workers. This operation took months to plan and implement and cost millions of dollars. Even if ICE were capable of carrying out a similar operation every day, it would take nearly thirty years to remove the seven million undocumented workers from this country in this fashion. In short, immigration raids are not a viable solution, unless your goal is to tear apart families, destroy businesses, and create a marginalized and fearful population.

The problems associated with the detention and deportation of undocumented immigrants discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, “Racism and the Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy,” are similar. We are currently stretching our resources with the average daily detention of 30,000 immigrants, costing taxpayers nearly $3 million per day. Even if we were to increase the number of detainees tenfold, we would barely be up to 5 percent of the current undocumented immigrant population. Not only do we not have the detention facilities; we also do not have
the lawyers to give those detainees due process, the judges to charge them, or the vehicles to transport 12 million people out of the country. Many deportees, especially Mexicans, simply return to the United States. They return because of extensive family ties in the United States and because they know there are jobs available.

Punitive immigration policies are implemented and proposed despite substantial research that demonstrates that harsh immigration policies fail to achieve their stated goals (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Golash-Boza and Parker 2007; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). The militarization of the border merely pushes migrants and would-be migrants to more remote areas to cross the border, putting their lives in danger. On average, one person dies each day attempting to cross the border. In fiscal year (FY) 2005, 472 bodies of perished migrants were encountered in the harsh terrain of the United States/Mexico border. The bodies of other deceased migrants were likely not found.1 Because of the increased difficulty in crossing the southern border in recent years, migrants must go to more remote places to cross. This enhances their vulnerability to gang violence, their chances of being sexually assaulted, their need to rely on smugglers, and the probability of their being injured or dying. Human rights researchers have found that as many as 70 percent of women crossing the border face sexual assault, and that some women take birth control pills before crossing, knowing that being raped is a likely possibility.2

There have been numerous studies that demonstrate the inefficacy of tough immigration laws, but these results have fallen on deaf ears in Congress. For example, in a testimony prepared for the House Judiciary Committee in August 2006, Professor Wayne Cornelius presented evidence that increasing border enforcement does not discourage unauthorized migration. Cornelius (2006) argued that tightened border enforcement since 1993 has not stopped nor even discouraged
unauthorized migrants from entering the United States. Even if apprehended, the vast majority (92–97%) keep trying until they succeed. Neither the higher probability of being apprehended by the Border Patrol, nor the sharply increased danger of clandestine entry through deserts and mountainous terrain, has discouraged potential migrants from leaving home. . . . With clandestine border crossing an increasingly expensive and risky business, U.S. border enforcement policy has unintentionally encouraged undocumented migrants to remain in the United States for longer periods and settle permanently in this country in much larger numbers.

Despite mounting evidence that increased border enforcement does not reduce illegal entries into the United States, the only immigration legislation to be passed in the wake of the massive immigrants’ rights marches in 2006 focused exclusively on border enforcement. Shortly after Cornelius presented his convincing data in August 2006, the Secure Fence Act passed the House on September 14, 2006, and the Senate on September 29, 2006, with few dissenting votes in either body. The Secure Fence Act authorized the building of a 700-mile barrier at the southern border of the United States. Congress has yet to appropriate the billions of dollars needed to erect this barrier, which is likely to lead to more migrant deaths, as migrants are pushed into more remote regions of the borderlands (Cornelius 2006; Anguiano Téllez 2007).

Vast increases in the budget for border and interior immigration law enforcement have not led to decreases in the population of undocumented immigrants. The Department of Homeland Security continues to enact, albeit with greater force, the same strategies that its predecessor, the INS, used, despite evidence that these strategies are ineffective. Congress continues to appropriate billions of dollars to enhance the Border Patrol and to carry out more deportations. These tactics make the lives of immigrants more difficult, but they do little to address the challenges presented by the presence of a large undocumented population.
The Roots of the Immigration Industrial Complex

The War on Terror has translated into a War on Immigrants. That's because of the fusion of national security with immigration law enforcement and the consequent allocation of funds to enforce immigration policy. This is not new: undocumented migrants have been targets of harsh immigration policies in ebbs and flows since the passage of Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. Despite the limited efficacy of the immigration enforcement actions of the late 1980s and early 1990s, enforcement returned with new vigor in 2003. Scholars predicted the failure of these measures (Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992; Calavita 1989), yet few critics have considered why Congress has passed laws that are destined to fail and why Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement these laws. As Wayne Cornelius (2005: 15) puts it: "Why does the United States' ten-year-old set of policies for controlling unauthorised immigration persist, long past the point when it became apparent that they are not working?" Cornelius briefly answers his own question by pointing to the political capital to be gained from being tough on immigration, the conflation of the War on Terror with immigration policy, and the "insatiable appetite for immigrant labour—much of it low-skilled—which is not satisfied by existing laws and policies" (16).

In these concluding lines, Cornelius (2005) is hinting at a coalescence of interests in these failed policies. This idea of a confluence of interests, or convergence of agendas, resonates with the concept of an industrial complex. Scholars of migration have invoked this concept in their discussions of a "security-industrial complex" (Mills 2004; Koerner 2002); the "border-industrial complex" (Akers Chacón 2006); and the "immigration-industrial complex" (Fernandes 2006; Koulish 2007). Each has invoked this concept of an industrial complex, yet mostly in passing; none has taken full advantage of the complexity of this framework. However, it is beneficial to take these analyses one step further by
considering and applying the extensive work done in the areas of the prison and military industrial complexes (MICs) to an explanation of the workings of the immigration industrial complex. I have chosen the term immigration industrial complex following the lead of Robert Koulish and Deepa Fernandes, from the three available, because it is the best suited for a consideration of how profit potential influences certain facets of immigration policy. In particular, the border is included in the framework of immigration policy, and immigration is only part of national security.

Legal scholars, historians, and journalists have devoted their attention to the profit potential of immigration law enforcement. This body of work points to the great profits to be made from the current enforcement regime and the dubious connections between fighting terrorism and arresting undocumented migrants. Brendan I. Koerner, for example, wrote in Mother Jones in 2002: “Because federal expenditures on homeland security are projected to rise dramatically in the coming years—and because every aspect of civilian life, from food distribution to public transit, could be affected—a wide range of industries ultimately stands to benefit.” Deepa Fernandes (2006) argues that “enforcing immigration policy has become the latest way to make a quick buck” (169). Robert Koulish (2007) contends that “catching aliens is a lucrative business made all the more so by exploiting already blurred distinctions between immigration and national security.” Justin Akers Chacón (2006) maintains that “border enforcement has become a profitable enterprise” and that “this unprecedented investment in border enforcement has spawned the term ‘border-industrial complex’ to denote the changing nature of immigration enforcement” (Akers Chacón 2006: 222–223). In this chapter, I expand on their work by engaging more fully with the literature on the MIC and the prison industrial complex to understand who benefits from immigration law enforcement, and, in turn, to help us understand better how the immigration industrial complex works.
What Is the Military Industrial Complex?
On his final night as president of the United States, in 1961, Dwight Eisenhower warned the American public of the dangers of the creation of a “permanent armaments industry of vast proportions” (Eisenhower 1961). Eisenhower urged Americans to be wary of the potential for the “unwarranted influence” of the “military industrial complex.” These predictions turned out to be prescient; the U.S. arms industry continued to grow and became heavily influential in the arms race in the coming decades.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of a MIC dominated much of the critical discussion of U.S. foreign and domestic policies. The basic idea behind this concept is that there are close relationships between the corporate elite, bureaucrats, and politicians, and these actors work together to ensure that state military investments serve the interests of capital (Moskos 1972; Cobb 1976). Although there was general agreement that such a complex existed, there were disputes with regard to who benefited from it and how it actually worked. Much of this discussion centered on the “self-serving accommodation between corporate elites, government bureaucrats, and the military hierarchy” (Moskos 1972: 499). Many sociologists used the framework provided by C. Wright Mills in The Power Elite to gain insight into how these actors came together to work in their own interest. As Moskos (1972) points out, this was not generally a Marxist analysis, insofar as the focus was not on the “economic relations of classes to the means of production;” but on the way elite bureaucrats used their power and position to their advantage (502). The justifications for the build-up of the military industrial complex were largely due to an external threat—the specter of Communism. In contrast, the justification for the prison industrial complex was based on an internal threat—the fear of crime.

What Is the Prison Industrial Complex?
In the early 1990s, writers began to explore the idea of a prison industrial complex (PIC), drawing from scholarly analyses of the military industrial complex. In 1995, Mike Davis mentioned the PIC in a Nation article about the rise of prisons in California. These ideas were expanded on and taken to a national level by Eric Schlosser and Angela Davis in 1998, and then by a great many other thinkers in the past decade.

The PIC refers to the vast network of prisons, jails, courts, police officers, and other elements that purport to reduce the amount of criminal activity in our society. The PIC is a "self-perpetuating machine": the enormous investment in prisons, jails, and law enforcement combined with the perceived political benefits of crime control have led to policies ensuring that more people are sentenced to prison, thereby creating the need for more prison beds (Brewer and Heitzeg 2008: 637). A core feature of the idea of a PIC is that prisons are not built solely to house criminals, but that a confluence of interests has led to the building of more prisons, the enactment of harsher laws, and the mass incarceration of poor people. Those constituencies with interests in mass incarceration include the media, private contractors, politicians, state bureaucracies, and private prisons (Davis 1998; Gilmore 2007; Schlosser 1998; Do Valle, Huang, and Spira 2006).

The PIC has come into being because it serves the interests of powerful groups in our society. Politicians have used a tough-on-crime approach to gain votes. The mass media have highlighted local crime to attract viewers (Chermak 1994). Rural areas have turned to building prisons to attract local economic development; more than two-thirds of the prisons built in California between 1982 and 1998 were built on formerly irrigated agricultural land that was out of production (Gilmore 2007: 105–106). Finally, private prisons have cashed in on growing rates of incarceration (Brewer and Heitzeg 2008; Schlosser 1998; Do Valle, Huang, and Spira 2006). For these reasons, not because of excessive rates of criminality, we now have more than two million people behind bars in
the United States, which is greater than ten times as many as we did prior to the 1970s. Mass incarceration of poor people has generated profits for private prisons and political capital for politicians, yet it has not made this country safer (Hattery and Smith 2006).

The Failure of Crime-Prevention Policy

The parallels between crime-prevention and immigration policies are striking. Despite substantial evidence that being tough on crime does not lead to safer communities, policies have hardly changed in response to this research.3 In 1998, Angela Davis pointed out that, "Mass incarceration is not a solution to unemployment, nor is it a solution to the vast array of social problems that are hidden away in a rapidly growing network of prisons and jails. However, the great majority of people have been tricked into believing in the efficacy of imprisonment, even though the historical record clearly demonstrates that prisons do not work" (Davis 1998: 3).

The United States has many more people in prison and much longer sentence terms than other Western countries. In the United States, nearly 1 in every 100 people is in prison, which is six to twelve times more than the rates in other Western democracies (Tonry 1999)4. This is despite the fact that victimization surveys show that violent and property crime rates are about the same as in other countries. The only sort of crime for which the United States has a higher rate than other countries is gun violence (Tonry 1999). The high rates of incarceration in the United States are not due to higher rates of crime, but to policies designed to “get tough” on crime and drugs. These policies do not serve to reduce crime; rather, they represent “a shift toward a more exclusionary and punitive approach to the regulation of social marginality” (Beckett and Western 2001: 55). Moreover, despite the fact that crime rates have declined in recent years, incarceration rates have continued to increase (Mauer 2001). Incarceration has a limited impact on crime rates. First, it is just one of many
factors that influence crime rates; changes in the economy, fluctuations in the drug market, and community-level responses often have more pronounced effects on crime rates. Second, there are diminishing returns to incarceration; incarcerating repeat violent offenders takes these people off the street and thus reduces crime on the streets, whereas incapacitating nonviolent offenders has a minimal effect on crime rates (King, Mauer, and Young 2005). Despite this, the incarceration of nonviolent offenders has skyrocketed in recent decades. Notwithstanding the low efficacy of imprisoning nonviolent offenders, this is the segment of the prison population that has grown the fastest. Between 1970 and 2000, incarceration rates in the United States increased fivefold. Much of this increase was due to legislation designed to fight drugs. As such, drug offenders represent “the most substantial source of growth in incarceration in recent decades, rising from 40,000 persons in prison and jail in 1980 to 450,000 today” (King, Mauer, and Young 2005: 6). The irony of this is that the incarceration of drug offenders is a highly ineffective way to reduce the number of illegal drugs sold in the United States. When street-level drug sellers are incarcerated, they are quickly replaced by other sellers, because what drives the drug market is demand for drugs (King, Mauer, and Young 2005).

One can also gather evidence from large-scale trends to show that increased incarceration does not decrease crime rates. Between 1998 and 2003, some states greatly increased the number of people they sent to prison, whereas other states did not. The average decrease in crime rates in these states, however, was similar. The states with higher increases in incarceration did not experience more substantial declines in their crime rates (King, Mauer, and Young 2005). Despite the lack of evidence that increased incarceration rates lead to decreased crimes (Lynch 1999), we continue to build prisons and imprison more people (Gilmore 2007). Politicians who invest money in the criminal justice system can claim to their constituents that they are serious about law enforcement. This strategy
creates the impression that they have crime victims' interests at heart and has become essential for winning electoral campaigns (Simon 2007). In a similar fashion, politicians who vote in favor of immigration law enforcement can allege that they are in favor of efforts to improve national security.

Immigration Industrial Complex: Fear, Interests, and Other-ization

The discord between rhetoric and reality when it comes to immigration policy points to the importance of using a framework similar to that of the prison and the military industrial complexes to understand the immigration industrial complex. The MIC relies on a fear of war; the PIC relies on a fear of crime; and the immigration industrial complex relies on a fear of foreigners. These respective complexes share three major features:

1. A rhetoric of fear
2. The confluence of powerful interests
3. A discourse of other-ization

Media pundits target undocumented migrants to promote fear, whereas industries such as meatpacking profit from the presence of a marginalized and temporary workforce. Politicians play on fear of immigration to win votes, while voting on immigration policy that is profitable for certain interests in the private sector. This confluence of interests in turn explains why the United States has yet to come up with a viable solution to the “problem” of undocumented migration just as we have yet to solve the drug “problem.”

The Media and Fear-Mongering

A key element of the PIC is fear of crime, which is exacerbated by media reports on crime. This fear of crime creates a situation where communities accept the militarization of their neighborhoods, and citizens vote for candidates who promise to be tough on crime. Local news outlets often focus on local violent crimes to attract viewers who want to see sensationalist news (Chermak 1994). This focus on local crime gives the false impression that violent crime is endemic;
people who watch local news are more likely to be fearful of crime (Romer, Jamieson, and Aday 2003). In a similar fashion, national news networks have homed in on illegal immigration to attract viewers and have spread misinformation in the process.

News reporters, media pundits, and outspoken “anti-illegal” advocates instill fear in the hearts of people in the United States that our country is being overrun by “hordes” of “invaders” who wish to carry out the “reconquista” of the Southwest United States (Buchanan 2006; Huntington 2004). This fear in turn creates a situation in which people accept the increased militarization of both the border and the interior of the United States.

