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1. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

'Terrorism, radicalisation and extremism are subjective concepts that have different meanings for different people. Furthermore, their meanings are constantly evolving as they manifest themselves in different ways in different parts of the world, exploiting new vulnerabilities, technologies and approaches.'
1.1 Terrorism
'Terrorism is a complex and contested issue, as are the associated labels of extremism, violent extremism and radicalisation'

There is no single universally accepted definition for terrorism because the concept is invariably political and cannot be framed in a manner that excludes the state. Most acceptable words to understand terrorism are 'acts committed with the objective of seriously intimidating a population, destabilising or destroying structures of a country or international organisation or making a government abstain from performing actions'.

1.2 Extremism
'Violent extremist ideologies have found fertile ground in fragile communities characterised by little access to development'

Extremism is generally understood as constituting views that are far from those of the majority of the population. Accordingly, one definition describes extremism as 'activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary'.

Though this is clearly a relative term which invites disagreement regarding benchmarks, it is broadly agreed that extremist views are not necessarily illegal and do not automatically lead to violence or harm. Indeed, those with extremist views and who choose to observe extreme practices with no impact on the civil liberties of fellow citizens, are rightly protected under fundamental freedoms and human rights norms.

Extremism becomes a concern when those views threaten democratic and tolerant societal ideas, or promote the use of violence to coerce their followers or to achieve their objectives. This form of extremism is described as violent extremism, a term which remains contested, but which generally refers to the creation of ideologically motivated or justified violence, as well as support for such acts.

1.3 Radicalisation
Radicalisers work by pointing to social, political and economic injustice around their followers.

Like terrorism and violent extremism, radicalisation is a contested term with various definitions. It is commonly understood, however, as the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political and religious ideologies. It does not necessarily mean that those affected will become violent. However, when a decision is made that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, radicalisation to violent extremism occurs.
2. India's Internal Security Situation

In the world of policy making and implementation, there is but little scope for a long term view on a state's policy, be it internal or foreign, as policy-makers are pressed for time to respond to present realities. The dynamism of India in this regard is only too intense. It is not easy to govern a country with such diversity and culture as India. Aspirations vary and expectations of the common people from the Indian state are high.

The internal security challenges in India, which has the greatest impact on state security, are poverty and unemployment. Mired in inequalities, the consequences of poverty and unemployment are the armed internal challenges like Naxalism and Northeastern insurgencies. These are few examples where the conflict between the development and extremism is clearly visible.

There is a cause and effect relationship between the components of development and extremism. The absence of development creates the breeding ground for extremism in the society, thereby creating threat to internal security of India. This, in turn, prevents further development of the region as can be seen in Naxalism-infested regions of Eastern India.

Internal security situation in the country can broadly be categorized as under:

- Terrorism in the hinterland of the country.
- Cross-Border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir.
- Insurgency in the North Eastern States.
- Left Wing Extremism in India.

While the causes of armed violence could be many, the reality that young Indian citizens risk their lives to take up arms against the state in such dire consequences is something we need to grapple with, in a realistic manner.
3. Left Wing Extremism (Naxalism) in India

3.1 Origin and Evolution

The roots of LWE in India lie in multiple factors such as the leftist/Communist political movements, labour and agrarian unrests, the revolutionary societies and the tribal revolts that erupted during various phases of colonial rule in India.

The independence of India from the clutches of foreign rule raised immense hopes among the landless, tribals and other downtrodden sections within the country. It didn't take too long for the masses to realise that independence had brought nothing new for them and almost everything had remained the same. Neither was there any hope of change in the future.

Electoral politics was dominated by the landowners and the land reforms that were promised were not being taken up in the expected spirit. The old exploitative structure had continued in a different garb. This led to a lot of disillusionment and frustration among the masses. They could recollect the prophecies of the early leftist leaders and revolutionaries that the political independence of India from British rule would in effect mean a change of exploiters and the socio-economic structure would remain the same and that an armed revolution will be needed to end the exploitation.

This disillusionment found expression in the increased support in favour of the left parties in second general elections in Kerala. At the same time, the Communist Party of India (CPI) in Bengal was also gaining strength and the United Front (of which it was a part) was the main opposition party. The radicals within the party accused the party leadership of being “revisionists” as they opted for parliamentary democracy. The growing dissensions within the party ultimately led to the split of the CPI. The newly formed party, i.e. Communist Party of India (M) also participated in the United Front governments in Bengal and Kerala in 1967. But nothing substantial was realised on the ground.

The discontentment grew and the radicals within the CPI (M) began to doubt the revolutionary zeal of the leadership. They were convinced that an armed revolution was the only way out. Since they were deeply inspired by Mao’s success in China, they wanted to replicate the same in India. They lost patience and started mobilising the tribals, the landless and the share-cultivators and began what is termed as the revolutionary “armed struggle” in certain pockets of Bengal. The movement crystallised into an organised armed movement in the aftermath of a police firing incident in Naxalbari village in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal on May 25, 1967.

3.2 Different Phases of LWE

3.2.1 The Naxalbari Phase (1967-1972)

The Naxalbari incident could be seen as the trigger that launched the transformation of a primarily political and socio-economic agrarian movement into an armed struggle. The incident was a fall-out of the underground efforts undertaken by the radical hardline Communist leaders like Charu Majumdar, Jangal Santhal and Kanu Sanyal who were able to motivate and mobilise the landless peasants to forcibly occupy the land belonging to the landlords whom they called “class enemies”.

Under the influence of Mao in China, radical Communists from different parts of the country rallied around Charu Majumdar as their leader. In 1967, the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was formed to reconcile the differences within the CPI (M) party. It failed and the radical leaders were expelled from the party. They then formed a new party called Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) i.e. the CPI (ML), on April 22, 1969. The party was to follow the Maoist line to achieve revolution.
During 1969-72, fierce battles raged between CPI (ML) and government authorities, resulting in large scale violence and bloodshed. The government also seriously undertook land reforms. With the coming into power of the Congress supported government in Bengal in the year 1971, a major operation named “Steeplechase” was launched in which the military, paramilitary and state forces participated jointly in the Naxal affected areas. The extremist movement was brought under control within two months. The movement finally died out after the arrest and death of Charu Majumdar in July 1972. In other parts of the country as well, the movement died out gradually and there was a lull for about a decade.

Even though the “Naxalbari uprising” was a failure, it marked the beginning of the violent LWE movement in India, and the terms “Naxalism” and “Naxalite” were born. Identification of revolutionary politics with the name of a village, and not with the name of the leader is unique in history.

During this phase, the movement could not win the support of the poor peasants, sharecroppers, agricultural labourers, urban middle class and the workers at large as they did not view it as a struggle for their own cause. Besides, the masses were not mentally prepared to go in for an “armed struggle.” The excessive identification with China robbed the extremists of a nationalistic image and this factor, to a large extent, was responsible for their isolation from the common people. The movement was based on an over-optimistic evaluation of the possibility of advancing rapidly and the under-estimation of the state’s strength. Devoid of broader mass support, the movement, notwithstanding the courage, sacrifice and motivation of the activists and the protagonists, gradually petered away.

However, the leaders succeeded in providing both an ideological veneer and cutting edge militancy to the nascent Marxist-Leninist movement. They also succeeded in attracting some of the best minds among the idealistic youth of the country.

### 3.2.2 Post Charu Phase: Early 1970s-2000

Charu Majumdar’s death came as a blow to the Naxalites across the country. Thereafter, the CPI (ML) disintegrated into innumerable groups and subgroups which were engaged in internecine squabbles and accusing each other of betrayal and pursuing the wrong line of thought and action. The 1970s and 1980s were witness to bitter polemics which divided these groups, but, at the same time, there were efforts to rebuild the Maoist movement as a whole.

In 1971, Satyanarain Singh revolted against Charu Majumdar’s “annihilation” policy and started his own group called the CPI (ML) Satyanarayan Singh Group (SNS). Similarly, during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Ashim Chatterjee and Santosh Rana also left the CPI (ML) due to Charu Majumdar’s opposition to the Indian government’s position. Mahadev Mukherjee and B N Sharma assumed the leadership of the CPI (ML) after the death of Charu Majumdar. But the unity did not last long as Mahadev Mukherjee expelled Sharma. Another split in the Mahadev Mukherjee camp came when CPI (ML) split between pro-Lin Biao and anti-Lin Biao groups.

Vinod Mishra was elected as general secretary of “Liberation” in 1975. Although he claimed to follow the Charu Majumdar line, he was the first Naxal leader to recognise the futility of armed rebellion against the Indian government. Without explicitly renouncing the methods of Charu Majumdar, he started a “rectification movement” which was aimed at rectifying the shortcomings and lapses in the armed rebellion. As a part of this new line of thinking, “Liberation” joined the mass mobilisation and jumped into electoral politics in 1982 through a front organisation called the Indian People’s Front (IPF). The IPF was envisioned as a nationwide alternative to the Congress Party. In the year 1989, IPF won a seat in the parliamentary elections and the first Naxalite member entered the Indian Parliament.
Yet another group in Bihar, which was then called “Dakshin Desh,” was founded in 1969 by Kanhai Chatterjee and Amulya Sen. This group mainly comprised lower caste and landless people and was extremely savage in executing landlords. The landlords belonging to the upper/middle caste saw this group as a threat to their dominance and raised private militias. Gangs like Ranvir Sena ruthlessly massacred Naxalites and those who were suspected to be Naxal sympathisers. The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), formed in 1975, merged with the Revolutionary Communist Centre, India (Maoist) to form the Maoist Communist Centre (India) or MCC(I) or MCCI in 2003.

3.2.3 Emergence of the CPI (Maoist): 2004-Present

Maoist insurgency doctrine, as elicited from copious documents recovered from their hideouts during several raids and encounters, is based on the glorification of the extreme left ideology. It legitimises the use of violence to overwhelm the existing socio-economic and political structure. Based on this ideology, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army was created as an armed wing of the Communist Party of India—Maoists (CPI-M). The movement got strengthened in 2004 with the merger of People’s War Group (PWG) that was influential in Andhra Pradesh, the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) with a stronghold in the central Indian states and the CPI-M. This merger significantly upgraded the combat capabilities of LWE groups together.

Over the decades since, the LWE movement is assessed to have impacted 40 percent of India’s territory and 35 percent of its population. In 2018, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), 60 districts in 10 states of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, were intensely affected by the LWE movement.

Based on the intensity of insurgency, 30 of the 108 districts spread over the ten States mentioned above have been classified as most affected LWE districts.

- The States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Bihar are considered severely affected.
- The States of West Bengal, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are considered partially affected.
- And the States of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are considered slightly affected.

Currently, the lethality of the LWE movement has increased multifold, establishing a complex web across the 10 states of India. It is estimated that these extremist outfits now have around 9,000-10,000 armed fighters with access to about 6,500 firearms. In addition, there are estimates of about 40,000 full-time cadres (Government of India 2017).
3.2.4 Contemporary Dynamics of Maoist Insurgency:

- Some sections of the society, especially the younger generation, have romantic illusions about the Maoists, arising out of an incomplete understanding of their ideology. The central theme of Maoist ideology is violence. The Maoist insurgency doctrine glorifies violence as the primary means to overwhelm the existing socio-economic and political structures. The People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), the armed wing of CPI (Maoist), has been created with this purpose in mind.

- In the first stage of the insurgency, the PLGA resorts to guerrilla warfare, which primarily aims at creating a vacuum at the grass-roots level of the existing governance structures. This is achieved by killing lower-level government officials, police-personnel of the local police stations, the workers of mainstream political parties and the people’s representatives of the Panchayati Raj system. After creating a political and governance vacuum, they coerce the local population to join the movement. A strident propaganda is also carried out against the purported and real inadequacies of the existing state structure.

- In areas under Maoist domination, the absence of governance becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy since the delivery systems are extinguished through killings and intimidation. This is a key step in the strategy of the Maoists to seek to control the countryside. In the meanwhile, many Front Organisations are created to facilitate mass-mobilisation in semi-urban and urban areas through ostensibly democratic means. Most of the Front Organisations are led by well-educated intellectuals with a firm belief in the Maoist insurgency doctrine. These ideologues function as masks to cover the violent nature of the CPI (Maoist) ideology. They also form the propaganda/disinformation machinery of the party.

- They stridently take up issues like 'displacement of tribals', 'corporate exploitation', 'human rights violations' by security forces etc. and often make fantastic claims in this regard which get reported even by the mainstream media. The Front Organisations also skillfully use state structures and legal processes to further the Maoist agenda and weaken the enforcement regime. The important functions of these Organisations include recruitment of 'professional revolutionaries', raising funds for the insurgency, creating urban shelters for underground cadres, providing legal assistance to arrested cadres and mass-mobilisation by agitating over issues of relevance/convenience. The Front Organisations aim to provide short-term democratic subterfuge to cover-up the totalitarian and oppressive nature of the Maoist ideology.

- The CPI (Maoist) also have a strategic game-plan to create a 'United Front' with all like-minded insurgent/terrorist outfits in India. It needs to be remembered that many of these outfits are supported by external forces inimical to India and the CPI (Maoist) consider such alliances as strategic assets.

- In a nutshell, the CPI (Maoist), the main LWE outfit in India, aims to overthrow the existing democratic state structure with violence as their primary weapon, and mass mobilization and strategic united fronts as complementary components and plans to usher in so-called 'New Democratic Revolution' in India.
3.3 Objective of LWE in India

- The core objective of the LWE movement is the establishment of the People’s Revolutionary State, which is supposed to be achieved by establishing a 'Red Corridor', stretching from the Nepal border through Central India till Karnataka in the South.

- This objective is to be achieved by using armed struggle as the prime tool to garner the support of the oppressed and the exploited. Violent protracted struggle is therefore expected to continue to help the movement consolidate and extend the Corridor.