The Media Matters Action Network published a report on the representation of undocumented immigrants on cable news networks, appropriately titled: Fear and Loathing in Prime Time: Immigration Myths and Cable News. This report revealed that three shows—The O’Reilly Factor, Lou Dobbs Tonight, and Glenn Beck—consistently propagate myths about undocumented immigrants. These myths include the alleged criminality of undocumented immigrants, the falsehood that undocumented immigrants don’t pay taxes, and the myth that Mexicans plan to carry out a reconquista of the United States (Waldman et al. 2008).

All these myths have been addressed by scholarly research. Extensive research by Rubén Rumbaut and his colleagues has demonstrated that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than the native born; the incarceration rate of the native born was four times the rate of the foreign born in 2006 (Rumbaut et al. 2006). More than half of undocumented workers pay payroll taxes, and everyone pays property and sales taxes (White House 2005). The idea of a reconquista is perhaps the domain of a marginalized few, but certainly not the sentiment of most Mexican-Americans (Chavez 2006).

Lou Dobbs in particular is obsessed with the topic of illegal immigration; 70 percent of his shows in 2007 involved a discussion of illegal immigration. With
these three shows—The O’Reilly Factor, Lou Dobbs Tonight, and Glenn Beck—on the air, viewers are consistently exposed to myths about illegal immigration. In the three shows combined, 402 of the shows in 2007 discussed illegal immigration, an average of more than one per day (Waldman et al. 2008). Perhaps most controversial is these three shows’ sensationalist discussion of crime. Discussion of crime took place in 189 of their shows in 2007, an average of more than once every other day. What’s more, these hosts misrepresent the criminality of undocumented people. For example, on October 5, 2006, Lou Dobbs said, “Just about a third of the prison population in this country is estimated to be illegal aliens.” This is a gross misrepresentation of the reality; less than 6 percent of prisoners are foreign-born, and only some of those are undocumented immigrants. The remaining are naturalized citizens, permanent legal residents, and other visa holders. Glenn Beck put flame to this fire by saying on his show on September 4, 2007, “Every undocumented worker is an illegal immigrant, a criminal, and a drain on our dwindling resources” (Waldman et al. 2008). The constant propagation of hate-filled rhetoric dehumanizes undocumented migrants and renders them appropriate targets for law enforcement activities. One way this can be seen is in polls Lou Dobbs conducts on his show. On his March 5, 2007, show, Dobbs reported, “Ninety-eight percent of you [viewers] voted that illegal immigration, failed border security, and sanctuary laws are contributing to the rise in gang violence in this country” (Waldman et al. 2008). By consistently presenting undocumented migrants as criminals and dehumanizing them by referring to them as “illegals,” these popular media pundits make viewers more likely to favor police action to rid the country of undocumented migrants. Industry Profits from Undocumented Workers and Immigration Law Enforcement
The presence of undocumented migrants provides media pundits with a target for social discontent. Yet, undocumented workers provide a vital labor force in
the United States. Moreover, certain sectors of the labor market depend heavily on undocumented migrants for labor. The undocumented labor force constitutes nearly 5 percent of the civilian labor force in the United States. This includes 29 percent of all agricultural workers, 29 percent of all rooftop workers, 22 percent of all maids and housekeepers, and 27 percent of all people working in food processing (Passel 2006). This high concentration of undocumented migrants in certain sectors means that removing large numbers of undocumented migrants would lead to severe labor shortages in these industries. There is already some evidence that the rise in deportations and increase in border enforcement have negatively affected farm owners across the country. Severe labor shortages have led to the loss of crops, as well as the transfer of production to Mexico. This loss of production, in turn, has ripple costs across the rest of the economy.

Nicholas de Genova (2005) argues that immigration policy in the United States is not designed to deter immigration, but serves to create a deportable migrant labor force. De Genova introduces the concept of “deportability” to describe the condition of undocumented migrants—deportability ensures that some migrants will be deported, but the overwhelming majority will remain, albeit in a socially marginal and vulnerable state (2005). Gilberto Rosas (2006) expands upon the arguments made by De Genova and introduces the concept of “policability.” By this, he means that the militarization of the border has created subjects that are deemed “worthy of dying in the treacherous geographies of the border, or subject to militarized policing, or vigilante actions, or daily forms of surveillance” (413). These concepts of policability and deportability are useful for understanding the migrant condition and for exploring how the creation of disposable and marginal workers is not only detrimental to migrants, but also advantageous to employers. Punitive immigration policies not only create marginalized subjects, but also are beneficial to employers in certain sectors of the labor market insofar as they create a disposable workforce. The meatpacking
industry is a prime example of this. A quarter of all workers in food processing are undocumented migrants. Over the past two decades, the industry itself has evolved to accommodate a transient, marginalized workforce. A brief discussion of the way that meat is processed in the United States will make it clear that an undocumented workforce is the best suited for work in meatpacking plants in the Midwest. Furthermore, it is evident there is a benefit to the owners of meatpacking plants that undocumented workers are not eligible for legalization in the United States.

As depicted in Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (1985 [1906]), the meatpacking industry has been characterized by grueling conditions for at least a century and has historically used immigrants as its primary source of labor. These two characteristics have changed little in the past hundred years. What has changed is that, starting in the 1980s, meatpacking companies began to move their plants away from urban centers and closer to rural areas where livestock abound, especially near small towns in Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, and Colorado. Along with this move, meatpackers changed the way they cut meats. Whereas previously skilled and semi-skilled butchers would cut up the cattle, now the carcasses are moved along a powered chain where each worker is responsible for a specific operation on the carcasses. This new way of processing meat has resulted in a deskilling of the workforce as well as an increase in the rate of production. Plants now process much more meat at a much faster rate than they did just twenty years ago. This efficiency has also led to extremely high rates of turnover and injury in the meatpacking industry. Turnover rates are as high as 100 percent in some plants, and incidences of carpal tunnel syndrome increased 264 percent between 1980 and 1988 (Gabriel 2006; Champlin and Hake 2006).

When Human Rights Watch conducted a study of the meatpacking industry, they found that workers who tried to form trade unions and bargain collectively were “spied on, harassed, pressured, threatened, suspended, fired, deported, or
otherwise victimized for their exercise of the right to freedom of association.7
They also found that many companies took advantage of workers’ immigration
status and lack of knowledge of their rights as workers in the United States to
deny them these rights. Overall, they found the meatpacking industry to be
characterized by unsafe working conditions, high rates of injury, and constant
abuses from superiors. The changes in the way meat is processed have generated
great profits for the largest meat processing firms, while putting smaller firms out
of business. It may seem odd that the large meat processing companies moved
out of cities with relatively high rates of unemployment to small towns with low
unemployment, even given the advantages of being closer to the raw materials—
the cattle. From a supply and demand perspective, it would seem that companies
would have to pay higher wages to attract workers to areas with low levels of
unemployment. The solution to this potential problem is that meat processing is
designed in such a manner that workers can be easily trained to process meat at
high rates of speed. This in turn causes high rates of injury and turnover. Thus,
the meatpacking companies do not need a large, stable workforce, but rather a
temporary workforce that is mobile and is willing to work for a few months and
then move on. Temporary undocumented migrants are in fact an ideal workforce.
The town of Lexington, Nebraska, provides an example of this trend. Iowa
Beef Processors (IBP) opened a large meat processing factory in Lexington in
1990, when the local unemployment rate was about 3 percent. When IBP opened
its doors, 81 percent of the people hired were non-Hispanic, and Lexington
and the surrounding areas had a low Hispanic population. Two years later,
57 percent of the new hires were Hispanic. Nearly all of these new hires had
come from other states to work at IBP. The turnover rate at IBP was about 12
percent per month during its first four years, meaning that the entire workforce
was replaced every nine months. While the average length of employment at
IBP was eight months, the average employment at Cornland, a smaller plant in
Lexington that was put out of business by the competition from IBP, had been thirty-three months (Gouveia and Stull 1997). The exceedingly high turnover rates and harsh working conditions make marginalized undocumented workers an ideal workforce for meatpacking plants. Undocumented migrants are ideal candidates for jobs with high turnover rates, because they are less likely to stay in the community once they are no longer employed there. Also, the marginalization of undocumented workers makes it difficult for them to fight for better working conditions.

Meatpacking industries profit from the presence of undocumented workers, insofar as they constitute a vulnerable workforce. A wide range of government contractors, however, directly benefit from immigration law enforcement through the profit potential. One sector that has profited from increased immigration enforcement has been the business of privately run immigrant detention centers. The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) is one of the main beneficiaries of the increase in immigrant detainees. CCA has a long history of profiting off of incarceration. It won its first government contract in 1984 to run an immigrant detention center in Houston. The company was inching along for the next decade, when it finally began to see substantial profits in the late 1990s. Its annual revenue shot up from $50 million in the early 1990s to $462 million in 1997. By 1998, its stock prices hit $44.00. CCA was doing so well that, at the end of the twentieth century, the company began to build speculative prisons—“excess prison space for inmates who did not yet exist” (Wood 2007: 232). These prisons were built with the expectation that the prison population would continue to grow. When rates of incarceration leveled off at the beginning of the twenty-first century, CCA faced serious problems. Its stock values fell from $44 dollars in 1998 to a mere 18 cents in December 2000. By 2001, CCA had 8,500 empty beds and was more than a billion dollars in debt (Wood

At the end of the twentieth century, the two leading private prison companies—CCA and Wackenhut—faced serious financial troubles. They had reinvested their immense profits in new prisons that were now sitting empty. The increased need for prison beds for immigrant detainees became their saving grace. On the verge of bankruptcy in 2000, CCA was awarded two contracts that allowed it to fill two empty prisons it had built speculatively—one in California City and another in Cibola County, New Mexico (Mattera, Khan, and Nathan 2003). It filled those prisons with immigrant detainees.

With these new contracts, CCA has been able to regain its financial footing. Its stock prices have fluctuated substantially but have generally improved since its low point at the end of 2000. CCA stock reached a new high of $32.40 in May 2007 and stood at about 27 dollars in May 2008. According to financial expert Eric Cheshier (2008), spring 2008 was a good time to buy CCA stock because their prospects for growth were quite positive. As of this writing, in April 2011, Google finance reports CCA stocks to be at $24.01 a share.

Many of CCA’s earlier troubles stemmed from their inability to manage higher security prisons and from states cutting back funding for prisons. Thus, CCA began to set its sights on the federal government. By 2002, 32 percent of CCA’s revenues came from federal agencies (Mattera, Khan, and Nathan 2003). In the post-9/11 context, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is giving even more contracts to private prison companies. Whereas there were about 15,000 federal inmates in private prisons in 2000, by 2004, there were 24,768. (Wood 2007: 233).

Much of the success of CCA is due to its lobbying efforts and political connections, combined with increased rates of detention for immigrants. Its federal lobbying expenses increased from $410,000 to $3 million between 2000 and 2004, and these efforts appear to have paid off both in terms of CCA filling
its beds and gaining contracts to build new prisons (Berestein 2008). In 2007, CCA spent almost $2.5 million to lobby on legislations and regulations related to the private prison industry, and it spent $2 million in 2009.8 At the beginning of 2000, CCA was awarded a contract to house 1,000 detainees at the CCA-owned San Diego Correctional Facility. CCA was to be paid $89.50 per day for each detainee it held. This was the beginning of a comeback for CCA. In July 2007, CCA announced that it was building a new 1,688 bed correctional facility in Adams County Mississippi, at a cost of $105 million. CCA built this facility without a management contract, because the company did not foresee difficulties in finding people to fill those prison beds. In fact, CCA had plans for 4,500 additional beds in 2007.9 With the constantly expanding detention of immigrants, CCA could fully expect to fill those beds.

In 2009, CCA was awarded a Federal Bureau of Prisons contract for the facility. By that time, they had expanded the capacity to 2,232 beds. In addition, CCA was constructing a 3,060-bed facility in Eloy, Arizona, that would house immigrant detainees, and a 2,040-bed facility in Trousdale County, Tennessee. And, in 2008, CCA was awarded a contract from the Office of Federal Detention Trustees to build and manage a new correctional facility in Pahrump, Nevada, to house detainees as well as inmates. Business has been booming for CCA.10 CCA has been able to obtain favorable government contracts in part because of its ties to current and former elected officials. The former head of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, J. Michael Quinlan, is one of CCA’s top executives. Both the CCA and the Geo Group have dominated the private prison sector because of their political influence. “Both benefit from extensive and intimate connections with state and local politics and the public corrections sector as well as from the usual interlocking directorships with other corporations in prison services, construction, the media, and finance” (Wood 2007: 231).

The private prison industry is just one example of how private companies
benefit from the increased surveillance and punishment of immigrants. Telephone companies such as MCI and Evercom have significant contracts inside immigrant detention centers, where they charge exponentially more for phone calls than they do at phones not in prisons (Fernandes 2006: 198). Overall, DHS awards billions of dollars of contracts each year. Many of the names are familiar: Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, IBM, Unisys and, not surprisingly, Halliburton. In January 2006, the DHS awarded a $385 million contingency contract to Halliburton subsidiary, KBR, to build facilities to temporarily house immigrant detainees (Scott 2006). In many ways, the increased surveillance of the foreign born in the United States has turned out handsome profits for wellconnected corporations. This is in large part because “DHS was conceived and created in a way that made it possible for private industry to become the driving force behind much of its operations. DHS was born with a massive budget, and those who were present at its creation undoubtedly saw the huge revenue potential for big business.” (Fernandes 2006: 172–173).

Creating the "Other": Using Fear as Political Ploy

With the military build-up during the Cold War, the “others” were communists. With the prison expansion of the 1990s, the “others” were criminals (often racialized and gendered as black men). With the expansion of the immigration industrial complex, the “others” are “illegals” (racialized as Mexicans). In each case, the creation of an undesirable “other” creates popular support for government spending to safeguard the nation. Ideas of racial otherness play an important role in the demonization of criminals and undocumented migrants. This other-ization allows politicians to play on public fears and portray these groups as threatening public safety. As Michael Welch argues, the punitive legislation passed in the last decades of the twentieth century to control crime and immigration are “not only poorly formulated, but also unjust and discriminatory against the poor and people of color” (2002: 14). Welch further contends that
these laws are passed in the context of a “moral panic, a turbulent and exaggerated response to a putative social problem” (2002: 8).
The PIC relies on the production of criminals through repressive laws and the policing of communities to fill the prisons it builds (Richie 2005). The creation of increasingly strict crime laws is partly due to campaign tactics used by politicians who aim to play on fear of crime to capture more votes. One of the most famous examples of a politician using the fear of crime as a campaign tactic is known as the "Willie Horton" case. In the 1988 run for presidential office, the George Bush campaign was able to play on white Americans’ fear of crime and racial prejudices against blacks through the use of an ad that featured "Willie Horton." William Horton, a young black man, escaped from prison while on a weekend pass. He then “kidnapped and brutally assaulted a white couple in their home, raping the woman and stabbing the man” (Mendelberg 1997). An ad that featured this story and a mug shot of Mr. Horton was used by the Bush campaign to portray the opposing party as being lax on crime. This ad was part of Bush's successful campaign for keeping the presidential office in Republican hands. This is just one of many examples of politicians using the fear of crime for political gain. Notably, the Willie Horton case used both the fear of crime and the fear of black men to push forward a political agenda.
Just as fear of crime is racialized, so is fear of immigration. As Kevin Johnson (2004) points out, the majority of immigrants are people of color. Fewer than 20 percent of immigrants come from Europe, Canada, or Australia. Thus, any discourse about immigration today has the subtext of minority incorporation into society. The racialization of immigrants, and especially of undocumented migrants, became clear in the campaign to push forward Proposition 187 in California—a ballot initiative that would deny social services and educational opportunities to the undocumented.
When Proposition 187 was being debated, California was on the verge of
becoming a majority-minority state, and demographic changes were at the heart of the fears of many supporters of the Proposition. In Robin Dale Jacobson’s interviews with Proposition 187 supporters, one of her respondents told her that Proposition 187 was a response to the “Mexican impact on the state of California.” Another interviewee was more forthright: “So, I just wanted something to be done about too many Mexican people all of a sudden” (Jacobson 2008: 39). These fears of the growth in the Mexican population were exacerbated by public perception of Mexicans as “illegals” and “criminals.” Supporters of the proposition often took the fact that undocumented migrants had crossed the border illegally or overstayed their visas as an indication that they were prone to criminal activity. Governor Pete Wilson put flame to this fire by “widely publicizing the estimated costs of keeping illegal aliens in prison” (Jacobson 2008: 55).

In addition to criminalizing undocumented immigrants, much of the discourse surrounding Proposition 187 racialized undocumented immigrants as Mexican. Thus, many of these supporters interpreted the “invasion” of undocumented workers as a racial takeover of California (Jacobson 2008: 117).

Political campaigns that promoted the passage of Proposition 187 drew from unmistakably racial imagery. Television ads supported by California Governor Pete Wilson “showed shadowy Mexicans crossing the border in large numbers” (Johnson 2004: 43). In another case, a political leader, Ron Prince, drew parallels to lynching by referring to a “posse” and a “rope” (Jacobson 2008; Johnson 2004). Johnson (2004) argues that the Proposition 187 campaign was a clear manifestation of the racial fears of white Californians. Although it would have been politically unsavory to launch an attack on domestic minorities, undocumented immigrants were seen as an appropriate target. The campaign for Proposition 187 had clear political benefits for Pete Wilson. Governor Wilson was on the verge of losing his reelection campaign in 1994 when he decided to put his support behind Proposition 187.
Governor Pete Wilson’s anti-illegal stance, combined with the large voter turnout for Proposition 187, helped Wilson retain his position as the governor of California (Diamond 1996). Although there was no clear connection between the presence of a large undocumented population and the hard economic times California was experiencing, gubernatorial and state legislature candidates in California were able to use the presence of undocumented people to their advantage by advocating for harsh policies that were not guaranteed to improve the fiscal health of the state. Politicians used undocumented immigrants as scapegoats by blaming them for poor economic conditions. Their promises to get tough on illegal immigration helped them to win elections. The scapegoating of undocumented immigrants is a political ploy used not only by politicians at national and state levels, but at local ones as well. For example, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, county sheriff for Maricopa County, has used antiillegal rhetoric to gain votes, along with creatively using state laws to imprison and eventually deport thousands of undocumented immigrants in Maricopa County. Arpaio requires that victims and witnesses of crimes prove their immigration status to testify; this leads many not to report crimes at all. He encourages racial profiling and frequently asks Latino citizens to prove their right to be here. These harsh tactics have repeatedly assured his incumbency.

In 2008, Governor Janet Napolitano took $1.6 million from Arpaio’s budget to redirect it to find fugitives, which was supposed to be his job (Robbins 2008). Undeterred, Arpaio continued with his dehumanizing campaigns. In February 2009, he shackled 200 undocumented migrants, dressed them in prison stripes, and forced them to walk under armed guard from the prison where they were being held to a new tent city. This was a media ploy designed to attract attention. It worked. A parade of TV cameras filmed the show and showed it around the world. Shortly afterward, four leading members of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee asked Attorney General Janet Napolitano to investigate Arpaio for
possible civil rights violations.12
The tactics used by these politicians have been successful insofar as they
play on voters’ fears of a rising tide of immigrants. Thus, even though getting
tough on immigration primarily has the consequence of making life difficult
for immigrants and does not reduce levels of immigration, politicians repeatedly
advocate for such tactics, in efforts to win elections and reelections. This parallels
the case of drug laws: it is widely accepted that “education and drug treatment
are the most effective means of reducing the demand for illegal drugs” (Díaz-
Cotto 2005: 148), yet politicians continue to advocate for repressive legislation
and longer prison terms for drug users and sellers.
In Whose Interest?
The failure of immigration policy has created profits for government contractors,
given fodder to politicians, and made undocumented migrants the targets of
mass media talk show hosts, while creating a climate of dependency on migrants
for certain sectors, such as food processing. The combination of fear, political
maneuvers, and corporate profits has created a confluence of interests in the
militarization of immigration enforcement, despite the negative consequences
and limited efficacy of these actions. Although border militarization and interior
immigration law enforcement are unlikely to alleviate any of the challenges associated
with the presence of a large undocumented population in the United
States, they have created new social problems.
There are many reasons to be opposed to having a large undocumented population
in the United States. They present a security risk insofar as there are too
many people who are unaccounted for, who are fundamentally disenfranchised,
and who have no investment in a nation that chooses to ignore their contributions
to society. The practical solution is not to try to remove all of them or to
scare them away, but to encourage them to come out of the shadows by offering
them an incentive to do so.
Increased militarization of the border will lead to handsome profits for certain corporations as well as increased funding for the DHS. It will not, however, lead to a reduction in the flow of migrants. Unfortunately, it is likely to increase the death toll at the border. The solution, however, is not to make more use of tactics destined to fail, but to encourage people to request permission to enter the United States by making the process less cumbersome and rendering the quotas more in line with actual labor needs in the United States. The growth of the immigration industrial complex, however, has ensured that practical solutions are unlikely to be enacted. As long as powerful companies, politicians, and media conglomerates stand to gain from the growth of the immigration industrial complex, it will be nearly impossible to enact viable reforms.

One of the aims of this book is to change the discourse on undocumented migration—to compel people to see that immigrants are not commodities or potential terrorists, but human beings with fundamental rights. The evidence, as discussed, shows that it will be difficult to change this discourse, partly because of the powerful interests behind the dehumanization of migrants. To begin to change the discourse, I want to conclude my discussion by laying out how immigration policies violate principles enshrined in human rights doctrine and set out a vision of how immigration policy would look in a world where human rights were valued and respected.
Chapter 6 Modernity, globalization and nationalism: The age of frenzied boundary-building

Nationalism and modernity both indulge in practices of classification, definition and delimitation, leading to the simultaneous destruction of old boundaries and the rise of new ones. Focusing on nationalism as a boundary-building practice, this chapter argues that it belongs to a broader ideological discourse, identified here as modernism, that began to prevail with the onset and expansion of modernity while this pushed towards the disruption of traditional boundaries and the rising of new ones. The chapter also argues that over the last decades these trends have interacted with neo-liberal globalization, processes which also corrode as well as reinforce existing boundaries. Finally, the chapter examines three cases from different modernization stages that have resulted in boundary changes or consolidation, examining the implications of these shifts.

The relationship will be unpacked in the following way: the first section expands on Ernest Gellner’s vision of boundaries as associated with the notion of ‘congruency’. It observes the way boundaries interact with industrial modernity by producing and reproducing expectations of regularity and homogeneity within societies. This is followed by the identification of specific ‘boundary approaches’ and then by a discussion of the modernity or antiquity of ethnic boundaries. The next three sections explore the interaction between state-formed identities and cultural homogenization, first across one of the oldest existing interstate frontiers, the Franco-Spanish one. Having identified modernity as an era of boundary destruction and demarcation through nationalism and cultural homogenization, the chapter goes on to analyse the cumulative effects of cultural homogenization and the reinforced salience of interstate boundaries through the lens of Ciudad Juarez under a regime of neo-liberal globalization. The final section explores the notion of ‘natural boundaries’ (both ethnic and state) in East Africa, observing their ongoing collapse as a result of the highly destructive impact of climate change. These frontier areas are chosen as symptomatic of the
three historical moments they represent: the legacy of the nation state, the effects of neo-liberal globalization and an anticipation of the coming era of climate change. Ethnicity is present throughout these three 'stages', yet nationalism is slowly withdrawn from the chapter's main argument as we pass from the boundaries of modernity to those of globalization and then to climate change's erosion of natural boundaries.

Industrialism, homogenization and the standardization of expectations
Ernest Gellner postulated that nationalism emerges when a standardized 'high' culture becomes the all-pervasive requisite of industrialism, at a time when only the state has the power to inculcate the new standard on an uprooted labour force. A scarcely noticed aspect of his explanation was the centrality of boundaries in his controversial notion of 'congruency' as a paradigm of modernity and the correlation between state and ethnic boundaries (Mandelbaum 2013). In fact, Gellner argued that nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state . . . should not separate the power-holders from the rest' (Gellner 2006: 36). Gellner, thus, identifies a double principle of 'congruency': first, between state and nation, second, between culture and ethnicity. He argues that ethnic boundaries and state boundaries should overlap in the new world order ushered by the spread of industrial society:
The age of transition to industrialism was bound . . . to be an age of nationalism, a period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political boundaries, or cultural ones, or both, were being modified, so as to satisfy the new nationalist imperative which now, for the first time, was making itself felt. (Gellner 2006: 39)
But how far has industrialism, as a broader concept than industrialization and as
the organizing category for modern social change, affected human relations and perceptions?

Along its trail of simplifications, industrialism and industrialization have created similar patterns of regularity. A conceptual distinction needs, thus, to be made between industrialism and industrialization: industrialization is the actual and uneven spread of industrial technology and relations of production, whereas industrialism refers to the broader mindset, attitudes and expectations created by industrialization, even in its abeyance and where industrialization did not occur. As industrialism spread and advanced, irregular, lopsided, erratic, complex patterns and multiplicity have been replaced by uniformity in a whole set of areas, from work to law, from food to custom, from leisure to politics, and so on. Each work piece produced by a pre-industrial artisan was uniquely endowed with the artisan's special touch, which could vary according to the customer's wishes, the availability of material, the means and the artisan's personal inclination. An artisan's products were never exactly the same, but always new and original in their own way. They could hardly be standardized. Likewise, the industrialization of agriculture has led to the cultivation of a limited gamut of standardized crops replacing the erstwhile richness of imperfect forms, shapes and tastes. In industrialized agriculture, field products became very much like those fabricated in a factory from industrial assembly lines of production and much less like those freshly picked up with the tools of the soil. When visiting rural communities and organizations committed to biological and organic farming, one can find that their products are often much more variable and irregular in form, colour and flavour. This unpredictable variability of non-industrial products can be anathema, or at least an uncomfortable fact, for the industrial mindset – particularly when the ideology of extreme modernism is applied as a system which privileges homogeneity and predictability above varieties of taste and texture. This set of expectations is
transmitted into the system of mass consumption. As the industrialized, 'massified' customer expects fruits, vegetables, eggs, seeds and other edible produce to be of a predictable form, tang and tint, his reaction to unpredictability and unexpected variety is dominated by anxiety and dislike. Many contemporary consumers find the uneven, imperfect shapes of organic products far from satisfactory.

Thus, industrialization has led to regular expectations of predictability. People born in the industrial age think, imagine, anticipate, suppose, assume and expect differently from people born in the premodern age and see things in a different way and on a different scale and within a different world vision. They experience existence through different lenses, scents, savours and sensations.

The argument here is that the refusal to perceive and tolerate the pre-industrial irregularity of patterns is a primary component of the homogenizing vision often appropriated by nationalists. Images of the nation as an organic, cohesive and homogeneous whole can, thus, be related to the impact of industrialism as a thought pattern, rather than as a technological revolution. Industrialism, as a thought pattern, triumphed first amongst the elites and then amongst the broader population. 'Nation builders' and nationalists expect evenness, regularity, congruence and standardization, whereas neither existed in a premodern age dominated by variety and capriciousness. Anthropologists have identified 'homogenism' as a prevalent feature in European nationalisms (Harrison 2002: 211–212).

However, Gellner’s grand scheme of nationalism, as an inevitable product of industrialization, seems unable to sense its ultimate consequences on the everyday life of human beings – he rarely touched upon the effects of industrialist ‘thought’ on the daily existence of ordinary people and elites alike. Moreover, Gellner did not speculate about ideology, noting that its impact on nationalism was negligible: nationalism was a self-sustaining
political force derived from the uneven impact of
industrialization and this did not necessarily need to be articulated by relevant
intellectuals in an ideological format.1 Gellner also failed to mention the impact of
‘supreme coercion’ on national indoctrination through mass militarization and war
(Conversi 2007). Thus, both the ideological and the military dimension of modernity
were largely lost to his analysis (Conversi 2012).2
Gellner is one amongst various authors who assumed an indissoluble link
between industrialization and modernity. Several scholars have criticized this
‘monolithic’ vision of modernity as synonymous with industrialization (Conversi
modernity’ was only one form of modernity. The geographer Peter J. Taylor
identifies three types or stages of modernity: the first one, which he calls ‘mercantile
modernity’, was centred in the Netherlands; ‘industrial modernity’ came
just afterwards, fanning out from Lancashire to the rest of the world and was followed
by ‘consumer modernity’, spearheaded by global Americanization (Taylor
1999). Rather than industrial modernization as a monocausal factor, the stress
here is on the notion of ‘multiple modernities’. Such a multiplicity can be
expanded geographically, not only chronologically, to encompass the rise of
recent challenges to Western-centred visions of modernity in their actual cultural
and political application (Kamali 2007; Schmidt 2006).
The concept of modernity is, thus, chronologically and geographically relative.
It is also intensively linked to the notion of boundaries: for Jeremy Rifkin
(2004), the modern era was born with the ‘enclosure acts’ emanated by the
United Kingdom Parliament (c.1750–1860), which bounded open fields and
shattered the rights of citizens to access common lands. From then on, the medieval
sense of collective responsibility changed and the people began dissociating
themselves from the land as a shared resource (indeed, the original ‘commonwealth’).
Great swathes of common land were slowly reduced to private property.
Enclosures marked the end of the right to land use, particularly the commons, on which a great number of peasants fully depended. That is how the modern proletariat was largely born and formed. Urbanization and the decline of rural culture were, thus, associated with this series of parliamentary acts of confiscation, more than with industrialization per se, since many impoverished and dispossessed peasants had no other option than migrating to the industrial centres. Here they provided cheap labour for a rapidly expanding, all-devouring capitalist class. The birth of early modernity was, thus, associated with a process of annexation and boundary-building.

The seizure of territory remained its main scope, involving sweeping expropriation of property from its erstwhile usufructuaries.