- Naxal leaders support various issues like protecting people's rights of Jal (water), Jungle (Forest) and Jamin (Land) (JJJ). These are prominent concerns of the people mainly in rural India as most of the people depend on agriculture and forest for their livelihood. Thus, any threat to these three elements is seen as a threat to their livelihood and triggers a high level of anxiety.

- In addition to building up an effective web of armed operatives to spread terror, Naxals also recruit influential local tribal leaders to maintain their firm grip over villagers in remote locations, like in the dense forests of Chhattisgarh and eastern states of India.

3.4 Strategy of the Naxal Movement

The theory and practice of revolutionary warfare has three distinctive phases. These are:

- First, organization, consolidation, and preservation of regional base areas situated in isolated and difficult terrain;

- Second, progressive expansion, which includes attacks on police stations, sabotage, terror tactics, elimination of persons with alternate viewpoints, and procurement of arms and ammunition from the enemy, and

- Third, destruction of the enemy through conventional battles including mobile warfare, protracted conflicts, negotiations, and unified command and control structures.

In practice, transition between the three phases might take years or decades. The objective of guerrilla strategy is gradual control of territory and increase in perceived local legitimacy of rebel ideology. Once that occurs, there is relative loss of legitimacy for state forces.

3.4.1 Key aspects of Maoists Functioning.

1. Targeting Civilians and Economic infrastructure

The Maoists kill civilians for a variety of reasons.

- First of all, they kill those who do not subscribe to their ideology in areas under their domination they are usually branded as ‘police informers’. They also kill people to create a power and governance vacuum in rural areas and the space is filled by them. They also kill the so-called 'class enemies'.

- All these killings lead to a chain of circumstances wherein the kin of victims can potentially rebel against the Maoists. This leads to a further chain of killings of such targets.
Finally, it reaches a stage where the 'power to kill' in their areas of dominance becomes the sole reason for the lower and the less 'politically conscious' cadres to kill innocent people.

They also attack schools and economic infrastructure for the following reasons

- To keep the population in their strongholds cut-off from the mainstream milieu.
- The schools are attacked because education promotes a spirit of enquiry among the local population and also equips children with skills for alternative sources of livelihood.
- They also destroy infrastructure like roads and telecom networks to keep populations isolated from mainstream India.

2. Large women cadre

- The idea is to brain-wash and indoctrinate young children to Maoist ideology. Most parents do not want to part with their children. But faced with coercion and threats, many poor Adivasi parents prefer to part with the girl child. This inhuman practice by the Maoists is the reason behind the large number of young girls/women being present among the Maoist cadres.
- They are also pushed to the forefront of engagements with the security forces
- In States like Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the Maoists have formed 'Bal Dastas' comprising young children
- In Spite of the Maoists professing disapproval of 'patriarchy', the number of women in top echelons of their leadership like the Polit Bureau & Central Committee are negligible.

3. Links with terrorist organisations and foreign countries

- The CPI (Maoist) have close fraternal ties with many North-East insurgent groups, especially the RPF/PLA of Manipur. Most of these outfits have linkages with external forces inimical to India.
- The CPI (Maoist) have also frequently expressed their solidarity with the J&K terrorist groups. These ties are part of their 'Strategic United Front' against the Indian State.
- The CPI (Maoist) also have close links with foreign Maoist organizations in the Philippines, Turkey, etc. The outfit is also a member of the 'Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)', which includes Nepalese Maoists.
- The Indo-Bangladesh border is sensitive on count of cross- border human trafficking including movement of suspected terror related elements, FICN dealers & other criminals. Terror elements have in the past used the Indo-Bangladesh border to cross into India. In such circumstances linkages between left wing radicals & cross border terror related networks cannot be ruled out.

4. Front Organisations

- The Front Organizations are the off-shoots of the parent Maoist party, which professes a separate existence to escape legal liability
- The Front organizations carry out propaganda/disinformation for the party, recruit 'professional revolutionaries' for the underground movement, raise funds for the insurgency, assist the cadres in legal matters and also provide safe houses and shelters to underground cadres.

The functionaries of Front Organizations provide intellectual veneer to the inherent violence in the Maoist ideology. In other words, they sanitize the bloodletting, and attempt to make the Maoist worldview palatable to urban audiences and the media. The Front organizations exist in 20 States of India
3.5 Causes for Spread of Left Extremism

While the goal of the left extremists was to actualise their own vision of the State through 'revolution', they chose to usher that revolution by enlisting the support of the deprived and exploited sections of society particularly in areas where such sections constituted a significant part of the population. Breeding grounds are most glaring in forest areas predominantly inhabited by tribal populations who thus become the main instruments and victims of left extremist violence. Few causes for spread of LWE are as under:

### 3.5.1 Land Related Factors

- Failure of land reforms, for example, evasion of land ceiling laws.
- Existence of special land tenures (enjoying exemptions under ceiling laws).
- Encroachment and occupation of Government and Community lands (even the water-bodies) by powerful sections of society.
- Lack of title to public land cultivated by the landless poor.
- Poor implementation of laws prohibiting transfer of tribal land to non-tribals in the Fifth Schedule areas.
- Non-regularisation of traditional land rights.

### 3.5.2 Displacement and Forced Evictions

- Eviction from lands traditionally used by tribals.
- Large scale land acquisition and displacement for 'public purposes' without appropriate compensation or rehabilitation.

### 3.5.3 Livelihood Related Causes

- Lack of food security due to factors such as corruption in the Public Distribution System.
- Disruption of traditional occupations and lack of alternative work opportunities.
- Deprivation of traditional rights in common property resources.

### 3.5.4 Social Exclusion

- Continued practice, in some areas, of untouchability in various forms leading to denial of dignity.
- Poor implementation of special laws such as Scheduled Caste and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 etc.

### 3.5.5 Governance Related Factors

- Corruption and poor provision/non-provision of essential public services including primary health care and education.
- Incompetent, ill trained and poorly motivated public personnel who are alleged to be mostly absent from their place of posting.
- Misuse of powers by the police and violations of the norms of law.
- Perversion of electoral politics and unsatisfactory working of local government institutions.
3.6 Factors that Sustain the Movement

3.6.1 An Appealing Ideology

- One constant feature of Naxal ideology has been that at all times it visualises and propagates that imperialism is heading towards total collapse. This belief is the driving force of the movement.
- This belief also allows them to blame the present wrongs on the capitalist economic structure.

3.6.2 Organisational Strength of Extremists Groups

- The consolidation of various factions of the left extremists groups (LEGs) has been attributed to the organised, institutionalised and planned manner in which the Naxals function.
- The ideological dedication, the cadre-based organisational set-up and understanding of the micro socio-economic situation in the various regions of India makes the extremists plan, operate and implement their strategies efficiently.

3.6.3 Funding Sources

- The Naxals have been able to strategically target every source of wealth generation in their areas of influence as funding is essential for their sustenance.
- To finance their activities, the Naxalites “accept contributions” in the form of “taxes and levies,” loot government treasuries and banks and also extort vast amounts from businesses, industries, political leaders, government officials, rich landlords and professionals.
- The Naxals exercise a monopolistic control over the forest produce and government contracts in their areas of dominance.

3.6.4 Continuous Availability of Recruits

- The extremists have been able to ensure both financial and social security to the youth in the deprived regions of the country.
- Lack of employment opportunities for the youth lures them towards the Naxals. Apart from economic security, it gives them a sense of empowerment and dignity.
- The prevailing security scenario also compels them to opt to join the Naxals for safety reasons as well.

3.6.5 Lack of an Adequately Assessed and Coordinated Response from the Government

- An appropriate assessment of any problem is the key to conceptualise, develop and implement appropriate strategies to counter it. It has been observed that there is no clear understanding of the nature and enormity of the threat that LWE poses. This has resulted in divergent approaches being adopted by different states and the central government, and their efforts remain largely uncoordinated.
- As of today, the notion of the formation of the “Red Corridor” that could compromise the territorial integrity of the state has been used to shift the discourse of Naxalites from being a “law and order problem” to being the “biggest internal security threat”.
- National security is being used as a blanket term to cover up the state’s confusion on devising ways and means to react to the multi-dimensional challenge the Naxal movement poses.
- Intrusive and insensitive security forces action in the Naxal affected regions also poses a threat to the socio-political and economic structures of those regions. The state’s response to the Naxal movement has been reactive, uncoordinated and inadequate.
3.7 The Government of India's Approach

- The Government of India believes in a holistic long-term policy in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities, improving governance and perception management to combat LWE.

- Most of the security related measures, apart from deployment of CAPFs, are aimed at assisting capacity building by the State forces.

- On the development front, an Integrated Action Plan (now called Additional Central Assistance to LWE affected districts) covering 88 affected districts aims at providing public infrastructure and services and is under implementation since 2010. Further, an ambitious Road Development Plan has been envisaged for LWE areas.

- An Empowered Group of Officers closely monitors the progress of flagship schemes. Special emphasis is being laid on the implementation of the Forest Rights Act and ensuring entitlement of local communities over Minor Forest Produce.

'The Union Home Minister convenes the meetings of Chief Ministers of LWE affected States.

- Provided helicopters for anti-naxal operations, assistance in training of State Police through the Ministry of Defence, the Central Police Organisations and the Bureau of Police Research and Development;

- Sharing of Intelligence; facilitating inter-State coordination; assistance in community policing and civic action programmes etc.

The underlying philosophy is to enhance the capacity of the State Governments to tackle the Maoist menace in a concerted manner:

3.8 Review and Monitoring Mechanisms

To give special focus to development in the LWE affected areas, MHA has been reviewing the LWE situation regularly through a number of review and monitoring mechanisms. Reviews cover operational and developmental issues including those of other Ministries of the Government of India. These mechanisms include:

- The Union Home Minister convenes the meetings of Chief Ministers of LWE affected States.

- The Union Home Minister and the Minister of States (Home) visit LWE affected States to review the LWE situation.
3.9 Important Schemes for LWE Affected States

- **Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme**: Under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme, the central Govt. reimburses to the State Governments of 11 LWE affected States Security Related Expenditure of 90 districts relating to training and operational needs of security forces, ex-gratia payment to the family of civilians/security forces killed/injured in LWE violence, compensation to Left Wing Extremist cadres who surrendered in accordance with the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the concerned State Government, community policing, Security related infrastructure for village defence committees and publicity materials.

- **Special Central Assistance (SCA) for 30 most LWE affected districts**: The main objective of the Scheme is to fill the critical gaps in Public infrastructure and Services, which are of emergent nature.

- **Special Infrastructure Scheme**, along with Construction of Fortified Police Stations in the LWE affected States. The Ministry had sanctioned 400 police stations in 10 LWE affected States. Of these 399 of PSs have been completed.

- **Assistance to Central Agencies for LWE management Scheme**: Under the Scheme, assistance is provided to Central Agencies (CAPFs/IAF etc.) for strengthening of infrastructure and hiring charges for Helicopters.

- **Civic Action Programme (CAP)**: CAP in LWE affected areas has been implemented since 2010-11 to bridge the gaps between Security Forces(SFs) and local people through personal interaction and bring the human face of SFs before the local population. The Scheme has been very successful in achieving its goal. Under the Scheme, funds are released to the CAPFs, deployed in LWE affected areas, for conducting various civic activities for the welfare of the local people.

- **Media Plan**: The Maoists have been misleading and luring the innocent tribals/local population in LWE affected areas by their So-called poor-friendly revolution through petty incentives or by following their coercive strategy. Their false propaganda is targeted against the security forces and the democratic setup. Therefore, the Government is implementing this Scheme in LWE affected areas. Under the scheme activities like Tribal Youth Exchange programmes organised by Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan(NYKS), radio jingles, documentaries, pamphlets etc. are being conducted.

- **Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I and RRP-II) for LWE affected areas**: This Scheme is being implemented by Ministry of Road Transport & Highways for improving road connectivity in 34 LWE affected districts of 8 States i.e. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh.

- **LWE Mobile Tower Project**: To improve mobile connectivity in the LWE areas, the Government approved installation of mobile towers in LWE affected States and 2335 mobile towers have been installed in Phase-I. Phase-II of the project has been approved by the Government of India, under which 4072 mobile towers, will be installed in LWE affected States.
Aspirational District: The Ministry of Home Affairs has been tasked with the monitoring of Aspirational districts programme in 35 LWE affected districts.

GIS Mapping: The project has been initiated for mapping of financial services, school, post offices, health facilities, mobile towers, PDS services, roads and security features etc. in a time bound manner. This will help the stakeholder to make informed decision on developmental and security related issues.

Unified Command: A Unified Command has been set up in the States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal. The Unified Command has officers from the security establishment, besides civilian officers representing the civil administration and it will carry out carefully planned counter LWE measures.

PESA implementation: The Left Wing Extremism affected States have been asked to effectively implement the provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) on priority, which categorically assigns rights over minor forest produce to the Gram Sabhas.

‘Clear, hold and develop’ strategy: it uses development as a tool to win back the support of the tribal population, who overwhelmingly appear to sympathize with the extremists.

Skill Development in 34 Districts of LWE under the 'Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana' (PMKVY).

SAMADHAN Scheme

During the recent review meeting of the Chief Ministers of the LWE affected States in May, 2017, the Union Home Minister enunciated an integrated strategy through which the LWE can be countered with full force and competence. The new strategy is called SAMADHAN, which is a compilation of short term and long term policies formulated at different levels. The meaning was well defined by the Home Minister as:

3.10 State's Response: An Analysis of the counterinsurgency efforts

Given that law and order is under the purview of the states or provinces, the most crucial counterinsurgency efforts are in the hands of state-level leadership. The Central government supported these efforts with joint strategies, resources, intelligence and coordination.

Andhra Pradesh

Following the attack in 2003 on then Chief Minister, who narrowly escaped, Andhra Pradesh embarked on a rapid modernisation of its police force while ramping up its technical and operational capabilities.

The State quashed mass organisation activities through the use of civilian “vigilante” groups that it had carefully encouraged through an attractive Surrender and Rehabilitation package.
The Rubber cultivation initiative in Andhra Pradesh has been successful in providing Maoist with livelihood and income opportunities when they surrender arms.