Since then, the modern era has been characterized by a frenetic rush to seize, resize, bound, enclose and classify, all of which nourished an obsession with boundary-building and, subsequently, cultural homogenization. However, the approach applied here focuses more on the political aspect of the institutionalization of modernity through both ideology and practice.

3 Binding the crowd: replaceability and boundary-making

Early twentieth-century social science was obsessed with the goal of 'binding' the otherwise boundless crowd (Borch 2012), to truss and shape an incoherent entity into a cohesive whole. This obsession with shaping and binding the crowd informed the bellicist vocation of warmongering agitators, like the founder of futurism, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944), and the founder of fascism, Benito Mussolini (1883–1945). Both highlighted the function of war in shaping a new militant society and as the most comprehensive tool to achieve such a binding purpose (Conversi 2009). Marinetti had studied 'crowd psychology' in Paris under the decisive influence of Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) and this transpires in some articles written in his youth (Conversi 2009). Incidentally, Le Bon also inspired Mussolini and other masters of mass propaganda, including Adolf Hitler (Aumerzier
2007; Welch 2002) and Edward Bernays (Bendersky 2007; Sproule 1997: 30–31). Furthermore, both Marinetti and Mussolini were directly influenced by Georges Sorel's (1847–1922) appeals to mass emotion and the need for overthrowing legitimately elected governments through the use of violence and direct action. All these trends could be fully expressed in the context of war, as military tactics were complemented by nationalist ideologies. Overcoming individualism, localism and regionalism, ordinary Italians were compelled to join the fight and seemed to merge into a malleable 'mass' ready to be moulded by conscript armies (Mosse 1975, 1980). Mass media, secular rituals, patriotic symbols and music were all used to 'nationalize the masses' by shaping 'the crowd into a disciplined mass in order to give it direction and maintain control' (Mosse 1993: 2).

All these efforts were predicated on, and resulted in, an unprecedented effort towards boundary construction, as well as boundary destruction. Nationalism was the main underpinning ideology behind all these trends, particularly behind both the cataclysm of the First World War and the advent of fascism in its various forms. The nucleus of the industry-war-nationalism linkage can be found in the concept of replaceability, the idea that, like the interchangeable parts of an assembly line, human items can be replaced as part of an already pre-homogenized whole. Replaceability should be read in contrast with individuality and distinctiveness. It is also radically opposed to concepts like uniqueness, inimitability and exceptionality. Once conceptually 'homogenized', a group or a person became ipso facto replaceable. In fact, replaceability was a direct consequence of the practices of cultural homogenization which Gellner attributed to industrialism, but which can be better ascribed to the elites' nationalizing efforts and their wish to 'mould' obedient citizens through militarism and education (Conversi 2008, 2012). In a mass society, great numbers count more than small individuals. Gellner used the term 'modular men' to indicate the new men spawned by industrial society, in such a way that they could be more easily replaced with one another in a mobile job.
market and through its sequential organization of workers. 6 But this replaceability touched its climax at the front, where ‘modular men’ were championed by soldiers, that is, fully replaceable human beings who can immediately be swapped or substituted upon elimination, that is, once hit, killed or maimed by enemy bullets (Conversi 2007). In fact, replaceability as a consequence of ‘modernity’ was fully tested and implemented on the battlefields of the First World War and other wars, in which millions of men were ‘replaced’ by other millions upon falling. Unlike unique individuals, homogenized components of the nation can in principle be effortlessly and straightforwardly swapped and substituted.

Boundaries, classifications and domination: from Saïd to Bourdieu

Both nationalism and modernity engaged in practices of classification, definition and delimitation, leading to the simultaneous destruction of old boundaries and the rising of new ones. This boundary-building endeavour transcended nationalism and belonged to the wider fulcrum of westernizing modernity as this was imposed all over the globe through war and colonialism. Edward Saïd recognized Western modernity’s push to simplify, eradicate, replace, render uniform and homogenize people and things, associating the process with imperial Westernization. In Said’s words, the latter’s task was ‘to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law’ (Saïd 1979: 86). But Saïd’s discourse-centred approach lay at the antipode of Gellner’s anti-linguistic structural functionalism. Moreover, Saïd rarely conceded nationalism as a relevant force and was mostly concerned with unmasking the production and reproduction of domination discourses underpinning the unequal relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Its focus on discourse limited greatly its analytical rigour and his diagnostic capabilities. He also overlooked the linkage between nationalism and modernism as twin, all-encompassing
ideological forces, emanating from the West. The approach applied here rather sees nationalism as a supremely binding ideology and as indissociable from modernism (Conversi 2012).

At the same time, modernism is understood to be indissociable from compartmentalization and classification and is a boundary-building endeavour. A similar emphasis could be seen once we transmute from the West’s global control of cultural production to the structuration of its own mechanism of inner control, from macro- or state-level mechanisms of control – to micro- or individual-level mechanisms of control. Shifting the focus from empire to class, Pierre Bourdieu observed that: the laying down of boundaries between the classes is inspired by the strategic aim of ‘counting in’ or ‘being counted in’, ‘cataloguing’ or ‘annexing’, when it is not the simple recording of a legally guaranteed state of the power relation between the classified groups.

(Bourdieu 1984: 476)

Bourdieu’s notion of ‘distinction’ (Bourdieu 1984) implicitly refers to boundaries: a distinction is itself a boundary between something that is and something that it is not. Deeply related to notions of identity, distinction is simultaneously associated with nationalism and boundary-building endeavours in a modernizing world. A sense of putative distinctiveness lies at the core of national identity and belonging, even though distinction itself can conceal factual resemblance and similarity (Harrison 2002, 2003). Therefore, the task of classification and annexation accompanied the imposition of modernity through boundary-building within the core Western nations, between them and beyond them. Boundaries are, thus, ‘artefacts of dominant discursive processes’ (Agnew 2008: 175–176).

Boundary approaches across disciplines

Within nationalism studies, I have chosen to identify a broad sub-category that can be referred to as ‘boundary approaches’ – the term ‘boundary theories’ being largely premature (Paasi 2011). These have developed across and beyond disciplinary
boundaries, moving from their early anthropological niche to the study of wider social phenomena. In the study of nationalism and ethnopoltics, they have been often reframed in terms of boundary maintenance and boundary creation (Brock 1999, 2001; Conversi 1995; Kolstø 2005; Paasi 2001).

Encountering a fertile terrain in political geography (Agnew 1997; Clayton 2002; Graham 1998; Jones 2004; Paasi 2001, 2004), boundary approaches have expanded into various disciplines. In international relations theory, the ‘Minnesota school’ has attempted to reconceptualize the discipline’s ethno-territorial epistemology through the constructivist notion of ‘identities, borders, orders’ (the ‘IBO triad’) (Albert and Brock 2001). The focus on boundaries has influenced the debate on nationalism and identities as part of a wider ‘cultural’ and ‘sociological turn’ within international relations (Brock 1999). Sociological theory has more hesitantly embraced these approaches (Shields 2006). Boundaries approaches have also been applied to cultural studies (Manzo 1996), literary critique (Corral 1996) and globalization theory (Short et al. 2000).

The focus on boundaries and ethnic conflict has resulted in a proliferation of studies touching on widely different topics. A most promising direction is the relationship between boundaries and violence. Two kinds of boundaries overlap, but usually do not coincide, in most ethnonational conflicts: state boundaries and ethnic boundaries. While the creation of state boundaries can be dated with some chronological precision, the origin of ethnic boundaries remains subject to much speculation. Most state boundaries are very recent, even though the nations they enclose may claim a millennial pedigree. State and ethnic boundaries may overlap, contrast and permeate each other. For instance, the boundary between Britishness and Englishness is sufficiently malleable that the difference between ‘English’ and ‘British’ becomes often imperceptible amongst the English, although it may be clearer among the Scots (Canovan 1996: cited in Brown 2000: 168). However, the issue of modernity of ethnic boundaries, as opposed
to, or complementary with, state boundaries is more questionable. Perennialists and ethno-symbolists argue that ethnic boundaries preceded the formation of modern states, either in the form of civilizational aggregates, or as premodern ethnies (Armstrong 1982; Smith 2008, 2009). Situationists, constructivists and transactionalists argue that ethnic boundaries are reinforced through ethnic transactions and interactions (Barth 1969). Instrumentalists and institutionalists argue that ethnic boundaries and identities are produced by modern elites either as tools or through the institutions they control (Jesse and Williams 2005; Lieberman and Singh 2012). Multilevel process theory sees boundaries as 'the outcome of the classificatory struggles and negotiations between actors situated in a social field' (Wimmer 2008: 970).

These approaches are not necessarily incompatible. For instance, Armstrong has blended perennial accounts of ethnicity with Barth's focus on the fluidity and situational nature of boundaries. He argued that 'ethnicity is a bundle of shifting interactions rather than a nuclear component of social organisation' (Armstrong 1982: 6).

The age of modernity has been the age of boundary-building and boundary changes. In specific historic periods, boundaries have been conceived as endowed with a fixity embodied in and emboldened by nationalist mythologies and discourses. Yet, they have been under constant attack by interstate competition and, lately, by the forces of globalization. Hence, most of the time they needed to be guarded and defended by large armies of mobilized citizens. From 1816 to 1980 there have been 770 interstate boundary changes worldwide (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Many more have taken place since then, especially after the end of the Cold War. This has resulted in much geopolitical instability, civilian casualties being the precondition, as well as the result, of changed
boundaries.
A few boundaries have remained unchanged for several centuries, and their persistence can reveal both the differential impact of modernization and the legacy of cultural homogenization. In the next section, one of the oldest existing interstate borders is held to exemplify the state’s lengthy process of ‘nation-building’, where cultural homogenization has led to a sharp definition of cultural practices and contents across the border. Yet, this line is challenged by ethnic boundaries that span the frontiers and manifest themselves politically through Catalan and Basque nationalisms. By looking at this border region, the following section deals with contemporary boundaries as they partition and divide up different ideas and notions of modernity.

Staticity and contestation in the Pyrenean borderland
The Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) established the current boundary between France and Spain and is, thus, one of the oldest and longest-standing interstate borders in the world – beside the Portuguese-Spanish border (Spanish, La Raya; Portuguese, A Raia) established in 1267. Peter Sahlins has analysed its long-term effects on popular imagination and culture, mentioning ‘the dual appearance of an undisputed boundary line’ and an ‘accepted opposition of nationalities in the borderland’ (Sahlins 1989). This is an ideal context in which to test the hypothesis of state-led agency in practices of cultural homogenization by observing the long-term effects the interstate border on such practices and norms. The relative antiquity of this specific border provides visible evidence of top-down processes of national identity formation through the power of the state over the longue durée. As an anthropologist, Sahlins suggests a process of politicization apart from the state, in which local communities autonomously spawn national identity, thus, turning ‘the borderlanders into the architects of their own destiny, as well as catalysts in the nation-building process of both France and Spain’
(Douglass 1998: 62). However, Sahlin’s locally centred approach is far from exhaustive and the full picture must take into account the determining force of state-led nationalism in shaping cultural practices and a shared sense of belonging. For a while, the inhabitants of the French Cerdagne and the Roussillon claimed alternatively French and Spanish nationality in order to evade taxes and military conscription. According to travellers’ accounts, people from both sides of the border continued to share the same language and customs well into the mid-nineteenth century, while cross-border contacts remained conspicuous. However, French government officials succeeded in spreading at the popular level a contempt for both Spanish ‘nationality’ and those ‘amphibious’ characters who claimed alternate citizenship in order to gain more benefits. In the long term, a French identity gained ground being steadily opposed to the Spanish one, despite the persisting cultural similarities which united both sides of the Pyrenees. A continuity of patterns of boundary-building can be observed throughout history, both before and after the advent of the nation state. For more than a century, state and sub-state nationalisms have competed in the Franco-Spanish borderland, through ‘contested imaginations’ by Basque and Catalan nationalism and despite cross-border cooperation and intrastate integration at the European level (Itçaina 2010). In 1971, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote: ‘How could it be admitted that the Basque nation existed on the other side of the Pyrenees without recognizing the right of “our” (French) Basques to become part of it?’ (Sartre 1971). The opening-up of the Franco-Spanish border in particular after Spain’s entrance into the EU (1986) has had mixed effects (Bray and Keating 2013). The old interstate border has acted as a barrier against the diffusion of sub-state ethnonationalism, but the internal administrative borders of Spain’s Autonomous Communities have also acted in a similar way. According to most Basque and Catalan nationalists, the interstate boundary cuts across two ‘communities’ sharply separating their homelands: both the
Països Catalans (lands where the Catalan language is spoken) and Euskal Herria (lands where the Basque language is spoken) are divided between the French and Spanish administration. North of the boundary lies Iparralde (Northern Basque Country), corresponding to the Basque portion of the French region of Aquitaine, while Catalunya Nord (Northern Catalonia), also lies in the French area of Roussillon. 10 South of the border lies Hegaldet (Southern Basque Country), including the ‘Foral’ Community of Navarre and the three Provinces of Alava/Araba, Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa and Bizkaia/Vizcaya, forming the Autonomous Community of Euskadi or Basque Autonomous Community (BAC/CAV). Also within Spain lie the rest of the Països Catalans, including Catalonia proper (‘the Principat’), the Valencian country (País Valencià), the Balearic Islands (Mallorca/Majorca, Menorca/Minorca, Eivissa/Ibiza, with Formentera) and the Western ‘strip’ of Aragon (la Franja de Ponent or Franja d’Aragó). The Basque Autonomous Community and Catalonia (‘the Principat’) constitute the bulk of their respective homelands. That is, Basque and Catalan nationalisms mobilize their constituencies overwhelmingly within Spain’s boundaries. The project of bridging the boundary and unifying the two portions of each homeland relies mostly on the vision of nationalist leaders and followers. In practice, the boundary is visibly existent and hard to deny, but there have been a host of initiatives to promote cross-boundary cooperation in a whole set of areas, including higher education and research. Has the Basque borderland, thus, become ‘more Basque’ after the opening of the Franco-Spanish border with Spain’s entrance into the EU (1986)? Beck points to the fact that ‘nationalist rhetoric substantially differs from daily cultural experiences and political practice’ and that both the old interstate borders ‘have
acted as strong barriers against the diffusion of ethnonationalism', so that since
the opening-up of the border and the rise of cross-border cooperation Basque
national integration has been largely confined to the Autonomous Community of
the Basque Country in Spain (Mansvelt Beck 2008). However, new forms of
local public policy interact with new social movements and the very process of
European integration to implement new patterns of transborder cooperation in
defence of sub-state languages like Basque and Catalan (Amado-Borthayre
2012). Arguably, the legacy of state-building and cultural homogenization is more
visible than the largely imaginary sub-state nationalist landscapes. Nearly four
centuries of state-building on both sides of the Pyrenean frontier have resulted in
sharp contrasts and differences in various aspects of social life, culture and the
environment. Moving across the borders from and to Spain and France entails a
series of eye-striking experiences: from France's immaculate and ordered town
planning to Spain's urban chaos with its culto al hormigón (worship of concrete).
The relationship between boundaries, nationhood, institutions and respect
for the territory unfolds openly while crossing the border and poses a set of questions
that directly bear on the visible continuity of a durable cultural past. The
power of the state in moulding the territory's physical space seems to triumph
over the imagination of stateless nationalism. While in France regional towns,
villages and cities have been largely preserved in their pristine aspect, within
Spain old town centres have been rapidly demolished down to the last popular
house in order to make space for politically expedient and bank-financed
anonymous, standardized high-rise flats and blocks. Thus, the cultural heritage
of entire cities has been shattered by politically maneuvered speculation without
encountering visible resistance. The wreckage of a host of smaller urban centres
recalls a warlike legacy: as indicative of the reckless devastation, nothing
remains of Albacete's old town centre, except the Cathedral of San Juan, with a
fake lateral facade in Romanesque revival style; with its indicative lack of
tourism, Albacete has assumed a derogatory status in Spain’s collective unconscious. A character in Manuel Vázquez Montalbán’s novel, La Rosa de Alejandría, clearly expresses this feeling as associated with a perverse and destructive notion of progress and modernity:
If you had ever seen the old neighbourhood, there in the upper part, the happy life it had. But nothing is left and you can now see it, that’s progress, Albacete is the New York of La Mancha, or something like that.
(Vázquez Montalbán 1984: 135)
The nickname ‘New York of La Mancha’ was coined, with a hint of sarcasm, by the novelist and literary critic Azorín (1873–1967).
For centuries, Spanish elites have been obsessed with international rumours about the ‘Black Legend’ (Leyenda Negra) portraying a terminally decadent nation. This obsession often verged on a persecution mania (Villanueva 2011), yet the myth of Spain’s destructiveness revives in the forms of self-inflicted devastation brought upon the Spanish territory without discernible opposition.
For instance, like many other urban centres in Spain, the ancient city of Zaragoza was subjected to a savage urbanization process which devastated vernacular architecture, leaving intact only a few ancient elites and religious buildings, like the cathedral, the Aljafería Palace (seat of the Cortes, Aragon’s regional parliament), the Basilica of Our Lady of the Pillar and its monumental complex along the Ebro River.
This pattern has been replicated with greater or lesser intensity throughout Spain, despite local claims that one’s own regional territory has been spared the worst excesses of speculation. In the Basque Country and Navarre, where the impact of mass tourism is limited, town centres appear in slightly better shape, particularly because the inclement weather has dissuaded mass tourism in the area, while the autonomous statutes allowed for some regional control over the territory and its resources without strictly replicating Spain’s pattern of wanton
destruction. Yet, the legal framework remains the same. This trend has continued unabated and has only been restrained at the interstate boundary. Hence, the panorama is quite different depending on whether one finds oneself on one or the other side of the border.