Succeeded in stamping out Left-wing extremism by combining police action with socio-economic programmes implemented by an effective service delivery mechanism

**Chhattisgarh**

While Maoist-led violence remains a major concern in Bastar division especially the northern parts, significant progress has been made in restricting Maoists to the state's southern districts.

The game-changer seems to have been the improved road connectivity: 11 key road projects were finished by 2018, connecting the Sukma, Bijapur and Jagdalpur districts.

The 'Bultoo' radio initiative enables the rural public to use their ordinary mobile handsets to make their point in their own language, and to record their songs, on the internet. These are converted to Internet-based radio programmes and transmitted to all gram panchayats that have broadband facilities.

**Jharkhand**

The State formed a special force (the Jharkhand Jaguar modelled after the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh) to lead the anti-Naxal operations. The state government also framed a unique surrender policy for Naxalites.

Together with central forces, the state launched Operation Anaconda to weed out Maoists from Saranda and succeeded in 2011.

In the last few years, the number of Maoist-related violence—reaching its peak in 2013 with 480 incidents—has declined to 53 in 2018. There has also been a high number of rebels who surrendered — as many as 108 in 2018 alone.

The state has set up an industrial sewing machine unit in Palamu district with the objective of sustainable livelihood creation using a model that could be enumerated in other districts. The facility fulfills the objective of supplying 2.5 lakh school dresses annually, through a Producer Group of 200 SHG members.

**West Bengal**

The State adopted a three-pronged counter-insurgency strategy.

First, the government overhauled the security strategy by setting up an elite police team to pursue the rebel leaders.

Second, they offered a surrender and rehabilitation package to the rebels, promising jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities to those who would surrender.

Third, and perhaps most critical element of the campaign was in the form of comprehensive confidence-building measures with the people living in the Maoist-infested Jangalmahal region comprising the districts of Purulia, West Midnapore and Bankura.

From a peak of 425 Maoist-related violent incidents in 2010 (which killed 328 civilians and 36 security forces), the numbers came down to zero by the end of 2018.

According to a report issued by the state government, more than 250 Maoists have surrendered before the state police between 2014 and 2018. There is one district, Jhargram, that remains categorised as "highly affected" by the insurgency.
Odisha

- The State has fortified the police stations, gave police officers rigorous training, and announced a suitable incentive package to police personnel involved in anti-Maoist operations.
- Importantly, thousands of tribal youth from the insurgency-affected areas were recruited as Special Police Officers (SPOs).
- The State also opened a training school in each of the seven police ranges, supplemented by 17 battalions of Central forces stationed in key Naxal affected areas.
- Over time, Odisha achieved significant progress in managing Left-wing extremism especially in the mineral-rich regions.

Bihar

- On the security front, the State initiated a number of steps including the creation of a 400-member Special Task Force as well as a Special Auxiliary Police for counter-insurgency.
- The state government revamped its surrender and rehabilitation policy to make it more attractive for insurgents to lay down their arms.
- What has perhaps yielded the most significant results was a series of development and good-governance measures adopted by the State.

Maharashtra

- Compared to several other Maoist-affected states, Maharashtra has responded rather seriously with a slew of measures comprising both security and developmental components. For example, the State has launched major offensive operations against the Maoists in the Gadchiroli-Chhattisgarh-Andhra border.
- The state administration is working to strengthen the police machinery in Gadchiroli and other Naxal-affected areas in terms of providing specialised training, as well as more funds for modern weaponry and equipment. The state has also created a district-level force, the C-60 commando, to tackle with the issue.
- It has put in place a Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy to encourage Maoist cadres to rejoin society.
- The state police along with Central paramilitary forces have succeeded in killing scores of rebels and arresting hundreds of them in the last few years.

### Naxal Violence by State: Incidents and Deaths

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Figures in bracket show details of the corresponding period of 2017
3.11 Outcomes of the coordinated Center-State Strategy

The outcome of a coordinated strategy is telling. Coordinated and concerted efforts from the Centre and Maoist affected states have brought down Maoist sponsored violence to drastic levels, have resulted in elimination of many important leaders of the insurgent organisation, and reduced the dominance to a handful of tri-junction districts in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha.

- The MHA removed 44 districts from Naxal affected list, while the 'worst-affected category' was reduced from 36 to 30.

- Security forces in the recent years have achieved the seemingly impossible by eliminating many top leaders. They have also succeeded in neutralising as many as 26 prominent members of 39 Central Committee in the past two years.

- They have captured more than 7,000 active cadres in the last three years, while an equal number of Maoists have surrendered before authorities in various states.

- Incidents of LWE violence down from 2258 in 2009 to 833 in 2018

- Number of deaths dropped from 1005 in 2009 to 240 in 2018 (Civilian deaths declined from 466 in 2004 to 150 in 2019)

- Districts affected by naxal violence reduced from 96 in 2010 to 60 in 2018

- The attacks on economic infrastructure have steadily declined from 365 in 2010 to 64 in 2019

Rapid decline in Maoist-related fatalities

![Map of India's Maoist conflict](image-url)

A crackdown on Maoist rebels has led to a rise in the number of casualties in the country's tribal areas. Here are the regions that are most affected.
3.11.1 Reasons for the decline in Violence

A combination of improved state actions, change in political economy and internal churns within the organisation have seriously hobbled the insurgency. The major reasons for decline in violence include:

- Greater presence of security forces across the LWE affected States.
- Loss of cadres/leaders on account of arrests, surrender and desertions.
- Loss of strongholds, declining appeal of ideology and leadership crisis
- Rehabilitation program of government along with improved performance from the affected states on socio-economic fronts
- Better monitoring of development schemes in affected areas
- Insurgency fatigue among the Maoist cadres.
- Shortage of funds, arms and ammunition.

3.11.2 Challenges persisting for the government

The Maoist insurgency was not viewed as a serious internal security problem for a long time. Over the years, the Maoists have managed to entrench themselves in remote and inaccessible tribal pockets in a few States. Correspondingly, the state institutions of governance also withdrew gradually from such areas, resulting in a security and development vacuum.

This suited the Maoists, who have set up some form of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas. However, during the last few years, the Maoist insurgency has been recognised as a serious internal security challenge. It is also seen as a major impediment to the nation building process.

Hence, the government initiated multi-pronged measures to address the security and development deficits in these areas. These measures have effectively halted the expansion of Maoist movement to new areas and has also resulted in contraction of their area of dominance. Now, the core areas are being gradually addressed. This is a challenging process, but will ultimately yield the desired results in the long-term and reduce the influence and impact of Maoist insurgency to insignificant levels.

3.11.3 Important trends and the state of play with regard to LWE in India in 2019

In 2019, the Government of India and state governments affected by Left-wing Extremism (LWE) continued to take steps to deal with what used to be the country’s ‘biggest internal security challenge’. Today, in terms of its capacities to wreak continuous havoc on the state, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), the forbearer of LWE, is a poor replica of its past. However, its self-preservation efforts as well as its attempts to expand in new frontiers appear to be more successful than the official efforts to eliminate it.

Presently 30 districts in seven states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha and Telangana) are covered under the scheme. In 2018, ‘most-LWE affected’ districts numbered 35. In 2018-19, Rupees 1000 crores (US$ 140 million) were released to these seven states under the SCA scheme. While these financial allotments portray the intent of the government to resolve LWE, progress on the counter-insurgency (COIN) front, however, appears below par in view of the following trends.
New Surge in Jharkhand

- Under the SCA scheme focusing on infrastructure development in LWE affected states, 44 percent of the funds released to states in the last three years (2016 to 2019) has been allotted only to Jharkhand.

- However, it has been established, on the basis of data, that while LWE could indeed be witnessing a battle for survival scenario in most of its erstwhile areas of dominance, it has managed to ‘engineer a surge’ in Jharkhand.

- According to available official data in 2019 (till 15 November), 160 of the 579 incidents were reported from Jharkhand.

Bastion in Chhattisgarh

- The number of deaths and incidents of LWE has declined over the years. However, Chhattisgarh still remains the worst extremism-affected state accounting for almost 40 percent of the total incidents and 46 percent of the fatalities among the security forces in 2019.

- Although the security situation has significantly improved, many of its interior districts have a vast number of no-go areas under extremist dominance.

Targeting of Infrastructure Projects

- Influence of the extremists continues to be felt in several sectors affecting New Delhi’s infrastructure push in the LWE affected areas. Several key road building projects continue to face delays.

- On 2 December 2019, Minister of Road Transport and Highways told the upper house of the Indian parliament that 13 ongoing works for different national highways and 19 state roads sanctioned under LWE scheme are delayed in Chhattisgarh.

- Non-availability of security forces to provide security to these projects, in spite of more than 70 battalions of security forces being deployed in the state, meant that the contractors limited their work only to 3 to 4 hours a day.

Cadre Preservation

- In its rare statements, even the CPI-Maoist has spoken of the challenges faced by the ‘party’ as a result of surrenders, arrests and deaths of its cadres. However, even in this state of absolute weakness during which the CPI-Maoist may not be recruiting too many, it could still be commanding thousands of armed cadres.

- It appears that the CPI-Maoist could have been exaggerating its operational weakness in order to deflate attention of the security forces and provide them with a false sense of triumph. Neutralization of extremists alone cannot be considered to be the most effective method of ending violent extremism.
Forays into the South

The fact that the CPI-Maoist is not in an exclusively preservation mode and could actually be looking at expanding its influence is clear from a series of events that have taken place in three southern states of Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.

A number of killings and arrests of the outfit’s functionaries in 2019 have bolstered earlier intelligence reports indicating its continued push to expand into these South Indian StatesFour Maoists including a cadre of Tamil Nadu and another from Karnataka were killed in Kerala. In May 2019, Karnataka identified almost 12 Maoist cadres who could be involved in a series of subversive activities inside the state.
3.12 What more needs to be done?

While India's military approach has failed to make much headway owing to a range of weaknesses among the forces, the development approach too has been critiqued for being too romanticised and unreal for implementation. There is an obvious need for a policy rethink and clarity of approach if the challenge is to be met. It is essential that the policy to deal with the problem needs to consider the following recommendations.

- The country has to arrive at a consensus on the kind of approach it wishes to pursue against the extremists.

- A permanent institutional mechanism in the form of a coordination centre can be established to thrash out emerging differences between the Centre and the States.

- Augmenting the capacities of the police as the primary force against Maoist violence will be key to neutralizing the firepower of the extremists.

- While development is a useful tool against Maoist extremism, it is imperative that a semblance of order precede injection of resources into the extremist affected areas.

- Development must operate in tandem with the security forces. Resumption of administrative activity should immediately follow the clearing of an area by the forces.

- It is essential that the official approach be based on an effective policy of communication that not just brandishes the extremists as essentially bad, but is also honest about its own honourable intentions.

- Holding elections for institutions of local self-government in the affected areas followed by the strengthening of these institutions with additional financial and decision-making powers is a necessity.

- Success of security force operations need to be based on the concept of just war that strives to do the maximum to avoid collateral damage.

- Bridging the trust deficit between the government and the civil society through good governance and IEC campaigns with the involvement of local NGOs and other civil society organisations.

- Government needs to stay away from propagandist claims about winning the war in quick time.

- Security forces operating in the area must be made aware of their new role in this war against COVID-19. Combing operations might have to continue, but health
camps, mobile hospitals, etc must be urgently incorporated into the counter-Maoist strategy.

Free medicines, soaps, masks, and sanitary napkins must be distributed along with government-sponsored rations.

An ordinary citizen can do the following things to fight LWE:

- Condemn the violent and brutal atrocities being perpetrated by the CPI (Maoist) and other LWE groups on innocent civilians in any available forum including the social media.

- Sensitize fellow-countrysmen to the dangers of outdated, failed and deeply flawed Maoist ideology to the nation-building process.

- Learn to recognize the propaganda war unleashed against the Indian state by the Maoist Front Organizations and Maoist ideologues/sympathizers.

- Cherish and nurture the democratic way of life deeply enshrined in our Constitution, as opposed to the totalitarian and oppressive nature of the Maoist ideology and percepts.

It is the belief of the Government of India that through a holistic approach focussing on development and security related interventions, the LWE problem can be successfully tackled. However, it is clear that the Maoists do not want root causes like underdevelopment to be addressed in a meaningful manner since they resort to targeting school buildings, roads, railways, bridges, health infrastructure, communication facilities etc in a major way. They wish to keep the population in their areas of influence marginalized to perpetuate their outdated ideology.

Consequently, the process of development has been set back by decades in many parts of the country under LWE influence. This needs to be recognised by the civil society and the media to build pressure on the Maoists to eschew violence, join the mainstream and recognise the fact that the socio-economic and political dynamics and aspirations of 21st Century India are far removed from the Maoist world-view. Further, an ideology based on violence and annihilation is doomed to fail in a democracy which offers legitimate forums of grievance redressal.

Urban Naxals

Urban Naxals are educated people in academia, media, NGOs and urban civil society in India who support violent insurrection against the State. They are often motivated by a violent-Left ideology and seek to achieve their objectives via coordinated violence rather than by democratic means. While the Naxalite movement is often associated with remote tribal areas, Urban Naxalism is a phenomenon in cities and urban centers.

Urban Naxals act to amplify and normalize the violent Naxal movements such as the "People's War Group", names among the top ten terror groups in the world, and act as recruiters, propagandists and sources of funds. Naxalism is named as the leading internal security threat to India.

Note: The term has largely been used informally as a political tool. The Left Wing Division of the Union Home Ministry, in response to an RTI, has denied the usage of the term for official purposes.
4. North-East Insurgency

At the time of independence, the state of Assam covered most of the Northeastern part of India, representing a plethora of culturally distinct populations of people. Over time, the Indian government organised the region into smaller states along ethnic and tribal lines, creating the so-called ‘Seven Sister’ states of the Northeast. These new states were created, among other factors, in response to sometimes violent disputes that sprang up along ethnic divisions in this isolated region, but this did not entirely subdue the disputes.

Historical Background

The historical connections among the traditional tribes in the Northeast are largely of Tibeto-Burman/Mongoloid stock and closer to Southeast Asia than to South Asia. It is ethnically, linguistically and culturally very distinct from the other states of India. Though cultural and ethnic diversity are not causes for conflict, but one of the major problem areas is that the Northeast is territorially organized in such a manner that ethnic and cultural specificities were ignored during the process of delineation of state boundaries in the 1950s, giving rise to discontentment and assertion of one’s identity. Whereas, the colonial rulers took nearly a century to annex the entire region, and administered the hills as a loose ‘frontier area’, with the result, that large parts of the north-eastern hill areas never came in touch with the principle of a central administration before.

Hence, their allegiance to the newly formed Indian nation-state was somewhat lacking from the beginning – accentuated by the creation of East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh) – which meant the loss of a major chunk of the physical connection between mainland India and Northeast India. Interestingly, 99 percent of the Northeast’s boundary is international and only one percent is domestic boundary.
4.1 Causes for NE Insurgency

There are certain valid reasons why the north-east in particular has been wrecked by insurgency. There are five major factors that have promoted insurgency in the region –

- Immigration,
- Language/ethnicity; Tribal rivalry,
- Economic underdevelopment,
- Poorly developed transport and communications links,
- Negligence of the central government, and
- Corruption among local politicians and elites

Other factors include – Control over local resources, governance issues and a widespread feeling of exploitation and alienation have resulted in violence and diverse demands by various Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs).

The demands vary from sovereignty in some cases to independent State or Homeland or simply better conditions for ethnic groups they claim to represent.

The underground outfits indulge in violent and terror activities and intimidate people with arms in order to achieve their objectives /demands. They maintain cross-border links, procure arms, recruit and train their cadres, and indulge in unlawful activities such as damaging of public properties, bomb explosions, extortions, killing of innocent civilians, Security Forces Personnel, attacks on/abduction of Government employees, politicians, and businessmen.
**MAJOR INSURGENT GROUPS OPERATING IN NORTH EASTERN STATES AND DECLARED AS "UNLAWFUL ASSOCIATIONS" AND "TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS" UNDER UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, 1967**

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I) All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)</td>
<td>Terrorist organization and unlawful association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAGALAND</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I) The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) [NSCN/K]</td>
<td>Terrorist organization and unlawful association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah) [NSCN(I/M)]</td>
<td>With ceasefire with the Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Kitovi Neopaokonyakho) [NSCN(KN)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Reformation) (NSCN(R))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Reasons for the Existence of the Armed Ethnic Groups

4.2.1 Political motivation

Politics forms the core of insurgent groups’ strategy of violence. Most insurgent groups garner popular support for their violent activities by citing a political cause, significantly important to the target population. According to Mao Tse Tung, the promise of mobilizing for revolution will exist in any country where the formal administrative structures fail to meet its basic obligations of providing the minimum standard of life to its citizens. Political mobilization is the first vital phase in any armed movement in order to acquire critical mass and create the space for conflict escalation.

4.2.2 Availability of Arms

Insurgent groups utilize violent means for political ends when the opportunity for armed rebellion exists in a given situation. The feasibility hypothesis argues that “where rebellion is materially feasible, it will occur”. The material conditions for an armed rebellion to exist are financial and military. The easy availability of arms in Northeast India enables the NSCN (K), NSCN (IM), the ULFA, the UNLF and the PLA to sustain their armed movements.

NSCN (IM) DEMAND

A “Greater Nagalim” comprising “all contiguous Naga-inhabited areas”, along with Nagaland. That included several districts of Assam, Arunachal and Manipur, as also a large tract of Myanmar.

Similar demand for Bodoland has been put forward by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), consists of regions located extreme north of north bank of Brahmaputra river in the state of Assam, by the foothills of Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh.

REBELS WITHOUT A CAUSE
Since 1992 over 11,000 guerrillas have been housed in 6.3 designated camps in Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Meghalaya.
4.2.3 Popular Support Base

An insurgent group critically depends on its popular support base for purposes of funding, base areas, recruitment, food supply and intelligence networks. Since insurgent groups portray themselves as representatives of a particular ethnic group or community, popular support adds to the legitimacy of the group.

4.2.4 Geographical terrain

The geography and terrain of a particular place is critical for the continuation of insurgent movements. Without supportive terrain, lightly armed, highly mobile insurgent cadres stand little chance to offset the technological superiority of the stronger power.

4.2.5 External Support

Perhaps one of the most critical dimensions of insurgent groups is external support. Support from neighbouring countries could be political, moral, military, economic, territorial or cultural and based on ethnic ties. A 2010 RAND study on insurgencies indicates that without external support and available sanctuaries, no internal insurgency can thrive over a period of 10 years.

4.2.6 Strategy and Nature of these Outfits

The NSCN (IM), ULFA, UNLF and the PLA have a declared strategy of protracted armed conflict. Interestingly, cease-fires are seen as phases to re-group, recruit, finance and re-arm. This has happened in most cases. The ULFA and the NSCN (IM) have decidedly re-armed and re-grouped during the cease-fire phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Wants What</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKLF (United Kuki Liberation Front)</td>
<td>Wants a separate &quot;Kuki&quot; homeland. Kukis are ethnic tribes of &quot;Mongoloid&quot; origin and spread across Assam, Mizoram, Manipur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNF(Kuki National Front)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCSN-IM(National Socialist Council of Nagaland)</td>
<td>Want a unified Nagaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOFB(National Democratic Front of Bodoland)</td>
<td>Wants a separate &quot;Bodo&quot; homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dima Haolim</td>
<td>Wants a sovereign states for Dimasa Tribe (Cachar, Nagaon, Karbialong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULFA(United Liberation Front of Assam)</td>
<td>The &quot;Father&quot;. Wants a separate Assam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLO(Kamatpur Liberation Organization)</td>
<td>Wants a separate homeland for &quot;Kamatpur&quot; tribe. Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubn and Goalpara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political parties and mainstream Indian political parties</td>
<td>Nothing- All they want is Votes from illegal Bangladeshi Migrants so they can enjoy some awesome Assam tea and have a hand in the huge corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3. Government Initiatives Towards North East Insurgency

State Response to Armed Ethnic Insurgencies in the Northeast can be located within three conceptual parameters. 1. Proportionate use of force. 2. Use of dialogue and negotiations. 3. Structural changes. Various dimensions for the same are as follows:

- **AFSPA**: Violence became the way of life in north-eastern States of India. State administration became incapable to maintain its internal disturbance. The Act enabled certain special powers to be conferred upon members of the armed forces in disturbed areas in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.

This Act has been facing a lot of resistance from various Human Rights groups due to the provision of sweeping powers and immunity to the army in these “conflict-ridden” or “disturbed” areas. As of Jan 2020, the act is in force in Nagaland, Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh.

**Peace Process in the North-East Region:** Keeping in view the multiplicity of diverse ethnic groups and the resultant complex situation in the North-East region, the Central Government has been pursuing a policy for talks/negotiation with such groups which abjure violence, lay down arms and seeks solutions peacefully for their problems within the framework of the Constitution of India.

As a result, a number of outfits have come forward or taken with the government and have entered into Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements and some of them have signed Memorandum of Settlements (MoS) and have dissolved themselves. At present, the government is engaged in peace talks with various insurgent groups of NE states. Central government has appointed interlocutors for holding peace talks with various insurgent groups in the region.

**Scheme for Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation of militants in North East:** The objective is to wean away the misguided youth and hardcore militants who stray into the fold of militancy and later find themselves trapped into that net. The Scheme also seeks to ensure that the militants, who have surrendered, do not find it attractive to join militancy again. It provides for:

- An immediate grant of Rs. 4 lakhs to each surrenderee, to be kept in his/her name as fixed deposit for 3 years
- Payment of stipend of Rs. 6000/- per month to each surrenderee for a period of 3 years
- Incentives for weapons/ammunition surrendered by the militants
- Vocational training to the surrenderees for self-employment
- Funds for the construction of rehabilitation camps
90% of the expenditure incurred on rehabilitation of surrenderees will be reimbursed under SRE Scheme to NE states

### Surrenders in different states during last 8 years in the North-East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1195</strong></td>
<td><strong>640</strong></td>
<td><strong>965</strong></td>
<td><strong>143</strong></td>
<td><strong>267</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>161</strong></td>
<td><strong>158</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reimbursement of Security Related Expenditure (SRE): The Central Government has been implementing a Non-Plan scheme for reimbursement of Security Related Expenditure (SRE) for the States seriously affected by militancy/insurgency. The scheme is being implemented in all States of the region except Mizoram and Sikkim. Under it, the expenditure incurred by them on various items, is being reimbursed. It includes:

- Raising of India Reserve Battalions,
- Logistics provided to the CAPFs/Army deployed in the State,
- Ex-gratia grant and gratuitous relief to the victims of extremist violence,
- 75% of the expenditure incurred on POL (petrol, oil and lubricants) in operations and honorarium paid to Village Guards/Village Defence Committees/Home Guards deployed for security purposes,
- Expenditure incurred on maintenance of designated camps set up for groups with whom the Central Government/State Governments have entered into agreement for Suspension of Operations

The following changes have been made in the Scheme

- Hike in the wages for the home guards
- Provision of vocational training for SoO cadres
- Enhanced ex-gratia for killed/injured person in extremist violence

Civic Action Programme in the North Eastern States: In order to take the local populace in confidence and boost the image of armed forces among the common people, Army and Central Armed Police Forces conduct Civic Action Programme.

Under this Programme, various welfare/developmental activities are undertaken viz. holding of medical camps, sanitation drives, sports meets, distribution of study material to children, minor repairs of school buildings, roads, bridges and running adult education centers etc.
Advertisement and Publicity: Keeping in view the peculiar problems of the North East, viz. militancy, infiltration, and perceived feeling of alienation, Ministry of Home Affairs implements a scheme of Advertisement and Publicity in North Eastern States with a view to highlight the activities being undertaken by the Government for peace in the region and also with a view to convey that "Peace pays".

Modernisation of Police Force: The Ministry of Home Affairs is implementing a Non-Plan scheme, namely Scheme for Modernization of State Police Forces (MPF) towards modernization of the State Police Forces, especially for meeting the emerging challenges to internal security in the form of terrorism, naxalism etc.

All major items of Police infrastructure have been included under the Scheme i.e. construction of secure Police stations, outposts, Police lines, mobility, modern weaponry, security, surveillance, communication, forensic equipment, upgradation of training infrastructure, Police housing, computerization etc.

Other Initiatives

The Central Government is supplementing the efforts of the State Governments through various measures including deployment of additional Central Security Forces and dissemination of intelligence to carry out Intensive counter insurgency operations in a coordinated and focused manner:

- Measures are being taken by the Security Forces to ensure vigilance and surveillance on the border including construction of border fencing and flood lighting along the Indo-Bangladesh Border.
- Resettlement of Bru migrants in Tripura, due to apprehensions about their security in Mizoram
- National Register of Citizens (NRC), Assam published on 3 1.08.2019
  - A machinery created for detection and deportation of illegal immigrants
  - 'In-principle' approval given for setting up of 1000 additional Foreigners Tribunals (Fts)
  - 'In-principle' approval given to Assam Government for creation of e-Foreign Tribunal platform

Government of India, Government of Tripura & National Liberation Front of Twipra led by sabir Kumar Debbarma (NLFT-SD) sign Memorandum of Settlement

- NLFT (SD) to abjure path of violence, join mainstream and abide by Constitution of India
- Agreed to surrender 88 cadres with their weapons
- Cadres to get surrender benefits as per the Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Scheme, 2018
- Government of Tripura to help surrendered cadres in housing, recruitment, education etc.
- Government of India to consider proposals of the State Government for economic development of tribal areas of Tripura.
- Smart Fencing -
  - Government launched BOLD-QIT (Border Electronically Dominated QRT Interception Technique) under Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) on Indo-Bangladesh border in Dhubri district of Assam, as an effective deterrent against illegal infiltration.
Two pilot projects covering about 71 Kms on Indo-Pakistan Border (10 Kms) and Indo-Bangladesh Border (61 Kms) of Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) have been completed.

### 4.4 Major Initiatives/Achievements during 2019-20

1. **Security Situation in the whole NE region has substantially improved over the last six years**
   - Insurgency incidents declined by 70%
   - Casualties of security personnel declined by 78%
   - Civilian deaths reduced by 80%
   - 2019 recorded the lowest casualties and Insurgency incidents since 1997
   - Counter Insurgency (COIN) operation lead to neutralization of 12 militants, arrest of 936 militants and the recovery of 312 weapons in 2019 in the region
   - Over 158 militant cadres of militant outfits have surrendered and joined the mainstream of the society
   - While States of Tripura, Mizoram and Sikkim are completely free from insurgency, there has been a substantial improvement in the situation of other states

### Security situation in North-East as a whole

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Extremist killed</th>
<th>Extremist arrested</th>
<th>Sfs killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>Extremist surrendered</th>
<th>Arms surrendered</th>
<th>Arms recovered</th>
<th>Persons kidnapped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1297</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>2162</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>2213</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2141</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>2145</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1712</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in the NER**
   - To deal with armed insurgency, entire states of Nagaland, Assam and Manipur (except for-Imphal Municipal Area ) are under the Act.
   - AFSPA has been completely removed from Meghalaya and has been reduced to 4police stations/outputs and 3 districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding in Arunachal Pradesh
3. Banning of insurgent Groups in the North-East
   - 17 insurgent groups operating in the North East have been banned declared as “unlawful organisations” and/or “terrorist organisations” under the UAPA, 1967.
   - Ban on HNLC of Meghalaya and NDFB and ULFA of Assam has been extended for 5 more years

4. Constitution of HLC for the implementation of Clause 6 of the Assam Accord
   - HLC under the Chairmanship of Biplab Kumar Sarma for the assessment of the actions taken since 1985 to implement clause 6 of the Accord and suggest measures to be taken in this regard

5. Constitution of a Multi-Disciplinary Committee (MDC) to look into the developmental issues and special needs of the people of Eastern Nagaland
   - This will speed up the process of development of physical infrastructure in the 4 districts of Nagaland (Tuensang, Longleng, Mon and Kirphire)

6. Amendment of Article 280 and Sixth Schedule of the Constitution
   - 125th Constitutional Amendment Bill amending Article 280 to strengthen the Autonomous Councils under the sixth schedule was introduced in the Rajya Sabha

7. Tripartite Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) signed with NLFT of Tripura
   - As per the MoS, NLFT has agreed to abjure the path of violence, join the mainstream and abide by the Constitution of India
   - 88 cadres of NLFT surrendered, along with the arms, in a surrender ceremony, thereby assimilating with the society

8. Home Minister Level talks between India and Bangladesh regarding security related issues and mutual cooperation between countries, including confidence building measures, etc.