On the Spanish side of the border, political bribery reaches its peak in the construction and town-planning sectors with town councils rating amongst the most corrupt:

Urban development has been a major source of political corruption in Spain for the last several years. Town council scandals reached news headlines on an almost continuous basis and an ongoing stream of complaints have been filed, not only before the courts of justice, but also the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament and the Ombudsman.

(Mendilow 2012: 122)

Urban deregulation has transformed Spain into a ‘criminal hub’ with potential global ramifications (Gómez-Céspedes 2012), its roots dating back to the Francoist dictatorship (Heywood 1997) and continuing boldly under the present neoconservative Popular Party (Partido Popular) regime. In the past two decades, the Spanish coast has lost an area equivalent to eight football fields a day (San Román et al. 2013). Building-related white-collar crime is so rife that ‘the universality of corruption has even opportunistically led rival political parties to buy one another off’ (Pradera 2006: 12, cited in Agranoff 2010: 176).

While most Western Europeans have become quite aware about urban speculation, popular attitudes in Spain from north to south, from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, have been generally oblivious to the more stringent urban planning rules appropriate for decent housing standards and prevailing in more advanced urban societies (Agranoff 2010: 174–176). As we shall see, popular complacency over urban destruction derives largely from the peculiar way ‘modernity’ has been experienced in Spain, at least since the years of fast-lan
development under Franco.
The absence, apathy and relative powerlessness of civic society vis-à-vis housing, town planning and the environment is clearly shown by the belated emergence of ‘non-profit’ campaigning organizations for the protection of territory and its historical heritage, similar to the National Trust in the UK (f. 1894), Italia Nostra (Our Italy, f. 1955), Maisons Paysannes de France (f. 1965) or Les Vieilles Maisons Françaises (f. 1958). Their approximate correspondent, Hispania Nostra, was only formed in 1976 (Stubbs and Makaš 2011: 97–99) and has shown much less impact over the defence of territory and environment than its European counterparts. Such tardiness can also be seen in the belated development of disciplines like ‘cultural heritage management’ (CHM) and ‘cultural resources management’ (CRM) in Spain. Moreover, Spain only joined UNESCO in 1982, that is, at a very late date in respect to all its European partners, although it has worked hard to catch up by producing its own heritage list in a few years (Stubbs and Makaš 2011: 97). All these delays are clearly visible and strike the eye when crossing the interstate boundary.
The failure to adhere to plain legal and civic norms whenever buying or selling recent constructions contrasts sharply with the normative and esthetical standards prevailing across the Pyrenean border: basic norms like acoustic insulation, safety and energy performance have been routinely ignored during the boom years leaving a legacy of unsuitable buildings endowed with mediocre housing standards, while ordinary Spaniards have been more interested in glamorous kitchens and bathrooms. For a long time, Spain’s estate agents (inmobiliarias) have been unwilling to provide regular Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) like those used beyond the Pyrenees since the European Union Directive 2002/91/EC made it mandatory to produce the appropriate certificate before the sale and even the rental of a building. While these certificates are usually displayed in most Western European estate agents’ windows, in Spain a culture
imbued with short-termism and inattention to this aspect of the quality of life prevails in the housing sector and is clearly visible in terms of the contrasting aesthetics of the two sides of the Pyrenean borderland.

An estate agent operating on the Spanish side of the border and one on the French side can work with sharply different ethical codes, despite supposedly sharing a common European legal framework. The origins lie in the peculiar way modernity was conceived and imposed upon Spain’s territory at least since the dictatorship, with an apparently unstoppable rush towards ‘non-creative’ destruction of the habitat.12 Franco’s Spain was amongst the first countries to develop mass tourism as an avenue to quick economic growth through ‘new beach-based, sun-worshipping international package holidays, first by coach, then by air’ (Walton 2013: 483). The regime established, thus, a robust connection between tourism and dictatorship (Pack 2006). During the second phase of Franco’s regime (1959–1975), modernity was broadly associated with concrete-based urban sprawl and estate development. After 1959, the Franco regime decided to concentrate most of its efforts towards mass tourism as a ‘development’ strategy, neglecting other forms of infrastructure like public transport, particularly railways (Bel i Queralt 2010). Facing international ostracism, it focused on tourism as a ‘form of international relations’ and on the construction and built environment industry as the chosen avenue for modernizing Spain – a trend which continued by force of inertia well after over-building and corruption spelled the end of the ‘tourism miracle’ (Pack 2008).

The notion of desarrollismo, or ‘developmentalism’, has been used apropos to underline the distortions produced by the Francoist vision of modernity (Black 2010; Saz Campos 2004). This has endured into the new millennium turning into the most serious endogenous factor in plunging Spain’s economy into deep recession. In many cities, like Madrid’s metropolitan area, desarrollismo is often linked to social exclusion, establishing unenviable patterns of demographic concentration
that still differentiate Spain from the rest of Europe (Palacios 2011).

On each side of the border, a different notion of modernity prevails, revealing a diverging relationship with the territory, the environment, historical heritage and the nation. For most Spaniards, modern housing and living standards are associated with high-rise and concrete flats with scarce consideration for the environmental impact, which is not exactly the case across the border. Decades of cultural homogenization have turned the entire territory under Spanish sovereignty into one of the most urbanistically unregulated in the developed West. These habits are so deeply ingrained that they continue to be condoned in spite of the economic crisis. Although the border has been contested by multiple forces, amongst which sub-state nationalism has emerged with particular strength, this section has underlined the persisting legacy of decades of cultural homogenization leading to shared practices which are only restrained by the interstate border.

Boundaries of globalization: the assault on cosmopolitanism in the neo-liberal city of Ciudad Juárez

The mainstream ‘cosmopolitan globalization’ thesis shared by authors like Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, David Held and Mary Kaldor (Beck and Sznaider 2009) holds that globalization is conceptually contiguous with cosmopolitanism.

This thesis has been contested by various approaches, including those associating globalization with Americanization or ‘McDonaldization’ (Ritzer 1996, 2008, 2009). Contrary to the ‘cosmopolitan globalization’ thesis, this chapter considers globalization as the global extension of westernizing modernity, thus, sharply dissociating it from cosmopolitanism (Conversi 2010). Both modernity and globalization bring about simultaneous boundary-rising and boundary deconstruction. For Stephen Castles, the ‘neoliberal dream is dualistic: a cosmopolitan, mobile world for elites; a world of barriers, exploitation, and
security controls for the rest’ (Castles 2011b: 311). Neo-liberal
globalization is conveyed through the ideology of globalism (Steger 2002, 2005).13
This market-oriented ideology can be situated at the opposite spectrum of the
cosmopolitan vision, also because it tends to favour competition over cooperation at all
levels of society, politics and culture. Globalism can, thus, be identified as a particular
form and aspect of modernism (Conversi 2012).
The iconoclastic effects of modernity and its simultaneous reliance on
uniform, standardized visions of society have been described above. Many
authors have linked globalization to hybridism, melange, permeability (Croucher
2004: 38–40 and 112–114), openness and other positive features. Yet, globalization
deepens and radicalizes previous patterns of replicability and predictability
across the whole globe, either in specific forms like McDonaldization’s ‘iron
cage’ (Ritzer 1996; Smart 1999),14 or in more generalized ideological forms like
globalism and its ‘subsidiary’ ideologies (Steger 2002, 2005). Like modernity,
globalization both destroys and reinforces existing boundaries. This section
explores the dynamics between globalization and recalcitrant neo-statism
in the Mexican border city of Ciudad Juárez, where the residual centrality of the nation
state interacts with, and has been fragmented by, the forces of neo-liberal
globalization.

On 19 September 1993 at midnight, 450 United States Border Patrol agents
(USBP) under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
swept along the banks of the Rio Grande River to seal the US–Mexican border
from the infiltration of illegal immigrants (Ackleson 1999; Nevins 2010). This
act was a prelude to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
between Mexico, the USA and Canada (1 January 1994). It highlighted a
seeming contradiction between ‘free trade’ for tax-avoiding
megacorporations
and blocked mobility for the destitute majorities coming largely from the de-ruralized
south. The booming economy of the maquiladoras of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, across the border from El Paso, Texas, testifies to the violent interaction between neo-liberalism and neo-statalism, and the contradictions unleashed by the neo-liberal securitization of interstate border areas (Ackleson 1999: 155; Nevins 2010). The maquiladoras are assembly plants that process imported raw materials to produce goods for export. These factories and companies largely moved from the USA after 'downsizing' and closing down their original 'mother' plants and branches located in various US states – and sacking thousands of American employees. They catalysed the rapid growth of large metropolitan areas south of the border. While decimating employment north of the boundary (Botz 1992: 172–176), the maquiladoras allowed megacorporations the fiscal incentive of a legally protected low-tax, even tax-free, environment. Prosperous, affluent and highly developed, Ciudad Juárez stands out as the quintessential example of the fracture and fissiparousness induced by neo-liberalism. The city became a demographic magnet, turning into 'perhaps the fastest-growing major city in Mexico' (Martínez 2011: 4). The assumed annual growth rate places it amongst the world’s top 100 fastest growing urban areas between 2006 and 2020.15

This economic boom came at a terrible human cost. With over 600 unpunished murders of women and 3,000 missing women since the early 1990s, Ciudad Juárez has witnessed one of the highest rates of female homicides per capita in the world, with the aggravating dimension of extensive use of torture on the bodies of the victims, mostly workers at the maquiladoras (Ganster and Lorey 2008: 180–181). The unpunished murders were accompanied by a binational conspiracy of silence, a near ban by the local and national media oscillating between denial and censorship (De Alba and Guzmán 2010: 5–8). With a few exceptions, this silence was shared by both US and Mexican mass media. According to some authors, the denial indicates an alignment between neo-liberal
media and politicians and
perhaps a tacit complicity at the local, national and international levels: thus, an
‘alliance of silence’ with Mexico’s ruling elites made possible a cover-up,
possibly to deflect the murders’ feared discouraging effects on economic investments
(Rodríguez et al. 2007: 158–159). Because the victims were lower class women,
their elimination could be tacitly tolerated, since the elite of, mostly male, super-rich
saw the flow of international capital as a superior value. Replaceability seems
to be a factor here, as working women seemed to be easily dispensable, replaceable
and deprived of their individuality.
Impressionistic accounts attribute this extreme violence to Mexico’s descent
into a feudal narco-state dominated by death squads and criminal cartels, with
some speaking of ‘femicide’ as simply stemming from fanaticism (Powell 2012).
However, the roots of much of this violence can be found in the cultural and economic
disruption brought about by ‘free trade’ and its rigid tenets upheld by a
massive security apparatus along the border line (Bowden 2010; Staudt 2011;
Swanger 2008). Ciudad Juárez has been identified as ‘the definitive neoliberal
city’, postulating a linkage between neo-liberalism
and ‘femicide’ (feminicidio). 16
The murders took place near the boundary between two of the world’s most neo-liberal
countries, the USA and Mexico. Ciudad Juárez also lies at the touching
point between two cultural areas undergoing rapid change. In a way, the
boundary separates not just two countries, but two continents, as if ‘North
America’ could be opposed to Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking
Latin America:
Samuel P. Huntington went as far as describing Latin America either as a separate
civilization or a ‘sub-civilization’ of the West (Huntington 1996: 46–47)
and, in his latest book, he precisely advocated the reinforcement of barriers and
boundaries between these two cultural areas, lest the tide of cultural hybridization
dilute the dominant position of the English-speaking majority in the USA (Huntington 2004). In a further generalization, we can speak of a boundary between two deeply different regions in which only mass consumerism and neo-liberal ideology span the border. In fact, the 'conspiracy of silence' about femicide was shared across the border by both US and Mexican mainstream media. This section has shown a case in which the boundaries between two states reconstituted by neo-liberal globalization have been simultaneously reinforced and debilitating at a severe human cost, highlighted by the torture, rape, mutilation, maiming and murder of hundreds of women. The next section goes beyond the nationalism-globalization dichotomy and takes a cursory look at an area in which 'natural boundaries', which have long provided the frontier between both states and ethnic groups, may eventually collapse, after being eroded by the potentially cataclysmic and unpredictable force of climate change – itself a consequence of the extreme exploitation of the environment induced by neo-liberal globalization.