9. Sectoral Level meeting between Indian and Myanmar
   - To discuss issues of internal security, management of borders, cooperation in the prevention of drug trafficking, wildfire smuggling, etc.
   - Act East policy has facilitated stronger ties with Myanmar, which has helped in effectively tackling insurgency and extremism in the NER

10. Signing of agreement for the settlement of Bru migrant in Tripura
    - 34,000 Bru migrants will be settled in Tripura and would be given financial assistance/aid by the GoI for their resettlement in Tripura and all round development through the a package of Rs 600 crore

    - All the surrendered militants will be rehabilitated as per the Central and State Schemes

12. Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) with Bodo groups
    - Putting an end to 50 years of Bodo crisis, a tripartite MoS has been signed between Central government, Assam government and the Bodo groups
13. National Investigation Agency (Amendment) Act, 2019

- NIA empowered with extra territorial jurisdiction for investigation of terrorism related offences taking place outside India, in which Indian property/citizens are victims
- The mandate of NIA is expanded by inclusion of new offences viz. explosive substances, human trafficking, manufacturing/sale of prohibited arms and cyber terrorism, to its Schedule

4.5 What Needs to be Done?

Although varying in their demands and methods, there is a common thread running through the insurgency infested north-east, that is of identity and development. Hence, some solutions that are common need to be explored with specifics derived from them for specific regions and groups.

- Meeting the political aspirations of groups by giving them autonomy. Implementing sixth schedule provisions in these areas will help them to preserve their identity and culture while giving them greater autonomy. Economic development of the area in a calibrated manner. Any development should be sustainable and should have the participation and acceptance by the locals.
- Improving Governance and delivery mechanisms of the government and administration.
- The pre-condition of complete abjuring of violence for holding peace talks is a flawed notion. If violence is discarded and peace is established then the need for peace talks become futile. Dialogue should be an ongoing process to reach concrete solutions by involving all the stakeholders and not a single group.
- Coordinating operations with the neighboring countries and use of force only when needed. Draconian laws like AFSPA should be repealed as it is one of the causes for inflating insurgency in the north east.
- Rebel groups must also be more pragmatic by seeking greater autonomy within the constitutional mandate rather than demanding newer states and regions based on ever narrowing ethnic and linguistic identities, which are beyond acceptance.
- Centre and states should coordinate in decision making. In the recent agreement of the Centre with NSCN (IM), it did not take concerned state governments and other groups on board. It should be avoided.
- State police and central forces should cooperate on intelligence sharing, investigation and operations against militants. It has been alleged by the army that the June ambush of the army became possible because state police did not share the intelligence about the attack with it. It is unfortunate and counter-productive.
Alternative Conflict resolution- Whenever tempers rise on perceived transgression, there are no social groups that can mediate to cool down the tempers to maintain peace. Under such circumstances, alternative conflict resolution and building capacity for peace through informal initiatives assume significance. Initiatives by people’s forum can become ‘small steps with big impact’, and such small changes may bring about a change in mutual attitude and perception. Such an initiative could assist in the following:

- **Communication.** First priority is to establish an informal communication between the various warring ethnic groups. Such an initiative can prevent or stop-in if there is transgression by any of the ethnic communities. “When a wrong is committed, let us focus on the individuals suspected of culpability, not their clans collectively.”

- **Mediation.** The current state is that normalisation of the situation after every ethnic clash is left to security forces to maintain peace. But it is significant to develop confidence among the people to directly establish communication for mediation through people’s forum.

- **Negotiation.** It is imperative to bring all stakeholders especially the people to negotiation tables not purely for conflict resolution but for conflict prevention so that collateral damages can be prevented. The situation of the blockade on the humanitarian ground can be negotiated. “Use of goodwill is far better than the use of force.”

- **Neutral Fact-Finding.** Under the prevailing circumstances, there is a complete distrust among the ethnic communities. Every group pretends to be a victim and excesses are always put on rival groups. Government reports are either too late or perceived biased. The party that is blamed by the government feels that aggrieved. People’s forum can act as neutral fact-finding and can themselves satisfy who has crossed the red line.

- **Neutral Evaluation of Grievances.** Government sponsored negotiations always fail since grievances are non-addressable. Neutral evaluation and spot visit by the people’s forum could set such doubt at rest.

- **Forum for Dissent, Disagreement, Demonstration and Discussion.** One may disagree, display dissent, demonstrate annoyance, disagree with each other but if at the end of the day they agree to discuss, I think the forum has achieved its objective.

- **Prevention of Misuse of Media to Fuel Division.** It is very difficult for the government to prevent misuse and spread of rumours through the media. It can best be done by local peace committees by denouncing such rumours since local peace committees can confirm authenticity of the news.

### 4.6 Miscellaneous Issues

#### 4.6.1 Assam NRC

Witness to decades of migration from Bangladesh — formerly East Bengal and then East Pakistan — Assam already has an NRC, which was published in 1951 on the basis of that year’s Census. The only state with such a document, Assam is currently updating it to identify its citizens.

The update, mandated and monitored by the Supreme Court, is a fallout of the Assam Accord of 1985, which sets March 24, 1971 as the cutoff date for citizenship. Those who entered Assam before that date are recognised as citizens. The final list of Assam’s NRC excluded names of over 19 lakh applicants. A total of 3.30 crore applicants had applied to be included in the NRC.
Issues involved

- Bengali Muslims felt that they were under greater scrutiny than other groups.
- The people not only had to establish that their ancestors lived in Assam prior to 1971 but also their relationship with the ancestor.
- Large number of D-voters: D voters or doubtful voters are people who had their voting rights suspended by the Election Commission because their citizenship was suddenly in doubt.
- Several flaws have been identified in the appeal to Foreign Tribunals, from the lack of legal aid to ex parte orders declaring people foreigners without even a trial.
- No clarity on what happens to those who lose their cases in the Foreigners’ Tribunals, whether they will be detained, deported or allowed to stay on without the rights and privileges of citizenship.
- No repatriation treaty under which they can be deported to Bangladesh.

Suggestions

- It is essential to deal with illegal immigration and a proper framework needs to be developed to deal with the post drafting issues in the region. State government should ensure that injustice should not be done to any of its citizens.
- Clearly chart out the course of action regarding the fate of excluded people from final NRC data.
- Need for a robust mechanism of legal support for the four million who have to prove their citizenship to India with their limited means.
- Bilateral engagement with Bangladesh for the repatriation of individuals staying illegally.

4.6.2 Naga Peace Talks

The October 31, 2019 deadline set by the Union government to conclude the Naga peace talks ended on a somewhat ambiguous note. The deadlock between the government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN (IM)) over a separate Naga flag and constitution were the issues holding up a final agreement.

Now, NSCN (IM) agreed to a settlement without a Constitution and with a conditional flag that can only be used for nongovernmental purposes. NSCN-IM would have to persuade Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam to give up parts of their territories inhabited by the Naga people for creation of ‘Greater Nagalim’.
Key roadblocks to the Peace talks include:

- The issues of flag and constitution would require fundamental changes in the Indian federal structure

- Article 371-A: An amendment to this Article is critical to the ongoing Naga peace process in order to resolve another substantive issue of settling the question whether Nagas have the right over land and resources, both above and beneath it.

- Integrity of other states: Nobody in three states i.e. Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh would allow even an inch of their land to be added to a 'Greater Nagalim', if at all that term is part of the accord.

- Similar demand from other groups: Political instability has undermined the role of democracy in the state and has fuelled apprehensions leading to separate agendas and demands by various factions and organisations.

- Federal Structure: Under a federal structure, the central government is not in a position to ask a state to give away parts of its territory. NCSN (IM) has to persuade and convince these states through democratic and political processes.

Way forward

- Government should address the confusion due to many interpretations to "special arrangement" implied in the 2015 agreement, particularly on how the shared sovereignty will be exercised.

- The government should not rush into a solution by declaring deadlines. It should involve all stakeholders from within and outside the state of Nagaland, and work towards a solution through a peaceful dialogue process that satisfies all.

- Other sections’ sensitivities also will have to be kept in mind. For example, Kukis, a tribe engaged in tussle with the Nagas in the Manipur hills, are unlikely to accept Naga dominance over their areas.

- Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur are wary of the NSCN-IM’s concept of Nagalim that could lead to a redrawing of their boundaries. The government and the NSCN (IM) must be completely transparent in their approach and must take into confidence all genuine political formations, civil society and ethnic groups.

- People-to-people contacts need to be built up so that real problems of the people can be voiced on a larger platform. There is a need for more cross-cultural openness, not only between mainstream India and the Northeast, but among the north-eastern states as well.
4.6.3 Bodoland Issue

Bodoland is a state demanded by a tribal community called Bodos in Assam, who comprise of 5%-6% of the state’s population.

National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), an ethnic insurgent organization, has been leading the charge in the demand for the separate state. Recently, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has extended the ban on the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) by five more years, under provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Reasons for the demand

- **Massive Illegal Immigration from Bangladesh**: It has led to certain concerns among the Bodos, such as:
  - **Changing Demography**: It might turn them into a minority in their own land.
  - **Inclusion of illegal migrants in the voters list**: It is viewed as a deliberate ploy to empower an outside group, so that the Bodos lose their political power.
- **Threat of loss of distinct language and culture**: Due to forced assimilation.
- **Growing Unease**: Due to the political empowerment of the minority communities in the BTAD in recent years.
- **Failure of The Bodo Territorial Council (BTC)**: Weak administrative institutions and divisive politics of the members of the BTC have also added to their insecurity.

Way Ahead

- The government should strengthen the autonomous, administrative divisions in Assam established on the basis of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.
- Establish a land record system that is computerised and accessible to the local people, and which can address the fear of loss of land to the outsiders.
- Improve the presence of both the state civil administration and the law enforcement agencies in areas that are identified as highly susceptible to ethnic violence.
- The government should take measures to improve the other economic sectors of the region like development of agro-based industries, tourism and hydroelectricity etc.
- Measures to protect their language and cultural identity should be taken.
4.6.4 Cross Border Linkages in North-East Insurgency

The armies of India and Myanmar carried out a coordinated operation called Operation Sunrise 2 in their respective border areas, targeting several militant groups operating in Manipur, Nagaland and Assam.

Operation Sunrise 2

> The armies coordinated with each other to bust camps of militant outfits, including the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), the United Liberation Front of Assam (I) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland.

> The first phase of “Operation Sunrise” was conducted in February 2019 along the Indo-Myanmar border, during which a number of camps of northeast-based militant groups were busted in Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and even China and Nepal.

Reasons for cross border insurgency

> **Safe Havens:** The shelter and support that the Indian insurgent groups receive from across the border have been one of the most important factors which has helped them in sustaining their rebellion.

> **Economic support:** The Golden Triangle (comprising Myanmar, Laos and Thailand) has provided an economic boom for the insurgent groups to sustain themselves.

> **Availability of weapons:** Easy availability of small arms in neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar has been another factor behind the sustenance of insurgency in the region.

> **Ethnic affinity:** Many ethnic groups in the region, especially in the areas bordering the international boundaries, have more in common with the population living across the boundary than with their own nationals.

> **Border issues in North east**

> **Terrain of Border:** Difficult terrain along the border with different countries in the north east make means of transportation and communication difficult and as a result, the border area remains sparsely populated with depressed economic development.

  ✓ High mountains, deep river channels together with lush forest characterize the borderland with Myanmar.

  ✓ Inaccessible forested areas along the Assam–Bhutan border continue to serve as temporary bases and safe havens for the insurgent groups.

  ✓ River line borders in Bangladesh tend to change course periodically, leading to a host of disputes associated with the difficulties in establishing ownership of the newly created territories.

> **Boundary issue:** Even though the international boundary between countries like India and Myanmar had been formally delimited and demarcated following the boundary agreement in March, 1967, the boundary has not crystallised on the ground as lines separating two sovereign countries.

> **Free movement regime:** India-Myanmar border has a unique arrangement in place called the Free Movement Regime (FMR). The FMR permits the tribes residing along the border to travel 16-km across the boundary without visa restrictions.
Way Forward

- Sensitization of people: The border community should be sensitised to participate in the nation building project through sustained community interaction programmes.
  - Increase cultural exchanges, tourism and people-to-people contact, including provision of job permits and work visas, for the South Asian countries.

- Cooperation with neighboring countries: International borders are best managed when neighbours cooperate to secure their mutual borders. For such cooperation to materialise, political and diplomatic initiatives are required to be carefully crafted.

- Strengthening of Regional Forums: Regional groupings like SAARC, BIMSTEC, BCIM can help in enhancing economic and security cooperation with these countries which will lead to a better understanding of the benefits of peace in North-East India.

- Effective Border Management through smart borders which ensure quick and easy, legal flow of people and goods, while maintaining a steady momentum in the process of improvement of infrastructure and other facilities at checkpoints.

- Joint Training and operations: Exercises like “Hand in hand” with China, “Operation Sampriti” between India and Bangladesh etc. can help to combat terrorism.
  - 'Operation All Clear' by Bhutan was a landmark operation which was conducted against Assam separatist insurgent groups in the southern regions of Bhutan. These types of joint operations can help fight insurgency in the north east.

4.6.5 Bezbaruah Committee recommendations on racial discrimination against North-Eastern Indians in metros

The Bezbaruah Committee Report headed by M.P. Bezbaruah, Member, North Eastern Council, was set up in February 2014 after the death of Nido Tania. The Committee’s mandate was to listen to the issues raised by people from North East living especially in the metro cities. The committee was also asked to suggest measures which could be implemented by the government of India. The major recommendations by the Committee include

- New law against Discrimination:
  - Either a new law should be promulgated as directed by the High Court of Delhi or the Indian Penal Code should be amended.
  - The offence should be cognizable and non-bailable. The investigation of the FIR should be completed in 60 days by a special squad and investigated by a police officer not below the rank of deputy SP or ACP.
  - A special prosecutor should be appointed to handle all such cases of atrocities. And the trial should be completed in 90 days.

- Fast-track Courts and Special Police Squads:
  - The Committee strongly suggests the creation of fast-track courts for handling the cases relating to the North East people, particularly those which are racially motivated and involving heinous crimes against the North East women and children.
  - Specially designated public prosecutors should be appointed for cases involving people from the North East. They should also be properly trained and sensitised.
Interventions in Education

» Suitable innovative ways should be devised to integrate each and every aspect of the North East into the consciousness of people outside.

» The Committee recommends that when the next the NCERT takes place, one, all teacher training institutes be advised to make their syllabus in a way that can sensitise their trainees on the North East and, two, universities and schools outside the NorthEast make projects on North East a mandatory part of the course curricula.

» A detailed socio-economic study of the nature of student migration from the North East would be worthwhile as it will provide valuable insight for planning of higher education in the region.

Social Media outreach and Legal Awareness Campaigns:

» The committee recommends legal awareness campaigns in neighbourhoods that have a significant presence of members from the North East community and on introducing lectures on legal rights for university students.

» It underlines the role of social media in improving connectivity and communication with the community.

» A dedicated Facebook page should be created and nodal police officers should be in constant touch with members of the community on WhatsApp

Bonding Power of Sports:

» The committee recommends that the Ministry should take steps to hold regular national and international events in the North East as such events will create greater harmony and better understanding. The ministry should, therefore, review the status of present facilities and make an assessment if they are suitable for such events.

» If not, such facilities should be created in every state of the North East. Indigenous games of the North East should be promoted.
Throughout ancient times, the breathtakingly beautiful Valley of Kashmir has stood for peaceful contemplation, intellectual advancement and religious diversity coexisting in an atmosphere of tolerance for the most part. In the modern geopolitical era, this same diversity, evident from the blend of Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism in this single state, has made it a center of warfare rather than cultural advancement. In the late 1980s, an insurgency in the valley threatened not only to rip Kashmir apart, but also pull the rest of the world into a dangerous war.

**Historical Background**

The origins and development of the Kashmir independence movement is evident since independence. Aspirations for the same never disappeared from the Kashmiri consciousness, despite their accession to India in 1947.
The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir or the Kashmiri Insurgency is a conflict between various Kashmiri separatists and nationalists sometimes known as "ultras" (extremists), and the Government of India. Few groups favour Kashmir accession to Pakistan, while others seek Kashmir's complete independence. Since 2002, skirmishes with the local insurgents have constituted the main conflict in the Kashmir region. The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir has strong Islamist elements among the insurgents, with many of the "ultras" identifying with Jihadist movements and supported by such.

The roots of the conflict between the Kashmiri insurgents and the Indian Government are tied to a dispute over local autonomy. Democratic development was limited in Kashmir until the late 1970s and by 1988 many of the democratic reforms provided by the Indian Government had been reversed and non-violent channels for expressing discontent were limited and caused a dramatic increase in support for insurgents advocating violent secession from India. In 1987, a disputed State election created a catalyst for the insurgency when it resulted in some of the state's legislative assembly members forming armed insurgent groups. In July 1988 a series of demonstrations, strikes and attacks on the Indian Government began the Kashmir Insurgency which during the 1990s escalated into the most important internal security issue in India.

5.1 Two Dimensions of the Kashmir Conundrum

There are two dimensions to the Kashmir conundrum as seen from the Indian perspective:

- The external dimension, due to Pakistani involvement and its claims over the erstwhile state of J&K;
- The internal dimension, due to the socio-political demands of the people of J&K from the Indian state.

The external dimension has resulted in four conventional wars, several near-wars, and disquieting nuclear rattles between India and Pakistan. The extension of a proxy war by Pakistan against India through Kashmir has kept our internal security situation constantly on the boil. Besides alienating J&K from the national mainstream, it is a serious bug in India’s growth story. It has been a continuous drain on the country’s resources, resulting in enhanced defence expenditure. It has also become an impediment in India’s proclamation of being a great world power due to allegations of human rights violations and other social restrictions, thus undermining it’s otherwise flourishing democracy.

The internal dimension of J&K, on the other hand, is a complex interplay between religion and region as well as multi-ethnicity/multi-cultural and political issues. There are several layers of complexities in it. Protests, agitations, and shut downs demanding greater autonomy and exclusive rights have, time and again, brought the state to a standstill, and highlighted the unsettled nature of its polity.

The resolution of the problem has not been easy due to the interplay of several interconnected issues like-

- Indian territorial defensibility,
- The Pakistani state argument, and
- Kashmiri nationalism making it an awkward a zero sum game,

All of this prevents any clean win-win situation for the involved parties.
Overall Security Situation 1988-2017

Violence levels in J&K had declined sharply after the internal and external peace processes initiated in 1999 by Prime Minister Vajpayee. The optimism that had built up after the initiation of this peace process was pursued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh till around 2007. This resulted in a demonstrable trend of a sharp decline in violence levels, cross LoC infiltrations, and Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) violations. Fall in overall violence corresponded to the drastic fall in the ground support extended by local Kashmiris to the terrorists and separatists. The CFA violations again picked up after 2009, after the Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) orchestrated the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the peace process began to melt down.

In 2015, civilian and security force casualties had dropped, even as more terrorists were eliminated; but in 2016, the numbers of both security forces personnel and terrorists killed have gone up sharply. Thus, while terrorist related violence is down, the separatist emotion in the Kashmiri society has seen a sharp rise over the last few years, and particularly in 2016.

5.2 Reasons for J & K Insurgency

5.2.1 Rigging of 1987 Assembly elections

The insurgency was sparked by the alleged rigging of state elections in 1987. This has contributed to anti-government sentiment. A government report found that almost half of all Kashmiri Panchayat Raj positions were vacant and the reason for this was the destabilising effect of the conflict. The report also noted that their ability to effectively govern was "crippled."

However, the 2014 Assembly elections saw the highest voter turnout in the last 25 years since insurgency has erupted. It recorded more than 65% of voters turnout which is more than usual voters turnout in other states of India. It is considered as an increase in faith of Kashmiri people in democratic process of India.

5.2.2 ISI’s role

The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has allegedly encouraged and aided the Kashmir independence movement through an insurgency due to its dispute on the legitimacy of Indian rule in Kashmir, with the insurgency as an easy way to keep Indian troops distracted and cause international condemnation of India. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an American government intelligence agency, in their first ever open acknowledgement in 2011 in US Court said that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and it oversees terrorist separatist groups in Kashmir.

5.2.3 Mujahideen influence

After the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, Mujahideen fighters, with the aid of Pakistan, slowly infiltrated Kashmir with the goal of spreading a radical Islamist ideology.

5.2.4 Sense of Alienation

Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state in Hindu-majority India. While India itself is a secular state, Muslims are politically, culturally and economically marginalised when compared to Hindus in India as a whole. The Government’s decision to transfer 99 acres of forest land to a Hindu organisation (for setting up temporary shelters and facilities for Hindu pilgrims) solidified this feeling and led to one of the largest protest rallies in Jammu and Kashmir.
5.2.5 Humanitarian abuses

After insurgency started in Kashmir valley because of above reasons in late 1980s, Indian troops entered in Kashmir valley to control the insurgency. The troops have been accused of humanitarian abuses and have engaged in extrajudicial killings. Military forces in Jammu and Kashmir operate under emergency powers granted to them by the central government. These powers allow the military to curtail civil liberties, creating further support for the insurgency. The insurgents have also abused human rights, engaging in what some have called an ethnic cleansing by exterminating Kashmiri Pandits from the valley of Kashmir. The government’s inability to protect the people from both its own troops and the insurgency has further eroded support for the government.

5.3 Government's Approach Towards Insurgency in J & K

The response of the Indian state towards the political insurgency in Kashmir during the last two decades has gone through various stages. In the final outcome, New Delhi’s response to the insurgency has moved from a heavy handed approach devoid of non-violent means for the most part to an active search for dialogue and broader peaceful interventions. As the situation has moved from

Stable peace prior to the troubles of the 1980s to war and back towards crisis and unstable peace along the conflict curve, an increasing emphasis on peacebuilding approaches aimed at bringing about sustainable peace and harmony have been on display. And yet, the Indian state’s actions have not fully moved away from militarism that continues to impede faster transformation to a normalized situation.

- **UDAAN Scheme:** Udaan, the Special Industry Initiative (SII) for J&K is funded by the Ministry of Home Affairs and implemented by National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC). The programme is a part of the overall initiative for addressing economic issues and the needs of the educated unemployed in J&K. UDAAN has two objectives:
  - To provide exposure to the graduates and post graduates of Jammu and Kashmir to the best of corporate India and
  - To provide corporate India with exposure to the rich talent pool available in the state
  - The target was to reach out to 40,000 youth in J&K over a period of 5 years.
  - UDAAN provides a framework of support to the youth to travel, undergo training in firms and transit to work.

- **NISHTHA Scheme:** National Initiative for School Heads’ and Teachers’ Holistic Advancement (NISHTHA) has been launched in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a capacity building programme for “Improving Quality of School Education through Integrated Teacher Training

- **Himayat Mission:** The project aims to generate sustainable livelihood opportunities through self-employment for the youth of Jammu and Kashmir by the crosscutting approaches of holistic entrepreneurship development programs. It aims at providing entrepreneurial skills for sustainable livelihood to 10,000 youth of J&K and facilitate access to finance and support services to at least 50% of them over a period of 3.5 Years.
Rehabilitation Policy: The objective of this Rehabilitation Policy is to offer facility to those terrorists who undergo a change of heart and eschew the path of violence and who also accept the integrity of India and Indian Constitution to encourage them join the mainstream and lead a normal life and contribute towards prosperity and progress of the State as well as the Nation.

Surrender Policy: The policy is intended to facilitate the return of ex-militants who belong to J&K state and had crossed over the PoK/Pakistan for training in insurgency but have given up insurgent activities due to a change of heart and are willing to return to the State.

Other Initiatives

- Placement of Special Police officers for their services in the state.
- Subsidised Helicopter services in the state.
- Scheme for providing financial assistance to the families of displaced persons of Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir.
- Central scheme for assistance towards damaged immovable/movable property during action by CPMFs and army in Jammu and Kashmir.

5.4 Challenges faced by the region

- Counter-terrorist operations with a human face.
- Rehabilitation of surrendered militants.
- Disposal/resolution of cases against terrorists for waging war against the Indian nation. Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits and other Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
- Economic reconstruction of the region, after the revocation of the special status.
- Revival of Kashmiriyat and Sufism to reduce the adverse impact of fanatic jihadi ideology. Conflict resolution.
- Role of the media can have polarising effect and make perception management difficult for the State.

5.5 Why has Militancy failed in Kashmir?

The situation in Kashmir can be significantly cooled down by the state and Central governments reducing steps which exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions and by improving the stagnant quality of governance. Following are the few reasons due to which militancy has failed to succeed in Kashmir:

- The Kashmir issue affects just six per cent of the Indian population and is extremely localised. The concerns of the Kashmiri Muslims have failed to find resonance with the Muslim population in rest of India.
- Likewise, the concerns of other ethnic groups like the Kashmiri Pandits, have also failed to find resonance with major segments of the Indian population which are more concerned with fighting cross-border terrorism and getting local issues to the forefront.
The disillusioned Kashmiri youth now want to fight its war on social media rather than adopt guerrilla warfare. Social media has opened new channels for Kashmiris to express their feelings of discontent and dissent.

World sees Kashmir as a border dispute between India and Pakistan and not an ethnic terror conflict

Indian soft power has permeated the bowels of the Valley and overthrown Pakistani propaganda and the demonstration of India’s pluralistic society is on display at all times. It has played a great role in forming public awareness and shaping public attitudes in Kashmir enhancing India’s soft power.

5.6 Removal of Article 370 and its Assessment

President of India in concurrence with the “Jammu and Kashmir government” promulgated Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019 which states that provisions of the Indian Constitution are applicable in the State. This effectively means that all the provisions that formed the basis of a separate Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir stand abrogated. With this, Article 35A is scrapped automatically.

They key changes include:

- UT of J&K will have an assembly.
- Special status provided by Article 370 has been abolished. Consequently, Article 35A also stands nullified.