Climate change, boundaries and ethnonational security in East Africa

For a long time before the advent of the modern state, natural obstacles like rivers, streams, deserts, lakes, seas, mountain ranges and other landscape features provided the most commonly accepted and expected nature-given frontiers between communities and polities. Amongst all of them, rivers have constituted perhaps the most popular choice for boundary-makers and enforcers (Donaldson 2009). The distinction between artificial and 'natural' boundaries is not a modern one and has been widely used amongst the ancients. Herodotus maintained that 'artificial' (i.e. man-made) boundaries 'seem less likely to provide a secure basis for lasting, peaceful intercourse' than natural boundaries, while the latter's transgression 'carries undesirable consequences' (Lateiner 1989:
130). But a proper theory of 'natural boundaries' only developed after the Enlightenment (Pounds 1951) slowly merging with French nationalism to justify both nationalist wars and imperial aggrandizement (Pounds 1954). Several natural frontiers were seized and politicized by states, either in core European nations, or in colonial and postcolonial settings. Thus, the flow of the Rhine still demarcates the official frontier between Liechtenstein, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg and Germany. Colonial and postcolonial boundaries may also rely on rivers, like the Komadugu Yobe between Niger and Nigeria. In many instances, these frontiers have been reinforced by 'nation-building' violence, as in the case of the Endeli River between Eritrea and Ethiopia.18 These are classical cases of 'riparian boundaries,' largely banks of rivers and streams (from the Latin ripa, riverbank).19 Some of these physiographic features are more stable than others, like the Alps separating Italy from its northern neighbours; the Pyrenees separating Spain from France; or the Caucasus Mountains separating diverse nations and communities.20 Throughout the world, rivers, as well as mountains and seas, still provide the natural frontiers and signposts between communities. Natural boundaries seem to be eternal, yet they are clearly not so, particularly when nature is under attack by the forces of unrestrained, human-made development.

In fact, climate change has begun to affect natural boundaries, including rivers and river basins. For instance, the effect of mass consumption-induced drought can be potentially catastrophic, not only for local economies, but for war and peace at the global level. If a river providing a boundary disappears or changes course, conflict is likely to erupt. In Ethiopia, leaders of the pastoralist Mursi (Mun) Nilotic tribe claim that:

we use the river to communicate with our ancestors. It is our lifeblood. And now it's disappearing. The river is like a fence for us. If the Omo [River] lowers, the Nyangatom will cross the river into our land. They will fight
African observers, NGOs, commentators and social scientists point to the foreseeable degeneration of entire regions into ethnic and international warfare (Davis 2010; Exenberger and Pondorfer 2014), which in turn can add up to the flow of refugees accompanying the advancement of global warming and climate instability (Parenti 2011).

A continuous stream of scholarly research has been published on specific aspects of climate change, suggesting ever more pessimistic scenarios. A global consensus has consequently emerged in the scientific community with 97 per cent of world scientists across disciplines now fully agreeing over the man-made origins of global warming and climate change as deriving largely from an unprecedented expansion of human consumption (Cook et al. 2013). One effect of climate change identified in the literature includes resource depletion and land encroachment into pastoral zones. For instance, the drainage of the Lula River in the Dolcha Valley, Ethiopia, has led to the emergence of conflict between pastoral and agricultural groups, like the Guji and Burji, turning the river into a site of contention. While the Burji’s agricultural economy relies on regular crop cultivation, the pastoral economy heavily depends on how pasture or water resources are managed for the livestock and their seasonal migration (Debelo 2012: 517), clashing with both state officials and agrarian communities over the ‘utilisation of pastoral lands’. It is hard to define or trace historical records of priority in settlement or utilisation due to the historical porosity and indefiniteness of administrative borders while ‘oral traditions’ of each group offer different interpretations of them (Debelo 2012: 530). Competing interests over resources fuel conflicts, which often assume an ethnic dimension.

The effects of climate change cannot stop at any specific boundary as climate change is wholly global and boundless, so its unpredictable effects need to affect
every nation, although there are different levels of vulnerability, at least initially. As Jared Diamond envisaged, the ensuing civilizational collapse might hardly be comparable to any historical cataclysm which has ever affected human societies throughout recorded history (Diamond 2005). Among a potentially endless list of irresolvable or hard-to-resolve problems, scholars, observers and policymakers have indicated the extensive likelihood of ethnic conflict and international war. More recently, genocide scholars have begun to plot the genocidal consequences of climate change (Cromwell et al. 2007; Levene et al. 2010; Levene and Conversi 2014; Zimmerer 2014). In 2007, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, wrote about the impact of climate change on Darfur’s genocidal crisis.22 A report on Sudan by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) indicated the strong relationship between desertification and regional climate change (UNEP 2007). The economist Jeffrey Sachs observed how climate change and drought are exasperating conflicts in war-torn countries like Somalia and Afghanistan.23 Once boundaries and borders can no longer hold millions of displaced, the fate of entire communities is at stake. However, the refugees are not causing global warming. On the contrary, those who are closing the gates are almost invariably the perpetrators, rather than the victims. As the problem is largely caused by the most developed nations, one could expect enormous human pressure towards opening the boundaries sealed by the polluting rich. In fact, the latter have already engineered new strategies to justify the closure of borders. The post-9/11 securitization of space has been used ‘profitably’ to stem the tide of asylum seekers and refugees (Castles 2011a). But the most usual and likely justification has been provided by nationalism, which normally underpins and subsumes the whole notion of ‘national security’ and the securitization of space though continually reinforced boundaries. Xenophobic nationalism can find a fertile terrain particularly in the current vacuum of information. As climate change knows no frontiers and is likely to affect every
living being on the planet, it would seem incongruous that inter-group
and interstate boundaries are reinforced, or even maintained. Yet, the principle of
territoriality's endurance is such that it is premature to identify the advent of a new
cosmopolitan age. Both ethnic and state boundaries provide a formidable obstacle
to the implementation of policies to effectively tackle climate change:
indeed, the territoriality of the national state has so far acted as a major obstacle
in global climate negotiations (Kythreotis 2012).

Conclusions
I have identified modernity as the age of hectic, 'frenzied' boundary-building,
because the sea changes brought about by various forces linked to modernity,
including industrialization and state centralization, carried with them unprecedented
forms of instability. Such volatility broke up and obliterated existing
boundaries between communities, classes and states, while continuously
demanding the creation of new ones. As a process of simultaneous boundary creation
and destruction, modernity was conveyed by the twin ideologies of modernism
and nationalism (Conversi 2012): while modernism can be identified as
the all-encompassing ideology of modernity, nationalism can in turn be redefined
as the avenue through which modernity-seizing elites could mould and
shape the contemporary political subject. Nationalism as the 'carrier' of westernizing
modernity can, thus, be reconceptualized as the most popular and influential
form of modernism. Through it, the ideology of modernity could assert itself
at the mass level while emerging elites longed for internal legitimacy in a world
of aspiring nation states. This chapter has analysed the way boundaries can be
conceptualized in relation to modernity and its aftermath, including globalization
and the impending climate change crisis.
Distinct sections explore the interaction between state-formed
identities, cultural
homogenization and modernities along and across boundaries, beginning from one of the oldest existing boundaries, the Franco-Spanish one. The Pyrenean borderland highlights the establishment of two contrasting patterns of modernity spanning the frontier. The chapter expands further on this relationship by addressing the case of the Mexican–US borderland as a quintessential example of the effects of neo-liberal globalization on official state boundaries in the fast developing city of Ciudad Juárez. Finally, the chapter considers climate change's erosion of nature-giving boundaries and its far-reaching effects on interethnic relations. Beside modernism, state-building and globalization, climate change will also need to be taken into account for its devastating impact on global instability and conflict through boundary demolition and reinforcement. All these are linked to the emergence of boundary approaches across disciplines. In all, the centrality of boundaries in processes of radical social, political and environmental change is assessed through three historical crises chosen for their iconic evocation and powerful representativeness of the processes described. These include a terminal crisis of boundaries, which may well turn out to be a terminal crisis for all national communities – and indeed for mankind as a whole.

Notes
1 Ellie Kedourie adopted an opposite approach, arguing that nationalism derived from a process of ideological diffusion. However, he partly failed to identify its Jacobin roots and preferred instead to focus on its German origins, as fashionable in the post-war period. Paradoxically, his German-centred vision went as far as absorbing Immanuel Kant's vision of personal self-determination into its aetiology of nationalism (Kedourie 1993).
2 This is surprising, considering the work of Eugene Weber and other authors on the centrality of schooling and the military experience (Weber 1976).
3 Elsewhere, I have identified the institutionalization of modernity through ideology and practice with the French Revolution and its war-ridden aftermath (Conversi 2012).
4 In the wake of the Great Depression, Roosevelt, Mussolini and Hitler unleashed their propaganda armour to impose 'high modernist' solutions to economic stagnation, civilian unrest and unemployment (Schivelbusch 2007: 61, 81). Le Bon's La psychologie des foules (1895; English trans. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1896) is considered the founding stone of Massenpsychologie ('Group Psychology') – and a major influence in Sigmund Freud's work (Le Bon 2006). Le Bon attempted a scientific approach to the problems of mass society and did not obviously recommend mass manipulation; nor could he anticipate the totalitarian appropriation/abuse of his work. His concern for the authoritarian effects of 'massification' included an awareness that compulsory schooling could accelerate both. However, his fatalism led many readers to consider the inevitability of authoritarianism, while he naively offered the detailed descriptions of the tools through which mass manipulation could be achieved.

5 In his book on Sorel, Irving Louis Horowitz claims that 'the predominant theme of Italian political realism had always been the psychological power factors in politics and history' (Horowitz 2009).

6 Gellner mentioned replaceability within the school system: the replaceability of individuals within the system by others applies to the educational machine at least as much as to any other segment of society, and perhaps more so. Some very great teachers and researchers may perhaps be unique and irreplaceable, but the average professor and schoolmaster can be replaced from outside the teaching profession with the greatest of ease and often with little, if any, loss.

(Gellner 2006: 35)

7 In Smith's description of Barth's work, 'transactions between ascriptive categories, far from fragmenting and dissolving them, reinforce the social boundary between them' (Smith 1998: 186).

8 Indeed, perennialist authors have adopted boundary approaches at a very early stage (Armstrong 1982). Boundary theories can also incorporate ethno-symbolism
while adopting a more instrumentalist viewpoint (Conversi 1995). And, although one can discern a constructivist predisposition in them, boundary approaches cannot be reduced to instrumentalism or modernism.

9 For Armstrong, myths are crucial to generate awareness of ‘a common fate’, by arousing ‘intense affect by stressing individuals’ solidarity against an alien force, that is, by enhancing the salience of boundary perceptions’ (Armstrong 1982: 9). However, ethnicity is subordinated to religion as a boundary-builder and major source of value differentiation, since religion provided the main mythomoteurs (myth-symbol complexes or legitimising constitutive political myths) of ethnic identities (Armstrong 1982: 291). For instance, the Egyptian conquest of Nubia in the second millennium bc led to the construction of otherness beyond and along Egypt’s southern frontier through rising ethnic boundaries between ‘civilized Egyptians and barbaric foreigners’. However, while texts, monumental art and other sources describe the ethnic ‘Other’, archaeological evidence shows how intermarriage and mutual cultural influences transcended ethnic boundaries (Smith 2003).

10 Moreover, the Paísos Catalans include the Principality of Andorra and the town of Alghero/L’Alguer in Sardinia, Italy, where Catalan is also traditionally spoken.

11 ‘Si usted hubiera visto el barrio antiguo, allí en el Alto de la Villa, la vida alegre que había. Pero no dejaron nada y ahora ya lo ve usted, el progreso, Albacete es el Nueva York de La Mancha, o algo así.’

12 The development began, in less toxic ways, under Primo de Rivera and the Second Republic (Walton 2011).

13 Manfred Steger identifies three major forms of globalization: neo-liberal globalization,
which is by far the hegemonic form, alter-globalization
(the No Logo movement)
and pan-Islamic
globalization (Steger 2005).

14 In his celebrated work on The McDonaldization of Society, George Ritzer adapted Weber’s description of the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratization to the standardized, uniform and control-freak spread of new Americanizing models of global retailing, beyond the fast-food industry (Ritzer 1996). More authors have expanded the application of this model to a host of other areas (see Smart 1999).


17 Not surprisingly, Huntington advocates the reinforcement of barriers and borders as a means to ‘re-nationalize’ the USA (Huntington 2004).

18 An Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) was specifically set up to supervise the boundary by reinterpreting Stephen B. Jones’s notion of boundary ‘demarcation’ (Donaldson and Williams 2008).

19 Seas, lakes and coastlines can establish broader boundaries, the so-called littoral boundaries (from the Italian litorale, in turn derived from Latin littoralis, ‘of, or belonging to, the seashore’ from litus = ‘seashore’, as in Lido).

20 The issue becomes particularly sensitive in the realm of trans-boundary water management, as documented by the International River Boundaries Database’s (IRBD) comprehensive datasets about river boundaries and disputes (Donaldson 2009).


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Chapter 7 Evaluating Party Politicization of Immigration

In the institutional arena of politics, the debate over how to effectively govern multiethnic societies remains contentious. While only a small handful of countries in the twenty-first-century world can be considered ethnically homogenous, governments struggle with how best to manage predominantly multiethnic societies. In democratic theory, political parties play a central role as representatives of the popular voice and institutional mediators providing the channels connecting demands of the people with governmental decision-making. Therefore, it seems reasonable that political parties would be key actors in shaping most issue debates in democratic societies. This chapter argues that political parties have been key architects of the contemporary debate over immigration and that this leading role can be either constructive or destructive depending on how it is handled. This chapter examines evidence of the party politicization of immigration comparing the United States, Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. It investigates the extent to which political parties have in recent decades facilitated the government response to the multicultural dilemma through their issue framing along with policy prescriptions and to what extent they have contributed to the problems governments face in managing ethnically heterogeneous populations.

The politics of immigrant incorporation

Crafting a politically acceptable strategy for immigrant incorporation has proved a challenge for governments in recent decades. In approaching this task, governments have had to determine the extent to which they intend to be multicultural nationstates. Distinctive political cultures and traditions of inclusion or exclusion have shaped national policy approaches to immigrant incorporation. As this study suggests, political parties have played key roles in framing the debate and policy while taking cues from national publics.

National populations in advanced industrial countries have remained divided on the appropriate policy response to immigrant incorporation, allowing room for
much political debate and discussion. This has in turn allowed for much political party competition on the issue within the respective political party systems. West European publics, for instance, vary considerably in terms of stronger support for full assimilation. Figure 13.1 shows these countries ordered left to right according to how strongly they favor assimilation. Yet, clearly several countries have a stronger preference for integration.

Integration is less pervasive, as it implies a legal status change without the necessity of cultural adaptation to the host country. On the other hand, assimilation presumes that cultural differences can and should be diminished. By assimilation it is expected that unity through equality will prevail over differences and that over time likemindedness and common values will emerge. People who come together under one government are expected to overcome their cultural differences. This section will briefly outline the integration and assimilation propositions.

The ability for societies to successfully integrate immigrants depends on at least two key factors: the legal status granted to immigrants as citizens, and the host country’s self-image as a multicultural society. Citizenship laws provide a legal way of separating “us” from “them.” Determinations about who is entitled to the benefits provided by social democratic governments across Europe are based on citizenship laws. Legal citizenship entitles them to the same benefits of health care, education, and basic rights that are reserved for recognized members of the political community.

However, the perspective of the host country and its members in terms of whether or not they set the goal for themselves of working to achieve deeper integration of the immigrant population matters a great deal as well. In other words, legal status is one thing, but legitimacy and belonging in the eyes of the host people make the
difference between smooth integration and social tension in multiethnic societies. The public divide on immigrant incorporation strategies reflects competing philosophical perspectives on the constituent nature of citizenship. Two classifications have been the basis of citizenship law in many nation-states arising in the Western tradition of democratic government. They differ in perspective over the composition of the nation-state, including whether multiethnic groups can be readily incorporated or not. Those opposed to incorporating other ethnic groups suggest that a state’s ideal of homogeneity arises out of a sense of the existence of an organic community among its people. Those who favor the ability of the nation-state to make citizens out of people from other ethnic groups suggest an instrumental approach to citizenship. They argue that states can define citizenship more liberally to include all those who share common goals and values and agree to do their part to abide by the accepted rules preserving order in the political community.

Under the premise of ascriptive citizenship, either the direct heredity of the person born (jus sanguinis) or the physical place of birth (jus soli) determines legal membership in the political community. Jus sanguinis implies citizenship by bloodlines. Put simply, “citizens are those whose parents have already been citizens” (Bauböck 1994, 38).

Jus sanguinis reinforces the primordialist argument that identity is static. The primordialist communal identity is a psychological one produced by shared historical experience, common myths and legends, religious beliefs, language, skin color, and regional customs (Gurr 1993, 3). The psychology of the group, then, may be said to formulate the nation. Following this line of argumentation, the nation precedes the state in its existence. Where there is jus sanguinis, the political community organizes on the basis of the common cultural practices and traditions that compose the psychology its members share. It is a nation foremost, and its organization reflects the common ideology of its people. The state, which according to Walker Connor is “a legal concept describing a social group occupying a defined territory and organized
under common political principles,” comes later (Connor 1994, 40). This type of
citizenship basis is entirely exclusive and thus does not allow for much integration.
Applying jus soli, the state forms on the basis of the organizing principle that all
persons born and living within a certain territory share a political community. One
aspect of political community is the legal status it imparts of inclusion under one
government, uniting persons dwelling in that territory. By jus soli, the “sense” of
political community which many authors might refer to as “the nation” (Anderson
1991, 6; Gellner 1983, 7; Connor 1994, 43) derives from the state, the legal institution
of government. It not only readily permits integration but additionally it
presumes that assimilation can occur among members of the nation-state.
Still, granting legal status as citizens to immigrants is only part of incorporating
them into society. The other part, acceptance, is perhaps even more challenging.
Assimilationists suggest that the best way to promote acceptance is to minimize
difference. This requires that immigrants be fully blended with their host society.
Some political theorists have warned that an overemphasis on differences can lead
to social fragmentation and ultimate demise of democratic national government
(Schlesinger 1992, Kiss 1999, Maclver 1999, Patterson 1975). They emphasize that
assimilation needs to occur in order to prevent differences from dividing and
crippling nation-states. This proposition has origins in the writing of John Stuart
Mill. Mill supported the assimilationist notion that differences are to be discouraged,
taking the position that liberal democratic government and political unity could not
be maintained in a multinational or polyethnic state (Maclver 1999, 12). Mill
believed that absent common goals, beliefs, and general unity, the democratic
government could not function. He supported the position that a homogenous
nationality was essential to hold together the nation-state.
Even to the extent that assimilation is possible, several nation-states have made
clear that they do not view themselves as melting pots in the sense of a blending place
for multiple cultures under one government. For many decades, Germany has
declared that “Germany is not a country of immigrants” (Süssmuth 2001, 13).
Alternately states may desire the melting pot where assimilation truly occurs but worry that rising multiculturalism, where cultural differences remain notable and potentially divisive, must be guarded against. Such states may welcome immigrants, yet do not want to see their societies become a mosaic of different cultures and traditions. Rather, they may believe it is important to achieve homogeneity through assimilation. In France, immigrant riots in 2005 and the French government’s reaction to them provide a good illustration of this predicament. In remarks recapitulated in Le Monde in the aftermath of the French immigrant riots, Trevor Phillips, chair of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in the United Kingdom suggested that the French identity seems “rigid and crushing” given the Muslim headscarf ban and the staunch defense of the secular state. He posits that the French government demand that immigrants assimilate and become more French plays an obvious role in the rioting as well as in fueling immigrant frustration (Langellier and Chambraud 2005). Yet, Phillips is also critical of British integration policy, indicating that such promotion of multicultural differences has produced some degree of segregation in British society. With governmental policy prescriptions on immigrant incorporation presently in a state of flux and given competing philosophical perspectives on the nature and origin of citizenship in political communities, it comes as no surprise that political parties have found much to say about immigration in recent decades.

The role of parties in the multicultural dilemma

The idea that political parties have a duty and functional imperative to respond and adapt themselves reflecting constituent demands permeated the literature on American political parties in the mid-twentieth century (APSR 1950). This idea can be readily combined with the theoretical perspective supplied by William Riker and Anthony Downs illustrating party competition occurring across ideological space Evaluating party politicization of immigration 203
where a normally curved distribution characterizes political ideology and parties can be located at various points across its continuum left to right (Downs 1957, Riker 1962). Following such logic, mainstream parties of both the left and right take up moderate yet still opposing positions under the peaked area of the curve with other parties flanking them signaling degrees of distance from the center and stronger positions ideologically advocating bigger policy changes. Such a picture of party competition suggests corresponding hinges of oppositional politics with each position on one side related to a corresponding opposing position on the other side. Taken together, such theories suggest that responsible parties produce fertile ground for optimal, oppositional, party-driven politics.

The importance of the immigration issue, combined with the indecision among governments and publics over policy prescriptions, has made this issue fodder for political parties in their strategic competition. The political left has traditionally framed immigration as a matter of cultural diversity, and social cohesion or pluralism. The left has long embraced minority rights including those of immigrants and ethnic minorities. “The demands of identity groups are quintessential leftist demands because they concern recognition and respect” (Noël and Thérien 2008, 202). Immigrant and ethnic minority voters have responded by their tendency to electorally support leftist candidates and parties (Messina 2005, 475). Meanwhile, the right has traditionally framed immigration in terms of cultural protection and nativism (Mudde 2007, 32–62), as well as in socio-economic terms from the perspective of law and order and given the imperatives of globalization (Noël and Thérien 2008, 57–65 and 204–7). Still, despite their ideological differences, parties across types typically utilize either culturalist or socio-economic rationales for their position on immigration.

The culturalist logic situates itself within anthropological notions of identity. As social anthropologists have long proclaimed, groups necessarily compare themselves to other groups in order to establish their own identity. Gregory Bateson
makes clear that perception is an important element, both in how groups perceive themselves and in how they are perceived by others (Bateson 1979, 78). All groups seek to belong in political society, as belonging means accruing certain objective benefits as a citizen; these may include the right to select leaders and representatives, to be protected from harm and unrest both domestically and internationally, to be educated in public schools, or to receive social services such as health care or unemployment assistance. Yet, belonging also provides socio-psychological benefits as well, such as the feeling of connectedness and solidarity. The obviously more desirable position in society is to be an insider. Following culturalist logic, whether a party adopts an inclusivist or exclusivist stance on immigrant incorporation depends on its view of immigrants as belonging or not belonging (either presently or with potential for future belonging) to the host nation-state's self-perceived grouping. The socio-economic logic revolves around ideals of civil society and social cohesion both philosophical and pragmatic and also more economic or cost-benefit analyses of the practical advantages and disadvantages of adding immigrants to nation-states. Civil society discussions range from how best to foster national values among immigrants while allowing for their cultural diversity, to whether certain cultures prove incompatible in their orienting values creating deep fissures and thus problems for civil society. On the economic side, carrying capacity comes into play including discussions of, for instance, effects on the welfare state of extending benefits to immigrants balanced against the receipt of their payroll contributions through the workforce.

Investigating party politics surrounding the immigration issue

Based on the literature on politics of immigrant incorporation and the role of political parties in issue politicization presented above, this section suggests several research propositions regarding the factors that likely contribute to more productive party politicization of the immigration issue.

Research propositions:
1 Meaningful opposition between parties on the immigration issue promotes an optimal ideological balance without bias in their debates by ensuring that the weight of evidence or emphasis on each side of the issue reflects rough parity and that two more or less directly competitive sides can emerge. However, unidimensional or one-sided issue framing proves less optimal as it tends to generate ideological disequilibrium on the issue with destructive tendencies for the multicultural dilemma; the benefit of consensus-building derived through heated debate to arrive at balanced policy is lost.

2 Responsible parties foster not only robust democratic governance but also equitable issue positioning. In this regard, responsible parties represent one tool aiding governments in confronting the multicultural dilemma in positive and productive ways because they facilitate meaningful opposition.

3 Value-neutrality of political issues proves important for the maintenance of meaningful debate and discussion in the policy-making arena because values evoke fixed, emotional inclinations that tend to preclude the consideration of all viable alternatives. If political parties manipulate public sentiment and make emotional appeals on the immigration issue, then they lose value-neutrality. Conversely, if the issue is presented by parties more pragmatically in terms of problems and solutions, then the issue will incline toward value-neutrality and meaningful debate will be fostered.

4 Socio-economic rationales are more productive than cultural ones. Where the immigration issue is framed more pragmatically pertaining to civil society and social cohesion, protocols for citizenship, travel and transit regulation, or in economic terms such as granting green cards to overcome demographic deficits, this suggests more productive issue development. Where culturalist and especially cultural protectionist issue framing occurs, destructive tendencies for issue development will likely result.

Using evidence from five advanced industrial countries of Western Europe
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, United Kingdom) in comparison with the
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United States, this investigation probes the politicization of immigration across
countries and parties within them. Advanced industrial countries provide a focus
here because their net migration tends to be positive while some parts of the
developing world have negative migration numbers, thus the immigration issue is
likely to be more politically salient there. Europe and the U.S. were selected because
of the comparability of their political and socio-economic systems along with the
ability to compare party family types across them. One notable exception is the lack
of a distinct radical right-wing populist party in the U.S. case, although arguably
such a wing exists within the U.S. Republican party. Finally, language functionality
was a factor in this analysis given the method employed of party manifesto content
analysis and given the author’s language abilities confined to English, German, and
French.
To examine party politicization and platform salience, the most recent political
party manifestos were analyzed for 28 political parties across six countries. Manifestos
were located for four main party family types in each country: mainstream right,
mainstream left, radical right, and green parties. Additional platforms were examined
in the U.S. case to provide for some party coverage of right of center small parties
in this country. Manifestos were examined qualitatively with content analysis of the
treatment of the immigration issue, as well as quantitatively with ratios developed
to establish the significance and priority of the immigration issue. The overall scope
of this investigation aims to capture party politicization of the immigration issue
within party systems cross-nationally, necessitating national snapshots rather than
extensive case studies of each country context.

Analyzing party politicization of immigration
This section examines both platform rhetoric from typically the most recent party
manifesto or platform document available at the time of analysis. Owing to differences in terms of how often some parties update these documents, the dates of publication range from 1995 to 2010, yet only three platforms were published before 2005. Analysis in this section also includes selective scholarly accounts of party issue positioning on the immigration issue. While this section could consume the entire chapter were it to take up a description of each party type for each country, an attempt was made to choose varied country cases from among the six featured in this study for explication of the immigration issue in each party family context. Where parties present multiple frames of the immigration issue, illustrative cases are discussed to show each angle. Where one side predominates across cases for a party family type, that side alone is illustrated through selective case examples.

The mainstream right
Mainstream right parties usually choose between two strands of their core ideological tenants when formulating either an inclusivist or an exclusivist position with regard to immigration: economic liberalism or cultural conservatism. For libertarians and economic liberals of the right-wing, those tracing their philosophical roots to laissez faire economics and Adam Smith, the imperative of globalization presents an optimistic outlook where efficiency and competition intensify on a global scale; globalization has altered traditional two-dimensional cleavage space where economics or social concerns prevail according to some scholars (Kriesi et al. 2006). Given a globalized world economy, the potential for economic growth for countries and the firms within them who are well-positioned to take advantage of open borders, open communication, and ease of financial transfers is previously unfathomed. Pro-globalization positions grounded in open market national economies tend to favor more open borders and labor migration along with outsourcing of jobs (West 2011). The British mainstream right party, the Conservatives, adopts a market-oriented pro-globalization stance saying in a section
of their manifesto titled “Attract the brightest and best to our country”:

“Immigration has enriched our nation over the years and we want to attract the brightest and the best people who can make a real difference to our economic growth” (Conservatives 2010, 21). Even though they go on to say immigration rates must have some controls or upper limits for feasibility (a ceiling beyond which returns diminish), overall the tone favors a globalized workforce.

Still another faction within mainstream right parties has increasingly supported immigration restriction in both a cultural and socio-economic, protectionist mode of thought. Social and cultural conservatives of the mainstream right have suggested dangers to nationalism and the loss of native culture as reasons to cautiously engage in the open borders of a globalized world. They often present social cohesion as a goal and suggest dire consequences for the lack thereof, including rising crime and even domestic terrorism and violence. The Belgian CD&V Party platform frames this broadly as “safety” concerns linking police and law enforcement requirements to the breakdown in social cohesion (multiethnic society) (CD&V 2010, 55). The U.S. Republican party speaks similarly about immigration policy as a national security concern, tackling it in the first section of its party platform. “In an age of terrorism, drug cartels, and criminal gangs, allowing millions of unidentified persons to enter and remain in this country poses grave risks to the sovereignty of the United States and the security of its people” (Republicans 2008, 6). The Austrian ÖVP moves toward a cultural protectionist position with emphasis early in the platform on preserving the cultural heritage of native Austria (ÖVP 1995, 4), although like most other mainstream right parties, it avoids crossing the line into primarily culturalist logic. Instead, while many contemporary mainstream right parties talk often of “native” culture, they actively attempt to avoid degenerating into a valueladen proposition, preferring to keep the emphasis on social cohesion when they articulate policies that require fuller assimilation of immigrants. For instance, the “mastery of language” is asserted as equally important as “observance of the
Constitution and laws” for a robust civil society (ÖVP 1995, 18–19).

An economic strand of mainstream right anti-immigrant positioning cites the loss of domestic jobs to outsourcing (a suspiciously pro-labor-sounding concern, especially when most of these jobs have been lost in manufacturing). This rhetoric evaluating party politicization of immigration 207 has marked a shift in the pre-2012 election campaigning on the weak economy during Republican presidential primary debates in the U.S., with candidates frequently citing policy maneuvers to “in-source” American manufacturing jobs by bringing them back to the U.S. Where opposition to globalization in terms of job loss prevails, these right-wing parties sound like catch-all parties sharing concerns with the mainstream left.

The mainstream left

Mainstream left parties adopt an inclusivist or exclusivist slant on immigration seemingly dependent on the degree to which they have either become catch-all parties or conversely maintained more ideological purity. The Austrian SPÖ, for instance, stays close to its leftist ideological roots saying, “We are dedicated to minorities and their right to full integration into society while maintaining their identity. We assume that all people have a right to their homeland, their nation, their language and their culture” (SPÖ 1998, 7). The Austrian SPÖ position is likely influenced by the unique legacy of Nazism in Austria which remains strong and arguably among the least “rehabilitated” (Art 2006). The SPÖ positions itself historically, saying “Because of this history” it is committed to “fight against all racist and neo-Nazi activities” (SPÖ 1998, 6).