Significance of the move

- Allow for political mainstreaming of the state, which has largely been alienated for the last 7 decades.
- A major step in the direction of national unity.
  - Allow avenues for investments to pick up in the region.
- Extension of benefits like jobs, reservation, etc. for the underprivileged sections of the region, which have been hitherto denied to them.
Assessment of the move:

**Positive Outcomes**

- Extended the reach of the Parliament and the Indian Constitution to the region. For example, acts like RTI (2005), RPA (1951) are now applicable in the region
- New Domicile rules allow people who despite living in the State for years were denied resident status due to Article 35A
- Construction of transit accommodation for the repatriation of Kashmiri Pandits; Monthly cash relief for the migrants settled in Jammu
- An array of social security measures including insurance schemes like Atal Pension Yojana and other developmental schemes like PM-KISAN, Stand-Up India, PM Jan Dhan Yojana have been extended to the region
- Decrease in terrorism related deaths in the region
- Recruitment of terrorists in the region has fallen significantly in the region
- There have been fewer IED and grenade attacks in the region over the last one year
- Dividing Ladakh from the region as fulfilled the popular aspirations and sent a clear signal to China that it is an integral part of India

**Negative Outcomes**

- Abrogation of article 370 at the time the assembly was suspended has raised the threat perception regarding their Kashmiri identity
- Shutdowns and Internet blockade has severely affected education in the region, especially in the midst of the pandemic where digital education has become the new norm
- Communication blockade, curfews and militant threats have severely affected the agricultural and industrial output in the region
- Tourism which contributes to a large chunk of the economy is in shambles due to the lockdowns
- While terrorism related deaths have decrease, there has been a growing trend of the youth joining militancy Cross border infiltration attempts although remain high since the abrogation of Article 370
- It has also lead to the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue
- Increased cases of Chinese transgressions in the Ladakh region after the bifurcation.
5.6.1 Supreme Court ruling on Internet shutdowns in the region

- Section 144 cannot be used a tool for repression of the expression of legitimate opinion and grievances of the people
- Indefinite ban on internet access is impermissible
- Any measure imposing reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the citizens, be it Internet shutdown or Section 144 order, has to pass the test of proportionality
- All government orders regarding such restrictions should be made public so that they can be challenged in the court of law.

Way forward

- Rebuilding the trust and confidence of the people of Kashmir in the democratic machinery
- Addressing the economic distress in the region through a comprehensive economic recovery package
- Lifting the Internet shutdown in the region
- Robust push to education in the region through special scholarships and adequate funding of the institutions

5.7 What needs to be done?

Professor Amitabh Mattoo has recommended 4D’s which shall be implemented to settle down the skirmishes in Jammu and Kashmir. They are as follows:

- **Dialogue**: Unconditional continuous dialogue between state and non-state actors.
- **Demilitarisation**: Essential to move the process of dialogue and reconciliation ahead.
- **Devolution**: Devolution of power and bringing all three regions of Jammu, Ladakh and Kashmir together. Reconciliation is imperative to prevent polarization on communal lines.
- **Development**: Through the participation of the people of Kashmir.
Few recommendations by various committees to tackle the situation in Kashmir are as follows:
(refer infographic)

- Undertake counter-terrorist operations with a human face
- Reduce the presence of uniformed men in population centres.
- Increase emphasis on surgical operations, based on specific intelligence.
- Employment of Territorial Army (Home and Hearth) units to fill the deployment gaps.
- Training of CPOs to undertake operations with a human face.
- Transparency in operations and zero tolerance for human rights abuses.
- Rehabilitations of surrendered militants and implementation of cohesive policy for surrender.
- Constructive engagement and employment of youths to insulate them from the lure of militancy.
- Certainty of convictions, with speedy disposal of cases against all those involved in terrorist activities.
- Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits, border migrants and protection of their lives and property after rehabilitation.
- Implementation and monitoring of the reconstruction plan of J&K to ensure inclusive development
- Constructive role of the media towards the reconciliation, reconstruction and development of J&K and highlighting the contribution of the Indian Army and sacrifices made by the security forces to defeat the evil designs of Pakistan.
- Revival of Kashmiriyat and Sufism through public debates and programmes.
- Engagement of all parties and sections of society for conflict resolution within the framework of the constitution.
- Need to expose the double-speak of Pakistan and their brutal methodology of handing counter-terrorist operations in SWAT and Waziristan.

5.8 Miscellaneous

5.8.1 Kashmiri Pandit Tragedy

The hotly contested circumstances of their departure between January and March 1990, the numbers, and the issue of their return are an important side to the Kashmir story that has fed into the Hindu-Muslim polarisation in India over the years, in turn fuelling the Hindu-Muslim chasm in the Valley.

Events in the 1980s-90s

Sheikh Abdullah had died in 1982, and the leadership of the National Conference passed on to his son Farooq Abdullah, who won the 1983 election. But within two years, the Centre broke up the NC, and installed dissident Ghulam Mohammed Shah as Chief Minister. This led to huge disaffection and political instability.
The Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) stepped up its activities, and the hanging of the militant leader Maqbool Bhat in 1984 added to the sense of foreboding.

In 1986, after the Central government opened the Babri Masjid locks to enable Hindus to offer prayers there, ripples were felt in Kashmir too.

In Anantnag, there were a series of attacks on Hindu temples, and shops and properties of Kashmiri Pandits, blamed on separatist and secessionists.

The rigged election of 1987 after which Abdullah formed the government was a turning point at which militants took the upper hand.

Waves of panic hit the community, especially after a local newspaper published an anonymous message, allegedly from the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, asking Pandits to leave.

The Gawkadal Massacre in which the CRPF gunned down 160 Kashmiri Muslim protesters at the Gawkadal Bridge, which has come to be known as the worst massacre in the long history of the conflict in Kashmir. After this, there was a large scale exodus of the Pandits from the valley.

According to some estimates, notably by the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), of 75,343 Kashmiri Pandit families in January 1990, more than 70,000 fled between 1990 and 1992. The flight continued until 2000. The KPSS has placed the number of Kashmiri Pandits killed by militants from 1990 to 2011 at 399, the majority during 1989-90. Some 800 families have remained in the Valley through these three decades.

5.8.2 Role of Over Ground Workers (OGWs)

Over ground workers (OGWs) are people who help militants, or terrorists, with logistical support, cash, shelter, and other infrastructure with which armed groups and insurgency movements such as Hizbul Mujahedeen and Jaish-e-Muhammad in Jammu and Kashmir can operate. OGWs play a vital role in militant attacks, providing real-time information and support to the tactical elements. Over ground workers have diversified into other roles such as stone-pelting, mob-rioting, ideological support, radicalisation, and recruitment of militants.

In 2020, up until 8 June, around 135 over ground workers were arrested in Jammu and Kashmir by the Jammu and Kashmir police. While the term is used and associated extensively with the Kashmir region, the term has also been used officially in other parts of India where insurgency is still active, such as in the Naxalite–Maoist insurgency and in Meghalaya for the Garo National Liberation Army.

Reasons for the rise of OGWs

An official report of the Crime Wing of Jammu and Kashmir police has revealed that while on one hand, the number of active militants has gone down since 2017, the network of OGWs have shown a steep rise, raising another concern for the security grid. The following could be the possible reasons:

1. The comparative freedom of movement available to terrorists due to limited resource control measures, emboldens the terrorists to change their strategy by trying to mix up with the population

2. There is an adequate pool of disgruntled unemployed youth both educated and uneducated for recruitment by anti-national elements
3. The individuals booked under Public Safety Act (PSA) of J&K and who spend time in jails with hard core, terrorists provide an ideal breeding ground for potential recruits.

4. As a sense of alienation increases the support for the grey population (separatists & OGWs) increases, who in turn are able to influence the perception of people more adversely and enable disgruntled youth to be recruited

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**RECRUITMENT: SYSTEMATIC ENTRAPMENT**

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**Role Played by OGWs**

1. Previously, OGWs were primarily involved in logistics support and intelligence gathering. Of late the distinction has blurred considerably with OGW also capable of carrying out small scale strikes while retaining the capability to mix rapidly with the population.

2. OGWs also become a significant tool for strategic communication and recruitment by their handlers in J&K.

3. OGWs can constantly work towards the development of a negative sentiment in the minds of the so-called grey population or fence sitters in an insurgency. They instigate people on trivial grounds in order to demoralize and discredit the security forces.

4. They mobilise mass support for implementing their work, masses are brain washed and mobilised for terror support. OGWs provides hide out and escape routes, as they are well aware of local geography, etc.

5. They collect enough support through local elections and mobilize resource and officials to help terrorists and insurgent organisations.

**Measures to deal with them**

1. To fight this most important tool of terrorism and proxy war it is important to categorise the OGWs so that separate response strategies can be made for each one of the categories. Although operating as larger network, the OGWs in Kashmir can be broadly categorised under the following heads
   - OGWs for Logistic Support (OGWLS) to Strike teams.
   - OGWs managing Funding (OGWF).
OGWs providing Ideological Support (OGWIS).
OGWs providing Radicalisation Support (OGWRS).
OGWs for Recruitment of Terrorists (OGWR).
OGWs generating negative Perceptions and Sentiment amongst the public (OGWPS).

2. OGWLS and OGWF are easy to identify as these can be caught in the act during a counter terror operation or by intelligence agencies tracking cyber funding and physical currency as funds for terror.

3. OGWIS, OGWRS and OGWR can be grouped together for the purpose of response strategies. These workers are omnipresent in all walks of life. Merely picking them up in night raids will only alienate the society further. On the contrary, launching intelligence-based sting operations over a period of time, gathering proof of their damaging activities of recruiting, radicalising or merely pushing the youth into militancy by handing them over guns, will expose them in the eyes of the public.

4. The last category is that of OGWPS who are the fence sitters and they are just keeping the pot boiling by creating an atmosphere of fear, dejection and helplessness in the youth. An endeavour to change their mind set through Psychological and social rehabilitation as well as strategic communication could be an answer to bring them back into the mainstream.

5. Security agencies and government should control their social interactions including digital interactions, especially with local youth and political parties, to control influence.

6. It is necessary to create an academic system of universities and colleges devoid of such radical ideologies. If the influence of OGWs is reduced among academician, there are great chances of dying down of the movement in the future.

The Perception and Psycho of the society is the key to the solution of the problem and highest standards of propriety and well thought out strategic communication for the different categories of the OGWs will separate the fish from the pond.
6. Vision IAS Mains Previous Years' Questions

1. What are the developmental and institutional provisions by the government for conflict management in left-wing extremist areas? Suggest steps for capacity building towards conflict resolution to complement the same.

Approach:

After explaining the problem of Naxalism very briefly, lay out the institutional as well as the developmental measures taken by the government to counter Naxalism. Thereafter, give the capacity building steps that can be taken (both with respect to security as well as integration strategy) for conflict resolution to complement the development and institutional measures.

Answer:

Naxalism or Left Wing Extremism (LWE) continues to be the gravest of the internal security challenges facing India. According to the official estimate a total of 223 districts are affected by LWE. Statistics also reveal a perceptible increase in the incidences of violence as well as fatalities caused by Maoists in recent times. The growing severity of their tactical counter offensive campaign which includes attacks, massacres and targeted killings of security forces and high profile individuals, is primarily responsible for the rise in incidences of violence.

In order to counter the grave security threat, the government of India has been taking various institutional, developmental as well as capacity building steps.

Institutional Measures:

› A Police Modernization Scheme in areas affected by Naxal movements. Under this scheme, modernization of police equipment and tactical gear including latest communication, vehicles and infrastructure facilities is taken up and to determine police stations and outposts susceptible to Naxal attacks to be fortified.

› Due to increased use of IED by the Naxalites and the increased number of casualties, providing the forces with Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV).

› Central Para Military Forces have been deployed on a long term basis by the government to help the state governments to fight against the Naxals.

› 40% recruitment in Central Para Military Forces from areas affected by Naxalism to discourage the youth from the path to militancy

› The government, to strengthen the security network in the states, had set-up the Indian Reserve (IR) battalions. These forces along with providing additional security provide youth with employment opportunities.

› Establishment of special security forces like Greyhound and COBRA
Developmental Measures:

- Integrated Action Plan (IAP) was formulated as an additional central assistance scheme on 100% grant basis in November 2010, under which the funds were to be placed at the disposal of district level committee which will have flexibility to spend the amount for development schemes according to need, as assessed by it.

- A special scheme to address the development of 33 (expanded now) LWE affected districts.

- Saranda Action Plan: It is a rural livelihood development plan for naxal hit areas of underdeveloped regions (Saranda is in West Singhbhum District, Jharkhand) launched by the Government of India in 2011. As Development and security are integral to each other, so the main aim is to bring about rural development, in backward areas, especially tribal and adivasi areas and weed out Maoism in these areas. Similarly Sarju Area Development Plan was started in Sarju Kone area of Latehar.

- The government started the Backward Districts initiative in 2003-2004 and the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) where worst affected areas in states were to be provided with funds to tackle the problem of Naxalism. Around 250 districts have been included in the BRGF scheme to accelerate socio-economic development in these districts.

Steps for Capacity Building in security arena:

- Revising the sanctioned strength of police stations and filling the vacancies that exist. Strengthening the manpower by transferring district/state armed reserve to police stations can also be done.

- Building the basic infrastructure on a priority basis with timelines in naxal affected districts, particularly improvement of police infrastructure, intelligence and military capabilities along with the formation of specialized forces.

- Many states are adopting the capacity building program based on the reverse application of the revolutionary field tactics used by Maoists, which has been successfully used by the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh. For example, while surprise, secrecy and speed have been the driving tactics for the Maoists, the greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh have used a reversal of the same strategy that has proved to be triumphant for the state.

To prevent the spread of Naxalism, the best strategic response would be to work with civil society actors to counter the Naxal narrative and ideology. This requires a fundamental re-conceptualization of the strategy to counter Naxalism. State response must be recalibrated to privilege the use of “brain force” over “battalion force”. A consensus needs to be arrived at that can serve as a force-multiplier for the security forces.

2. While extreme inequalities are a major source of tension, the developmental deficits in the country are too great to allow developmental interventions to play any defining role in the resolution of existing conflicts within a reasonable time frame. Analyse with respect to the government’s approach in tackling left wing extremism in India.