By contrast, many mainstream left parties have moved in recent decades toward the ideological center, abandoning their working-class and minority-rights basis grounded in left-wing egalitarian ideas (Allen 2009). Such catch-all party behavior has led to more parties on the left adopting the anti-immigrant position espoused
by the mainstream right, although they tend to stick closer to a rational or economic logic avoiding the culturalist lines of conceptualization. For example, the French left has positioned itself less ideologically and more in the midst of the widely popular public policy stance supporting restrictions on immigration. It shares arguments with the French mainstream right calling for crackdowns on illegal immigration, linking crime and immigration (mafia activity specifically), supporting links to countries of origin to foster the possibility of returns and even investing in those countries of origin to make returns more attractive to immigrants (PS 2007, 28).

The Greens
Green parties have had a mixed record when it comes to how they address the immigration issue and multiculturalism debate. Some green or environmentalist parties have remained more single-issue in their focus. By the end of the 1980s, the French greens, Les Verts, determined to remain focused fairly exclusively on environmental protection after two party frontpersons pushed for competing models between 1984 and 1988. Yves Cochet wanted the party to find a place in between the other French parties of the left, taking on some of their neglected issues in an attempt to occupy issue space. Antoine Waechter wanted to remain fundamentalist and remain close to the core environmental elements of the party position without reaching for other issues (Shull 1999, 99–100). The party later drifted toward the mainstream left under Waechter’s successor Dominique Voynet, who took leadership of the party in 1993. Unlike Waechter, Voynet was not opposed to alignment with other left-wing parties, and Les Verts broadened their platform, gaining their first seats in parliament as a part of a plural left-wing governing coalition in 1997. The party has since dissolved in 2010, becoming Europe Écologie–The Greens through a merger with the party formerly known as Europe Écologie. Most other green parties have followed suit, avoiding the single-issue focus. However, the party regarded as the most effective of all green parties, the German
greens, has always presented a broader platform focus to include and even emphasize an inclusivist position on immigration. Even as the Greens in Germany formulated their platform position in the early 1980s, they adopted a relatively broad and comprehensive party manifesto. The German Greens became champions of the otherwise disenfranchised, supporting minority-group rights including those of women, foreign workers, homosexuals, and the physically disabled (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992, 131). They still advocate strongly for minority rights today, including those of women and ethnic minorities; and with regard to immigrants, their manifesto stipulates that Germany “is an immigrant society” even though they claim that successive German “governments have largely ignored this fact” (DG 2009, 13). In addition to advocacy for minority groups, the German Greens took positions on civil rights and liberties, and on social issues well beyond the parameters of environmental concerns. They were able to advocate for workers’ rights, especially as the mainstream-left Social Democrats in Germany became increasingly centrist in their platform. The German Green party manifesto became increasingly comprehensive after the party began to gain seats in the national legislature and faced pressures from the public to more clearly define its positions on the array of issues of the day (Burchell 2002, 130). Thus there was something of a positive, linear effect between gaining seats and broadening its issue focus.

The radical right
Radical right-wing parties have often been accused of a single-issue focus on the immigration issue with an exclusivist slant. While scholars tend to disagree with the single-issue-party thesis, they often suggest that the clearest common denominator among these parties is their anti-immigrant stance (Art 2011, Rydgren 2005, Mudde 1999). The rhetoric of these parties confirms the exclusivist characterization with regard to immigration. Additionally, examination of their party manifestos reveals the prevailing culturalist slant in their discussion of immigration. While they
make use of socio-economic rationales, especially as they transformed themselves through the 1990s to cultivate more perceived legitimacy and salonfähigkeit, they remain different from all of the other political parties above in their retention of strong cultural-exclusivist rationales. Just as the green parties present a valuedriven commitment to diversity, radical right parties offer up a value-driven aversion to it.

Radical right parties use “multiculturalism” in a distinctively pejorative manner, and fiercely criticize their governments for having long fostered such policies that encourage immigrant incorporation without requiring the adoption of local customs and cultural mores. The party manifesto of the French National Front opens with the declaration that “At the root of most evils afflicting our country is the immigration policy pursued for over thirty years by successive governments” (FN 2007, 5). In many ways such rhetoric makes the radical right the original architects of the “end of multiculturalism” proclaimed by West European leaders in 2010 and 2011 outlined in the introductory chapter to this book. They certainly toed this line ahead of most other parties. Yet, their opposition to multiculturalism differs in both degree and kind from that of the mainstream governments of the mainstream right that later came to adopt this position. The degree to which they reject the prospect of cultural diversity bringing social goods becomes clear through the demand by many that all immigration be curtailed and all existing foreigners be expediently deported. The German REP manifesto illustrates this, saying “all opportunities must be taken to limit the immigration of foreigners, and to send certain groups of foreigners back to their homeland” (REP 2002, 15).

The difference in kind exhibits itself in their value-driven objection to immigrant incorporation. While the mainstream parties have recently moved toward promotion of quantitative caps to reduce numbers and fuller assimilation, radical right parties remain committed to the premise that immigrants prove largely "unassimilable." They maintain a value commitment to the idea that nations have a unique
cultural identity and that foreigners inherently corrupt it. “Not only is Britain increasingly overcrowded, but the fact is that a country is the product of its people and if you change the people you inevitably change the nature of the country” (BNP 2007, 5). In particular, Islam and religious difference are often highlighted as too culturally different from native culture for assimilation to ever prove effective. The Belgian Vlaams Belang frames failed immigrant incorporation as a clash of “Western versus Islamic values.” The manifesto explains, “The adjustment of aliens with a Muslim background is proceeding very slowly. Sometimes there is even absolutely no adjustment. The cultures of these immigrants are much farther from ours. Values such as equality between men and women, freedom of speech and the separation of church and state . . . are often alien to them” (VB 2008, 2).

Analyzing party platform salience of the immigration issue

Political party manifests generally tend to place priority issues toward the front of the document and less significant issues toward the end. All viable parties must cover and declare their philosophical positions and policy positions on the same range of issues from economic policy to social policy, to education, to health care and to the environment. However, parties distinguish themselves through their manifestos and platform positions in their emphases as well as quality of content, discussed above in the previous section. With this in mind, one might expect to see a higher volume of emphasis on the immigration issue among the anti-immigrant parties, as the populist radical right parties have been accused of being a single-issue type party.

This party type certainly gets the most attention in the media and scholarly literature, being most likely linked to the immigration issue. Another likely party type to lead in its volume of emphasis on the immigration issue is the mainstream right party family. Former conservative presidents in two countries considered in this analysis, George Bush and Nicolas Sarkozy, provide high-profile examples of conservative politicians identified with crackdowns on illegal immigration and with pushing highly restrictive anti-immigration policies that resemble those proposed by radical
right-wing parties and their leaders.
The analysis presented in Table 13.1 shows such expectations to be misplaced. The mainstream left parties in Germany and the U.K. clearly outpace even the radical right-wing parties in terms of volume of issue emphasis in the manifestos. The French greens prove more focused on the issue than any mainstream right parties with only the mainstream right parties from Germany, Belgium, and France making the top ten list. Five of the six countries have at least one party represented in this list, with Austria the notable standout. This may seem peculiar given the 1999 uproar across much of the western hemisphere over the electoral victory over the mainstream right earned by Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party and also the literature that portrays Austrian politics as xenophobic and racist (Ar 2006).

Additionally, the parties making the list may not be the ones expected for each country, including the notably absent Republicans in the United States and the British Conservatives.

These results may prove more encouraging than confounding for the purpose of this investigation. The research propositions set forward expect that balanced opposition prevails where constructive politicization of the immigration issue is occurring. In other words, heavy one-sided issue dominance by a far right-wing populist orientation of parties pressing a restrictive and highly anti-immigrant agenda would be especially destructive. This analysis finds a wider array of parties prioritizing the immigration issue bringing different ideological orientations to the issue framing. This suggests a tradeoff between arguments for inclusiveness versus those for restrictiveness on the issue.

Another way to consider platform salience besides volume of emphasis is to analyze the placement of the issue within the structure of topics covered in the manifesto. To examine this indicator, this analysis operates under the assumption that earlier placement means higher priority of the issue. In Table 13.2, this has been captured by calculating how much of the manifesto content is placed after the
### TABLE 13.1 Priority of the immigration issue by volume

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Date manifesto published</th>
<th>Section priority</th>
<th>Total no. of sections</th>
<th>Proportion of the manifesto sections aiming after the immigration issue</th>
<th>Party type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.9831</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.9600</td>
<td>R.R.P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Greens-Ger.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.9333</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austrian People's Party</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.8889</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.8750</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Reform Party</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.8636</td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Flemish “belong”</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.8180</td>
<td>R.R.P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8000</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Freedom Party</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.7647</td>
<td>R.R.P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 13.2 Priority of the immigration issue by manifesto placement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Date manifesto published</th>
<th>Pages on immigration issue</th>
<th>Total no. of pages</th>
<th>Proportion of pages on immigration</th>
<th>Party type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.1288</td>
<td>MSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.1105</td>
<td>MSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0833</td>
<td>R.R.P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>National Front-Belg.</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>0.0772</td>
<td>R.R.P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Greens-Fr.</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.0765</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Flemish “belong”</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>10.09</td>
<td>0.0743</td>
<td>R.R.P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.0728</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Christian Democratic &amp; Flemish</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.0648</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Reform Party</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.0554</td>
<td>MSR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
immigration issue placement.

The evidence from the top ten list again shows variance cross-nationally with most countries showing two parties making the list, except in Belgium and the U.K. where only one party is included. The parties in Table 13.2 all have more than 75 per cent of their manifesto sections following the immigration section, showing immigration as a clear priority issue through its placement. A major difference in Table 13.2 from the volume of emphasis measure in Table 13.1 is that the ideological diversity among the top ten parties has evaporated, leaving only two non-right-wing parties, the German Greens and the Reform Party of the U.S., in the top ten list. Here the top ten list shows a clear right-of-center bias among those parties who make this issue one of the first emphasized in their party manifesto document.

One reason for this difference on the placement indicator of priority as compared with the volume indicator of priority may be that right-wing parties want to be "known" for this issue more than many other parties. This may be due to their tendency toward more emotional appeals or to attaching this issue as an omnibus issue with immigrants as the culprits of many social problems. All parties may recognize this issue as an issue of the day but for some it may be one among many significant issues and for others is becomes more of a centerpiece.

Are parties constructive or destructive for the multicultural dilemma?

Evidence from the analysis in this chapter suggests that parties across the ideological spectrum deal directly with the immigration issue. In their platforms and rhetoric, they adopt both inclusivist and exclusivist positions on immigration and also utilize both economic and cultural rationales for these positions. Table 13.3 places party families into categories reflecting their predominant or most well-defined positions. Smaller parties such as the green and radical right-wing party families tend to utilize cultural rationales in either inclusive or exclusive policy directions. Green
parties stay close to their ideal of diversity as added social value while the radical right parties see diversity as a threat to cultural homogeneity. Mainstream parties appear more conflicted than most other parties over how to frame the immigration issue with disagreement within their party families. Mainstream right parties may adopt a pro-globalization inclusivist policy position or they may opt for an exclusivist policy based on socio-economic protectionism including concerns over immigrant crime or even terrorism. While admittedly some mainstream parties of the right have moved toward applying a culturalist, nativist logic as discussed above in this chapter, they typically avoid crossing this line completely or to the exclusion of other strands of logic such as the more socio-economic ones. On research propositions—value neutrality, economic rationales, and meaningful opposition—the evidence suggests mixed results. Some parties such as those of the populist radical right tend to use more emotional appeals to culture and identity in their immigration rhetoric while others discuss it more in economic terms.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic rationale</th>
<th>Inclusive</th>
<th>Exclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream left</td>
<td>Mainstream right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>Radical right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural rationale</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 13.3 Typology of party families on the immigration issue

Inclusive
Socio-economic rationale Mainstream left Mainstream right
Mainstream right Mainstream left
Cultural rationale Greens Radical right

The first two research propositions of this chapter, meaningful opposition and responsible parties, collectively suggest the need for balance in the arguments presented in the immigration policy debate. They call for parties to oppose one
another directly and to truly debate various sides and perspectives of the issue. These propositions also call for a wide variety of policy options to be articulated by parties for public consideration, ranging from strict assimilation all the way to multiculturalism at the other extreme. The evidence presented above in the analysis suggests that robust debate of various policy options and perspectives has been occurring in the supply-side provision of political parties considered here. As the discussion of manifestos and parties in the analysis above reveals and Table 13.3 summarizes, parties are taking up directly opposing viewpoints. The platform salience measures presented in Tables 13.1 and 13.2 seem to confirm that there is meaningful opposition on the issue with parties large and small, left and right prioritizing the issue and engaging both the more inclusivist and exclusivist positions.

One shortcoming in the oppositional and responsible nature of parties may be in the finding that mainstream right and mainstream left parties seem to have some internal disagreements within their respective party families concerning their stances. In Table 13.3, for instance, mainstream parties are presented in two different locations because of this discrepancy. This study suggests that there are times and circumstances in which responsible parties may fuel the multicultural dilemma rather than mitigating its effects. This proves especially true in societies where ideological bases for political parties have blurred, catch-all and cartel parties have taken over and the number of small parties such as those of the radical right increases. It seems worth noting that ideological parties may become the antithesis of responsible parties under circumstances in which the public becomes disconnected from politics, complacent, and irresponsible. In other words, irresponsible publics may make for irresponsible parties.

More pessimistic are the findings regarding the third and fourth research propositions concerning value-neutrality and socio-economic rationales. According to the analysis of this chapter, only the green parties have remained mainly valueneutral and exclusively tied to socio-economic rationales. All of the other party
families were found to either venture occasionally into or situate themselves firmly within value-laden or culturalist rationales. Radical right-wing parties prove the worst offenders in this regard, often justifying their opposition to immigration in terms of cultural contamination and threats. The mainstream parties provide more of a moving target, offering more varied logics for their positions on immigration across and also within their respective party families.

In sum, parties appear to be facilitating the governmental response to the multicultural dilemma in many ways. They articulate opposing policy positions based on varying rationales. Many present ideologically driven arguments taking up clearly antithetical positions across their political party spectrums of ideology.

According to the logic of the research propositions presented in this chapter, such behavior contributes to the germination of optimal policy alternatives. However, several cautionary notes seem warranted. Governments may do well to foster civic engagement and electoral accountability in their societies. Such measures combat tendencies toward catch-all party or cartel party behavior among mainstream parties, as citizens monitor parties’ tendencies to move away from core ideological bases of support and away from accountability altogether. These measures may also curtail rapid small party expansion, which could otherwise be accompanied by the widespread promotion of narrowly focused policy propositions. Parties provide a crucial link mediating between citizens and governments where governments cultivate a climate of balance and meaningful opposition.

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