Answer:

All the regions in which the Naxal, the Maoist and the left wing movement took hold are ones with alarming levels of poverty and inequality. Many of these inequalities have also been a result of the trajectory of the post-independence development that we have followed. These were:
a. Unequal development under five year plan: The economic development under five year plan led to the formation of the growth poles, i.e. unequal development, restricted only to some urban centers.

b. Alienation of Forest Land: In implementing government regulations on forest access, government officials resorted to harassment of the tribals. Loss of access to forest produce and land which had constituted a significant part of their income and social fabric, resulted in their extreme deprivation, poverty, bonded labor etc.

c. Policies of agrarian development: It focused on massively improving output without doing enough to check economic and social disparity.

d. Policies of Industrial development: The land acquisition policies, low compensation to the landowners, degradation of the environment by the industrial setups, all formed the part of the trajectory of the industrial development.

This trajectory of development has created discontent. The Inequality in the form of class inequality, regional inequalities, caste inequality and agrarian and economic exploitations at the hands of the landed class and money lenders manifested itself in the form of unrest against the landowners, petty bourgeoisie, the beneficiaries of this development and the state that failed to address the injustices.

Now with the growth of the left wing extremism in these regions of development deficit, the steps that are require to cure this developmental deficit are further facing major hurdles as mentioned below:

Lack of Infrastructure: The basic infrastructure that is required for the development to reach these remote sites of left wing extremism, majorly do not have transport and communication connectivity and are lack basic infrastructures like bridges, schools, hospitals etc. which bear the brunt of extremist violence.

Skilled Human Resource Deficit: The skilled human resource in the form of doctors, teachers and engineers required to bring development to these regions do not wish to tread these regions due to the threat involved in service to these areas.

Inaccessibility of government schemes in these remote regions: Absence of government machineries and parallel government running in these regions hinder state sponsored development to reach these regions.

Government’s approach in tackling left wing extremism in these regions

The government approach to this problem has been to deal with left wing Extremism as a security problem first and clear all the hurdles from developing these areas, so that the discontent fuelling the extremism can be addressed. These include measures like:

Law and Order approach

Police Modernization Scheme in areas affected by Naxal movements. Under this scheme huge sums of money have been provided to the state governments by the central government to modernize their equipment and tactical gear including latest communication, vehicles and infrastructure facility. States have also been told to determine police stations and outposts that are susceptible to Naxal attacks and have to be fortified.
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Social Integration approach

The government started the Backward Districts initiative in 2003-2004 and the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) under which 55 of the worst affected areas in 9 states were to be provided with funds to the tune of Rs. 2475 crores to tackle the problem of Naxalism.

Rehabilitative Approach

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007. The main aim of this act is to minimize the displacement of people and to promote non-displacing or least displacing alternatives.

Forest Rights Act, 2006, The Ministry of Environment and Forests has also allowed use of 1 hectare of land for non-forest purposes and conversion of kutcha roads into pukka roads.

Approach of Developing Grassroots Democracy

Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 or PESA enable Gram Sabhas to self-govern their natural resources.

These approaches as a whole with an inclusive development and not development alone can solve the problems of left wing extremism in the conflict ridden regions.

3. Although insurgency groups are present in both Kashmir and the North-east, their nature and model of sustenance are entirely different. Analyse. Also, compare the linkages between organised crime and terrorism in both these areas.

Approach:

Mention the identity based nature of conflict – tribal v/s religious in the two areas. Comparison of the relationship between organised crime and terrorism should follow from presence (in NE) and absence (in Kashmir) of parallel governments, kidnapping and extortion, percolation of government funds to terrorists, etc. should be mentioned. Role of external factors should also be mentioned.

Answer:

Insurgency is a violent rebellion against a constituted authority, where those taking part are not recognised as belligerents. The parameters to differentiate the nature of insurgencies roll back to their originating factors and the targets desired. Differences in models of sustenance can be gauged by (i) structures which support them, such as external state and non-state assistance, (ii) sympathy of locals, mostly through propaganda, and most importantly, (iii) access to sound financial resources. Both J&K and North-east India have witnessed insurgency during larger part in post-independence period; however, there are certain differences in its nature and model of sustenance.

Difference in Nature

- While conflicts in North-east have their origin in distinct tribal identities, the one in Kashmir is based on religious identity.
- Perceived alienation from the mainland has been an important factor in case of north-east, but there is no such element in Kashmir.
Conflicts in North-east range from insurgency for secession (in Nagaland) to insurgency for autonomy (Karbi-Anglong), from 'sponsored terrorism' (ULFA, NDFB) to ethnic clashes (Meities v/s Nagas) and to conflicts generated as a result of continuous inflow of migrants from across the border as well as from other states. Conflict in Kashmir, on the other hand, is instigated and sponsored from across the border, with an overt demand for independence and a tacit understanding for uniting with Pakistan.

Guerrilla tactics are an important element in case of north-east militants. In Kashmir, however, the attacks are more overt with an intention to keep alive the separatist cause by flaring up anti-India sentiments.

Difference in model of sustenance

With extremely weak governance structures in the north-eastern states (Nagaland and Manipur in particular), the insurgents mostly run parallel governments through extortion, kidnappings and keeping people under constant fear. In Kashmir, the governance structures are better established and insurgents have to regularly play victims of the state in order to win some support.

External state, i.e. Pakistan is heavily involved in sponsoring of terrorist activities in the valley directly through ISI and indirectly through jihadist terror outfits. While many groups in north-east receive support from external states, their role has been limited and the major source for finance is trafficking, smuggling and extortions.

Comparison of linkages between Organised Crime (OC) and Terrorism in J&K and NE:

In India, linkages between OC and terrorism exist both at national and transnational level.

In North east:

The organised crime network and the militants are virtually inseparable. Apart from kidnappings and extortions as criminal sources of finance, much of the government funds and food supplies are also siphoned-off due to mal-governance. Government servants are often threatened or bribed to award contracts to individuals patronised by the militants. These are clear examples of linkage between OC and terrorism.

These activities are, however, not sufficient to finance their nefarious acts. This is where transnational linkages through drugs and arms syndicates come into play. Insurgent groups mobilize funds by becoming couriers of drugs, arms and human beings. Moreh in Manipur and Chittagong hill tract on India-Bangladesh-Myanmar border are crucial transit points of the Golden Triangle. Initially the international crime syndicates (ICS) had their own network; however, with these routes being taken over by various insurgent groups in the NE, the ICS have started using these groups as couriers rather than bribing them.

In Kashmir:

There is minimal reliance on funds from extortion and other means. There are no parallel government structures and the government resources do not easily reach the terrorists, even if they may be lost due to corruption.

However, external funds compensate more than enough for lack of internal mobilisation. Funds mobilised in Pakistan and Gulf countries, mostly in name of religious or philanthropic activities reach Kashmir through Hawala (money laundering) route.
Besides, it is also believed that funds from drug trade in the Golden Crescent finance terrorist activities in Kashmir. Counterfeit currency, estimated to be Rs 300 Cr annually, mostly emerging in Pakistan is another major linkage between OC and terrorism, terrorists being the couriers and part beneficiaries.

When ethnic identity, religious fundamentalism and extra-territorial sponsorship of terror fuel violence and disorder, the challenge becomes particularly grave. Such threats to national security need to be addressed by concerted and consistent State action, backed by swift justice, competent governance and democratic legitimacy.

4. While the roots of Naga insurgency lay in issues of identity and ethnicity, over the course of time it has evolved into a complex problem with political, social and economic ramifications. Discuss.

Approach:

- Discuss the roots of Naga insurgency and its evolution into a complex problem.
- Bring out the political, social and economic ramifications of this complex problem.
- Conclude by suggesting ways to ensure long-lasting peace in the region.

Answer:

The region of Nagaland is characterized by the presence of various tribes, sub-tribes, clans with varying customs, traditions, dress, language, polity etc. Naga ethnicity struck deep chord with the various tribes even though some of its roots lay not in the feeling of commonality but in the desire to be left alone. There was also a deep distrust of the Indian state due to the unique identity and ethnicity of the Naga people that led to the demand of a separate nation after independence.

The vast heterogeneity of India was homogenized in the Naga consciousness as an exploitative, unpleasant stereotype. This was further fuelled by the influx of migrants in the region leading to heightened anxiousness of losing the unique culture and resources thereby impinging on their identity. There were strong apprehensions about the ownership of community-land and the security of land tenure. The Nagas also feared interference with their traditional methods of livelihood and customs.

This led to the Naga National Council under the leadership of A.N Phizo declaring independence which was subsequently rejected by the central government. This directly led to confrontation and conflict of armed insurrection between a group of Nagas and a counter-offensive launched by the central security forces. The government’s efforts to bring the violence to an end was partially successful with the signing of the Shillong Agreement in 1975. However, several disgruntled groups such as NSCN did not accept the agreement and therefore the area continued to be inflicted by violence.

This insurgency is further complicated by international support, inaccessibility due to hard terrain and support from local population to the insurgent militia.

The complex issue now has multi-dimensional ramifications such as-

Political

- The Naga population occupies a vast area of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Myanmar and demand creation of a Greater Nagalim. However, the adjacent states and Meitei insurgents (Manipur) are opposed to any territorial changes.
There is a lack of consensus on a political solution as there exists various groups with different demands. The negotiation with one group is not accepted by the other leading to continued conflict.

The alleged international support from Myanmar and China further complicate the politics of the region.

Social

The insurgent groups have a considerable influence among the people leading to disruptions in the daily life and society of the region.

The extortion activities and corruption abated by the insurgents disrupt the local economy and society. It gives rise to social ills like drug and alcohol consumption etc.

Tribes fighting among themselves and raiding the plains of Assam lead to violent ethnic clashes, loss of human life and forced migration.

Due to the continued confrontation, the region witnesses poor health and educational outcomes.

Economic

Despite being resource-rich, region does not attract investment from corporates due to instability and insurgency.

Also, the insurgency hampers the government initiatives for economic and infrastructural development.

The poor physical, digital and communication connectivity with the rest of the country adversely impacts the well being of the population.

Further, lawlessness provides fertile ground for illegal activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling etc.

Therefore, the government should involve all factions of the underground groups in future negotiations for peace. A lasting solution lies in giving more autonomy to the state, accelerated infrastructural development, new trade routes, and asserting pressure on militant groups.

5. Why is radicalisation seen as a significant security challenge for India? Suggest ways to tackle it.

Approach:

Briefly discuss what is radicalisation in introduction.

Discuss why radicalisation is seen as a security challenge for India?

Suggest ways in which India can tackle the problem of radicalisation.

Conclude accordingly.

Answer:

Radicalisation is a process with multiple reinforcing pathways of developing extremist beliefs, emotions, and behaviours. Whether based on religious, ethnic or political grounds, extremist ideologies glorify the supremacy of a particular group or cause, and motivate people to use
Radicalisation is seen as a significant security challenge for India due to various reasons:

- Radicalisation is the first step towards violent extremism, which in turn may lead to loss of human lives. It has the potential to tear apart the social fabric and increase the probability of a polarised society in such a diverse country as India.

- It is used by the enemy countries or extremist organisations to instigate resentment amongst the people by taking advantage of the factors like lack of economic development, mis-governance etc. In India, it is spread over many parts of the country - Jammu Kashmir, North Eastern States, Punjab etc. Moreover, radicalisation has also created problems in the South Asian region, which is India’s neighbourhood.

- Further, with the rising number of social media users in India, the threat of internet-facilitated indoctrination becomes imminent as it may lead to rapid increase in recruitment by militant agencies through social media. The Islamic State and other such organisations have indeed used this path. This along with the trend of reasonably well educated and urban youth joining militant organisations makes it a prominent security concern.

- As radicalisation is fueled by an ideology, unlike other, more physical manifestations of violence, radicalization cannot be countered by traditional kinetic measures only. Although India is taking steps like setting up de-radicalisation camps, roping in scholars of ideological or religious affiliation for counselling etc., there are some steps that the government can take to tackle the problem of radicalisation:

  - Developing a comprehensive policy framework that focuses on de-radicalisation and works in tandem with the peculiarities of each state.
  - Roping in senior citizens and family members to share their words of wisdom with vulnerable youth and monitor suspicious online activities of children and help bring them back into the mainstream.
  - Building counter-narratives on social media that would help in tackling social media propaganda originating from other countries as well as from extremist organisations. The government must launch both online and offline campaigns targeting the right audience along with an effective content-based online regulation, blocking of websites and removing extremist propaganda.
  - Training officials and staff members of the agencies working in counter-radicalisation in matters related to special aspects of different communities’ religious and cultural sensibilities and the way investigations against extremism should be conducted.
  - Undertaking efforts towards de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of the detainees charged with crimes of violent extremism.
  - Developing close cooperation with other countries in conducting counter-radicalisation programmes including integration and dissemination of information.
The problem of radicalisation has seen an uptrend. There is a need to avoid discrimination between one kind of radicalisation and another. Strengthening social resilience is an important tool in countering radicalisation in all its forms, targeting all types of people. Thus, it is important to conduct meaningful research towards development of a counter-radicalisation framework, which is both preventive and curative in nature and also rehabilitates the misguided youth of the nation.
7. UPSC Mains Previous Years' Questions

1. Article 244 of Indian Constitution relates to administration of scheduled areas and tribal areas. Analyze the impact of non-implementation of the provisions of fifth schedule on the growth of Left Wing Extremism.

2. The persisting drives of the government for development of large industries in backward areas have resulted in isolating the tribal population and the farmers who face multiple displacements. With Malkangiri and Naxalbari foci, discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) doctrine affected citizens back into mainstream of social and economic growth.

3. The north-eastern region of India has been infested with insurgency for a very long time. Analyze the major reasons for the survival of armed insurgency in this region.

4. Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend, but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government of India's approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE.

5. The banning of 'Jamaat-e–islaami’ in Jammu and Kashmir brought into focus the role of overground workers (OGWs) in assisting terrorist organizations. Examine the role played by OGWs in assisting terrorist organizations in insurgency affected areas. Discuss measures to neutralize influence of OGWs.

6. Cross-border movement of insurgents is only one of the several security challenges facing the policing of the border in North-East India. Examine the various challenges currently emanating across the India-Myanmar border. Also discuss the steps to counter the challenges.
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